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ABSTRACT
It is attempted in this thesis to analyse the 
aspirations, attitudes and activities of the rajas and 
nawabs during the second decade of the twentieth century.
It was the decade which experienced the effects of the 
Morley-Minto reforms on the one hand and the Delhi Darbar 
proclamations on the other. Within this political frame­
work the functions of these territorial magnates are 
examined.
At the outset the question whether the 'nobles’ 
formed a distinct social group which could be called a 
nobility or, as an alternative, could be identified as 
a status group, is analysed. Simultaneously, the secon­
dary question of how far their ideology was a reflection 
of.their social position is examined. The next issue 
discussed is their claim to be the 'natural leaders' of 
the province. a 'natural leader' would find it impossible 
to justify his claim without some basic links of communi­
cation with the local people. What were the socio-economic 
links which had evolved over the centuries and which made 
it possible for them to influence a large section of the 
population? That is the theme of the second chapter.
Having examined these channels of influence, it is assessed 
in the following chapter how far such links provided them 
with 'ohe basis for acting as intermediaries in public affairs 
through political associations and as eminent individuals, 
and how far their attitudes and aspirations differed from 
those of the 'nationalists' of the time. Their capacity 
to provide an alternative indigenous leadership and their
distinctive approach to political issues was put to 
the test by the framers of the 1909 reforms in the 
enlarged Executive and Legislative Councils, Their 
efforts to become an effective counterpoise to the 
’nationalists' in the Councils is the question analysed 
in the fourth chapter. Alongside formalised politics 
a series of inter-connected extra-constitutional move­
ments - Congress, Swadeshi, Terrorist, Muslim separatist - 
dominated the- contemporary Bengal scene. The thesis 
is concluded with an examination of their attitude and 
activities in relation to these movements. Having examined 
their activities from social, economic and political view­
points, it is ultimately attempted in the thesis to draw 
conclusions regarding their functions and effectiveness 
in Bengal during the decade under review.
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INTRODUCTION
It is commonly believed that the rajas and nawabs 
of India were the pampered creatures of the British.
They ignored all the traditional responsibilities that 
their titles implied. ^ ‘Unlike their predecessors of 
the pre-British era, who carried out their duties with 
pride and dignity, they spent their time indulging in 
expensive hobbies like shooting tigers, playing polo and' 
watching the performances of decorative dancing girls. 
Extreme extravagance was noted in the cases of rajas and 
nawabs who squandered away small fortunes on pleasures of 
the flesh and hedonistic entertainments* Such futile 
pursuits not only sapped their vitality but converted 
them into an unwelcome burden on the impoverished 
peasantry whose labour financed their conspicuous follies. 
The rajas’ and nawabs' anti-social behaviour was supple­
mented by their habit of sending their children abroad 
for an education which 'denationalised' them, making 
them incapable of appreciating the needs and requirements 
of the Indian public, aggravating the people's dislike 
for them even further. Moreover, they were primarily 
absentee proprietors who lived in indolence, received a 
large unearned income and squandered them away in distant 
cities. Thus they had virtually become a group of 
'denationalised', rent-receiving, burdensome, absentee 
proprietors of huge properties, thoroughly disliked by 
the people in general. All the above factors put together 
tarnished their reputation and lost them the respect and 
support of the masses, over whom they held titular sway,
1. retails of pre-British zamindars' social functions in 
Chapter II and political funs lions in Chapter III.
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making it obligatory on independent India to abolish 
the system once and for all. Such are the usual 
arguments put forward by the advocates of their abolition 
and accepted as valid by many. But their success in the 
polls in post-Independence India, despite their deprivation, 
shows the contrary.
Economically the ex-landholders no longer rank
with the richest in the country and politically they have
no special standing. Explanations for the unexpected and
positive support they received from the local inhabitants
must lie elsewhere. It would be facetious to suggest that
the accusations against their behaviour were totally
fabricated by interested parties in an attempt to belittle
them in the eyes of the public. It is more likely that
the explanation lies in the fact that, in spite of their
individual shortcomings, the institution of hereditary
'noblemen* satisfied certain human needs. At a time
when the sub-continent is involved in economic and social
*
problems of great severity, this possibility has signifi­
cance. Moreover, an examination of the activities of the 
rajas and nawabs, who were economically and socially at 
the apex of the social pyramid and proprietors of a large 
portion of rural India, would help complete the picture 
of socio-political life in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The purpose of the thesis is not to suggest 
that the group under review should be re-installed in 
their old positions but to examine their functions - . 
social, political and economic.
for convenience of study the province of Bengal 
has been selected as ohe field of research. In that province
it was possible to find tributary states with semi­
independent status, descendents of Mughal viceroys who 
once held supreme power, the biggest zamindari in 
British India, tribal rajas who traced their ancestry 
back to pre-British days, rajas and nawabs created by 
the new regime, hereditary rajas and nawabs, rajas and 
nawabs who required to be re-installed by the paramount 
power at every succession, landholders who were governed 
by the law of primogeniture, and proprietors of estates 
whose inheritance was sub-divided time and again. In 
other words a cross section of all the different types 
of rajas and nawabs that existed in the Indian Empire. 
Moreover, till 1911 it was the vice-regal seat of 
authority making it the focal point of British interests. 
Furthermore, it was the province where the foundation of 
modern India was laid in the nineteenth century. Last 
but not least it was, and is till today, the most troubled 
section, of the sub-continent.
Having focused attention on Bengal the years between 
. the Delhi Durbar (1911) and the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
(1919) appeared to be the most appropriate period for study. 
The coronation of a sovereign on Indian soil brought the 
so-called Indian noblemen to the limelight. It became - 
necessary to formalise their nebulous hierarchy in some 
such way as to give the group a definite shape. Moreover, 
at the coronation the King made a royal proclamation by 
which Bihar, Orissa, Chota-Hagpur and Assam were detached 
from the Presidency, leaving Bengal proper a reasonably 
homogenous province. The rearrangement of boundaries also 
ensured that the Indian non-official members of the Governor1
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Legislative Council would be representatives of Bengal 
only, removing the possibility of their ever having to 
face a situation in which they were in the minority 
against the combined strength of Biharis, Oriyas and 
Assamese. It was also the decade following the Morley- 
Minto reforms when much reliance was vested in the large 
landholders as a check upon discontent. With the Montagu- 
Chelmsford reforms the emphasis shifted once and for all 
from the large landholders to the nationalists.
The socio-political forces affecting the Bengali 
people during the early decades of the twentieth century 
evolved gradually over the preceding century. The nine­
teenth century could be considered the transitional period 
when Bengal shed her traditional way of life and adopted 
modern ways. In the annals of Indian history, the nine­
teenth century occupies a unique position. Modern India 
evolved out of the nineteenth century, and Bengal was the 
centre of this awakening.^*
A
Much scholarly work has been done on the socio­
political history of Bengal in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. But it is impossible to assess the 
functions, efforts and attitudes of the rajas and nawabs.
The most striking shortcoming is the relative silence 
concerning the activities of the Bengali Muslims, especially 
when we find that the Morley-Minto scheme considered them 
competent enough to act, along with the landholders, as 
a counterpoise to the nationalists. The leadership of the 
Muslims was vested in the Dacca hawab’s family and its 
associates. Moreover, one is left perplexed not only by 
the silence concerning the Muslim nawabs but also by the
1. M.S.Bose: Indian Awakening cc Bengal, p.iii
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conflicting statements made regarding the rajas and 
nawabs as a whole.
Prom the journals of the early nineteenth 
century we get a confused picture of the socio-religious 
condition of Calcutta. On the one hand we find lavish 
and exuberant sacrificial-rites, pretentious religious 
festivals and gala occasions such as important pu.jas 
and family ceremonies, The big zamindars of the time 
took the lead in such conspicuous consumption. 'It is 
said that many of them spent thousands of rupees on 
occasions such as the 'marriage' of their pets. On the 
other hand we are made aware of the fact that numerous 
big zamindars were at the very forefront of the movements 
that initiated the awakening of Bengal. Amongst the 
members of the Atmiya Sabha who regularly attended the 
meetings were Dwarkanath Tagore of Jorasanko, Prassanna 
Kumar Tagore of Puthuriagh&ta, Kalinath and Baikunthanath 
Munshi of Taki, Kailsankar Ghosal of Bhukailash, Brindaban 
Mitra, and Ananda Prosad Banerji of Telinapara. Amongst 
others it was this society of men that nudged Bengal into 
cultivating an outward outlook and pushed it into the 
modern age. Fearing that they might lead Bengal into an 
excessive process of westernization the orthodox community 
organised itself in defence of Hindu religion and practices 
under the patronage of Radhakanta Deb of Sovabazar. It must 
not be misconstrued that the orthodox opposition comprised 
reactionary elements who were opposed to social progress.
Radhakanta Deb was in favour of western education, women's 
education and medical education. He supported the Temperance 
Society. He was a benefactor of the Hindu College, a member
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of the School Book Society, and one of the Secretaries 
of the School Society, In his memorial service it was 
appropriately remarked that compared toihis contempor­
aries he was not behind "but in advance of his equals 
in age”. The intent of the opposition group was not to 
obstruct social progress but to preserve the Hindu 
religion.^
One may wonder which type of zamindar - the wastral 
or the social leader - was the norm. It does seem that a 
large number of them were active participants in the socio­
religious life of the province and helped activate the 
forces that created modern Bengal.
By the second half of the century the nationalists 
emerged as a prominent force who manifested their capa­
bilities in organised associations such as the Congress 
and the Indian Association. Their prestige was based on 
education and personal merit rather than on hereditary 
landholdings as in the case of the previous group.
Since the nationalists came to the forefront the historians 
have tended to brush aside the doings of the rajas and 
nawabs and other big zamindars as insignificant. Although 
it was acknowledged that the national Mohammadan Association 
was the only muslim organisation worth its name and that 
the British Indian Association was still serving a useful 
purpose both are summarily set aside on the ground that
they were associations of aristocrats and not in keeping
2with the aspirations of the time. The unconscious in­
sinuation apparently is that they were bodies of big 
zamindars and concentrated their efforts on safe-guarding
zamindari vested interests only.
PP* 7 ,13,34,3r
2. Ibid, pp. 173,177
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How much truth there is in the above suggestion 
requires a second look. A closer scrutiny of the 
British Indian Association reveals that the Aristocrats 
so referred to did not consist exclusively of the big 
zamindars. More accurately it was the first organised 
body of Indians known for. their "wealth, social position 
and education". Amongst the members there were "repre­
sentatives of the most important interests, whether 
territorial, commercial or professional".^ It is unlikely 
that a society comprising commercial and professional 
interests as much as territorial interests would concentrate 
solely on zamindari problems. Accepting that as a 
logical hypothesis it would appear that the senior 
zamindars of the province were not only active in socio­
religious questions but also members and leaders of 
prominent political associations of the time.
Moreover, we are aware that they were the major 
landlords in the areas under permanent settlement andA
helped collect the Government's revenue. At times indi­
viduals were created honorary magistrates and were asso­
ciated with the machinery of law enforcement. Moreover, 
they were the unofficial local executives in the work of the 
Government and the coadjutors of the official agents. In 
a rural hierarchy founded on deference, the role of these '
local landlords could be pivotal. Their own and their
2family's influence ramified far and wide.
Educational activities were one certain link bet­
ween the local people and the local zamindar. <j>he
1. B.B.Kisra: Indian middle Classes, p.344
2. Anil Deal: Emergence of Indian nationalism, pp.10,11,141
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richer landowning classes played a vital role in the 
growth of education in Bengal by diverting a portion 
of their zamindari funds to the foundation and main­
tenance of schools. The educational enthusiasm of 
Joy Kissen Kukherjee of Uttarpara was proverbial in 
the last century. It was almost a convention among 
zamindars to establish English schools on their 
zamindaris. The zamindars of Taki, Janai, Burdwan and 
Andul had gained widespread reputation for their edu­
cational enterprises. It should not be thought that 
these educational institutions were constructed for the 
benefit of their own children and relatives. The Hunter 
Commission of 1885 was unable to establish such a 
connection. Nor do the later reports establish it. On 
the contrary, Rajendralal Mitra, the noted Indologist, 
and Mahendralal Sarkar, the pioneer organiser of 
scientific studies in India, asserted that the richer 
landowning classes were unlikely to be very anxious toa
give their own children a formal education. Formal 
education was looked for as a means of livelihood and 
those who had to earn their own bread applied themselves 
to it. The rich, who had no such incentive, ignored 
the prospect.^ That part of their income which they 
spent on education was applied to spread education amongst 
the local people for whom it was of vocational impor­
tance ♦
Apart from such direct benefits, at times their 
activities also helped the local inhabitants indirectly. 
For example, at the Sanskrit tols the pandits were re­
quired to teach the pupils gratuitously and provide them
with food, clothing and lodging during their stay.
1. x rad ip S inha: .vineteenth Century Bengal, pp. ;> 6,41,4 2 .
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The pandits themselves were in turn remunerated by presents 
received during the religious festivals from the neigh­
bouring zamindars Hence we find that the system in­
directly provided sustenance for the priest-teachers who not 
only spread education and trained some young for a future 
livelihood but also supported their pupils during their 
years at the tols. It automatically follows that their 
parents and guardians derived indirect benefits as they 
were relieved from providing for the youngsters during 
that time.
By the twentieth century the existence of the Muslim 
leadership could not be ignored. The partition of Bengal 
thrust them into the limelight. The Nawab of Dacca was 
the community's most influential figure. He and his 
associates instilled a new direction into Bengal politics.
Even after the reunification of the province his place 
in Muslim politics continued to be of prime importance.
It was the policy formulated by him that remained the 
programme of a large section of the community for a con­
siderable time under the triumvirate leadership of the 
Nawab, Nawab Shamsul Huda and Nawab Oyed Nawab Ali 
Chaudhury. Their policy made it possible for the Bengali 
Muslims to avoid the danger of losing their identity and 
becoming merged with the Hindu dominated Congress movement. 
Till his death the Nawab of Dacca continued to be a counter­
poise to the rising influence of the nationalist leaders, 
continued to perform the task of unofficial advisor 
on muslirn problems for the Government, and continued to
exert his influence effectively to keep the new element
2
of angry young Muslims within reasonable bounds.
1. Ibid, pp. 46,37.
2. J.H.Broomfield, p. 30,51.
After the Nawab's demise the Bengal Muslims 
came very close to losing their exclusiveness when the 
nationalist leadership compromised and joined hands with 
the Indian National Congress in 1916. Fortunately for 
them one man stood adamantly against that tendency 
which could have cost the community all the advantages 
it had gained in the last ten years. After two years 
of experiment the Bengal Muslims began looking for a 
leader who would not compromise, who could put forward 
communalism before all else in the battle about to be 
fought over Muslim legislative representation. The man 
who supplied the need was Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury
Unfortunately, this picture of the activities of 
the nawabs in early twentieth century Muslim politics 
becomes confused when it is extended to the provincial 
level. At this point the rajas and nawabs as a body 
become bracketted with the bhadralok status group. The 
bhadralok elite is readily identifiable by their .rigidly 
maintained distinction between bhadra and abhadra. The 
bhadralok abstained from all manual labour and looked 
with condescension on all manual occupations. To avoid 
the possibility of having to perform abhadra tasks English 
education was utilised to find bhadra vocations. Education 
itself became the hallmark of bhadralok status. The 
ideal was generally accepted. The school became the one 
gate.to the society of the bhadralok. But we are already 
aware that this was not so in the case of the richer land­
owning classes. Just as the bhadralok despised manual
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occupations, so the big zamindars despised any service 
which was a means of livelihood.
Moreover, a glance at the legislative politics 
of the time suggests that their attitude and efforts 
were distinct from those of the bhadralok elite led by 
Surendranath Banerjea. Broomfield states that the 
Maharaja of Burdwan was the leader of the ’great Zamindars' 
implying that they did not follow the lead of Banerjea. 
They aid not comply with the boycott call during the 
1909 elections and opposed and defeated the Banerjea group 
in the 1912 elections. The Maharaja of Nashipur was 
elected to the Viceroy's Legislative Council not by the 
Indian non-officials but because of the backing of the 
European members and the large landholders, who differed 
from the bhadralok elite in their political approach.^* 
Hence they should not be biacketted with them but should 
be treated as a separate group. Although they may have 
been superseded by the bhadralok elite in the political 
field, the fact that emerges from the writings on 
twentieth century Bengal is that the rajas and nawabs 
were just as active on this plane as their predecessors 
in the nineteenth century.
The rajas and nawabs of pre-independent Bengal 
were in no way indolent creatures of the British, forever 
seeped in hedonistic pleasures. From various sources 
it is possible to gain some slight impression of what 
functions the institution of hereditary "noblemen" per­
formed in Bengal society, Pradip Sinha writes, "Studies 
in the social history of Bengal in the 19th. century have
!• Ibid, pp. 6,8,48,59
a general tendency to emphasise cultural, educational 
and religious movements,and social legislation. An 
excessive emphasis on urban phenomena in such studies 
results in the almost total exclusion of rural society 
from the picture."^ With slight variations the same 
tendency is noticeable in- historical writings about the 
early twentieth century. Yet it is a well known fact 
that Bengal, like any other province of India, is pre­
dominantly rural. A large section of that rural environ 
was physically owned by the rajas and the nawabs. Even 
if one were to accept the supposition that they were 
primarily absentee proprietors the fact that possession 
was in their hands would suggest that their fundamental 
functions, whether direct or indirect, lay beyond the 
limits of the metropolis of Calcutta. Such being the case the 
rajas and nawabs have been by-passed as practically non­
existent .
To provide an answer to the question whether the 
institution of hereditary "noblemen" served any signifi­
cant function in pre-independent Bengal three different 
elements have been considered - social, political and 
economic. Although the period chosen is from 1911 to 
1919, it is impossible to define this institution without 
going as far back as the period of Kughal decline, and 
tracing their gradual development to the twentieth 
century. Similarly it is necessary to examine the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century to assess the relation­
ship between the political associations dominated by the 
"noblemen" and the emerging nationalist leaders respec­
tively. To understand their attitude towards the Indian
1. P.Siiiha: on. cit. . o.g.
National Congress and the Muslims’ political awakening 
in Bengal it is essential to look into their reaction to 
the terrorist and swadeshi movements so closely interwoven 
with the former and their activities in the defunct 
province of Eastern Bengal and Assam which gave an 
impetus to the latter. This forces one to retreat at 
least to the partition. Despite the necessity to go 
beyond our set limits T;he nucleus remains the eight years 
under review. The overstepping is only carried out to 
clarify their activities and attitudes during the time 
in question. Moreover, as the rural community changes 
at a much slower pace than the urban society.it is not 
wrong to maintain that what transpired a few decades 
before or after was not fundamentally different from 
what transpired in the second decade of the century.
To examine its functions it is necessary at the 
very outset to define the group under review. Previous 
works use the terms nobles and notables, aristocrats, 
large landholders and even bhadralok interchangeably in 
an indiscriminate manner. It is impossible to differen­
tiate the rajas and nawabs from the other personalities 
as they have been either ignored as nonentities or 
bracketted together with others in an arbitrary fashion. 
Doubtless the reason for such a practice can once more 
be traced to the fact that the focal point of most previous 
works has primarily been the metropolis of Calcutta where 
the differences tended to submerge below the political 
and commercial life of the city. In the Legislative 
Council the Raja of Kakina, the representative of the 
Rajshahi Division District and Local Boards, and Ambica
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Charan Kajumdar, elected by the Dacca Municipalities, 
would doubtless meet on an equal footing. Similarly 
the Raja of Azimganj, the proprietor of the firm Mool 
Chand Hurrack Chand, and Sir R.N. Hitter, the owner of 
Burn and Company, would be involved in similar activities.
But neither Ambica Charan Majumdar nor Sir R.N. Hitter 
would be received at Kakina or Azimgunj by the respective 
rajas in the same fashion, steeped in traditional customs, 
as they would receive one another. The reason for the 
difference of treatment would not be found in their 
political or commercial interests, nor in the fact that 
they were influenced by western ideas, nor that they 
belonged to the Calcutta aristocracy, but in the fact 
that the two rajas were bound together by the feeling 
of being fellow noblemen of the realm. The thesis opens 
with the examination of the historical development of the 
group and their behavioural patterns, privileges, 
prerogatives, traditional customs, etc., which differentiated 
them from the rest of the community and created a-sense 
of belonging to an exclusive status group of their own.
Their activities and attitudes would undoubtedly be 
greatly coloured by that fact. Much would be done because 
it would be considered correct decorum by fellow "nobles", 
or because their prestige as "noblemen" hung on it, or 
because of their inability to break away from the pattern 
set by their forebears. Only having understood their life 
style is it possible to assess their social functions in 
the province and their economic links with the people.
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It is often asserted that the rajas and the nawabs 
had no significant social and economic functions. On 
the contrary they had lost touch with the people because 
of their pretentious arrogance and their only apparent 
economic task was to extort as much as they could from 
the helpless peasants cultivating on their lands.^ Yet 
we find that not only did they themselves claim that they 
were the ’’natural leaders" of the society but that a 
large section of the Government officials actually 
acknowledged them as such. The question that arises is 
whether there was any truth in their claim to leadership, 
or was it as difficult to substantiate as the medieval 
monarchs1 claim to a divine right to rule. Unlike the 
medieval sovereigns, the "noble^" claim could not be 
based on political superiority as they had been divested 
of all political authority. At the same time their claim 
could not be founded on the fact that they were the 
charismatic leaders. The former was vested in the British 
themselves and the latter in the nationalist leaders.
The only possible basis for such a claim was that they 
received traditional deference from the local people.
Bven if the individual raja or nawab was insignificant, as 
long as custom allowed him to remain remote, preventing 
his personal capacity from being tested, he could maintain 
traditional authority and generate depersonalised charismatic 
influence over the inhabitants.
Sociologists maintain that depersonalised charisma
does not last for very long unless the willingness to
1. During the few years spent on research for this thesis 
the author did not come across a single scholar who 
maintained otherwise.
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render services on the part of the followers is 
preserved. That can only be done by providing positive 
benefits to the followers which would create a sense of 
deference for the traditional patriarch even if the 
person in question was hardly ever seen. Pradip Sinha 
points out one such benefit by elucidating their 
activities in the educational field. Starting from that 
point the thesis continues with the examination of the 
'’nobles'" economic connections with the smaller zamindars 
and the under tenure-holders. This is followed by an 
examination of their social activities: in religious 
life, in caste groups, in relief work during distress 
caused by natural calamities, in attempts to popularise 
the agricultural and cottage craft products of their 
estates, in contributions towards the civic development 
of the mufassil, in medical facilities for the local 
people, in the commercial life of the province, and in 
their patronage of intellectual societies and sporting 
associations. Only after an analysis of their economic 
and- social functions can the validity of their claim to 
natural leadership be examined.
Kere social leadership would not have induced the 
political authorities to rely on the rajas and nawabs for 
aid and advice in politics. Actual interest and competency 
in public affairs must have been essential qualifications. 
Since the mutiny the type of politics practised was con­
sultation with political associations and important 
individuals^before the enactment of any important legislation, 
by the nxecutuve authority. This system was at its
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height during the early decades of the century.
Twentieth century history has been virtually limited 
to the activities of the Administration on the one 
hand and the Congress cum Indian Association and the 
All India I-iuslim League on the other. The fact that 
there were other associations in Bengal which were 
considered as important by the political authorities 
has been overlooked on the ground that they were 
dominated by aristocratic interests which doubtless 
went counter to patriotic spirit. Patriotism has been 
defined within the limited confines of the sub-con­
tinent. The question why Bengal's patriotic spirit 
should be limited to India with Delhi as the centre 
rather than cover a wider field with London as the 
pivot can only be answered by political scientists and 
sociologists. The thesis does not attempt to examine 
that question. The "nobles" accepted the latter 
definition as true patriotism. They maintained that 
Bengal would benefit more if she strove to become an 
equal unit within the Empire than if she remained a 
province within India alone. Then the political activities 
of the rajas and nawabs are analysed.
Because of the preconceived notion that patriotism 
must necessarily be confined within the limited boundaries 
of India, historians have tended to ignore the activities 
during the twentieth century of those other political 
associations. It seems to be assumed that if they were 
loyal to the imperial concept they could not be patriotic 
tow-ards Bengal. The imperial concept implies subjugation
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or at least subordination to the imperial power.
Whether the "nobles" actually strove to keep Bengal 
in subjugation or not has not been examined. Further 
questions for investigation are how active were their 
societies, how much could they influence the Government 
and the people, and on what type-of issues did the 
Government rely on their judgement during the heyday of 
consultative politics. Furthermore, their individual 
eminence and dominance over political associations 
led to a number of rajas and nawabs being appointed as 
representatives in various public commissions. Whether 
they played any effective role in this capacity has been 
overlooked. This thesis contains an examination of 
their activities in political associations and public 
commissions as intermediaries in public affairs. It must 
also be remembered that one of the major factors that led 
to the i'iontagu-Chelmsford reforms was the persistent 
claim of the nationalist leaders that India should be 
rewarded for its participation in the War. What has been 
left unexplained is the contribution of the rajas and 
nawabs to the war effort which helped the nationalists 
substantiate their demands.
Closely linked with their interests in public 
affairs were their activities within the Governor’s 
Executive and Legislative Councils. Broomfield points 
out that in the Council chamber there were fundamentally 
two parties: the officials and Europeans on the one hand
and the Indian non-officials led by Surendranath Banerjea 
on the other. Yet he also states that the landholders
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defied the boycott call of Surendranath Banerjea and 
his associates'during the 1909 elections. Moreover 
they opposed and defeated Curendranath Banerjea1s 
group in the 1912 elections. If that is so, it is not 
feasible that the large landholders would also support 
Surendranath Banerjea's programme of continuous 
opposition by falling into line with the other Indian 
non-officials. At least the rajas and nawabs would 
doubtless work on their own. From that hypothesis we 
find that there were 24 officials and Europeans, 18 
Indian non-officials and 9 rajas and nawabs in the 1913 
Council and 22 officials and Europeans, 21 Indian non­
officials and 7 rajas and nawabs in the 1917 Council.
This suggests, therefore, that the rajas and nawabs 
were numerically in a position which would enable them 
to become the decisive factor if they consolidated 
themselves into a power block. An examination is made 
of their approach to and treatment of issues discussed 
within the chamber and whether they managed to hold the 
balance between the opposing forces by introducing 
conservatism and sobriety in the debates as they had been 
expected to do by the framers of the Morley-Minto scheme.
The thesis concludes with an examination of the rajas' 
and the nawabs1 attitudes towards, and relationships 
with the Congress, the swadeshi, the terrorist, and the 
Muslim separatist movements. The two primary questions 
the final chapter deals with are whether their effort to 
contain the spread of terrorist activities and forestall 
the swadeshi movement from turning into a programme of
boycott and picketing helped Eastern India avoid 
turning into a bloody battlefield, and whether the effort 
of the nawabs helped the Bengali Muslims to retain 
their identity which came so close to being lost by 
the compromising attitude of the Muslim nationalist 
leaders. ;
A final question is whether the nobles ’.efforts 
had any importance in the socio-political life of Bengal 
during the pre-Independence era, and how far their 
presence acted as safety valves for the tribal population 
as a whole.
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CHAPTER I 
THE NOBLES OF BENGAL
In twentieth century British Bengal certain
landholding titled notables were addressed as noblemen or
nobles by the British Administration,^ the existing English 
2
language press, and the translators of Indian language
newspapers in their reports forwarded to the India Office 
•3
in London, The same terms were habitually used in the 
various Government gazetteers of the different districts 
of Bengali Before proceeding to analyse the questions as 
to who were these so-called noblemen and what was their 
position in Bengal society, it is advisable to consider 
whether it is analytically justifiable to call them a 
nobility, or whether the term was a mere courtesy designation.
Generally speaking kingdoms known to history have
been governed in two ways: either by a king and his servants,
who as ministers by his grace and permission, assisted in
governing the realm; or by a king and by barons who held
their position not so much by favour of the ruler as by
antiquity of blood and by virtue of their local power and 
5
influence. On the eve of the British hegemony, Bengal,
having become a virtually independent kingdom, manifested
both these aspects. The political machinery comprised the
senior hereditary administrators, official and
baronial, subordinate to and linked by
the paramount authority in the province. They
1. Warrant in precedence at Governor's darbars, sanads 
official correspondence, public speeches, etc.
2. The Englishman, The Statesman. The Bengalee .Hindoo Patriot.
3. Nat. h.P.: 1911-1916
4. List. Gazatteers: Bengal, Eastern Eengal, Bihar & Orissa
5. N. riachiavelli: The Prince
had the hereditary privilege of maintaining law and order, 
dispensing justice and, in many cases, creating new laws. 
Thus they individually embodied the functions of the State - 
executive, legislative and judicial - as defined by 
political scientists, within their own territories. Legal 
authority and hereditary succession are the two most import­
ant facets of a true nobility. Though the hereditary 
semblance of this nobility was retained after the trans­
ference of paramountcy, its members were systematically 
deprived by the British of their basic functions as the 
local source of all political power. It is well known 
that during the early twentieth century the legal 
authority of these descendants of Alivardi Khan's political 
class who survived the ravages of time was no greater than 
that of any other owner of agricultural estates; collecting 
rents from tenants and providing revenue to the Government. 
Hence, under no circumstances could they be designated as a 
true nobility in the sense in which it existed in Bangal 
before British domination.
a
With the establishment of British rule many of the 
institutions of British India were inevitably modelled or 
remoulded after parallel existing institutions in England. 
Such being the case it was possible that the new rulers 
may have replaced the old pattern of nobility in Bengal by 
the English model. To examine the question as to whether 
it was so or not in the case of the Bengal nobles, it is 
necessary to look into the composition of the British 
nobility and compare it with the indigenous group. The 
accepted custom in Great Britain was, and is until today, 
the restriction of the word noblemen to members of the 
peerage, and those who by courtesy bore titles in virtue
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of their connection with noble families. Title holders 
in Britain were divided into two layers: the nobiles 
ma.iores and nobiles minores. It was the former group that 
was ascribed as noblemen by the British. It customarily 
consisted of all peers from a baron upwards and inclusive; 
in short those with seats, in the House of lords, the here­
ditary counsellors of the sovereign.^- Such was never the 
case in British Bengal. The British had carried out no 
major reshuffle to convert the character of the Bengal 
nobility to resemble that of the British peerage. Thus the 
term could not be applied in the British sense for any 
parallel body of men there.
The above negations immediately bring to mind the 
question in what sense, in that case, could the term 
be used with reference to Bengal. To come to a conclusion 
it is necessary at this stage to trace the evolution of the 
zamindari class and study the system by which Indian titles 
were conferred and recognised by the British, and see if
a
they could be classified accordingly into categories in the 
manner of the British peerage.
The British, while in the process of becoming an 
Indian power, encountered a sub-continental empire of a 
shadowy emperor in many ways similar to the titular sover­
eign of Britain. But, unlike Britain, which had a regulated 
nobility with specific privileges and prerogatives in 
keeping with hierarchical seniority, the Indian emperor 
presided over a nebulous nobility with no systematic hier­
archy. With the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 the Mughal Empire 
had rapidly fragmented into numerous virtually independent
1. Debrette, p. cxxxi.
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princedoms and vice-regalities, paying token fealty to the 
Timurid throne at Delhi, but functioning independent of any 
effective central control. Thus, although the Nawab Nazims 
of Bengal technically derived their viceregal powers from the 
reigning Mughal, for all practical purposes they were the 
defacto kings of the province. Despite the fact that the 
Mughal emperor continued to;be considered "the sole 
fountainhead of honour11, and "every outward mark of respect, 
every profession of allegiance, continued to be paid to the 
person who filled the throne of the house of Tiinour",^ the 
Emperor had become administratively insignificant.
All through the Mughal period the Nawab Nazim's 
authority in Bengal had rested on the strength of the 
nizamat arms and his personal capacity to rally the indig­
enous forces. These forces comprised the local chiefs having 
personal sway over the population within the territories in 
their control. At a time when the central authority was 
still unimpaired, the nizamat nobility consisted of the 
senior officials of the provincial administration and the 
various chiefs mentioned above.
These local chiefs had come into existence in various 
ways. Some, like the Rajas of Nadia, could trace their 
ancestry back to the days prior to the Muslim conquest of 
Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khilji. The embryo of the Nadia estates 
was granted by the Hindu king*j4disur. Gaining mastery over 
large territories in a single generation, the head of the 
family casually adopted the title of Raja, and after eleven 
generations his descendent was confirmed in the raj and had 
the title officially recognised by the ruling Emperor in 
consideration of an annual tribute. In acknowledgement of
1. J. Malcolm : The Life of Robert. Lord Clive. Vol.I.
pp.4u2,403.
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this recognition the Nadia family forwarded a nazar of 1,000
head of cattle, a mass of gold equal to the Raja's own weight,
and other valuable gifts.^
Other families with claim to authority as local chiefs
rose to prominence as independent chieftains without the
blessings of the paramount power and were brought into
Bengal1s sphere of influence by the force of arms during
the earlier period of Muslim hegemony. Such were the cases
2
of the Rajas of Oooch Behar and Tripura. Despite the con­
quests, their position continued to remain that of vassal 
princes. They were required to pay tribute and rally round 
the imperial banner during times of crisis. For all other 
purposes they remained independent to do as they pleased.
With the collapse of the Delhi Sultanate followed by 
the defeat of the King of Bengal by Akbar, central control 
over vast areas of the province was virtually lost. The 
province fragmented into numerous principalities, under 
individual chiefs known as bhuiyas. Like the Susang 
family, most of them set themselves up as masterless rajas 
in their different corners of the province. After a hard 
and long campaign the Mughals brought the province back into 
the imperial fold. In the process many of the bhuiyas were 
destroyed, while others were forced to acknowledge imperial
4
vassalage.
In time the number of local chiefs in Bengal increased 
considerably with the addition of even more new elements
1. B.D.G. : Nadia, pp. 149,153, 155.
2. A. Karim : Murshid Quli Khan & His Times, p.78.
3. 'Genealogy of Susang Raj Family1, B.C. Sinha :
Changing Times, p. 6.
4. A. C. Roy : History of Bengal, pp. 54,55,107.
34
into their ranks. With the extension of Mughal supremacy
the nizamat administration, patterned in accord with the
imperial system, acquired a military basis. All officials
were members of the armed forces, and were allotted ranks
in accordance with the mansabdari system introduced by Akbar.
According to Athar Ali during the reign of Aurangzeb, the
mansabdars of the rank of 1,000 zat and above, were considered
noblemen. In the province the Nawab Nazim himself was the most
senior mansabdar with inferior mansabdars under his charge.
A number of them were appointed as revenue collectors or
jagirdars of large territories. It was an indirect method
of paying the officers their salary while, simultaneously,
maintaining Mughal authority in the area. Jagirs thus
assigned in lieu of salary were known as .1 agir-i-tankwan. ^
Frequently the office became hereditary and the supervisory
capacity was confined to a single family. The d‘ag*irdars
could be officials sent to Bengal from outside, or local
notables whose families had risen to prominence through
their own diligence. One such local family was that of
the Burdwan rajas who rose from being the kotwals of
Rekabi Bazar to chaudhuris before being appointed jagirdars
0f Burdwan. A few more generations passed before the family
2
acquired the title of raja.
It must be kept in mind that the .jagirdars so appointed
were officials and not chiefs. The latter were the zamindars 
or proprietors of their own territories unlike the .jagirdars 
who were administrators of royal estates. Though in practice 
the authority of the two were the same, their difference
1. M. Athar Ali : Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, pp.2,75.
2. Table of Succession at College of Heralds, London.
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could be traced in their respective proprietorships. The
sanads appointing the jagirdars quite clearly stated that
they were to superintend the portions of the country committed
to their charge. The hereditary privilege was for the office
of local administrator and not the ownership of the property .
which continued to belong to the sovereign. With the decline
of the Mughals, leading to the loosening of central control
a number of these jagirdars gained firm footholds in the
territories in their charge until their rendering of accounts
became almost nominal.^ In time, however, for all practical
purposes, they too acquired characteristics of local chiefs
with full proprietory rights over the land.
The change of status was the result of the shift in
the forces of political power from the centre to the province.
It was accompanied by a shift in the balance of power within
the province itself, as the Nawab Nazim could no longer rely
on Delhi's support and was forced to rely on local help even
more than he had previously. Thus the jagirdars came to
acquire baronial prestige instead of being subordinate officials,
2
as had been the case before.
Another category of local chiefs took shape during 
the last stages of Mughal rule in Bengal. When Mir Jafer 
became the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, he signalised his rule 
by making a new settlement of the province - dividing it 
into units called chaklas. The principal Hindu subjects, 
like the Dinajpur family, were appointed chakladars. and were 
made responsible for collecting revenue. The most important
1. Radhabinod Pal : History of Law of Primogeniture,
pp. 339,340.
2. P.B. Calkins : 'Ruling Group in Bengal', J. A . 3 .
Aug. 1970 p.803.
of these chakladars adopted the title of raja in due course.^
As the nizamat control declined, the powers of the local
chiefs increased until they in their turn became the absolute
rulers in their localities. It was the conglomeration of
these different types of local chiefs that the British
pioneers encountered.
Most of the local chiefs had high-sounding titles,
either conferred or recognised by the Mughals, suffixed to
their names. But the conferring of Indian titles followed
no regulated system in accord with any graduated model of
precedence. It was possible for a raja to be raised to
2
Maharajadhiraj Bahadur in a single stride. Moreover, the
question of particular titles being specifically allotted for
Hindus, while others were specially reserved for Muslims,
was not yet defined, and it was possible to come across a
Hindu Khan side by side with a Muslim Raja. Generally
speaking, the nawabs were of Mughal descent, while the
4
rajas were of non-Mughal and Indian origin. But the
A
general rule did not always apply. It was even possible 
to encounter an Englishman who had been granted the title 
of Nawab.
With the transfer of virtual paramountcy in Bengal 
to the East India Company, the right of granting titles 
and recognising the title holders of the nizamat became
1• E.B.D.G.: Dinajpur, pp. 22-24.
2. B.D.G. : Burdwan, pp. 26-31.
3. Hindu Khan of Narajole, and Muslim Raja of Birbhum.
4. A. M. Khan : Transition in Bengal, p. 11.
5. e.g. lord Clive = Nawab Sabut Jung Bahadur. •
the joint prerogative of the British along with the Mughal 
authorities. Confusion continued to prevail. Titles were 
conferred without much respect to method. No college of herald 
was created to systematize precedence or to set a pattern for 
granting titles in the future. Even a mere act of humanit­
arian charity to a British officer could be the primary 
cause for being raised to a rajaship.^ But to secure the
blessings of the British in reality, and the Mughals as
2
a necessary formality, became the accepted practice. Up to 
1775, however, it was assumed that the Nawab Nazim was, at 
least in name, the focus of power in Bengal. The question 
of his position came to prominent focu when two cases were 
brought before the Supreme Court in that year. As the vakil 
of the Nawab Nazim was implicated, a memorial was forwarded 
to the Governor General claiming immunity from the Court's 
jurisdiction, in accord with the privileges granted to all 
foreign powers. Y/arren Hastings declined to acknowledge 
the Nawab Nazim as a sovereign prince. The question was 
tested in the law courts, which formally declared that the 
status of the Nawab Nazim was not equivalent to that of the 
sovereigns of Europe. Yet, presumably because the British 
were still in the process of consolidation, the Nawab's naib
continued to retain the formal semblance of power and issued
titles, employments, khilats, horses, and jewels in the 
Nawab Nazim's name. The deception was so successful that 
it was possible to find people such as the Raja of Morang
1. 'Kassimbazar Raj', G.R. no.UXIII, 1875, pp. 90-94.
2. Maharaja Bahadur loknath of Kassimbazar's title was 
granted by Nawab Nazim on the recommendation of Warren 
Hastings in 1785; Tej Chand of Burdwan was invested 
Maharajadhiraj Bahadur by Bhah Alam and confirmed by 
the British in 1791.
3. Z. Ahmad : 'Decline & Fall of Nawabs of Bengal’,
A.3.P.J., 1966, pp. 97-106.
applying to the Nawab Nazim for assistance against their
enemies, and others such as Jawahir Singh applying to the
Nawab Naib for permission while seeking friendship with
the British at Calcutta. The deception benefitted the
British at a time when they were still establishing their
supremacy, as they could claim that many of their acts
were carried out on behalf .of, or under the instruction of,
the Nawab Nazim. ^
While Indian policy remained in the control of a
commercial company, the question of precedence lacked
importance. The emphasis was on the systematisation of
revenue collection and land tenure. In the process
matters became even more confused than before. The
new Administration misunderstood the legal rights and
functions of the .jagirdars, chakladars, etc., and
equated them with the vassal chiefs. Doubtless the
vassal princedoms of the preceding era could be equated
with the hereditary nobility of Europe9 But the majority
that the infant British colony encountered were the
imperial officers of the previous regime. They were
even told so by the local experts. The Rai Rayan and
the Kanungos, replying to a questionaire in 1773, quite
clearly stated that, after the death of a zamindar, the
zamindari devolves to his son, but ’’the country belongs
to the King, who may indeed give it to whom he pleases”.
They further emphasised that if the heir failed or neglected
to secure a sanad from the King "the Mutsuddies and
other officers of the Sircar will not acknowledge him as
Zamindar...”. But there were others who opined otherwise.
The pandits replied that upon the death of a zamindar
"the ground belongs to his son, as also his other effects. 
Whether or not the King’s sunnud is necessary to put him.
1. A.11. Khan : ’Transition in Bengal’, pp. 137,133.
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in possession is. not written in the S h a s t e r " O n e  can
surmise that the former were referring to the jagirdars ,
chakladars, etc., and the latter to the vassal chiefs.
As "both groups were generally addressed as zamindars, the
confusion is understandable. The British, being conditioned
to a landowning nobility, were presumably unable to see
the subtle difference and declared all of them as proprietors
of the areas in their keeping by the Permanent Settlement,
officially associating large estates with superior titles.
Its side effect was the decline in importance of the
military and administrative nobilities. Thus came into
being the foundation on which the group, addressed in the
future as the landed nobles of Bengal, developed.
It was soon obvious to the large landholders that,
as far as they were concerned, the Permanent Settlement
was more of a curse than a boon. Years of ineffective
superior control had induced them to cultivate negligent
habits and they were often unable to meet the revenue demands
of the new government, which settled the matter by - auctioning
large sections of their properties to the highest bidders.
Strict administration led to most old estates being reduced
to smaller units. The people who bought them were men of active
business habits who had risen in life from small beginnings
and accumulated wealth by commercial enterprise. Such men
were anxious to exchange their wealth for the prestige
2
arising from the possession of land. The auctions 
provided them with the opportunity. Many from amongst 
the new landholders were in time granted titles associated
1. P. Francis to P. Mitchell, Memorandum on Rights of
Zemindars, 1776., pp. 12,13,16.
2. ’Rajas of Rajshahi1, G.R. no.CXI. 1875, p.18.
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with nobles of the previous regimes. It was not long before 
the descendants of the nobles of old and the new grantees 
were bracketted together as one body.
In 1917, Maharaja Tagore attempted to classify these 
zamindar noblemen into different compartments and analyse 
their hierarchical status. He stated that the first class 
represented the old Hindu and Muslim rajas of the country, 
previous to the Mughal conquest in 1576, or persons who claimed 
the status. The second class were rajas or great land­
holders dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
and some of whom were, like the first class, de facto rulers 
in their own territories, subject to a tribute or land tax 
to the representative of the emperor. The third and most 
numerous class were persons whose families had held the 
office of collecting revenue during a few generations. The 
zamindars of the first and second classes held princely 
darbars, maintained their own bodies of armed followers, 
dispensed justice in their territories and handed down 
their positions from father to son.^ Maharaja Tagore
could have added that their personal powers were such
2that they were able to war with each other, make war
3 4against the Nawab Nazim, and even defy the British. But,
despite the fact that the larger 2amindars could be
classified to some extent, there was still no way of
distinguishing an ordinary zamindar from a nobleman nor
the lesser titles from the noble titles during the Company
era.
1. The Englishman : 22 Nov. 1917, p.4.
2. B . 1).G. : Nadia, pp. 156-157.
5• Ibid. : Birbhum, p .13 *
4. b.N. Das Gupta : 'Revolt of Tilok Chand',
U . P . H . S. J. Nov. 1534, pp.34-51•
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The Act of 1858 formally brought India directly 
under the Crown. With the formal re-creation of an
Indian sovereign* an interest in the sovereign's nobility 
in India, or rather what came closest in resemblance to 
the British nobility, began to take root. Periodical 
darbars and assemblies summoned by the Governor General 
and the Governors, heightened the interest further. More­
over, the conferment of titles was transformed into a care­
fully directed process for strengthening the foundation 
of the British Empire in India. Indians were rewarded
with honours with the conscious aim of increasing the
2
number of loyal supporters of the British Crown.
The Calcutta Review of 1872 and 1875 published a
number of articles on the "territorial aristocracy" of
Bengal. The author claimed that he planned to deal with
the territorial and genealogical history of "noblemen"
and "gentlemen" of the province. With the Jubilee Darbar
of Victoria the interest grew. In 1879, loke Nath Ghose
A Aattempted to compile biographies of the Indian nobles.
By the last decade of the nineteenth century the first 
official attempt to regularise the classification of the 
noblemen in India was carried out. Sir Roper Xethbridge 
attempted, in 1893, to list Indian "nobles" and "gentlemen" 
in the manner of the British peerage. It was not an easy 
project. The editor confesses to the extreme difficulties
1. Victoria was declared Queen Empress of India in 1877.
2. V.C.P. Chaudhury : ‘Titles & 7/ye/r Implications',
B.R.S.J.t 1959. p*435.
3* 'Burdwan Raj 1, C.R. no.CVIII, 1572. p.171.
4. Chiefs. Ra.ias cb Zamindars pp. i-vi.
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he encountered in the monumental task he had undertaken. 
Ultimately he was faced by the impossibility of clear identi­
fication, and compiled the list in an alphabetical order 
rather than by seniority. In conclusion, he recommended 
the creation of an Indian College of Arms or, at least, 
the keeping of systematic records of the Indian nobility 
in the Foreign Office. 1
Sir Roper's analysis of Indian titles led him to 
the conclusion that they were created either by grant 
from the Government, or by descent, or by well established 
usage. "The hereditary Maharajas, Rajas and Nawabs of 
British India occupied a ‘position very similar to that of 
the British Peerage of England," he wrote, "while the 
holders of lower titles may be compared with English Knight 
Bachelors, and the Knights and Companions of the Military 
Orders." Some Indian titles were personal, and remained 
extant during the lifetime of the recipient, while others 
had been officially recognised as hereditary by the Paramount 
Power. The point was supplemented by the remark that no 
title below that of the Raja or Nawab was ever declared here­
ditary. He ranked only the titles that could be declared 
hereditary as noble titles. Thus, by the turn of the 
century, the Bengal nobility was officially recognised 
as comprising the people with the title of Raja, Raja Bahadur, 
Maharaja, Maharaja Bahadur, Maharajadhiraj Bahadur for Hindus, 
and Nawab and Nawab Bahadur for Muslims. Any person with a 
lesser title was listed in the official list as "title holder" 
as opposed to "nobleman" for the former. Moreover, particular 
titles for specific religious communities were demarcated.
1. Golden Book., pp.VIII,X,XI,XII.
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Thus, for the first time, the nebulous group'"; of title 
holders had been divided into categories similar to those 
termed as the nobilis ma.lores and nobilis minores in England, 
giving them a definite identity. But, on the issue as to 
who should be recognised as such, and under what circum­
stances, was still left undecided.
The decision to hold the Coronation Darbar at Delhi 
created an urgent necessity to re-examine the principle 
on which Indian titles were bestowed and define it more 
precisely.^ The King-Emperor himself was to be present and was 
to grant honours personally. It was essential to safeguard 
against any mistake which could arouse criticism, calling for 
an apology, during such an important occasion. Moreover, the
need was felt, according to Walter Lawrence, to separate
2
the "territorial nobles" from the "bazar rajas" It was 
decided to ascertain the views of the leading Indian title 
holders of senior rank. The local Governments were instructed 
to nominate their representatives to discuss the matter.
The Maharaja of Burdwan was selected by the Bengal ‘Govern­
ment to represent the province.
The Title Committee thus created recommended that 
the titles: kumar, maharaj kumar, rai., rao, khan, diwan, 
sardar, thakur, sardar sahib, and nawabzada should no 
longer be granted by the Government as they were family 
titles. The titles were to be recognised by the Authorities
1. A similar attempt was made during Lytton's darbar. The 
Committee suggested"an extension of the honours of the 
Indian Empire, the creation of a 'libro d'oro1 to en-hance 
existing titles and prevent unauthorised assumptions, the 
conferment of rank in the British Army on certain 
princes....". But nothing was done to define precisely 
the different prerogatives in keeping with hierarchical 
ranking. —  L.a . Knight : 'Royal Titles Act cc India' , 
Historical Journal no.xi/j (1968), p .78.
2. Lawrence to Wigram, 4 June 1911, L cc T.K. : 1970-11,
Vol. VU3, pt. I., p.7b.
but not conferred as titles of personal distinction, 
as currently practised. The noble titles, as defined by 
Lethbridge, were to be bestowed very sparingly, and only 
to persons of "good" families who were in a position"to 
maintain them suitably". On the other hand, the lesser 
titles were to be granted more liberally to inculcate 
loyalty to the British regime in a greater number of 
people. The qualifications for noble titles were to be 
the possession of considerable landed property, 
unimpeachable fidelity to the Government, respectable 
private character, and the services in recognition of 
which they were to be granted must necessarily be of an 
exceptionally high standard. Furthermore, the use of the 
titles kumar, maharaj kumar, and nawabzada was to be 
restricted to the sons of officially recognised here­
ditary nobles only as classified by Methbridge. Even 
the sons of nobles whose titles had not been so recognised 
were not to attach any titles to their names.*
Along with these recommendations further concess­
ions to the noblemen were recommended by the King's 
Private Secretary. He suggested that the King-Emperor 
should grant them the right of territorial signatures.
Those who held hereditary titles higher than that of raja 
or nawab were to be allowed to sign territorially,
while the hereditary rajas and nawabs should sign their
2
names along with their territorial titles. The recomm­
endation was not accepted altogether. Only the Nawab
1. Hardingeto King's Sec. 29 June 1911. Ibid. Vol.VC3.;,
pt.II , pp.98d,98f,98g,98h.
2. King's Private Sec. to Hardinge 16 June 1911,
L & T.K. : 1910-11, Vol.VC3, pt.I , pp.77-78.
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of Murshidabad and the Maharaja of Burdwan were permitted 
to sign territorially in the same way as the Maharajas of 
Cooch Behar and Tripura, while the rest were conceded 
only the right to sign their names along with their 
territorial title,1 The lesser title holders, although 
they might have been proprietors of huge zamindaris, were 
to continue to sign as before. Thus a well graduated 
body of noblemen, following a regulated warrant of pre­
cedence and privilege according to seniority, came into 
being in Bengal.
Having traced the historical evolution of the 
zamindari class, and of the noble titles which came to 
be confined to that class' senior members, we can now 
categorise the noble houses. The local chiefs who had 
been allowed to retain the exterior semblance of sovereign 
states under British protection, were designated native 
princes. The rest were drawn into British India, 
levelled down and merged with the rest of the British 
Indian noblemen created by the British. The latter 
category could be further ranked into different layers 
in accordance with the official recognition of separate 
rules of succession to noble titles. Thus, the Bengal 
noblemen during the twentieth century consisted of
2native princes, hereditary nobles, and life nobles.
The supreme noblemen of Bengal, according to 
the warrant of precedence at the G-overnor's darbars
1. Gumming to Sec.For.Dept.Ind. 4 Oct. 1913, B.P.P.
: Oct. 1913, Vol.9146, p.11 .
2. Appendix I.
thus established^were the Maharajas of Gooch Behar and 
Tripura. Neither was considered senior to the other. 
Precedence was given in accordance with the date of access­
ion, seniority being determined by the date of demise of 
the late Maharaja.^* Being the only two native princes of 
Bengal they had special privileges denied to the other 
noblemen. The gaddis were treaty bound to the Crown, 
subordinate to the Viceroy and supervised by the G-overnor 
of Bengal. Direct supervision was in the hands of the 
political agents for the states. The Commissioner of 
Bhagalpur and the Magistrate of Tripura at Comilla were
the political agents for Cooch Behar and Tripura respect- 
2
ively. The Cooch Behar and Tripura states had passed 
under British suzerainty in 1773 and 1765 respectively. J 
The native princes generally followed the law of 
primogeniture during succession to the gaddis. Cooch Behar 
followed the principle without any variation; but Tripura 
had a process of succession unique to itself. The 
Maharaja had the power of nominating his heirs. In"1904 
a sanad recognised his right to nominate any male member 
of his family, descended through males from him or any male 
ancestor of his family, as his successor or Jubra.i and a 
successor to the Jubra.i called Bara Thakur. In short, 
the Jubra.i. upon becoming Maharaja, could nominate 
only the successor to the successor under normal
1. List of Ruling Princes. Provincial Order of Precedence,,
1937, Po4
2. fList of Principal Political Appointments in India1 :
Memoranda of Native States 1912: Hardinge, Vol. Va.32,
p.l.
3. Chiefs. Ra.jas and Zamindars: pp. 199,201.
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circumstances.^ Identical systems of inheritance were 
followed in the case of their zamindaris, since they, 
despite being located in British Bengal, were considered 
impartible appendage*of the protected native states.
p
Both Roshnabad and Laharpur estates of Tripura and
3
the Chaklajat Estate of Cooch Behar were inalienable. 
Moreover, on succession the native princes had the 
right to repudiate their predecessor's debts at will,^ 
making both the states and the zamindaris secure 
from passing out of their control. Presumably the 
right was never exercised, for fear of their losing 
face with the Government, their own associates and 
the public in general.
Though the native prince seemed to be kept 
within bounds merely by social sanctions, in reality 
he was definitely subordinate to the central authority. 
He succeeded and ruled by the .grace of the British.
Ho succession in a native state was valid until it 
had been formally recognised and confirmed by the 
Paramount Power®. There had been cases in which 
the succession of native princes, announced by 
the native darbars, had been set aside by the Gov­
ernment of India. The ordinary rule, however, 
in the case of the existence of an undisputed natu­
ral heir, was that he would be allowed to succeed as 
a matter of course, unless he was obviously and totally
1. Aitchison, pp.194,195.
2. Chiefs. ITobles and Zamindars, pp.225,224.
3. Appendix II.
4. Carmichael to Hardinge 23 June 1912, C.P.I.:
1912, Vol.Va 7, pi.I, p.300.
unfit.^ But what was to be taken into account in order 
to judge fitness to sit on the gaddi was left unexplained.
It was for the paramount authority to decide at its dis­
cretion. In view of the facts that the permission to rule 
depended on the British, and that daily administration 
was largely vested in the political agents, it is correct 
to say that the native principalities were as attached to 
the Governor's darbar as the nobles within the juris­
diction of the Bengal legislature. But owing to their 
evolutionary emergence, they continued to receive token 
precedence over all others on ceremonial occasions.
On the demise of a native prince, his darbar 
informed the Viceroy of the fact, and a date was fixed 
for his successor's installation. During the investi­
ture a grand public darbar was held where the Viceroy 
or Governor, acting as the Crown's representative, cere­
moniously installed the new prince on the gaddi. Thus 
the prince's sense of importance was satisfied; this 
fostered a feeling of identification with the British 
Empire. Simultaneously, tradition, so respected by the 
Indian populace, was maintained. Yet, all along, it was 
made subtly clear that the British were the supreme autho­
rity and not the prince. On the fixed date the Crown's 
representative arrived in state, and was received publicly 
by the new prince, as an underlord, at the scene of installa­
tion. The salutation for the representative was fired
by a hundred man guard, compared to only a fifty
2
gun salute for the new prince. While proceeding
1. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.For.Dent.Ind. 27 Aug. 1911,
G.I.E.P.P.: Dec. 1911, Vol. R/1/19/4D5, p.1.
2. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.For.Dept.Ind. 17 Oct. 1911,
G.I.F.D.P.: Dec. 1911, Vol, R/1/19/453. pp.5-6.
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to the Durbar Chamber in a ceremonial procession, all 
could see the Maharaja-to-be being escorted by the political
agent while the Crown!s representative walked alone at the 
rear under a canopy established as a royal symbol by the 
imperial powers prior to the British.^ Processions were 
utilised by the British to present a fine spectacle for 
the people and, simultaneously, by detaching the import­
ant personages from the rest of the procession, further
2
heightened their importance in the public eye.
The maintenance of the appearance of semi­
sovereignty was continued even after installation. Once 
a prince had been invested, all civil administration within 
the state was carried out in his name. Moreover, he was 
granted the privilege of officially corresponding with, 
and being received by, the Viceroy, and of expecting a 
return visit from him in a manner similar to sovereign 
states. Technically, the relationship between the 
prince and the Crown was direct. On the surface it 
appeared to rest on well-defined treaties and engage­
ments. A school of political writers led by Sir William 
Lee Warner even maintained that the states fell within 
the jurisdiction of international law. Such arguments 
were based on the facts that the treaties, enagagements 
and agreements of the British Government with the states 
abounded in instances of specific consent given to the 
adjustment of differences by methods of justice which 
could only be described as international law. Moreover, 
the agreements were equally explicit as to the exclusion
1. Sec.For.Lept.Ind. to Chief Sec.Beng. 29 Oct. 1911,
G.I.F.D.P. : Deo. 1911, Vol. P/1/19/453, p.8.
2. Wilson to Lady Hardinge 1c June 1911, Correspond­
ence : Fleetwood Wilson, Vol.7, pp.4,5.
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of the law of British India, and as to the incapacity 
of its legislature to make laws hinding on the princes 
and subjects of the states. Sir Frederick Pollock corr­
ected this misconstruction by pointing out that the 
relations of the Government, and the states were gov­
erned by a body of conventions and usages, rather than 
by formal treaties. In time they had been deprived of 
their independent status, leaving only a reflection of 
their former selves.^
In reality, the principalities were administered 
under the vigil of the political agent. Even in states 
like Cooch Behar, where state councils had been estab-
p
lished, the Agents were ex-officio members of such bodies. 
Moreover, on the Resident's recommendation, the British 
Government could send troops at any time. The locality 
where the troops were quartered would be considered Brit­
ish territory for the time being. If the Government had 
decided to quarter troops from one end of the state to
A
the other, the entire principality would automatically 
have become directly administered British territory.
Furthermore, the troops that the prince himself was 
allowed to employ were limited to a relatively negligible 
number. Princes were further prohibited from constructing 
any new forts, from keeping old ones in repair, and from 
starting ordinance factories for the manufacture of 
arms.^ To prevent the possibility of a hostile alliance
1. 'States Having Political Relations with Govt, of
Beng.', Memoranda of Native States 1912:
Hardinge, Vol. Va.32, p. 126).
2. Nat, owned Eng. N.P.: week ending 4 May 1912, p.291.
3. Nat.N.P.: week ending 4 Feb. 1911* p.116.
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being formed by the princes, they were prevented from
corresponding with each other until 1918. The letters had
to be despatched via the Political Agent, or a copy supplied
to the residency for its perusal.^
The remaining nobles, other than the native princes,
being mere zamindars t had no direct approach nor treaty
relations with the Viceroy*. Their estates being situated
in a directly administered part of British India, they
2
were invested by the Governor-General in Council, and 
remained under the direct supervision of the Governor 
in Council. These zamindar noblemen could be conven­
iently divided into two groups: hereditary and personal.
The former succeeded to the titles of their predecessors 
in more or less the same manner as the native princes.
On the conclusion of the mourning period the heir simply 
assumed the title as his birthright. Th0 latter, on the 
other hand, were invested with the noble title at each 
successive generation for their personal or family 
achievements. But the position of the two in the eyes of 
the Government did not differ to any noticeable extent.
It was quite possible for a life noble to be given pre-
4
cedence over hereditary noblemen. In the eyes of their 
fellow title holders the same attitude would prevail.
Quite probably the same opinion would exist in the minds
1. Deputy Sec.Bor. & Pol.Dept.Ind. to Chief Sec.Beng.
7 Feb. 1919, B.P.P.: Feb. 1919, Vol. 10525, P.73.
2. Though the same person functioned in both capacities, 
as Viceroy he represented the Crown for the native 
states and as Governor General he was the administ­
rative head of the directly administered province of 
the Raj.
5. The Englishman : 20 Aug. 1918, p.4. (h'ashipur)
4. Rajas of the Chakma and Hong tribes would be placed
relatively low in the hierarchy.
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of the educated community and the illiterate peasantry 
and. urban labour force also. Eminence would depend more 
on participation in public life.
It was so because, although technically the personal 
title holders were granted their titles only for life, 
the usual practice was to invest each succeeding generation 
as a matter of course. Thus it was possible to find a life 
noble with a longer pedigree than a hereditary one.^ The 
usual practice was to test the merit and loyalty of the 
suceessor for a short interim period before bestowing the 
relevant honours. Only on very rare occasions were the
2
descendants of noble houses by-passed and left unrecognised.
The reason for the two rules of succession depended 
to a great extent on the system of inheritance followed 
by individual noble families of Bengal. Indian inherit­
ance followed the scriptures and local customs. The 
Davabhag and the Mitakshara of the Hindus and the Muslim 
Hanafi schools of law advocate division of inheritance 
amongst the heirs. Adherence to this principle resulted 
in sub-division and fragmentation of estates. Too often, 
the individual holdings became minute and insignificant, 
losing prestige in the eyes of the public. Often an
3
affluent family would split up into many petty zamindaris.
The tendency to fragment made it practically imperative 
to confer and re-confer the dignities over and over again 
to avoid the possibility of noble titles becoming a 
ludicrous farce9
1. Nadia was longer than any hereditary line.
2. Kumar Polden, son of Raja of Karmi, was never invested
with noble title. - Stephenson to Sec.Rev.Dept.Beng.
13 June 1911, B.R.B. : Jan. 1912, Vol.8939, p.15.
3. Ranajit Sinha : Reforms in Administration of India, p.23
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However, a small number of zamindaris followed 
the same principle as the native princes and conti­
nued to pass on the estates from a single deceased 
to a single successor. In such cases primogeniture 
became the customary law followed by the families 
in question.^ In 1841, the Judicial Committee decided 
that in every individual zamindari in which the 
custom had been that it descend entire, the custom 
should then prevail in the eyes of the law, despite the 
fact that it went contrary to the scriptures. Inherit­
ance by primogeniture existed both in Hindu and Muslim
families of Bengal; thus came into existence the impart!—
2ble estates of many of the major zamindars of Bengal.
Although the impartible estates maintained success­
ion according to the principle of primogeniture, inherit­
ance was not as clear-cut as the system prevalent in 
Britain. In determining from whom a single heir had to 
be selected, the class or degree of relationship of the 
kindred had to be ascertained. Next, it was necessa­
ry to see whether the custom of the relevant family 
disclosed any special method of selection. In def­
ault of such custom, seniority of age usually con­
stituted a title by descent to the impartible 
estate. In communities where polygamy prevailed, the 
question would necessarily arise as to whether seniority 
in marriage or superiority in caste and form of marriage of
1. Primogeniture Zamindaris:-Burdwan, Maliara, Simlapal,
Jhargram, ojalgarh, Raingarh, Murshidabad, Rashipur ,Narajoi£> 
Baikantpur. - Ascoli to Sec.Rev.Best.Beng. 28 Jan.
1919, B.R.P. : Aug.1919, Vol.10532", p.161; Lhan- 
baria assured unitary succession by Beng. sett. Act.
Ill (B.C.) of 1904 - Rep. Administration British 
India: 1911-12, Vol.35, P*vi; iagore also - Rep.
Com. to consider 1'amily Settlement, 30 Oct. 1911,
B.R.P. : Peb, 1912, Vol. 8559, p.300.
2. Radha Binod Pal: History of Law of Primogeniture,p .362.
•1
a wife would in any way effect the seniority of the son.
Only after complying with all the necessary factors could 
a son inherit the gaddi and the title. From this we see 
that single succession secured precedence and continuity 
for the nobles following the primogeniture principle of 
inheritance.
Only a few decades before the period under study
there existed a noble house with a position even superior
to that of Cooch Behar and Tripura. The Murshidabad
family's nominal seniority continued to exist even after
2
the transfer of power. The titular rank of the head of 
the family was drastically reduced from that of the Nawab 
Nazim to a mere hereditary zamindar Nawab Bahadur of 
Murshidabad. Nawab Nazim Mansur Ali Khan was forced 
to abdicate in favour of his heir for licentious and 
reckless misbehaviour in 1882. His successors were to
3
be entitled Nawab Bahadur only. There is a passing refer­
ence in the Government of India Foreign and Political 
Departmental papers that the degradation of the Murshidabad 
family was not due to the misbehaviour of the Nawab Nazim 
only. It was alleged in a letter to the Secretary of State 
by the Governor General in Council that the British 
Authorities followed systematically the policy of gradu­
ally reducing the rank, dignities, and emoluments at
1. Radha Binod Pal: History of Law of Primogeniture. p.381.
2. Continued to be addressed as Nawab Nazim of Bengal 
and received 19 gun salute, against 13 of Cooch Behar 
and Tripura.
3. Gould to Wood 25 Oct. 1917, G.I.F & P.P.P. : 1918, 
Vol. R/1/19/606, p.1.
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each period of succession of the Indian noblemen.** It is 
doubtful whether there was any truth behind the allegation.
The evidence available shows a contrary policy. The Govern­
ment of Bengal in a letter dated 22 August, 1885, made it 
abundantly clear that it considered it essential to safe­
guard and maintain the high social position of the
2
Murshidabad House. This assurance is repeatedly voiced 
and acted upon by officials on a number of occasions. As 
a matter of fact the tendency was to increase the prestige 
of the nobles as they were loyal to the imperial concept.
The argument was doubtless put forward in 1918 "by the 
Government of India to support its stand against the 
suggestion that the Nawabfs status be raised to that of 
a native prince. It feared that such a step would offend 
the other native princes who had recently given unrestrained 
support in Britain's war against Germany. Y/ith the abdica­
tion of Mansur Ali the institution of Nawab Nazim was 
abolished forever in Bengal, and the Cooch Behar and
*
Tripura families superseded the Murshidabad House in 
precedence. The only concession left to the Nawab was
3
the status of premier nobleman .in British Bengal.
The Burdwan family's title was unique in Bengal.
Though a mere zamindar. the head of the family had the 
unusual privilege of being addressed as Maharajadhiraj 
Bahadur. The title had been granted to the family 
during the time of the Mughals, and continued to remain
1. Viceroy to Sec.St. 30 Aug. 1918, Ibid, Prog. no.26,
Lt.no.5 9 of 1918, p.6.
2. Murshidabad to Chelmsford 12 Sept. 1917, G . I. F . d
P.P.P. : Jan. 1918, Vol. 10416, p.4.
3. Aitchison, p.183.
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in existence even with the transfer of paramountcy.
Though flamboyant, the title never carried the same 
prestige as that of the Nawab Nazim. He neither symbol­
ised the independence of Bengal prior to British suprema­
cy nor did the family ever rise beyond the comparatively 
junior 5,000 mansabdar rank during that time.^ Once 
more we find the G-overnment -consciously exerting 
itself to maintain a noble family*s prestige as an 
added support to its authority. In order to secure the 
Maharaja* s position even further, the G-overnment issued
a sanad in 1908 declaring the title a hereditary one,
2
attached to the estate.
For a short period of time the British raised 
the Nawab of Dacca higher not only than that of the 
Maharaja of Burdwan but also than the Nawab of Murshidabad. 
In 1911, Salimulla Khan of Dacca received the unusual 
favour of the title G-.C.I.E. for, amongst other things, 
his vigorous efforts to raise the standard of the 
Bengali Muslim community as a whole. It was an 
honour very rarely granted to any other than a very 
few senior native princes. The Administration assessed 
that the influence of the Nawab was so great that it was 
necessary to assure its continuance in favour of law and
4
order. The enhanced position of the Dacca family rem­
ained until the demise of Salimulla Khan in 1915, and
1 . B.D.G-. : Burdwan, p.51 .
2. Sec.For.Dept.Ind. to Chief Sec.Beng. 15 Oct. 1911,
G.I.E.P.P.: Oct. 1911, Vol. R/1/19/449, p.2.
5. Nat. N.P. : week ending 50 Dec. 1911, p.1575.
4. Discussed in fuller detail in Chapter V.
returned to its original position, that of hereditary
Nawab Bahadur.
The only other unusual feature in the ranks of
the so-called noblemen were the titles of the chiefs
of the Mong and Chakma tribes. Their tribal names
were attached to their titles, and they were addressed
as the Mong Raja and Chakma-Raja J  All other title
holders ranked between the Raja and the Maharaja
Bahadur and the Nawab and the Nawab Bahadur.
The conferment of such titles was officialised
by the granting of sanaas (writs) and Khilats (robes
of honour) and the declaration of the fact in the
Honours Gazettes. The donning of the robe of honour
was made into an exclusive privilege of the nobles in 
2
1915. The investiture was usually held in a darbar.
If possible, the writ was presented in the throne room
of the Governor's Palace amidst a gathering of important 
3
dignitaries. "Native princes, noblemen" and "title
holders" of lesser rank, as graded in the warrant of
precedence, were seated to the right of the dais. The
sanad drawn for the recipient was read to the assembly
before being handed over. In return, he presented a
4
nazar of a Gold Mohur to the Governor. If it was not 
possible to hold the investiture in the Governor's 
Palace, the chief government officer of the Division 
or the Governor himself, depending on the recipient's
1. Petitions of Chakma 6c Mong Chiefs', B.P.P. : Feb.
1915, Vol. 9146, pp.25,50.
2. Nat.N.P. : week ending 22 March 1915, p.284.
5. 'Rajas of Rajshahi', C.R. no.CXI 1875. p.58.
4. S & B.P.Singh Roy: History of Chakd.iyhi Family,
pp.96-99.
seniority in rank and importance to the Government, held 
a public darbar at the recipients estate.^ If the recip­
ient was a lady, then she could receive it standing behind 
2a screen. Thus, many components of the proceedings conti­
nued to remain in the form inherited from previous 
regimes. The granting of sanads and khilats and the 
offering of nazar were in existence in pre-British days, 
but the British introduced systematic court precedence, 
seating regulations in accordance with a formal code, 
and demarcation between native princes, noblemen, and 
lesser title holders.
These ennobled personages could not acquire their 
status by acts of munificence alone, as it is commonly 
believed. It would qualify the person for a lesser 
title only. To gain a noble title a landowner, over and
above the standard set by the Title Committee, was
3required to be a political asset to the Crown. More­
over, a suitable standard of "dignified life" was con­
sidered essential by the Government. Often a greatly 
deserved title, according to the standard set by the 
Government, was withheld on the ground that the potent­
ial recipient was involved in financial difficulties, 
hence would be unable to maintain the required standard
4
suitably. A person could also miss his opportunity on 
the ground that he was too young to shoulder the superior
1. 'Rajas of Rajshahi', C.R.no.CXI 1373. p.40
2. The Bengalee : 21 July 1911, p.4. (Rani Dinainani
of Santosh).
3. Chief Sec.Beng. to Duke 18 Oct. 1911, C .IJ.I.: 1911,
Vol.Va6 , pt.I, p.397.
4. Carmichael to Hardinge 25 Aug. 1912, C : 1912,
Vol.VaQ, pt.I, p.132.
status with proper "dignity"
A combination of the recommendations of the Title
Committee and the standard already set by the Authorities
enhanced the prestige carried by the superior titles even
further as access to their ranks became practically
impossible. In the Birthday Honours Gazette of
1916, only four out of 250 Indian titles granted in
the entire country were of the type considered as
reserved for noblemen. Moreover, the four invested
were mere promotions to higher dignities in respect
of persons already belonging to the group acknow-
2
ledged as Indian nobles by the Government. Thus, 
on that occasion, there was not a single new entry 
to the higher ranks. Similarly, in the New Years 
Honours List of 1917, out of 200 grantees of Indian 
titles, six were of the superior kind, of which only
3
three were new members. The same pattern was apparent 
after 1911. '
•The Government of India’s reluctance to grant 
higher titles when avoidable cam - into prominent 
focus in 1917. The Bengal Government, administering 
a province dependent largely on trade and commerce, 
recommended Rai Sita Nath Roy Bahadur for a rajaship.
In reply, the Imperial Government maintained that 
the superior title was hardly suitable for a 
business man, and that the services rendered by the
1. Carmichael to Hardinge 19 Nov. 1912, C.P.I.:1912,
Vol.VaQ, pt.I , p.348b.
2. Honours Gazette : 3 June 1916.
5* Ibid : 1 Jan. 1917.
Rai Bahadur were not of the exceptional nature for 
which he could he considered for such a title. The 
Bengal Government * annoyed at the rejection, 
pointed out that business men had been invested with 
superior titles before. Such were the cases of Raja 
Shew Bux Bogla (1897), Raja Bijoy Singh Budhoria (1908), 
Raja Kristo Das law (1910), and Raja Rishee Case law 
(1913)#. To further support their argument the Bengal 
Government stated that the Rai Bahadur should receive 
the title in consideration of his wealth, the high posit­
ion held by him in native society, and his varied public 
services. He was the Sheriff of Calcutta in 1888, was 
a leading member of important associations, and took 
considerable interest in municipal affairs. Moreover, 
he had rendered useful work in connection with the raising 
of the Victoria Memorial Fund, and had provided for the 
RS.550,000 scKerne for model housing for the poor.^ Despite 
this strong recommendation, the Imperial Government refused 
the proposal. It maintained that the custom of loose 
investment grew up owing to the absence, before the Title 
Committee, of a proper standard of granting "high native 
titles". Since then they were granted in very exceptional 
cases, and it was certainly not clear that, the Rai 
Bahadur’s case came within that category. His position 
was based not on family but on wealth derived from
business. The title of Raja primarily connoted'family
2
and high social standing. As he was already a Rai
1. Gourlay to maffey 17 March 1917, 1 & T (India),
Vol. 18, pt.1 , pp.190-192.
2. Maffey to Gourlay 10 May 1917, * Ibid, Vol.18, pt.II,
p.97.
Bahadur, first amongst titles for Hindus, he was granted
a C.I.E. as a compromise.
The closed door policy, along with the awareness
of being considered more "dignified*1 than others further
nourished the desire of individual noblemen to achieve
greater heights within their own hierarchy. The Maharaja
of Burdwan self-righteously claimed, in 1904, that it
was ungracious to covet titles and honours from the 
1Government. But a study of his career shows repetitive 
attempts to increase his status to the equivalent of a 
native prince. During the discussions of the Title Comm­
ittee, he moved that the titles superior to that of
2
Maharaja Bahadur be reserved for territorial princes.
If the proposal had been accepted, he would automatic­
ally have been equated with the native princes, since 
he was the only person in Bengal with such a title.
Having failed once, he persisted in his attempt and 
applied to the British authorities three times between 
1911 and 1919 for an increase in rank. Basing his Argu­
ments on legal grounds, he pointed out that a territorial 
form of address had been used in all the notifications 
conferring titles upon the Zamindars of Burdwan from 
1833 onwards. Even the royal licence signed by the Queen 
herself in 1868, allowing the family to bear arms, stated
n
that the colours were to belong to the heirs male of his 
body who shall succeed him in the title of Maharaja of
1. B.C. Mahtab : Studies, p.66.
2. Hardinge to King’s Sec. 29 June 1911, L & T.K.: 
1910-11, Vol.VC3, pt.II, pp. 96d,98f,9bg,98l".
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Burdwan". The sanad of 1908 corroborated the fact by- 
stating that the title was "to be attached to the estate". 
Despite the fact that the Bengal Government highly recomm­
ended his case,^ the appeal was rejected by the Imperial 
Authorities at every turn.
The Nawab of Murshidabad, being less subtle, 
requested a rise in rank on grounds of personal and 
family humiliation. He complained that since the title 
of Nawab Bahadur was granted to his grandfather the 
same title had been bestowed upon various others, and
nothing remained to distinguish him as the represent a—
2
tive of the old nizamat house. He not only wished to 
be one of the "dignified" group, but desired to be 
remembered as the premier amongst them. Although his
3
cause was supported by many newspapers of Bengal , 
the Government ignored his appeal.
It was not only by direct appeal to the Government 
that the nobles tried to supercede one another. Manipu­
lations and intrigues to overstep their ranks were not 
uncommon. There were instances when the authorities had 
to step in and reprimand noblemen who had casually adopted 
the territorial type of title permitted only to the
Maharajas of Cooch Behar, Tripura and Burdwan, and the
4
Nawab of Murshidabad.
With the forthcoming visit of the Emperor to 
Calcutta in 1911, the struggle for precedence was 
intensified. Early in the year the Maharajas of Burdwan
1. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.Bor.& Pol.Dept.Ind. 15 Sept.
1919, G.I.B. & P.P.P. : July 1920, Vol. R/1/19/648,
p. 1 .
2. Gould to Wood, 25 Oct. 1917, G.I.F. & P.P.P. : 1918,
Vol. R/1/19/606, p.1.
3. See Indian Newspaper Report (Beng) of 1911 and 1912.
4. Cumming to Sec.Bor.Dept,Ind. 4 Oct. 1913,
P.P.?. : uct. 1915, Vol.9146, p.11.(Dighapatia & Nakina).
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and Tagore approached the authorities for permission to
organise the Imperial reception. By their early move the
two managed to push themselves to the very forefront of
the most important social occasion during the entire
period of British Indian history, thus usurping the
hereditary right of the Nawab of Murshidabad to receive
royalty as the premier nobleman of Bengal. A working
committee was promptly formed of which the two Maharajas
became President and Secretary respectively.^ It was too
late by the time this subtle manipulation became apparent,
and an attempt was made to remedy the wrong by proposing
another resolution namely that the Nawab of Murshidabad
should be in the Executive Committee. Ultimately a
formula was worked out by which the Nawab was allotted
the honour of receiving the king on his arrival, while
the two Maharajas continued to dominate the arrangements
in the Working Committee for the rest of the Imperial 
p
visit. Hardinge was fully conscious of the fact that, 
given the slightest chance, the "two petty little
A
zamindar Maharajas of Bengal" would be delighted to
assume a position of importance among the native 
3princes.
The Raja of Hetampur succeeded in emerging from 
comparative insignificance by a singular method. He 
made available the sum of Rs.50,000 at the disposal of 
the Queen to be distributed as charity in any way she
1. Pvt.Sec.Viceroy to Burdwan & Tagore 30 Jan.1911 »
Their Majesties Visit to Calcutta: Hardinge,
Vol.Va 20, p.2.
2 . Nat.M .P .: week ending 29 Apr.1911, p.499*
3. Viceroy to Pvt.Sec.King 4 Apr.1911, L & T .£.: 1910-11,
Vol. Vc3, pt.II, p.51.
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saw fit.^ Even the Haja of Narajole, alleged supporter of
the terrorist movement in Bengal, approached a number of
officials in an attempt to secure an invitation for the
2occasion and be placed among fellow nobles of Bengal,
It was doubtless humiliating for him to be disassociated
from the group to which he felt he belonged.
The nobles1 admiration of titles and precedence,
the fact that their spokesman, the Title Committee, had
firmly shut the door to further entry to their ranks,
and the awareness of being considered more "dignified”
than others led to the growth of a profound sense of
the importance of their own exalted position. The
Maharaja of Burdwan caused a great deal of amusement in
1 9 0 5 by declaring in a private darbar that his relations
with the British Government were still friendly: a
remark that only a full sovereign can make in relation
to foreign and friendly powers. Although he vehemently
denied that he was presenting himself as a sovereign
power in 1917, it is difficult to accept a denial more
3
than a decade later. Maharaja Tagore went a step 
even further than the Maharaja of Burdwan. He insin­
uated that the only reason that the British Empire 
retained its position was due to the heroic efforts of the 
large landholders of Bengal. But for the financial help 
which they had rendered at tremendous risk to themselves, 
Britain would have been "doomed to destruction11 as a 
first class power in the closing years of the eighteenth
1 . Act.lt.Gov. to Hardinge 22 Dec.1911, C.P.I.: 1911,
Vol. Va6 , pt.I, p.519.
2* Nat. N . P .: week ending 22 March 1913, p.284. - more
detailed discussion in Chapter V.
3. The Englishman: 9 March 1918, p .3•
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century. He argued that the Rohilla War, the two cam­
paigns against Tipu Sultan, the prevention of the hostile 
demonstration at Oudh, the mission despatched to Hepal, 
the reduction of Pondicherry, the reform of the civil 
administration, and the arrangements made for the improve­
ment of the navy caused a considerable drain upon the 
resources of the British. This crisis was accelerated 
by the fact that at the time Prance, Holland, Spain, 
and Italy (sic) were allied against her, while the armed 
neutrality of the Baltic Confederation was hardly less 
hostile. The United States had been alienated, and Austria, 
the sole continental ally, was exhibiting a very dubious 
friendship. The drain on the imperial exchequer had left 
the Bank of England with a cash balance of less than one 
million pounds, compelling it to suspend cash payments 
in 1797- The country had been within forty-eight hours 
of bankruptcy, and only the large landholders1 sympathetic 
cooperation in the land settlement of Bengal provided the
A
Empire with the funds that delivered it from the financial 
catastrophe which threatened to overwhelm it.^
The senior noblemen's attitude towards the general 
populace also pointed towards a sense of group superiority. 
Association and marriage alliances with their own respect­
ive caste members of "lesser" status had .to be necessarily 
tolerated to a certain extent. But such marriages were 
arranged with great reluctance. Once married the new 
brides were usually made to lose all basic connections 
with their previous relatives and friends which automati­
cally led to their getting thoroughly grafted into
1. The Englishman : 22 Eov. 1917, p.4.
their new surroundings. Since most of them were married 
at quite a young age, they retained practically no emotional 
attachment to their own families. They grew from near
i
infancy to womanhood in their bridegrooms1 homes in 
the same manner as the other children of the families.
They spent more of their childhood and adolescence under 
the tutelage of their parents-in-law than under that of 
their own parents. Thus, despite the fact that the sons 
of the nobles had to marry girls of "lesser" birth it was 
not difficult for the bridegrooms to disassociate them­
selves from their relatives-by-marriage. The process
2
was painless to their brides, and was relatively simple. 
Bhupendra Chandra Sinha of Susang, recalling his childhood,
writes that his uncle, the late Maharaja's brother,
brought back a bride of ten from Dacca who "easily became
our playmate and a valuable recruit to the team of my
3
own and cousin sisters" .
This attitude of superiority towards people of 
"lesser" birth is noticeable from various other sources 
also.. The Maharaja of Burdwan, describing the bhadralok 
chashas (gentlemen farmers) in his book in which he 
analyses the changing Bengal scene, assumes a condes­
cending tone. According to him they could be identified 
as the people who could be seen "wearing a stylishly cut 
shirt, dhoti imported by Ralli Brothers, or some German 
firm, carrying a vilaiti-chudder or scarf, holding a
1. eg. Kaharani of Burdwan was married at the age of 6 ; 
Maharani of Susang at the age of 12; Sovabazar's 
daughter-in-law at the age of 10; Burdwan's daughter 
at 1 2 .
2. Frequently the marriage of the daughters were also 
manipulated in a similar manner. Rather than sending 
the daughters to their new homes the sons-in-law 
were brought into their homes and treated as members
of the family. Such sons-in-law were called ghar-.jamais
3. B.C. Sinha: Changing Times, p.31.
fancy-handled umbrella for fear of getting sun-burnt".
Later he describes newspaper editors in a similar tone.
According to him, the editors "with a very few honourable
exceptions, are a disreputable and venal lot'O While
recommending Nawab Mohammad Ali Chaudhury's case for a
rise in title, Carmichael remarked that although he did
not speak English he was "proud of his lineage, and does
not make himself loved by those of his own religion whom
he looks on as upstarts: people like Fazlul Huq, for
2
instance, dislike him." The Nawab of Dacca and the 
Maharaja of Dinajpur provoked the wrath of the educated 
public and the press by proposing that a separate building
for the large zamindars1 children should be erected in the
3Dacca College. The Maharajas of Burdwan and Nashipur, 
basing their demand on the existence of chiefs' colleges 
in other provinces, tried to persuade the Government to 
build an exclusive school for the large landholders of 
Bengal. Later the Maharajas of Burdwan, Natore, Nashipur,
a
and Tagore pointed out in a memoranda that the big land­
holders, and others of similar status, and positions, were 
very reluctant to send their sons to the existing high 
schools which did not provide the education of the kind
4
which they required. But when this school actually received 
the sanction of the Secretary of State in 1915, it was as •
1. B.C. Mahtab: Studiest- pp. 3,66.
2. Carmichael to Hardinge 7 Nov. 1913, C.P.I.: 1913,
Vol. Va 10, pt.I., p.401.
3* Nat.N.P. : week ending 13 May 1911, p.1911
4. 'Memoranda to Carmichael', B .G .P .: Aug. 1913,
Vol.9137, p.59.
68
a public school open to others also.^ In spite of that, 
it continued to remain exclusive, and by the fourth year
it had only forty-four carefully selected boys studying 
2
there.
According to the Indian-owned newspapers, the
Hastings House School was an instrument to further
anglicise the students. The leading newspaper, Bangali,
pointed out that the school "though meant for the sons
of Bengali noblemen, is to leave everything Indian -
Indian History, Indian literature, etc. - out of its
syllabus.... The young descendents of noblemen who will
read in that school will become Anglicised by studying
%
English literature and English History". The advocates 
of the school, however, refuted the suggestion by stating 
that they did not desire the students to become denationa­
lised Bengalis, but cultured and disciplined Indians who
were able to take their place in the social life of modern
4India and contribute to the development of the country.
Despite their arrogance, the nobles were by no means 
narrow-minded, and managed to absorb the liberal and social 
ideas of the time. Most of them were born and reared in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century: the century 
which experienced the Bengal awakening - an awakening 
which, to a great extent, had been activated by their 
forbears. A number of them tried their hand at writing
1. The Englishman : 10 Dec. 1915» p.9*
2. Ibid: 23 Jan. 1919, p.5*
3. Ind . II .P.: week ending 12 June 1915> p. 860.
4. Viceroy to Crewe 1 Jan.1915, F.L.: 1915» Vol.458,
lt.no.11, Dnclo.4, p.3.
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1 2 "books and editing journals, some dabbled in social
3
reforms , quite a few participated in constitutional 
politics,^" while one was even alleged to have joined the
5
rebel forces terrorising the province.
Moreover, as the group comprised many castes and
creeds, they were forced to outgrow sectarian prejudices 
in their personal habits, or face the danger of total 
disintegration.^ Flexibility and tolerance were 
essential for existence. Furthermore, many must have 
been conscious that the tradition of communal tolerance 
by the Bengal nobles stretched as far back as the reigns 
of the Ilyas Shahi and the Hussain Shahi Sultans of pre- 
Mughal days. This outlook, considered a noble attitude, 
had been stamped with long established custom. It was a 
matter of pride to maintain That the raja or nawab was 
the karta or malik (patriarch) of all the pra.ias (inhabit­
ants) residing on his estates. It is interesting to note 
that the Burdwan family name was converted from the
7Sanskrit word Chand to the Perso-Sanskrit Chand-Mahtab 
in the nineteenth century. Doubtless it was motivated 
by the fact that the pra.ias of Burdwan estate comprised 
a large number of Muslims with whom the family wished to 
be identified as much as with their Hindu pra.ias.
The setting aside of social taboos is blatantly
1. Cooch Behar, Burdwan, Tagore, Lalgola, Syed Mohammad 
Khan, Nawab Ali, Chakdighi, Nashipur.
2. Cooch Behar, Natore, Paikpara, Kakina.
5. Burdwan, Nadia, Natore, Narajole.
4. India Office List (Bengal): 1911-19.
5. Narajole.
6 . Their position in caste groups in Chapter II.
7. Both Chand and Mahtab mean the moon in the two
languages.
visihle in the marriage alliances of the Cooch Behar and 
Tripura families. The Hindu Maharaja of Cooch Behar 
shocked the public by marrying the daughter of the cele­
brated Brahmo reformer Keshab Chandra Sen. Their son, 
Jitendra Narayan, married the Maratha Maharaj Kumari of
Baroda, while two daughters married into an English family.^
2
Similarly, the Maharaja of Tripura’s wife was from Nepal,
while the Maharaj Kumar Ranabir Kishore took as wife the
3
Sikh Maharaj Kumari of Patiala, and another brother
4
married the sister of the Raja of Dholpur.
Tendencies towards a liberal outlook were notice­
able in other spheres. The Nawab of Dacca, the spearhead 
of Muslim separatism, employed more Hindus in his estate 
than Muslims. Nor were they restricted to junior posts.
His most popular estate Superintendent was Babu Sarada 
Charan Hookerjee.^ His personal Secretary, who handled 
all his private papers, also was a Hindu named S.Das
7
Gupta. The Maharaja of Burdwan, the premier Hindu nobleman,
did not hesitate to kiss the hand of the Pope, and made it
a point, to travel with a staff comprising an equal number
8of Hindus and Muslims on his way to Europe. He also patron-
9
ised Muslim institutions. The Hindu Maharaja of Kassimbazar
1. Indian Princess, pp.54,203,208,250.
2. I.S.A.R. (Tripura) 1909-19, Vol.17 Rep.1915-16, p.1 .
3. The Englishman : 24 Feb. 1916, p.4.
4. The Bengalee : 18 March 1916, p .4.
5. Hat9owned Eng.N.P.:week ending 9 March 1912, p.172.
6 . The Englishman: 19 March 1919, p.8 .
7. The Bengalee: 7 Dec. 1911, p.3.
8 . B.C. Mahtab: Impressions, pp. 1 ,4 0 .
9* Tours (Burdwan):7-13 Dec.1912, p.51.
financially supported the Theosophical Society. It was 
not unknown for a member of one religion to support the
2candidature of another in times of general elections.
The Nawab of Murshidabad prohibited cow slaughter in his
mahal in consideration of Hindu sentiments. Nawab Shamsul
Huda declared that he never -forgot that he was an Indian
first and then a Muslim. ^
Thus it was neither religion, nor caste, nor race,
5
nor nationality, nor formal education, nor the knowledge 
of English that predominated in the nobles' feeling of 
belonging to a group superior to the rest of society.
Their attitude of superiority was encouraged by their high 
sounding titles which gave rise to a conviction that they 
were superior to the general public: a public which found 
it extremely difficult to enter their closed ranks.
Their exclusiveness was furthered by the fact that they were 
so few in number. There were only seventy nobles in the 
province during the period under review. Their conviction 
that they belonged to an exclusive and "dignified" group 
resulted in a desire for separate educational institutions, 
separate seating in public functions, and special treatment 
by the Government. These tendencies were reinforced 
by the fact that even this small number were at
times further bound together by marriage_________
1. The Englishman: 10 Eeb. 1911, p.4*
2. J.H.Broomfield: 'Vote & Transfer of Power'
J.A.B.: Feb. 1962, p.174
3. Nat.owned En^. N .P . : week ending 13 Jan.1912, pp.33,34
4* Ibid : week ending 15 Feb.1913, p*125
5. eg. Burdwan, Sovabazar
6. Appendix I
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1 2 alliances, intimate blood relationships, and the declara—
3
tion of brothership by the exchange of pagris.
This miseroscopic group was further marked out by 
the favours shown them by the ruling power. They were, 
as a rule, included in the guest list during state cere­
monials, levees and receptions. Their young children 
were invited to the garden parties held in Government 
House. Accompanied by their wives and adult children, 
they attended the Governor's balls and banquets, and 
were occasionally even called to private luncheons 
with the Governor or Viceroy. Such occasions were
frequently used by the Administration to sooth away
4
any discontentment that they might have. The nobles 
were granted the right of private entry to the Governor's 
presence. In the year 1913 the hereditary title holders 
were issued the right of officially calling on and, of
5
receiving an official return visit from the Governor 
this increased their feelings of self-importance.
The privileges they received were not only social, 
but were in many ways concrete and tangible as well.
Being a nobleman could mean the right of exemption from
1. Kd.Yousaff + daughter Abdul Gani & half-sister 
Absanulla; Comilla's son + Serajul Islam's daughter; 
Nawab Ali + Bogra's daughter; Dighapatia's son + 
Kassimbazar's daughter; Comilla + Paschimgarin's 
daughter; Tahirpur's son + Susang's daughter.
2. Burdwan adopted, real father Ban Bihari Kapur; 
Myi^ensingh adopted, real father Muktagacha; Tagore 
adopted, real father Sourinder Mohan; Heshee Case 
brother Kristo Das; Wala Qadr Murshidabad1s uncle; 
Kd.Yousaff Dacca's uhcle; Peary Mohan 1st. cousin 
Jyot Kumar; i-iaharani Busang's maternal grandfather 
Kishori Lai Goswami.
3. The Englishman: 20 Jan. 1915, p.7. (Dacca-Burdwan)
4. Carmichael to Hardinge 27 July 1915, P.P.I.:1915
Vol.Va 13, pt.1, p.456b.
5. The Englishman : 18 Bept.1913, p.6.
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attendance in any civil court in British India, Though
only a few actually received the honour,** the possibility
was open to the other members of the group. Moreover,
the Government of India had limited by law the maximum
fee chargeable on hereditary title holders by Government
2
medical officers. They were also exempted from the Arms 
Act. The privilege of maintaining arms has always been 
looked upon in India as the traditional symbol of super­
iority. The entire mansabdari system was graded accord­
ing to the amount of armed retainers each mansabdar was 
allowed to keep in his employment. Unlike the others, 
the nobles were not required to apply for a licence to 
purchase arms and ammunition. On purchase, all that 
they were required to do was inform the District Magis­
trate of the fact. They were further permitted to dis­
tribute the arms amongst their retainers. When the 
question of the revocation of this privilege came up 
for review in 1911 , the Maharaja of Burdwan, on behalf
<k
of the Imperial League, replied that it was highly 
esteemed by those who enjoyed it, since it was an 
acknowledgement of their ’'dignity". Its revocation
3
would lower them in the estimation of the general public.
Inevitably their sense of self-importance, pampered 
further by social favours shown by the Administration, 
and special privileges granted for their exclusive use,
1. Wala Qadr, B.M. Tagore, Laldanga, Dinajpur, Kassim­
bazar, Dacca, Chakma, busang, murshidabad & 3 sons ,BuTdv/an 
Tagore, Tripura, Cooch Behar. - Gumming to Registrar,
High Court Cal. 24 Oct. 1913, B.P.P. Hov.1913,list of 
Persons exempted, p.5.
2. Rat.N.P.: week ending 27 Jan.1912, p.118
3. The Bnglishman; 25 July 1911, p.7.
led them to cultivate living habits different, in degree 
if not in kind, from other zamindars and from the intelli­
gentsia.^ At their zamindari head-quarters they lived 
in palatial buildings, popularly called ra.ibaris, nawab- 
baris, and nizamat killa. Both in the structural plans 
of their mahals, and the living conditions within, an 
admixture of occidental and oriental tastes prevailed. 
Eeeling the need to identify themselves with the 
European rulers, they built their mahals to look like the 
palatial buildings of the west. The most majestic was 
that of the Murshidabad family. The Hazar Dwari was 
completed by 1 8 3 7 , designed and constructed by an 
English engineer. It was approached by a long flight 
of steps resembling that of the Government House at 
Calcutta. At the top of the steps was a large portico, 
with doric columns which supported an entablature. Inside 
one came across arched recesses, each with two Corinthian 
columns. There was a state banquet room capable of
*
seating three hundred and fifty guests in the European
style. In the large reception room there were a number
of cabinets of florentine enlaid wood work. Fine old
porcelain, bronzes and china were distributed profusely
all around the house. There were also spacious billiard 
2
and card rooms. The JMawab of Dacca's residence, Ahsun
1. Those who received some sort of formal education 
which qualified them for professional occupations 
and more routine —  clerical and administrative — 
jobs. In other words, all those who engaged in 
non-manual occupations. - T.B. Bottomore: Elites 
& Society, p.70.
2. The Englishman: 25 July 1911, p.7.
Manzil, built in 1872, was a stately structure, whose
public apartments were furnished in the best European style
The Maharaja of Burdwan’s house plan was drawn by an
Italian architect, and followed the line of Italian
villas. The Tagore family even christianed their
2
homewith an English name; Tagore Castle. The 
architectural influence apparently was Royal Balmoral.
Built in 1896, it was fashioned like a medieval castle. 
Sovabazar House, though built in the previous century, 
gave the same impression of an imposing country
3
house of Europe.
The mahals often had large picture galleries.
The Murshidabad collection was particularly strong in
Butch, Blemish, French and Italian schools, and was
considerably esteemed as one of the finest in India.^
The Tagore Castle housed pictures by Rubens, Van Djke,
Titian, Reynolds, and Zoffany; they also commissioned
artists such as Landseer and Chinnery to paint their 
5
own portraits. It is interesting that the records and 
catalogues primarily listed only European works of art, 
and remained comparatively silent about any Indian or 
oriental pieces, and even private libraries, such as 
that of the Murshidabad family numbered more books in 
European than in Indian languages.
Despite the tendency to identify themselves
externally with the tastes and habits of the British
1. E.B.D.Gr. ; Dacca, p. 182.
2. ’Note on Bengal Settled Estates Act 1904* B.R.P.: Feb.
1 9 1 2 , Vol.8939, p.321.
3. D. Doig: An Artist’s Impressions, nos.26,31.
4. The Englishman: 19 Feb. 1917, p.12.
5. P.C. Tagore: Catalogue of Paintings & Sculptures in
Collection of luahara.ja Tagore.
6 . The Englishman; 19 Feb. 1917, p. 12.
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as is apparent from the above examination, Indian features 
in the internal structure of their houses continued to 
prevail. Dountless it was so because of their reluctance 
to shed many traditions which they had inherited from 
their forbears of previous regimes. Many of these 
customs were anachronistic and were ignored outside 
their own zamindaris. But in their own estates these 
traditions were zealously retained.
A section of their houses, known as the andar- 
mahal,^  was totally segregated from the presence of 
males other than immediate relatives. If any message 
was to be given, the male attendent relayed it to a 
female servant at the dividing door who carried it to 
the ladies within. At times even ladies of foreign 
blood were prohibited from entrance to the andar-mahal.
If they wished to speak in person, a chair was placed 
beside a screen behind which the ladies of the house 
remained. Only after a considerable increase of friend­
ship could they hope to penetrate the intimate chambers 
and come face to face with the ladies of the family.
This was so despite the fact that most of them parti­
cipated in social life quite openly in Calcutta and
2
other places outside their own zamindaris.
Along with the ladies in the andar-mahal also 
lived the children of the family.^ Their lives were 
carefully supervised- by imported or Anglo-Indian govern­
esses. Once more the admixture of the two cultures was 
noticeable in their upbringing. It was usual for them
1. Bor fuller details of life in andar-mahal, read 
haharaja Bhupendra Chandra Sinha : Changing Times;
po. 1- 12.
2. Andrew Fraser: Among Indian Rajas & Ryots, p.94.
3. 'Bast Beng. A Assam Court of Wards' Lady Asst's.
Rep. 1909-10', R A 0.h .L .: 1911, Vol.694, File 391,
p.56
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to be fed on Indian food for lunch and European food for 
dinner, served in their proper fashions respectively, 
while wearing the proper style of clothing in accordance 
with the meal: a method of training for social associations 
with both sections of the community. Though no sacrile­
gious food was served within the house, it was pointed . 
out to them that, while attending functions as the 
guests of others, especially if the host was a pra.ia. 
they must consume whatever was served, since refusal 
could hurt the sentiment of the people of less for­
tunate birth whose household they had graced. It was 
irrelevant whether the host considered their presence as 
gracing the occasion or not, for in their own estimation 
their acceptance to attend was as good as granting a 
favour. Similarly, while calling on one another, it 
was left to the host to remember the customs of the 
guests. If a mistake was committed, the host would be 
considered ill-bred, and not worthy of being in their 
'’dignified” ranks. During special occasions such as 
the marriage of a Muslim nobleman, the orthodox members 
of the Hindu community present, who were prevented from 
partaking of the Musalman feast, were carefully set 
apart and offered attar-pan, rose water and garlands
of flowers by members of the nawab’s family them- 
4
selves. The Hindu noblemen would follow the same 
pattern. The Muslim guests would be separately fed 
with meat, pallao. sweets, etc., prepared to suit their
1. The Englishman: 30 Apr. 1915, p.7. (Bogra)
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customs, and the nobleman would personally look after 
the guests' comforts.^ Frequently the occasion was con­
cluded with benedictions by priests of different relig­
ious groups residing on the estate.
More often than not the education of the children
of such families was carried out in the house by private 
2
tutors. They were taught English, Bengali, Sanskrit or
3
Persian, and zammdari management. Even the ones who 
attended normal schools were trained for zamindari work 
as soon as they graduated.^" Along with literary education 
a great deal of emphasis was placed on the cultivation of 
correct behaviour and social appearances considered 
worthy of noblemen. Even very young boys could be seen 
during public functions clad in cloth of gold and wear­
ing chains of gold filigree studded with jewels, shaking
5
hands with others "with most fascinating dignity".
Proper behaviour in kutcheris was considered very 
important. It was important to be able to different­
iate when respect was to be shown to others in keeping 
with kinship and when in accord with status. Attention 
was paid to minute details of social behaviour. When 
slightly mature command of public speaking became an
7
essential item of the curriculum.
1. The Bengalee: 8 hay 1912, p.6. (Karajole)
2. Ibid: 1 Jan. 1913, p •4•
3. Practical training was given from a very young age. 
The young had to sit in kutcheris with their elders, 
and receive petitions, etc. At such sittings they 
had to learn proper forms of address and salutations 
in accord with the petitioner's religion, caste, 
status, etc. - B.C. Sinha: Changing Times, p.15.
4. The Englishman: 31 march 1914, p.6. (i.ashipur) .
5* Ibid: 16 lob. 1911, p*5. ^uarbhanga House party)
6. B.C. Sinha: Changing Times, p.16.
7. The Bengalee: 31 march 1912, p.3«
A day.of intensive instruction left very little time 
for play. Children played amongst themselves, since it 
was considered below their "dignity" to associate with 
children of pra.jas and inferior families. It was more 
common to find them mixing with European children and 
children of people from the cities than with those of any 
family residing on the estate. The Tripura family solved 
the problem by taking new born female children into the 
household as playmates and bringing them up as members of 
the family. The kachcha institution, as the system was 
called, was acknowledged as an honourable one. When 
the playmates matured into maidenhood they became the 
female companions of the maharaj kumars. Often children 
were born of such unions who were addressed as kumars and 
respected by all as members of the family. Occasionally 
they even became the most important personality in house­
hold affairs,”' and although the question was never tested 
in a law court, it was possible for such children even to 
succeed to the gaddi in the absence of any legitimate heir.
Children brought up in such an exclusive atmosphere
unavoidably grew up with a profound sense of self-importance
and tended to believe that they were in some way superior
to others and, without any outside persuasion, accepted the
view that it was right to maintain princely darbars. Hence
the difference in the design of their homes from that of
2
the houses of other big zamindars. From the highest point 
the family flag, traditional or official, was hoisted to 
inform the pra.jas that the noble was in residence and
Nat.N.P.: week ending 21 Sept. 1912, p.1131.
2. The andar-mahal was a common feature in the homes of 
nobles ana other zamindars alike.
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available for petitions. Every raja and nawab in India
had a sheaf of petitions (Darkhasts) presented to him
1 2annually. To proclaim general policies and programmes
and receive their officers and other important personalities 
of the estate, darbar chambers were erected. Thus the 
darbar hall of the nobleman 'replaced the baithak khana 
of the zamindar. Though the darbar chamber retained the 
same lines as the overall Europeanised designs, the 
ceremonies held within were conducted in the pattern set 
by previous rulers. On a raised darbar platform in the 
darbar hall was placed the gaddi. The noblemen appeared 
in colourful Hughlai costumes, bejewelled head dresses,
4
and bedecked with precious ornaments. They possessed
5
large quantities of jewellery, because, since ancient 
<lays, jewellery had been considered a manifestation of 
affluence, grandeur, importance and authority. The 
Emperor of India presented it in the same manner as medals 
in the west. Hence, it was made into property inalien­
able from the joint holding.
It was customary for the nobleman in darbar to 
carry a sabre (talwar) studded with precious stones, 
wrapped in a red cloth as a symbol of authority at peace.
In the days when the local chiefs were powers absolute, 
the removal of the red covering signified a state of war.
The ladies of the family usually watched the proceedings
1 . The Englishman; 12 kay 1911, p.6. (Sovabazar)
Nat.N.P.: 12 Sept.1914, pp.946,947. (Tagore)
3. The Englishman: 9 inarch 1918, p.3. (Burdwan)
4. Bowring Papers (Illustrations): Yols.I,II,III.
5. Gov.Gen. to Sec.St. 25 karch 1915, R.L.: 1915,
Vol.143, File 2 0 2 1 , p.1 .
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through screened windows from a secluded room attached 
to the darbar chambers. Extraordinary darbars were also 
called during birthdays of the nobleman and his heir 
apparent and on other such occasions. The day would 
begin with the booming of guns proclaiming the advent of 
the auspicious day. Some time later a procession would 
set out comprising elephants, mounted sawars. horses, 
and carriages with the nobleman's colours at the end.^
The local towns would be decorated with flags and festoons. 
Later a darbar would be held where gifts would be presented, 
nazars offered by eminent personalities of the estate, 
and suitable speeches made, prayers chanted in the
2
temples, and in the evenings the towns illuminated.
It was not unusual to close the day with SO1U0
3
theatrical entertainments and musical concerts. To 
mark such occasions it was common to declare the day a 
public holiday within the zamindari when Government
schools, the collectorate, and municipal and district
4 *board offices were closed. Such traditions attributed
5to noblemen were carefully maintained at the estates.
The nobles received each other in the manner of 
royal princes. Dressed in full regalia with a
1. The Bengalee: 4 July 1915, p.2. (Hetampur)
2. The Englishman: 13 June 1911, p. 5. (Nashipur)
5* The Bengalee: 17 kay 1912, p.2 (Nadia)
4. The Englishman: 20 July 1917, p.4. (Dinajpur)
5. Outside their estates the traditional Indian ways- 
noble paraphernalia, life-style, clothes, etiquette, 
etc. - were not considered essential. That is
what has led to the widespread misunderstanding 
that they were similar to the upper bracket of 
the bhadralok elite of Calcutta.
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deputation of leading personalities^ of the locality 
and their senior staff, the host would receive the 
guest ceremoniously at the station or dock, isolated 
from the general public for the occasion. That was so 
despite the fact that neither the railways nor the 
river ports within British Bengal were in the jurisd­
iction of the zamindari management. On arrival, the
guest would be presented and introduced to the awaiting 
2
deputation before being escorted to the mahal by 
brass bands and private sepoys amidst cheering crowds.
On arrival the visitor would be received at the entrance 
hall and garlanded by the host and his family before 
distributing pan-attar to the assembled crowd.^
The reception was followed by formal visits and 
return visits during which customs peculiar to the 
nobles were noticeable. The newly married Bunity 
Devee, Maharani of Gooch Behar, was taken aback by 
the gestures of the Kaharani of Burdwan on whom she 
called during her honeymoon visit to the latter1s 
estate. The old Dowager poured gold coins into the 
palms of the new bride until they overflowed, to 
commemorate her reception. Sunity Devee, being used 
to the normal customs of new brides of bhadraloks 
receiving gifts and presents (tatto), found the
5
ceremony unusual. Doubtless she soon became adjusted to the 
new ways and adapted herself totally in the near
1. The Englishman: 15 Aug. 1516, p.6 .(Dacca-hurshidabad)
2 . Indian Irincess, p.79. (Burdwan-Cooch Behar;.
3. The Englishman: 17 Aug. 1911, p.6 . (Dacca-Tagore).
4. The Bengalee: 15 Jan.1911, p .5• (Jyot Kumar
 ^ , Kuker jee-Burdwan).
5. Indian Princess, p.80.
future* Even when the nobles corresponded with each
other, they made it a practice to use specially prepared
dusted papers."^
In the same manner the nobles received senior
dignitaries of British India, often being favoured by
2
formal visits from Governors and Viceroys. The 
visitor would be received -in regal splendour, freq­
uently with an elephant procession marking the occasion. 
The dignitary would be seated in a massive silver and 
gold howdah, and head the procession of half a dozen 
or so elephants with retainers in liveries, carrying 
spears and maces, leading the way. Often brass bands 
would accompany the procession. A huge umbrella would 
be attached to the main howdah to signify the visitor’s 
eminence. At times the household sepoys were used as
guards of honour, and the route would be lined with
4
chobdars and naiks. Later in the day the visitor 
would be formally called upon, who in his turn would
5
return the visit in due course. Receptions and parties 
would follow with a small darbar being the climax of the 
occasion. A marquee was raised on the mahal lawn with 
a ceremonial chair for the visitor to sit on. All the 
eminent people of the locality appeared to pay their 
respects to him. Police bands played the national 
anthem, speeches were read, and assurances of loyalty
1. Natore to Bowring 9 June 1860, Bowring Papers:
Vol.Ill, p.127.
2. Nat.N .P .: week ending 25- Nov. 1912, p.1371.
3. Bengal Diary 1917-19: Zetland, Vol I, p.63.(Dhanbaria)
4. The Bengalee: 2 July 1912, p.1. (Kakina)
5. B.C. Sinha : Changing Times, pp. 16-17.
to the Crown voiced.^ In the evening functions and enter­
tainments, consisting of dances, theatrical performances 
and musical soirees were held to mark the occasion. If
the host was a Muslim nobleman, the guests could even
2
be amused by cock-fights and bull-fights.
Apart from maintaining establishments at the various
estates, the nobles generally kept residents at prov-
3 4incial headquarters^ and popular hill stations. Since
they were exempted from the Arms Act and were allowed
to employ retainers, the mahals and the grounds were
patrolled by armed sentries carrying both offensive
and defensive weapons. They were of various ranks
and technically had varied functions but, in reality,
were general watchmen guarding the property. The
Burdwan estate military establishment, as it was called,
comprised sawars (horsemen), nazirs (swordsmen),
paiks (lancers), sepoys (gunmen), and mahuts
(elephant riders). There existed a hierarchy of
officers designated havildar. Jamadar, subedar, in,
respective seniority, with a bakhshi with overall
control. The arms were kept in an armoury in the
charge of an officer called rishi. The Dhanbaria
retainers comprised spearmen, mace-bearers and
5
mahuts. The Kakina establishment had household
sepoys with .jamadars and havildars in charge of
them and contingents of chobdars and paiks. The
1. European Residents of Hatwa Raj to Lieut.G-ov.
3 July 1910, RJj. : 1910, Vol.134, Pile 3015, 
enclo.C, pp.5,6 .
2* Nat.N.R.: week ending 24 Feb.1913, p.238. (Dacca)
3. Calcutta & Dacca.
4. Darjeeling, Kurseong, etc.
5. Bengal Diary 1917-19: Zetland, Vol.I, p.63*
6 . The Bengalee: 2 July 1912, p . 1.
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Nawab of Dacca even had a band of his own.
From the above examination of their life style and 
privileges, it becomes apparent that the nobles of Bengal 
formed a status group as defined by Max Weber. Their refusal 
to associate on equal terms with the rest of society was 
evidence of a desire to preserve a way of life, which at one 
time embodied the genuine values of the political class in 
Indian political life. As an economic class they belonged 
to the body of Bengal zamindars. But this economic determina­
tion did not exhaust the conditions of their group formation. 
In contrast to the class situation there existed a status 
situation in which the typical component of their values 
was determined by a specific estimation of honour. Their 
status honour was expressed by the fact that they demanded 
a specific style of life from fellow members belonging to 
the circle; a circle made nearly impossible to penetrate 
by their spokesman, the Title Committee. Linked with that 
expectation were restrictions on social intercourse. 
Stratification of status went hand in hand with the glorifica­
tion of the ideal of '’dignity." Beside the specific status 
honour, which rested upon distance and exclusiveness, other 
material monopolies were also visible. Such. honor&fic 
preferences consisted of wearing the Mughlai costumes,
and the privilege of donning the robe of honour, 
carrying the talwar wrapped in red cloth, presiding
1. Gov.Gen. to Crewe 5 Oct. 1911, F.jj. : 1911,
Vol.443, Lt.no.2 3 6 , enclo. pp.2.3*
over ceremonial darbars. receiving each other and visit­
ing dignitaries in state, maintaining arms and employ­
ing retainers, having the right of private entree to 
the Governor’s Palace, special medical benefits, 
special seating arrangements in state ceremonials, 
and being exempted from attendance of civil courts 
and compliance with the Arms Act. They were grouped 
together by their prestige, a feeling of superiority, 
the conviction that they were true noblemen, and 
specific ideas of correct noble behaviour, leading to 
a specific way of life. Their actions were orientated 
primarily by the feeling of belonging together over 
and above the rest of the community: an awareness 
of being considered more "dignified” than others.
CHAPTER II.
THE PATRIARCHS.
By the twientieth century the nobles had been 
deprived of all political authority and were virtually 
degraded from being the governing class of the prov­
ince. Their function had come to be confined to the 
collection of rent from their tenants, strictly 
regulated by the Bengal Tenancy Acts, and the supply­
ing of revenue to the Government, in accordance with 
the Permanent Settlement regulations. In other words, 
they were of no more consequence than any other 
zamindar in the eyes of the law. Nor did they have 
the advantage which the British nobility possessed 
of being a hereditary part of the legislative machinery 
of the country. Moreover, their exclusive habits 
frequently led the articulate intelligentsia to main­
tain that their lives were spent in fruitless leisure 
in a rarified atmosphere remote from ordinary life.
Thus, both from a legal point of view and as members 
of the Bengal community, they were apparently of no 
value as noblemen. Yet, despite their apparent insig­
nificance , we find the Government singling them out, 
granting them preferential treatment, and generally 
pampering them like spoilt children.
The Government’s behaviour appears more 
illogical in the light of the prevalent political 
climate in the province. If political expediency 
required the delicate handling of any particular
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group, one would expect it to be the articulate intelli­
gentsia, led by renowned leaders like Surendranath 
Banerjea, Bhupendranath Basu, Ambica Charan Majumdar, 
Bash Behari G-hose, Rabindranath Tagore, Arobindo 
Ghose, Razlul Huq, A. Rasul, and other such prominent 
political figures. They were the recognised leaders 
of the educated public, and challenged the practice 
of alien domination in the country. When the British 
Administration relied heavily on the nobles to make 
the Royal Reception a success, on the ground that 
the large landholders were the true leaders of the 
people, there ensued a furore from a large section 
of the Indian press against the decision. It was 
repeatedly pointed out that the rajas and nawabs 
carried little weight with the people, and had no 
right to the pretence of leadership of Bengal 
society. According to the Bengalee, "in India men of 
education are the friends and guides of the poor wbn 
form the overwhelming portion of the population of 
the country1.'^ The Nayak in a more adamant tone asserted 
that "we are not in touch with Rajas and Maharajas,
we are not of the class of toadies or darbaris....
The Anglo-Indian papers talk of the people of the 
country organizing these Receptions. Who are the 
people of the country then? Is the Maharaja of Burdwan 
or Maharaja Tagore of Naptepara to be understood by
1. Hat. owned Bng. . P .: week ending 1 June 1912,
p.338.
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that term? Do they mix with the people of the country,
M 1listen to what they say? The Pallivasi maintained 
that they did not urge the exclusion of "Aristocrats” 
from the Royal Reception, hut suggested that the "middle
p
classes” had the right to take the leading part in it.
The nobles, on the other hand, claimed that the zamindars, 
of whom they were the leading members, were the "natural 
leaders" of the people. To assess the validity of the 
nobles' claim, it is necessary at the very beginning to 
examine the extent of truth in the claim of the intelli­
gentsia that it was they who were in direct touch with 
the general public, or, as the Bengalee put it, that 
they were the"friends and guides" of the poor, while 
the nobles lived in ignorance of their needs in a 
world totally detached from the rest of society.
An overall analysis of the contemporary press 
reports brings to light the fact that the Indian press 
itself was divided in its views. All contemporary 
journals did not hold the same opinion as the Bengalee. 
the paper that reflected the view of Surendranath Bcinerjea's 
group. Some papers were not convinced by the contention of 
the leaders of the intelligentsia that they represented 
the interests of the general public. The journals 
advocating the retention of traditional Indian views 
quite rejected their claim to general leadership. The 
most outspoken, the Nayak, accused them of not caring for
1. Nat.N.P.: week ending 15 Apr. 1911, pp.427,428.
2. Ibid: week ending 29 Apr. 1911, p.497.
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the multitude but of using that as an excuse for further­
ing the prospects of the small educated community: 
"Bhupendranath and Surendranath are self-constituted 
leaders of the country. They do not keep themselves 
informed of what is going on in the country, nor under­
stand the feelings of its inhabitants. They simply 
want to extend the scope of the activity of the
i
educated community". Carmichael gave emphatic support
2to the same view in a speech to the students of Dacca.
The fundamental reason for such views was not 
far to seek. The leaders of the group were undoubtedly 
men of considerable ability. But like most Indians, 
they too avoided mixing with people considered 
socially inferior, and so their activities were 
restricted to the educated community. To this day, 
social separation due to status consciousness is a 
predominant characteristic of the Indian temperament.
It was more so in the early part of the century. Bhup- 
endranath Basu quite frankly confessed in an interview 
with the Manchester Guardian. "My brief experience of the
English working people has been a great eye-opener
to me. I have mixed with them very freely, and I have 
gone about in crowds in a way I should not have dreamed
3
of doing in my own country". Social association and
actual identification with the crowd was relatively
unknown before the emergence of Ghandi as the national
1* hat.i'J.P .: week ending 15 June 1912, p.657; - Accord­
ing to the 1921 Census out of a total population of 
47,592,462 there were only 4322645 literate people of
which only 778,932 knew English. - Census 1921 :
Bengal, Vol.V, pt.2, p.7o.
2. The Englishman: 31 Jan.1916, p.8.
3. Ibid: 31 July 1911,-p.7.
leader of India. Thus both the groups were primarily 
exclusive. The difference lay in the attitude towards 
the exclusiveness.
The nobles and their fellow zamindars, unlike the 
leaders of the intelligentsia, made no pretence of being 
part of the general public. On the contrary, they argued 
that direct association on an equal basis with the people 
would diminish their position and influence as the 
"natural leaders" of the society. Their attitude was 
well illustrated by Maharaja Tagore's remarks as spokes­
man of the British Indian Association. He said that 
"these great zamindars actuated as they are by 
oriental ideas of social dignity would consider 
themselves greatly humiliated if they were forced to 
canvass for votes among their subordinate tenure 
holders, tenants, retainers and persons of inferior 
status. If by any chance they may be obliged to 
stoop to such infamous practices, their position 
would be lowered in the eyes of the people, their 
influence greatly reduced and their sphere of use­
fulness become extremely limited."^ Words such as 
'great', 'social dignity’, 'humiliated', 'inferior 
status', 'stoop', 'infamous', speak volumes on the 
subject of the opinion they had of themselves. Though 
they may be condemned for having such an obviously 
inflated sense of arrogance, the fact remains that 
neither the nobles nor the leaders of the intellig­
entsia, who claimed that they were not status con­
scious like the nobles, had any direct touch with the
1. J.H. Broomfield: 'Vote & Transfer of Power',
J. A . 6.: Peb. 1962, p.172.
people at large. It would not be wrong to conclude that 
in Bengal the method of contact between the two primary 
status groups claiming leadership and the general public 
was through indirect processes. On personal capacity 
and reputation, rather than direct communication, 
depended their influence over the public.
The zamindars as a class have for generations 
been reputed to be exploiters, tyrants, and primarily dis­
interested in public welfare. Contemporary literature 
emphasised the point by using the zamindar tyrant as 
a favourite theme. It was of this economic class that 
the nobles formed the prominent status group.
The novelists' portrayal of the landed nobles as 
extortionists was corroborated by other authoritative 
sources. The Report on Survey and Settlement Operations 
for 1913 stated that the big landholders had been found 
to be the worst offenders against the section of the 
Bengal Tenancy Act limiting the enhancement of rent. 
Referring to the Bhowal estate, it stated that 
illegal enhancement had been superimposed on 
illegal cesses to a large extent. The report extenu­
ated the iNfatore and Dighapatia. estates by pointing 
out that on the whole they were well managed.  ^ But 
only a couple of years later, in a letter to the 
editor of the Muhammadi, the Dighapatia estate was 
accused of exacting abwabs from the tenants of Noak- 
hali at the rate of four annas on the rupee on the 
occasion of the marriage of the eldest son of the
1. The Englishman: 2 Apr. 1914, p .7.
As with the novels and official reports, the
newspapers were also full of adverse comments. The
Rayat complained that the law prohibited the enhancement
of rent at a rate higher than two annas on the rupee,
but enhancement was sometimes made even up to eight
annas or more, and rayats deliberately injured by
false measurements of the holdings. The principal
offenders were the bigger and better known zamindars
rather than the small talukdars, maintained the same 
2
paper. The Prasun drew a dismal picture of the condi­
tions of the rayats in the Burdwan estate. Most of 
it was farmed out to patnidars and dar-patnidars "who 
screw the last penny they can from their poor rayats".
If rents fell into arrears, heavy interest was charged
at the rate of eight annas per rupee. Illegal cesses
3
were also extorted almost every year. The Bangavasi 
received a complaint from certain rayats of the Sund- 
erganj Bandar Estate of the Raja of Tajhat, making,
4
serious allegations against some of the local amlas.
The Islam Ravi accused Rani Dinamani Chaudhurani of 
Santosh of allowing her naib to oppress the Muslim
5
tenants in various ways. The Moslem Hitaishi 
reported that Maharaja Tagore turned a blind eye
1. Ind.IT.P.: week ending 6 May 1916, p.633-
2. Ibid: week ending 13 Nov.1913, p.1632.
3. Ibid: week ending 15 Eeb. 1913, p.160.
4. Ibid: week ending 21 June 1913, p.559.
5. Ibid: week ending 9 Jan. 1915, p.51.
*to the oppression committed by his manager of Sarai-
kandi Zamandari in the shape of exacting presents,
begar (unpaid labour), and nazar (financial offerings).^
Writing about the Maharaja of Kassimbazar, the same paper
at an earlier date reported that the Jotedars in the Bahar-
band Taluk of the Maharaja were levying illegal cesses on
the tenants of the Maharaja with his consent, ostensibly
for the purpose of paying the money to the Maharaja as a
2
present, but in reality for their own benefit.
Phan Mahmud in a letter to the editor of the above
paper accused the Raja of Mymensingh of the most outrageous
oppression. He wrote, ”At about 1 or 2 o’clock on the night
of Wednesday, the fourth of Baishak last, the Deputy Manager
of the Raja Sasi Kanta Acharyya ... accompanied by four
elephants and countless armed lathials attacked my house...
The four elephants utterly trampled down the six rooms of my
house and the lathials damaged and threw away my stocks of
paddy, rice, jute, clothes, utensils. The elephants killed
many' of my goats. Minhazuddin peon struck my younger brother
with a sword. He is in a precarious condition. The Raja's
lathials are keeping watch on me; there is no telling when
3they may kill me.”
From such evidence one might conclude that they
1. Ind.N.P. : week ending 12 Sept. 1914, p.946.
2. Ibid. : week ending 24 Jan. 1914, p.70.
3. Ibid. : week ending 13 June, 1914, p.570
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had no right to pose as leaders of the community. Doubt­
less nobody would be willing without coercion to be led 
or influenced by people of such calibre. Yet, keeping 
in mind that the franchise was limited to the ”educated” 
and the "well-to-do”, the election results of 1912 gives 
some support to the nobles11 claims to leadership. Suren­
dranath Banerjea's group had captured or could expect 
support from the municipality seats only. The results 
showed that most of the members returned to the legis­
lative Council were zamindars. Out of those returned, 
three out of five District and local Boards representing 
rural Bengal, the landholders* constituencies, and the 
Indian commercial community were represented by noble­
men. Moreover, out of the five Muslim seats, one went 
to a nobleman, while another went to a nominee of the 
Nawab of Dacca.^
The election results reflecting the inclinations
2of the rural population, the commercial community and 
the Muslim Bengalis show that, despite their reputation 
as oppressive zamindars the nobles had far greater influ­
ence over the local people than the contemporary leaders 
of the intelligentsia. Apparently the latter's influence 
was localised in the cities and the urban areas maintain­
ing municipalities only. That was so because their 
efforts were directed primarily towards the uplift of
1. Discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
2. See Appendix IV for the electorate of District and
Local Boards who in their turn elected the Legis­
lative Councillors.
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the educated community, equal opportunity for the educated 
Indian in services with the British, and struggle for
-j
political power with the Administration. Until the
emergence of C.R. Das in the political life of Bengal,
the rural population was largely ignored by them as
being insignificant. The nobles, on the other hand,
derived their economic strength and political prestige
from the support of agricultural Bengal. The province
was predominantly agricultural, with a population of
2
about 46,700,000 , of which the urban section, com-
3
prised only 2,500,000 or so. Moreover, out of the 
above total figure, approximately 25,000,000 were 
Muslims^ whose ranks comprised even less urbanized 
intelligentsia than the Hindus. Furthermore, the 
importance of the city where the intelligentsia had the 
largest influence not only rested on its municipal life 
but also on its commercial activities. All three - the 
rural, Muslim and commercial community - had given 
their confidence to noblemen and their fellow 
zamindars.
Leadership of rural Bengal must not be 
belittled as insignificant on the grounds that the 
majority comprised indifferent agriculturists who 
would not participate in the political life of the 
time. The nineteenth century had proved that they 
also could, if aggravated, become a turbulent element
1. S.H. Banerjea: Various resolutions described.
2. Census 1 921 : Bengal, V0 1 .V, pt.2, p. 12.5.
5. J.H. Broomfield, p.5*
4 . Census 1921: Bengal, VoI.V, pt.2, p.175.
affecting the political stability of the province.
The disturbances of Titu Mir (1830), of the Faraizis
(1836), of the indigo rayats (1859), of the East Bengal
rayats (1866), and the riots at Pabna (1872) and at
Rajshahi-Dinajpur (1882) had been proof manifest of
the above fact.^ As early as the 1870s reference can
be found to the British awareness of the agriculturists1
2
potential power if they combined together. Moreover, 
the Administration’s interest in the agricultural commu­
nity was implied by the Civil Servants' claim to be 
the guardians of the peasants of India. Indeed, to 
forget the potential strength of people who, both men 
and women, were capable of working in waist-deep water 
from sun rise to sun set, day in and day out, with a 
minimum amount of food and in sub-human living conditions 
would have been folly. The bhadralok were capable of 
sporadic terrorist activities but such a peasantry could 
doubtless sustain the attrition of a guerilla movement 
for years under the most taxing conditions.
' A large section of that population, residing in 
rural Bengal, continued to respect the nobles, although 
they had been superseded as the political class, had 
gained a derogatory reputation amongst a large 
section of the intelligentsia, and had preserved 
exclusive habits despite the decline of the Mughal 
nobility. There were many and varied reasons for
1. List supplied by Dr. Mohar Ali.
2. P. Sinha: Nineteenth Century Bengal, p.26.
98
this apparently contradictory phenomenon. One was 
that the local nobleman could be easily identified 
as one of themselves by the rural people. The Bengalis 
tended to live out their lives, generation after genera­
tion, in their ancestral districts. The Census reports 
of 1911 and 1921 show that only 8.7f° and 9.8$ respec­
tively of the Indian population lived outside the 
district of their birth. Kingsley Davis points out
that even those low figures were probably exaggerated. 
Often it was easier to trace older connections of
the peasantry with a village than that of the land- 
2
lord himself. Consequently, for the majority of 
Bengalis, until today, the word desh neither meant 
the country as it should if translated literally, 
nor the province, but the village or district of 
the speaker’s origin. Even for many who had estab­
lished residence in the city, their bari (home) conti­
nued to be the ancestral home, while the city dwell-
"3 Aing WciS their basha (shelter). Thus the interest and
affiliations of the common man tended to revolve 
within the limits of his desh, rather than with the 
larger concept of the province or the nation. In that 
desh the people in whom was vested the legal authority 
changed with the expiry of their term in office; the 
political leaders from the city came and went at per­
iodic intervals, but the nobleman and his descendants
1. R. Eendix: Max Veber, p.151 in.
2. L.R.C.: Vol.Ill, p.62.
3. P. Sinha: Nineteenth Century Bengal, p .11.
remained with, them generation after generation in the 
same manner as themselves.
In that small area, the zamindar and his predec­
essors had been the karta or rnalik for centuries. Their 
authority had . previously enveloped not only the land 
of the locality but also the inhabitants who resided on 
it. Anand Ram Mukhlis, an official of Muhammad Shah’s 
court, wrote in the Mirat-al Istilak that a zamindar 
meant a person who was the malik of the land of a village 
or township. Thus, unlike the ordinary agriculturist, 
his right extended over not only the land but also the 
people who resided on it. For this privilege he paid a 
fixed sum of revenue, and then made collections called 
malikana from individual peasants at high rates fixed 
by custom or by himself. An eighteenth century glossary 
of revenue terms, compiled by an official familiar with 
the practice of Bengal, informs us that the malikana 
was the right of the zamindar. It became so that in 
the eyes of the common man payment of state revenue 
meant payment to the malik. Moreover, his military 
contingents and fortresses symbolised his resolution 
to defend the land from external aggression and 
maintain internal law and orderJ Thus for centuries, 
in the eyes of the local people, the zamindar was 
nothing short of the actual sovereign of the desh.
Some territories, for example those of the zamindar 
of Bishnupur and the chiefs of Cooch Behar and Tripura, 
were so inaccessible that even the powerful Mughal 
Subedar, Murshid Quli Khan, left them unmolested,
1. Irfan Habib: Agrarian System of Mughal India,
pp.140,145,146,156,103*
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allowing them to be nothing less than real kings in their 
localities.^ It resulted in the belief that the zamindar 
embodied all the authority of the state, rather than held 
his authority as the delegated subordinate of the para­
mount power. It is apparent from contemporary literature 
that the zamindar and his successors were set apart by the 
inhabitants and treated as-though endowed with exceptional
qualities: qualities inaccessible to ordinary persons
2and regarded as exemplary. The qualities were further 
magnified in the case of a zamindar with a noble title: 
a title which had been identified with rulers in India 
from antiquity. To a Muslim the title nawab was further 
sanctified, since it was closely identified with the 
Amir amongst them: the Amir who was to be given due
respect in accord with the Prophet's injunction.
Traditional domination in their own locality auto­
matically followed and continued even after the noblemen 
had been divested of all political authority. It was a
product of custom or usage resting on long familiarity or 
3
habit. A habit so old is never discarded easily, espec­
ially in such countries with truly old civilizations 
which have strongly established traditional social
4
institutions. The zamindar nobleman's position 
1 . A. Xarim: Murshid Quli nhan. p.78.
2. Weber applied the term charisma, to a certain quality of
an individual by virtue of which he is set apart and
treated as endowed with exceptional qualities. These are
not accessible to ordinary persons but are regarded as
of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of
them the individual is treated with deference, freq­
uently his descendants continue to generate the same 
awe which leads to traditional domination. - R.Bendix:
Max v.eber, pp.8 8 fn. , 304,5^5,309.
3. Traditional authority is "the authority whose legitimizat­
ion is based on some such justification as 'since time 
immemorial', or 'since the memory of men runneth not
to the contrary' - J.B. G-oIdtnorpe: nn introduction
to Sociology, p. 157.
4. T.B. Bottomore :Batur- 6: lynes of iocioloaical Theory.
p.pbi.
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became sanctified by tradition, transmitting a deperson­
alised charisma to the man on the gaddi. thereby allowing 
him to maintain traditional authority. This quality 
remained unimpaired even after the loss of substant­
ive political authority, due to the retention of all 
extraneous features of the old baronial houses explained 
in the previous chapter. Even then the false aura might 
have atrophied had not the British converted their 
offices into proprietory rights over the area in 
their charge. The result was that the inhabitants of 
the locality were constantly aware of the existence of 
a raj.* a raja, ra.ibaris. ra.i darbars. ra.i kutcheris, 
ra.i naibs, ra.i sepoys, and so on. The deception was 
accentuated by the fact that the rent paid was called 
khajna, which associated it with the State's revenue. 
Moreover, the Government continued to address them as 
maliks in their khatians^, and ancient terms like 
maliker malikana continued to exist in estate management 
terminology until the very end. Such attitudes were- 
further strengthened by the Government's measures on 
such exceptional occasions as births and deaths in the 
noble households. It was not unusual to declare public 
mourning at the time of death,or public celebration at 
times of birth, as though they were in fact the rulers, 
or, at least, of some political importance. Under such 
circumstances, not only the zamindari establishments
1. McAlpin to Sec . Aev .i.ept .Beng. 17 June 1913, B.R.P. : 
July 1913, Vol.9157, p.43; khatian = official 
notifications ana correspondences, and proprietory 
deeds.
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would close but also the civil and criminal courts, the
1 2  3 
kutcheris. the collectorate, and the offices and schools
run by the G-overnment. Sociologists have pointed out that
the legitimization of traditional domination occurs whenever
obedience is given on the basis of established usage* It
ultimately becomes as routine as the father’s authority over 
4
his household* It had become so in the case of the nobles of 
Bengal in pre-Independence India.
Though the basis of traditional authority and depersonal­
ised charismatic influence may be found in their historical
5
emergence, their high-sounding titles, and the lack of population 
mobility, the reason for its continuance has to be sought 
elsewhere, A nebulous figure with exclusive habits would 
not be able to exert patriarchal dominance for long by mere 
psychological means. It was essential to remain in the public 
eye and provide benefits for the people which to some degree 
would tilt the balance of opinion in their favour, and miti­
gate their reputation as extortionists, or else face the 
consequence of gradually sinking into oblivion.
• The nobles1 behavioural pattern examined in the 
previous chapter shows that they were consciously attempt­
ing to preseve a way of life that had been established by 
their predecessors. Such being the case, it is necessary to 
make a quick representative survey of the activities
1. The Bengalee: 4 Sept. 1912, p.l. (Natore)
2. The Englishman: 20 July 1917, p.4. (Dinajpur)
3* Telegram from Comm.Dacca 16 Jan. 1915, B.P.P.: Peb.1915,
Vol.9647, p.17 (Dacca)
4. R. Bendix: Max Weber, p.332
5. Maharajadhiraj Bahadur conveyed the suggestion that 
such a title holder was emperor or king of kings 
rather than a mere zamindar.
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of their forbears before proceeding to see how the traditions 
thus established cam:e to serve the current nobles as a means 
of remaining within the realm of public awareness.
Prom the annals of the eighteenth century we find that 
Raja Sitaram Rai of Bhusna was a renowned Zamindar nobleman.
He built the city of Harihamager and adorned it with a tank, 
a number of temples and other public buildings. He did the 
same at his capital, Muhammadpur. Out of the temples he 
erected, the Dhol Mandir and the temple of Krishna and Balaram 
were most notable. He patronised Hindu sages and Sanskrit 
scholars, giving to them large endowment s. On the occasion of 
Dolyatra and Rathyatra, he used to distribute large sums to 
the poor and the destitute.
After the rebellion of Raja Sitaram the nizamat authorities 
dispossessed him of his estates which were handed over to 
Ramjiban Rai, the ancestor of the current Raja of Natore.
The reputation of the Natore family reached its peak during 
the time of the Rani Bhavani. She patronised the Hindu religion 
by bestowing stipends on the Brahmins and on places of worship. 
She constructed numerous tanks, wells, roads, and charitable 
institutions. During the great famine of 1770 she opened 
free kitchens in different parts of her zamindari and, aside 
from this, purchased food grains at great expense and sold 
them at lower prices in the famine stricken areas.
Another renowned contemporary was Raja Krishna Chandra, 
the ancestor of the current Raja of Nadia. He promoted 
art and literature and at his court gathered some of the 
greatest Sanskrit scholars of the time to whom he made 
large endowments. The famous clay models of Krishnagar 
and the fine cotton industry of Santipur owe their develop —
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ment to the patronage of the Raja.
Raja Krishna Chandra’s fame in Hindu society was 
closely challenged by Raja Rajvallav of Vikrampur. like the 
hatore and Nadia families' patronage towards their own 
Brahmin caste, Rajvallav in turn patronised the Vaidya 
society. Under him the Vaidyas grew prosperous and power­
ful. Being a keen social reformer he gave protection to 
Hindu widows and sincerely tried to persuade the Hindu 
pandits in 1 7 5 6 to sanction remarriage of minor widows.
He was a great patron of the artisans and the craftsmen 
and took a personal interest in their well-being. He 
was also a great builder and gave considerable impetus to 
the architectural development in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth 
century. His court too was adorned with gifted poets and 
scholars.
It should not be thought that the traditions
of the nobles were restricted merely to the Hindu
families. The Muslim noblemen also followed a similar
pattern. Badiul Zaman of Birbhum used to spend Rs.140,000
*
annually on religion, education and stipends to poor 
scholars and sages. He also built numerous tanks and 
mosques in his zamindari.^
Thus we find that the zamindar noblemen of this 
earlier era set a pattern which had received the stamp 
of tradition and had come to be acknowledged as the 
proper behaviour for nobles. They were expected to 
beautify their own territories, develop irrigation and 
the supply of water by digging tanks and wells in their 
own zamindaris, erect and maintain temples and mosques
1. a .C. Roy: History of Bengal, pp.357,358, 360-363.
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where the devout, the poor, the old, and the destitute
could find sanctuary, patronise education, arts, and crafts,
help relieve the distressed during famine, and take an
active interest in the well being of their caste groups
in particular, and social reforms in general*
Over and above the traditions the nobles sought
to preserve, they aspired to greater titles and elevation
in their own hierarchy. Such aspirations could only be
achieved by being able to convince the Authorities that
they were indeed worthy landlords. Thus the nobles had a
dual incentive to maintain social services. In many ways
the nobles retained a prominent position in the public
consciousness despite their reluctance to associate with
the people at large.
As the premier landlords, the nobles were obviously
considered their leaders by the other zamirdars of Bengal.
They dominated all the associations and societies dealing
with zamindari interests.Their inter-locking interests
were further strengthened by marriage alliances, blood
relationships, and pagri exchanges. Apart from concrete
unions, their class cohesion resulted in one coming to
2the rescue of a zamindar in times of stress. On occasj- 
ions one even managed and maintained the estates of 
another as trustee.^ The size of their landholdings and 
their position within their class convinced the Government
1. Discussed in more detail in Chapter III.
2. Nat.N.P.; week ending 1 July 1911> p.784.
3. Bengal Zamindars, p.3.
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of the need to acknowledge them as leaders of the zamindari
class which is made obvious by the fact that the Government
frequently felt it adequate simply to consult them alone,
along with the associations dominated by them, on questions
that involved the entire class.'1' The zamindars as a body
owned 86^ of the total area of Bengal, of which a very
large portion belonged to the nobles themselves. Their
position with their class was of such high standing that
Maharaja Tagore could be presumptuous enough to say that
he pledged the loyalty of all the zamindars to the British
Raj in the inaugural gathering of the Great War Conference
held at Government Eouse.^
Often it has been suggested that ownership did not
give the privilege of leadership to the zamindars, since
they were absentee landlords. The point that is left
unclarified is that for the nobles, at least, the word
did not signify living away from their estates. Their
zamindaris were not consolidated holdings but were
scattered over the province and, sometimes, even beyond
the provincial boundaries. The properties of eminent
nobles such as Maharaja Tagore and the Maharaja of
Kassimbazar might v/ell be located in ten to fourteen
different districts of Bengal and the neighbouring 
4provinces. It was not possible for the superior 
landholders to be present in the various holdings per­
sonally at all times. Doubtless the Maharaja of Burdwan,
living at Burdwan, was an absentee landlord to his prajas
1. Birly to 13 nobles & 8 associations 10 May 1916,
B.R.P.; May 1516, Vol.9 8 9 8 , p.61.
2. The Englishman: 4 June 1918, p.6.
3. Ibid.
4. Chiefs, Rajas & Zamindars, pp.199*200,327,337.
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at Kujang estate^" located on the sea coast at Orissa.
It could not be otherwise. Official reports have helped 
to cloud the issue by denominating such cases as absentee
i
2
landlords on a par with those landlords and large tenure
holders who were truly absentee, in that their income
and prestige from the land .were supplementary to their
primary occupation.^ A lieutenant-Governor describing
the latter type of landholder explained that “the Bengali
barrister, lawyer, official, litterateur, trader, while
following diligently his calling in the city, contrives
4
to acquire his bit of land”. This was not so in the 
case of the nobles. The normal practice amongst them was 
to have a single estate headquarter which acted as the nerve 
■centre for the entire zamindari. It was there that people 
like the Maharajas of Nashipur and Dinajpur the Rajas of
5
Chakdighi and Naldunga, Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee , and 
the Raja of Hetampur^ lived. The Rawabs of Murshidabad 
and Dacca, the Maharaja of Burdwan, and the Raja of Kakina 
also spent most of their time in their estate head-
7
quarters. On the other hand, the Tagore, Paikpara, and 
the Law families, preferred to remain in the provincial 
capital for the major part of the year. But it must be 
kept in mind that Puthuriaghata, Paikpara, and 24
Parganas, the headquarters of the three respectively,
1. ’Restoration of Land to Burdwan Raj’, B.R.P.: Apr.1912,
Vol.8939, p.1 2 .
2. 'Quinquinnial Report of Brudwan Div. 1905-10*, B.G.P.:
Sept.1911, Vol.8677, p.87.
3. L.R.C.: Vol.V, p.238.
4. A. Seal: Emergence of Indian Nationalism, p.53.
5. Addresses Presented at Cal.s Montagu, Vol.34.
Biographical points on members of deputations 
and memorialists.
6 . ’Rep.Survey & Settlement', B.R.P.: Apr.1916,
Vol.9898, p.125.
7. The Englishman.: 'Indian Events-Eengal Presidency1
and 'By the Way1 columns.
were all parts of greater Calcutta and have become parts 
of the city by now. The ones who remained away from 
their estates were the exceptions rather than the rule. 
Summing up the above view, the Bengal Landholders Assoc­
iation pointed out to the Land Revenue Commission 1938 
that "most of the big zamindars are residents but they 
can reside in one place only while the zamindaris are 
very much scattered and cover a wide area...." ^
Other advocates of the absentee landlord theory 
maintain that the word did not signify physical 
absence but the absence of interest. How far they 
lacked interest is difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess. That they lacked all interest in their estates 
when their income, well being, and prestige depended on 
it does not seem feasible. The Chief Manager of Tagore 
estate pointed out to the Land Revenue Commission 1938 
that Mthey are generally alert to their own interests 
as well as to the interest of their tenants, they keep 
all informations about the tenantry that is required ....
The nobles themselves made frequent remarks that the
interests of the tenants were very close to their 
hearts as their mutual interests, both in prosperity
and adversity, were correlated.^ After all their lots
4
were cast with their tenants. Byomkesh Chakrovarty, 
speaking for himself and Raja Reshee Case Law to their 
prajas stated, "If you are prosperous our collections 
are better, if you are in distress our collections may 
entirely cease and we may have to pass anxious time ....
1 . " l T R T c T T o i T f i T r ^ T  — —  - -
2. Ibid: Vol.V, p.422.
3. The Englishman: 28 Aug. 1911, p.5. (Tagore)
4. The Bengalee: 15 Aug. 1913, p.2. (Santpsh)
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It is obvious therefore your interest is our interest,
your joys are our joys, your sorrows our sorrows. It
therefore necessarily follows that it would be foolish
of us if we did not combine and cooperate for our common
good, and our common advantage."'*’
The Maharaja of Nashipur attended kutcheri
regularly from eleven to five to supervise the day
to day work of the estate staff and toured the various
estates in the winter months to discuss with his subordi
2
nates the possibilities of any improvement. The 
Maharaja of Tripura also toured his estates periodically 
to discuss various questions of local importance and to 
grant his prajas interviews. Moreover, he appointed 
a mixed commission of leading officials and one non­
official to examine the finances of the zamindaris.^  
Similarly, Maharaja Tagore toured his estates and met
the tenantry in public receptions, drawing crowds as
A
large as four to five thousand people. The tours were 
utilised to receive petitions from the residents and
local institutions seeking financial assistance and
5 6redress from grievances. The Maharajas of Mymensmgh
7 8and Natore and Baja of Muktagacha also drew crowds of
thousands during their tours round their estates. The 
Maharaja of Burdwan, assisted by Baja Ban Bihari Kapur,
managed to streamline and reform the administration of
1. The Bengalee: 14 Feb. 1912, p.5.
2. T).C. Boulger: Maharajah Devi Sinha, p. 199.
3. 'Report 1911-12', I.S.A.R.: Tripura 1909-19, Vol.17,
pp.3,4.
4. The Englishman: 25 Aug. 1911, p.5*
Ibid: 12 May 1911, p.6 .
6 * Ibid: 2 6 Aug. 1912, p.3*
7. The Bengalee: 2 Sept,1911. p.2.
8 . Ibid: 12 Sept. 1912, p.l.
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the Burdwan estate.^" The Kumar of Paikpara was consid-
2
ered an authority on estate management during his time.
Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee was such a stringent zamindar
that he gained the reputation of being a "hard landlord".^
Nawab Syed Mohammed Ali Chaudhury was considered one of
the best zamindars of the time^ and the Raja of Chanchal
5
was acknowledged as a model landlord. The Raja of Chak- 
dighi took great interest in village institutions and
g
was reputed to be a good landlord. The Raja of Naldunga
7
was praised for his sympathetic treatment of his tenants.
As for the Maharaja of Kassimbazar, even as eminent a 
nationalist leader as Surendranath Banerjea pointed out
g
that he was a zamindar beyond criticism. Apparently the
tribal chieftains were also not far behind their fellow
nobles. About the Chakma Raja, the Superintendent of
Chottagong Hill Tracts wrote that " he has proved him-
o
self to be an excellent administrator", while the Comm­
issioner of Chittagong Division stated that "the Mong 
chief is just as good an administrator as the Chakma 
c h i e f i f  the above data is to be accepted as repres­
entative examples of the nobles1 behaviour pattern as 
gamindars, it is not entirely correct to suggest that
1. I.B.D.: p.71.
2. Catalogue of Books (Bengal): 1915-23
3. Addresses Presented at Cal.: Montagu, Vol.34.
. Biographical detail preceding his memorandum.
Carmichael to Hardinge 7 Nov. 1913, C.P.I.: Vol.ValO, 1913,
pt.I, p.401.
5* Gourlay to DuBoulay 15 March 1916, Ibid; 1916,
Vol.Val5, pt.I, p.180.
6 . Addresses Presented ai> Cal.: Montagu, Vol. 34.
Biographical detail, preceding his memorandum.
7. ’Quinquiniel Renort of Presidency Div.1905-10’, B .G-.P . :
Apr.1911, Vol.8677, p.558.
8 . The Englishman: 22 July 1911, p.3.
9. rusher to Sec .Pol, Dept. E.Beng. 22 Apr.1911, B.P.P.:
march 1913, Vol.9146, p.33. ----
10. Lang to Chief Sec.Ber.g. 25 Hay 1915, B.P.P. : juiy icnr-, 
_________ Vol.95.17. _________________ —  .... ou-i-J --.-i-',
they were non-resident zamindars, nor that they lacked 
interest in their zamindaris.
Such being the case, the nobleman’s presence, 
despite his exclusive habits, was felt by a large section 
of the population, both the educated and the illiterate, 
due to his personal supervision, periodical appearances, 
and through the junior landlords whose spokesman he and 
his fellow nobles usually were. Moreover, his presence 
was kept alive by the delegated subordinates in his own 
service. The authority of the estate staff depended on 
their ability to convince the prajas that they acted 
with the consent of the patriarchical superior (karta/ 
malik) who was the inhabitants* provider (annadata) 
destined by fate.
Doubtless the parasitical zamindar, so frequently 
brought to the literate public’s notice by the vernacular 
novelists, existed in society. Referring to them the 
Maharaja of Burdwan wrote, "I believe the sole occupation 
of many is to gloat over the meals like hogs, and have 
servants to rub oil over them, and who pass their days 
mostly smoking the Hookah and cracking vulgar jokes".*^ 
Such zamindars were urged to make fruitful use of their 
time. By voicing their advice, the nobles not only 
influenced the lesser zamindars but also brought to the 
Government's and the general public's notice their own 
activities and achievements. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar
1. B.C. Mahtab: impressions, p.46.
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urged at the Bengal Landholders Association that it was 
essential for the country that the zamindars should improve 
the quality of the. land and labour applied to agriculture.
They should consider their prime duty to make gifts of
1
model agricultural farms to their own tenants and peasantry.
The best known model farm was the Palla Farm Maintained
2
by the Burdwan estate. The Maharaja of Burdwan, in a 
more forceful tone, proclaimed that if dreams were to 
be realised, work rather than discussions and resolu­
tions was necessary.^
The nobles* functions were not restricted to giving 
a lead to the zamindari class only. If that had been so, 
success at the polls against the formidable nationalists 
would have been unlikely. After all, however powerful a 
malik had been, he must nevertheless see to it that his 
followers' willingness to render service was preserved.
4
In other words he owed them humane treatment. Such 
humane treatment necessarily had to extend over a larger 
area than merely the zamindari class for his traditional 
authority to remain unimpaired, since the landholders 
who paid revenue to the Government were comparatively 
small in number. But the zamindari machinery did not 
comprise only the landlords and the peasants with 
a handful of zamindari staff linking the two. There 
existed a long chain of tenure holders, between the 
landlord and the tiller, whose interests were so
1. The Englishman, 5 Deb. 1913> p.6 .
2. B.D.G.: Burdwan, p.SB.
3. The Englishman^: 28 Dec. 1S12, p.12.
4. R. Bendix: Max V/eber, p.303.
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inter-locked with the interest of the zamindar that 
their interest to render service was automatically 
preserved.
Between the actual cultivator and the State 
there were sometimes as many as twenty to thirty inter­
mediate holders. Above the tiller there were two or 
more grades of under-rayats. Above them was the de.jure 
rayat followed by layer after layer of tenure holders.^” 
The entire hierarchy shared the profits of the land in 
a manner similar to shareholders in a company. It has 
been said that 70$ to 8 0 $ of the income of the land was
taken by the zamindar. But the entire amount did not go
2into the zamindar1s coffers alone. This is clear from 
records of the Land Revenue Commission 1938 which sur­
veyed the situation in Bengal from the turn of the century 
onwards. The Manager of the Murshidabad Estate reported 
that only 6$ of the gross produce went to the Nawab.^ 
Doubtless the low figure was not the general rule.
A
The more affluent estates gave a far larger share 
to the zamindar. Such was the case of the Maharaja of 
Burdwan, proprietor of the largest zamindari. His margin 
of profit fluctuated between 3 6$ in the most fertile 
sectors to nil in areas with poor quality soil. On the
average he received 16$ of the profit. Keeping these
two extreme figures in mind, it is apparent that though
1. Zamindar- Patnidar- Darpatnidar- Sapatnis- Chahar- 
patnis- .... Jotedar- Chukanedar- .... Adhiar. The 
first was the owner of the land while the last was 
the real cultivator. - Administration Report British 
India 1911-12: Bengal, pp.77-82.
2* L*R.0.: Vol.Ill, pp.6 6 ,67.
3o Ibid, : Vol.V, p.8 6 .
4. Ibid: Vol.Ill, p.486.
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the zamindar received a substantial sum of money on paper, 
the entire income from the land did not come into his 
possession. A large percentage of it was distributed amongst 
the tenure holders well before his dues came into his hands.
Although the superior landholder has been accused 
of rack-renting his tenants at every available opportunity 
to increase his share it was not really in his interest 
to resort to such means. Such a policy was a short­
sighted one which involved loss in the end, as it 
rendered collection difficult."^ The only really effect­
ive way of gaining the tenants1 cooperation to secure 
increases in rents or cesses was by giving them various 
collateral advantages. As the relationship was a per­
sonal one, rather than an impersonal relationship with 
an indifferent state official, it was possible to come 
to an understanding. That intimacy was based on age-old 
customs. It was not unusual for tenants to think it 
their sacred duty to offer the first fruit of the newly 
planted tree to the zamindar and, even until recent times, 
the custom of propitiating the zamindar1s name along with
the ancestors' during the sradh ceremony was commonly 
2
noticeable.
Apart from sharing his income and traditional 
intimacy with the landlord, the tenant gained some 
other advantages from the zamindari system, As the 
landlords generally avoided recourse to the law 
courts for recovery of rent unless any due could be
1. L.R.C . : Vol.Ill, p.61.
2.. The Bengalee: 27 Sept. 1911, p.3.
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barred by limitation, the tenants had an inbuilt period 
of respite, unlike the tenants of the Government. More­
over it was easier to obtain remission of rent or a 
reduction of interest rates during times of distress 
from an individual personally connected to them. The 
Burdwan estate remitted an average of Rs.90,000 
annually between 1900 and 1938.^ Lastly, whenever the 
agents of the zamindar were too oppressive, the 
tenants could appeal to the zamindar himself, who was 
much more amenable to threats and persuasion than a 
State or salaried official. Since the zamindar had to 
rely on the tenants for collecting sufficient money to 
pay land revenue, he could not become too unreasonable 
and over-bearing in his dealings with them, and the 
latter, if organised, invariably got the best terms
p
from him. This group of tenure holders formed the 
bulk of the rural bhadralok of Bengal.^
Like the tenantSjthe peasants were also inter­
locked with the zamindars in many respects. It is4gene­
rally argued that the links were ineffective since 
the zamindar made a habit of extorting illegal cesses 
which turned the peasants away from him. At times 
these abwabs were larger even than the rent itself. As 
a justification for this, the zamindars informed the 
Land Revenue Commission that it was generally recog­
nised that such abwabs were preferred by the rayats to
1. L.R.C.: Vol.IV, pp.384,484.
2. Ibid.: Vol.Ill, p.6 8 .
3» Ibid.: Vol.V, p.111.
the regular enhancement of rent, provided the cesses
were not exhorbitant It is impossible to assess the
validity of their, argument since no record is available
2
where the peasants* reply has been noted. On the 
other hand, what is possible to examine are the advanta­
ges they received, the types of lives they led, and 
their disregard for alternative occupations.
In order to extend cultivation and develop the 
countryside, the zamindars often allowed the rayats 
to hold land free of rent for a term of years, and 
they occasionally even paid for building huts for the 
cultivators. In some cases the homestead land of such 
a rayat was not assessed for rent even when his culti­
vated lands were fully developed and assessed. R.C. 
Dutt, in his open letter to Curzon, maintained that in 
consequence of the Permanent Settlement “the cultivators 
are more prosperous, more resourceful, better able to 
help themselves in years of bad harvest than cultiva—  
tors in any other part of I n d i a . T h e  picture of 
relative comfort and security portrayed by J.C. Jack 
in his survey of a Bengal district corroborates this
1. B.D.G-.: Mymensingh, pp.108,109.
2 . It is very difficult to accept their claim since
records show that such cesses were undoubtedly- 
exhorbitant. According to the Ploud Commission, 
abwabs varied from 30 to 1 2 0 per cent of the legal 
rent. Abwabs were demanded for such instances as 
marriage fees, fines for social offences, tolls and 
taxes for carrying on certain trades, for digging 
ponds and for construction of roads and canals. An 
ironic case was reported of a landlord levying a 
tax of 2-g times the rental in order to pay the 
cost of his own litigations. - L.R.C.: Vol.VI,p.34.
3. Ibid.: Vol.V, pp.49,54.
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analysis.^- Apparently it was also possible to come
across many ra.yats who were prosperous enough to
build houses with corrugated iron roofs and sal posts,
and living in conditions of reasonable comfort. Rarely
did one come across a village where the peasantry had
not lived there for generations, some longer than
their landlords. Moreover, it is significant that
very small percentages of the labourers working in
the mills of Calcutta and its neighbourhood, and in
the tea gardens of North Bengal and Assam, consisted
of rayats of Bengal. It was equally noticeable that
ra.yats from other parts and provinces of India migrated
in large numbers to distant places like Africa, New
Zealand, Burma, Fiji Islands, British Guyana, whereas
2
few of the Bengal rayats did so. Presumably they 
preferred to stay and cultivate the lands of their 
zamindars.
Apart from their activities as the superior 
zamindars of the province, the nobles operated in 
other spheres as well: activities they had inherited 
as traditions from their predecessors. These also 
acted as channels of influence. One such sphere was 
the religious life of Bengal. They maintained vast 
debottor and waqf^properties. According to the lead­
ing Muslim journal, the Muhammadi, those waqf estates
4were "the backbone of the Mussalman community". The 
income from such properties was expected to be used
1. J.C. Jack: Economic Life of a Bengal District,
pp.19,2 1 -3 0 .
2« L.R.O.: Vol.Ill, po.3,17,62.
8* Ind.N .P .: week ending 17 Apr.1915> p.580.
4* IliiiL** ending 1 9 Aug. 1911, p. 1030.
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for the upkeep of various temples and mosques. Thus 
they became the recognised sebayats and mutwallis of a 
large number of important religious centres in Bengal. 
The devout were constantly aware of the fact that the 
nobles were the benevolent keepers of their holy 
shrines. Prayers were regularly chanted and blessings 
invoked by the priests on behalf of the benefactors. 
Tablets recording the dedicator’s name were placed 
at prominent places for the devotees to view.
During important ceremonies many noble families 
participated with the public and personally led the 
festivities. The Sovabazar family’s annual Durga 
Puja had become a reputed institution of pride for 
the Hindus of Bengal, when the general public was 
lavishly entertained.^* The lavishness of the celebrat­
ion was closely rivalled by the Raja of lalgola.
During the festival the Raja distributed clothes
2 ■for the poor and fed thousands of people. The 
Maharaja of Nadia used to celebrate the Baradol with 
tremendous pomp and show.^ Escorted by household sepoys 
aimed with guns and bayonets, horses richly caparisoned, 
attendants carrying silver huddas, flag bearers, bands 
of music, trumpeters and drummers, the Nashipur family 
and the estate officials helped pull the holy chariot
1. The Englishman: 12 Oct.1912, p.3.
2. The Bengalee; 13 Oct. 1914, p.2.
3. Ibid: 11 Apr. 1914, p.l.
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during the Rathjatra, During the Jhulanjatra, which 
was similarly sponsored by the Nashipur estate, the
people from Murshidabad, Birbhum and other districts
1 2 flocked to Nashipur. The Hetampur family and Raja
Jyot Kumar Mukerjee^ celebrated the Saraswati Puja on
a large scale with spectators from the neighbourhood
crowding the places. The latter also celebrated the
Gajadharti Puja with great pomp and ceremony when the
inhabitants of Uttarpara, Bally, Serampur and other
4
adjacent villages were invited and entertained. Regu­
lar kirtan processions were led out with a great deal 
of display on behalf of the Kassimbazar family. More­
over, the huge Shivaratri festival fair held at the 
Maharaja1s Sidheswar temple in Begunia Mauza was a
well known occasion, and drew Hindus from all the
5neighbouring villages. Prom this we can see that such 
popular ritual observances maintained by the nobles 
provided credibility to their position not only as 
landlords but equally as guardians of religious institu­
tion's.
Such activities as these were not merely confined 
to Hindu families among the nobility. The Nawab of Dacca 
spent sixty-five thousand rupees annually on religious 
and charitable purposes. Nawab Abdul Jabbar frequently .
7
led the Id prayer on the grand maidan. The Murshidabad 
chelum-tabut procession of the waqf estate of Nawab
1. D.C. Boulger: Maharajah Devi Sinha, pp.140,141.
2* The Englishman: 13 Peb. 1911, p.6.
3. Ibid: 3 Peb. 1914-, p.3.
4. Ibid: 20 Nov. 1918, p.8.
5. Kassimbazar to Sec.Gen.Dept.Beng. 16 Dec. 1913,
B.G.P.: March 1914, Vol.9373, p.5.
6. E.B.D.G.: Dacca, p.182. 7. The Bengalee:21 Nov.1912,p.2.
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Naseul Mamalik was renowned in the Muslim community.
A large number of the Nizamat family would participate
in the procession,. together with thousands of people.'*'
To the naive understanding of the common man, such
acts were not only overwhelming but also were visible
proof that the local nobleman was one of them, although
his extraordinary position far above their mundane
existence called for their respect and loyalty. To
an extent the nobles1 activity in the religious life
equated them with the Brahmins and clothed them with
2
the same charisma as the latter. In some cases it went
even further than the Brahmins as, unlike them, the
nobleman could ignore religious barriers, and also
act as a benefactor of other religious communities
beside his own. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar presided over
the Bengal-Buddhist Association-^ and the Raja of Santosh
a -
over the Young Men’s Christian Association. The Hindu
5
Burdwan family managed a Muslim shrine and the Muslim
a
Nawab of Dacca upheld the Hindu students’ privilege to
g
perform Saraswati Puja in schools and colleges. The 
Nawab’s religious tolerance gained him the respect of all 
his prajas so clearly manifested by the deep mourning
7
both communities went into at his death.
1. The Bengalee: 1 Jan. 1916, p.2..
2. According to Weber, the Brahmins and the Chinese
literati were thought to possess magical charisma
by virtue of their familiarity with the sacred books. 
- R. Bendix: Max Weber, p.117.
3* The Bengalee: 4 Jan. 1913, p.2.
4- Ibid: 15 Aug. 1913, p.2.
5. Khakar Baba pirsthan located in rajbari,
now Burdwan University.
Nat .I'T.P.: week ending 21 Peb. 3-914, p. 158.
7. Ird, owned Ilng.N.P.: week ending 30 Jan. 1915, p*71.
Religious life was closely interwoven with the caste 
system. Most Hindus belonged to, or claimed to belong 
to one of the .jat or .jati that comprised the Hindu caste 
system. The tribals either followed the same pattern 
or had tribal affiliations which had become as 
structured as that of the .jats and the jatis. More­
over, a large number of immigrants from other parts 
of India who had been settled in Bengal for generations 
maintained their traditional affiliations and formed 
individual subcultures of their own. The census 
reports denominated all three different categories 
as one, presumably because, for all practical purposes, 
all three could be regarded as caste groups, although 
the two latter were not so technically.
An analysis of the caste groups as distinguished 
by the census reports shows that the nobles dominated 
a large number of them as patrons, presiding officers 
and spokesmen: in short, the caste dalpatis. The
A
Maharaja of Dinajpur presided over the Uttar Rarhi 
Kayasthas, while the Kakina family were the leaders 
of the Barendra Kayasthas. The Sovabazar and Santosh 
families and Raja Upendranarayan Mitra Roy also played 
prominent roles in the Permanent Standing Committee of 
the Kayasthas.1 The Maharaja of Burdwan was the president
^ — — — i — W W W O W O — attt
1. The Bengalee: 1 Jan. 1913, p.3.
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of the Kshatriyas and took a keen interest in their wel­
fare. ^  The office hearers of the Tili Jati Sanmilani 
were the Maharaja of Kassimbazar as president, with the
p
Eajas of Dighapatia and Bhagyakul as vice-presidents. 
Baja Beshee Case Law chaired the Subarna Banik Samaj.^ 
The Kanaraja of Nashipur was a leading member of the
A
Agarwalla group. The Eajas of Tahirpur and Susang
5
presided over the Bangal Brahmin Mahasava , while Baja 
Kishori Lai Coswami was an important figure of the
g
Barendra Brahmins. The Baja of Balasore was a prominent
7
personality of the Vaishnab sect. Though the Maharaja 
of Kassimbazar was a Tili he convened a Conference of 
the Vaishnabs with the intent of making it an annual 
occasion, and establishing a permanent body to spread 
the Vaishnab doctrine. As a gesture of sincerity, ’’the 
resources of the Maharaja Bahadur [were] consecrated
g
at the altar of the noble ideal”. The Baja of Chakdighi
9
was a prominent Bajput chattri. The Maharajas of Cooch 
Behar and Tripura and the Chakma Baja were eminent 
members of the Koch, Tipera and the Chakma tribals. 
Moreover, the Eajas of Tripura, Cooch Behar, Burdwan 
and Narail had territorial influence over the G-oalas,
1. The Englishman: 28 Dec. 1912, p.12.
2. Ibid: 29 Dec. 1913, p.5.
3- Ibid: 10 June 1912, p.5.
4* Ibid: 11 June 1913, p*3*
5. Ibid: 13 March, 1914, p.6 .
6 . The Bengalee: 25 Peb. 1911, p»7.
7. The Englishman: 21 Peb. 1911, p.6 .
8 * The Bengalee: 17 March 1911, p.6 .
9. S & B.P. Singh Boy: Chakdighi Singh-Ro.y Family, p.3«
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Bagdis and Namasudras^* According to the census report
of 1 9 2 1 , that would mean influence in some form or the
other over approximately 40cfo of the Hindu population of 
2
Bengal. If the Cooch Behar family's influence over the 
Brahmo Samaj and the Raja of Azimganj's, as President 
of the Digambar Jain Shetambar Association,^ over the 
Jains are taken into account, the figure would be even 
larger.
The caste committees were powerful and influential
bodies in the social life of the province. The caste
kutcheris of the eighteenth century were replaced by
intercaste dais or de facto social factions by the
nineteenth century. This was possible because the caste
structure was less rigid than in other parts of India.
The Brahmins had to share the economic and social power
with other castes. The Kyasthas and the Baidyas enjoyed
a very high social and political status along with the
Brahmins, although their ritual status was rather low.
*
Even the Subarnabaniks (unclean Sudras) could and did 
acquire a high social standing. Brahmins were often 
employed in the most servile office and the Sudras 
elevated to situations of respectability and importance. 
Although lack of rigidity made it possible for intercaste 
dais to be formed, caste remained important in the social 
life of the people in relation to marriage, inheritance, 
adoption and funeral rites.
The dalnatis, or the office bearers of the dais, 
controlled the members of their respective castes by
1. Ind.N.P.: week ending 19 Aug. 1916, p.1140.
2. Censtis 1921: Bengal, Vol.V, pt.2, pp. 166-179-
3. Gumming to Religious Associations, 27 ilarch 1911,
B.J.P.: Sept. 1911, Vol.8676, p.11.
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Using the instruments of social sanctions and of excommu­
nication through the caste dais. Once- excommunication was 
invoked, the person involved would find it difficult to 
marry his children off or obtain a priest to perform the 
family rites; he might not have been invited to tradition­
al social functions such as sradhs. pu.jas and marriages, 
and his invitations might not have been accepted.^
Though the nerve centres of such dais were usually 
at the provincial capital, their influence was pervasive 
since the urban society was greatly an extension of the 
rural community, and because the dalpatis comprised so 
many nobles and zamindars whose zamindaris were located 
throughout the province. The main object of these organisa­
tions was to improve the social positions of their different 
castes as a group. They held periodical meetings to 
discuss questions of social importance that arose. When 
an aggrieved party appealed to them as dalpatis. they 
would call a meeting of the more influential caste members
where the question at issue would be discussed, votes taken
2
and the verdict passed. Their respective castes’ stand­
ing committees would meet to frame constitutions, 
co-ordinate all the movements of the subsidiary bodies
and receive donations into the central fund for the
3
use of their more unfortunate caste members.. It
1. S.LI. mukherjee: 'Class, Caste and Politics in
Calcutta, Eli':os in South Asia: ed, leach and
Mukherjee, pp.53-57, 59, 71, 7 2 .
2. P. Sinha: Nineteenth Century Bengal, p.90.
3. The Bengalee: 1 Jan. 1913, p.3* (Kayastha)
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was also in their province to keep a vigil over the over­
all economic conditions of their caste groups and formu­
late policies to increase their communal wealth. More­
over they published journals and periodicals for the 
information of their own caste.^ General subjects such
pas education, the abuse of* the custom of dowry payments,
and the wasteful display of wealth were also handled by
them.^ Furthermore, major social issues, such as the
grounds for ostracising a member, were also in their -
4
sphere of control.
An examination of the proceedings during the 
period under review, reveals an attitude pattern of 
the nobles in their capacity as leading figures of 
their respective castes. Apparently they were convinced 
that the caste system was being gradually eroded by the 
over-westernised political leaders of the time. Their 
efforts were directed towards stemming the process.
During the ninth All India Kshatriya Conference, ^he 
Maharaja of Burdwan emphasised that the degeneration of 
social customs was a product of "over westernization” or 
”denationalization” of Bengal's modern leaders. He advised 
the gathering not to lean so far towards western concepts 
since it would not suit Indian conditions. On the con­
trary, it would lead to "racial suicide”. The advocates 
of such ideas were downright "mischievous" according
5
to him. ____ ______
1. The Englishman; 29 Dec. 1913, p#5« (Tili)
2* Ibid; 10 June 1312, p.5. (Subarna Banik)
3* Ibid; 28 Dec. 1912, p.12. (Kshatriva)
4* Ibid; 13 March 1914, p.6 . (Brahmin)
5. Ibid; 28 Dec. 1912, p.12.
The Raja of Tahirpur, at the inaugural meeting of 
the Bengal Brahmin Mahasava, asked the gathering to set 
aside western approach* to such meetings and follow Indian 
traditions instead. To underline his appeal he moved 
and carried the proposal that, instead of electing the 
chairman in the western fashion, the senior-most member 
should be installed with Indian customs. Moreover, he 
refused to welcome the people from out of town as dele­
gates since, according to the Indian concept, members 
of the same caste were not considered visitors but rather 
"kith and kin" who belonged together. In the same meeting 
the Raja of Susang proclaimed that excessive "occidental 
influence" was at the root of the downfall of Hinduism.^
At the All India Kayastha Conference held at the Sova- 
bazar Rajbari, the Rajas of Dinajpur, Kakina, Santosh, 
Sovabazar and Raja Upendranarayan Mitra Roy supported 
the resolution that the Kayasthas cooperate with the 
Brahmins and other castes "as it was a wise division of 
labour*.^
To prevent the total destruction of the caste system 
which, according to them, was one of the pillars on which 
Indian society rested, they made serious efforts to intro­
duce reforms within their respective caste systems. To 
revitalise the dying embers of the system was their aim. 
The Maharaja of Burdwan vehemently criticised some of the 
leading Kshatriyas for not translating into action the 
resolutions that were passed in these conferences. He
1. Ibid: 13 March 1914, p.6.
2. The Bengalee: 1 Jan. 1913, p.3.
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said that when the dalpatis resolved on some policy, 
not only should they adhere to it hut also make sure 
that itw&s observed by all their caste members. Only 
then could they hope to regain their previous prestige. 
Moreover, the group should be strengthened by doing away 
with all artificial sub-divisions within the caste itself."*" 
The Kayasthas, in the same strain, resolved that all
2artificial restrictions between sub-castes be removed.
The Raja of Tahirpur emphasised that Brahmanism was on 
its way out and required to be resuscitated quickly.
To avoid further loss of followers Raja Kishori Lai 
Goswami began the movement to readmit the members who 
had been outcasted by the Brahmins for having travelled 
abroad.^ Raja Reshee Case Law encouraged the Subarna 
Baniks to do away with sub-divisions, maintaining it
A
was "distinction without any differences".
Thus we find that the nobles made serious efforts 
to resuscitate the caste groups rather than allowing them 
to perish under the influence of westernised Indians. 
According to them, it was a basic pillar of society 
which the "denationalised" leaders could not appreciate.
The nobles1 task was made easy by prevailing conditions. 
Caste, to an Indian was, and in many respects still is 
today, an instinctive habit. He accepted it without 
much question. Goldthorpe felt this was so because 
caste observances in India were not forced by a power­
ful and privileged group upon resentful lower orders.
1. The Englishman: 28 Dec. 1912, p.12.
2. The Bengalee: 1 Jan. 1913, p*3*
3. The Englishman; 13 March 1914, p.6 .
4. Ibid: 10 June 1912, p.5*
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On the contrary, they were accepted and upheld by most 
Hindus."^ After all, one of the poorest and consequently 
under privileged man in Bengal could be a Brahmin, and 
the richest and most influential a Tili, with the former 
working as a servant of the latter. Such being the case 
it was more difficult to destroy than preserve the system. 
Moreover, the nobles were ideally positioned to make 
their infxuence felt.. Their capacity to influence 
often embraced more than one caste group. For example, 
the Tripura and Cooch Behar families were not only 
important Kshatriyas but were leading figures of the 
Tipera and Koch tribals as well. In this way, their 
influence as caste dalpatis was widespread since many 
of them had tribal affiliations and all of them had 
territorial influence.
The nobles’ interest in religious life and in
caste groups led a number of them to take an active part
in questions of social reforms effecting the society
as a whole. During a function held to demonstrate the
’’feeling of joy” by the Sanskrit pandits of Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa at a new decoration bestowed on
the Maharaja of Burdwan, he pointed out that he had
had discussions with the Maharajas of Natore and Nadia
about social conditions, and had concluded that
next winter they would invite the opinions of the pandits 
on certain, vital points (left unexplained), and then
1. J.E. Goldthorpe: Introduction to Sociology, p.126.
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hold a large meeting. They requested the pandits not
entirely to obstruct the present stream of social change
"but to utilise the opportunity to canalize it into a flow
which would accrue to the entire society.1 The Raja of
Narajole presided over the Projapati Samiti: a society
to propogate the abolition ,or reduction of marriage dowries,
2curtailment of expenses and other allied matters. The 
patrons of the Samiti were the Rajas of Susang, Dinajpur,
Mymensingh, Hetampur and Tajhat and the Rajas Peary Mohan
3 4Mukerjee and Kishori Lai G-oswami. The Maharaja of Nadia
5
also took a prominent part in the anti-dowry movement,
while the Maharaja of Burdwan was a patron of the Hindu
Marriage Reform League. Their attitude was that of
reformers of Indian institutions, rather than rejecters
of them as antiquated structures. They strongly believed
that the indigenous institutions served definite purposes.
It was not only on festive occasions associated with
religion and caste that the nobles came into contact with*
the people as benefactors. They would also step out of 
their exclusive surroundings in times of difficulties 
to help the distressed prajas. During the much dreaded 
floods one could often find them taking charge of the 
relief work. The Raja of Chakdighi once managed to 
evacuate twenty five villages in a few hours during 
the middle of the night, thus preventing the loss of any life
17 
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
The Englishman: 8 Apr. 1912, p.6.
Ibid: 3 Jan. 1913, p.3*
The Bengalee: 14 I-'"ay, 1813, p.2.
The Dnglishmau: 22 1913, p.3.
Ind. owned Png. I:. P.: week ending 4 Apr. 1914, p.232. 
The Bengalee: 20 Dec. 1913, p.2.
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on his estates..'*' Without his assistance, the unsuspect- 
ing villagers could easily have been overtaken by the 
terrible calamity. At such times he gave shelter to
p
thousands in his thakurbaris. At Burdwan the Maharaja
and Raja Ban Bihari Kapur usually took control during
such critical periods with their elephants being rushed
about to help in the evacuation of drowning people and
property, in blocking any breaches in the embankment .
of the rivers.^ Often many would be fed from the 
4rajbari 'stores. Carmichael said that Raja Ban Bihari 
"was of the greatest service at Burdwan during the 
floods. He was personally most active, his advice 
to the Collector was invaluable, and he dispensed the 
Maharaja’s charity with an experienced and discrimina­
ting hand. He was the one man there who knew exactly 
what had to be done from the time of the first alarm,
5
and he did it.” When heavy r a m  caused floods 
at Brahmanberia, the Maharaja of Tripura personally 
arrived to supervise the relief work, allowing the 
raj schools and hospitals to be used for housing the 
affected people and opening the gates of the huge 
Uzzayantaprasad where the zanana ladies were cared for 
as the Maharani opened the andar-mahal for their use.
The raj officials in the zamindari kutcheris were 
instructed to supply rice and chira to the flood 
victims and all the raj boats were dispatched for
1. S & B.P. Singh Roy: Chakdighi Sin ;i-Roy Rarnily,p.14.
2. The Englishman: 13 Aug. 1913, p«6 .; Thakurbaris = Temples.
Nat.N.P.: week ending 23 Aug. 1913, p.869.
4. The Engljshman: 13 Aug. 1913, p.6 .
5. Carmichael to Hardinge 13 Sept. 1913, C.P.I.: 1913,
Vol. ValO, pt.I, p.251.
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rescue operations.^" In his arrangement to give relief 
to his flood distressed prajas, the Raja of Kakina sur­
passed all. He gave away fifty thousand rupees in cash, 
and paddy worth another twenty thousand. Moreover, he 
sanctioned fifty thousand more for constructing embank­
ments along local rivers. Altogether he spent one lakh
twenty thousand rupees, or nearly half of his annual income,
2
on a single occasion.
Even during an unexpected crisis like the collapse 
of a bridge with a train full of passengers at Hetampur, 
the first person on the scene was the Raj Kumar of 
the place.^ When large-scale distress was caused by lack 
of rain leading to wells and tanks drying up, the Hetam­
pur family distributed rice and paddy to the affected
population with people from the neighbouring areas also
4
finding help at the rajbari. After a number of houses 
collapsed at Burdwan in a terrible storm which caused 
widespread havoc, many were faced with terrible hardship.
The son of Nawab Abdul Jabbar came to their rescue'by 
taking into his houses over three hundred storm victims 
and supplying many others with food and money. He later 
moved about from village to village, alleviating distress
5
of the people. When there was a scarcity of food grains 
causing the poor to feel the financial pressure because 
of rice selling at an inflated price of six to seven
1. The Bengalee: 6 June 1915* p.2.
2. The Englishman: 23 Sept. 1513, p.4.
3. Nat.N.P.: week ending 19 July 1913, p.683»
4. The Bengalee: 21 May 1916, p.3.
5. . The Englishman: 29 Sept. 1916, p.2.
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seers per rupee, the Raja of Aziraganj imported vast 
quantities and sold it to the people at ten seers 
per rupee for the entire period of scarcity.'*' The 
Raja of Chanchal's splendid work during a cholera epide­
mic resulted in the saving of over a thousand of his
tenants' lives and drew profound admiration from the
2 ;Bengal Government. Such acts were not easily forgotten 
by the people who had received these timely helps, so 
appreciable during periods of great strain.
While the illiterate appreciated the immediate 
benefits rendered by the nobles, the educated residents 
could see a step further, being aware of the fact that 
the Government exacted a substantial pulbandi tax 
from the landlords for the maintenance of the embank­
ments. For example, the Burdwan estate alone paid the 
large sum of sixty thousand rupees per annum. ^ The 
Engineer's report on the 1913 floods suggested that, 
out of 1,600 bighas of cultivated land situated within 
the town of Burdwan, the crops of 1,200 had been des­
troyed. Fifty cattle, ten horses and various other 
animals had also perished, while the total loss suffered 
by the merchants and aratdars approached two lakhs of
4
rupees. The above report was supplemented by the 
statement issued by the Estate Administration which 
revealed that SOfi to 1 0 0 /i of the inhabitants of 
many villages of the flooded area had been made
1. Bengal Zamindars, p.102.
2. Gourlay to DuBouley 15 March 1916, C.P.I.: 1916,
Vol. Val5, pt.l, p. 180.
3. Nat.N.P.: week ending 19 July 1913 p.683.
4. Ind. owned Eng.N.P. : weex ending 10 Jan. 1914,p.3
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homeless. The Maharaja brought the fact to the notice 
of the officials and the public in a meeting at the Town 
Hall.^" Reacting to the two statements, the leading news­
paper, Bangavasi, suggested that the Maharaja should sue
2the Government for neglect. The local residents were aware 
of the fact that as early as 1911 the Chakdighi family had 
taken the trouble to escort Sir Andrew Fraser to view the 
precarious conditions of the Damodar embankment, although 
nothing positive came of it. For a similar reason after 
six continuous floods of the Kunti River at Hughli district, 
the Maharaja of Dighapatia drew up a cost of repair 
personally, and persuaded his fellow zamindars-to contribute 
towards the strengthening of the embankments.^ The sympathetic 
approach to the difficulties of the -pra.ias resulting from 
natural calamities - difficulties which in many ways were 
inter-linked with the zamindars1 own - identified the local 
nobleman, with the local people, and formed an invisible bridge 
over the gap separating the nobles from the general public.
The help extended to the pra.ias went further than 
mere aid during times of crisis. A number of nobles 
attempted to publicise the agricultural produce of the 
locality by organising periodical exhibitions on their 
estates as an incentive towards better productivity.
Such exhibitions were looked upon with favour by the 
Government, since it helped the spread of knowledge about
1. 'Town Hall Meeting - Floods',
B.R.P.: Jan. 1914, Vol. 9386, p.83 
2* Hat.N.P .: week ending 6 Sept. 1913, pp.920,925
3. Ibid: week ending 7 Oct. 1911, p.1252
4. The Englishman: 19 Apr. 1916 p.6
agricultural improvements among the actual cultivators. 
Amongst others, the Chakdighi and the Balasore families
were commended by the Government for their efforts in 
this line.'*' The most well known was the annual agric­
ultural and industrial exhibition, cattle show and mela held
at Hetampur during the Saraswati Puja, under the patronage 
2
of that family. The Bankithia exhibition was jointly
sponsored by the Maharaja of Kassimbazar and Nawab Shamsul
Huda at Berhampur.^ The former also inaugurated the
Khulna and Kurigram Agricultural and Industrial Exhibi —
4
tions. The Nawab of Dacca arranged a most interesting 
exhibition of the works of the Dacca artisans in his 
Shahbag Gardens.
Apart from exhibitions, they also exerted them­
selves in other directions. The Maharajas of Darbhanga 
(Bihar) and Kassimbazar floated the cooperative society 
called Dharma Samayaya Ltd., with a registered capital 
of thirty crores of rupees and invited the "ruling chiefs 
and noblemen of the country" to put themselves at the
g
head of the concern. The financiers and trustees 
also Included the Gouripur (Mymensingh) fami]. .
The Maharaja of Kassimbazar even established a cooper­
ative department in his estate. It was to help create 
associations among weavers, rearers and realers of silk-
g
farms, and other such workers on cooperative principles.
1. 1Agri.Dept.Rep. for Year ending 30 June 1911’,
B.R.P. :19H, Vol. 8692, pp.27,2 8 .
2* The Eng1ishman: 13 Feb. 1^11, p.6 .
3. Ibid: 2 Feb. 1915» p*5»
4* Ina. owned Bng.N .p . : we-;k ending 8 Feb. 1913, p. 105.
5* The Englishman: 24 Aug. 1 9 1 6 , p.5.
6 * Ibid: 7 Aug. 1911» p.6 .
7* The Bengalee: 26 July 1912, p.10.
8 . Ibid: 11 Aug. 1911, p.2 .
oThe Raja of Narajole donated Rs.1,000 to the Midnapore 
Cooperative Society for the promotion of its objects, 
and later increased the sum to Rs.5,000.^ The Raj 
Kumar of Kakina did much to encourage the devel- 
opment of the Kakina Cooperative (town and rural) Bank.
In 1917 fourteen noblemen*^ t along with some other 
affluent Bengalis inaugurated the Bengal Home Industries 
Association under the patronage and persuasion of Lady 
Carmichael. The Maharaja of Burdwan, moving the resolu — 
tion in the inaugural meeting, said: "this meeting 
deplores the present depressed condition of the Home 
Industries, arts and crafts of Bengal, ’and welcomes 
the proposal to establish an Association for their 
promotions and development." ^ Out of the first week's 
collection, the fourteen nobles contributed two thirds 
of the total amount.
The contribution of the nobles was equally notice­
able in the civic development of the mufassil areas.
During the period under review many such projects were 
undertaken. Moreover, the inhabitants were still 
enjoying the benefits of the projects completed before 
the period.
The Maharaja of Dinajpur spent money to complete 
the Ghagra and Thompson canals, and to improve sanitation'
1. The Bengalee: 4 Deb. 1911, p*6 .
2. Ibid: 19 May, 1911, p.7.
3. Tagore, Mymensingh, Burdwan, Kassimbazar, Chanchal,
Tajhat, Dinajpur, Hashipur, Hetampur, Santosh, 2 I.aws,
2 Uttarparas.
4. The Englishman: 2 Feb. 1917, p-7*
5. Ibid: 6 Feb. 1917, p.6 .
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in Dinajpur town. The Raja of Bhagyakul constructed the 
waterworks at Chittagong.^ Raja Reshee Case Law spent
p
Rs.80,000 for the construction of waterworks at Chinsura.
The Raja of Narajole wrote to the local magistrate 
expressing his willingness to contribute one lakh of 
rupees towards the Midnapore waterworks fund.^ The 
Maharaja of Burdwan contributed Rs.50,000 for the con­
struction of waterworks at Burdwan.^- The Raj Rajeswari
waterworks at Mymensingh was provided by the Maharaja of 
5
Muktagacha. It was also announced that Raja Jyot Kumar
Mukerjee subscribed Rs.25,000 towards the construction
£
of waterworks at Serampur, a figure which was later
7raised by adding another Rs.10,000. The Nawab of Dacca 
gave as much as four and a half lakhs of rupees to 
provide the town with electric light, and another two
g
and a half lakhs for waterworks. The Raja of Kakina 
promised Rs.50,000 as a donation for the improvement of 
the town.^ The Raja of Lalgola made munificent grants
4
for the improvement of water supply and sanitation in 
the Murshidabad district.^ Carmichael admired him 
veiy much for his civic consciousness.^ The 
drainage of Murshidabad received substantial help from
1 . V/hos Y/ho, pt.V, p.4.
2 . Bengal Zamindars, p.71*
3. Nat.IT.P.: week ending 18 Oct. 1913, p.1099.
4. Tours: 7-13 Dec. 1912, p.47*
5. Ibid: 22-25 Dec. 1912, p.13.
6 . The Englishman: 28 Feb. 1911, p.9.
7. Ibid: 4 Apr. 1911, p. 6 .
8 . E.B.D.G-.: Dacca, p. 182.
9. The Englishman: 10 Feb. 1912, p.3.
•o1 —I Nat.N.P.: week ending 24 June 1911, p.754.
1 1 . Carmichael to Kardinge 17 March 1913, C.P.Iu U Xlci JL LU. 11^^ -*-( I L-Ii
1913, Vol.Va 9, pt.I, p.145.
the Maharaja of Kassimbazar.^
Apart from providing help for general civic devel-
2
opment, the nobles founded and maintained or financially 
assisted a number of welfare institutions. The best known 
organisations belonged to Raja Reshee Case Law and the 
Raja of Sovabazar. The former was the Honorary Secretary 
and Manager of the Maharaj Mata Shibo Soondary Debi Hindu 
Widows Fund and the Brahmajogi Hindu Orphans Fund, 
founded by his family.  ^The latter founded the Sovabazar
Benevolent Society to give relief to poor students, widows,
4 5orphans and disabled invalids. Moreover, he had created
the Kayastha Students Fund. Similarly, Raja Kristo Das
Law presided over the Subama Banik Charitable Institution
and the Subarna Banik Samity. All such acts benefited the
individuals who required help, and increased the nobles'
image as annadatas of the society.
Over and above the general civil welfare, the
nobles concentrated a good deal of funds and energy on
the medical needs of the people. The Burdwan family
maintained and managed the Raj Hospitals at Burdwan and
Kalna. The Maharaja also contributed Rs.80,000
and the construction site to build the Fraser 
Hospital at Burdwan, which was to provide the 
most modern facilities available to medical science.
1”  Tours: 7-13 Dec. 1912, pTl7~ ~
2. This is a perfect example of how their efforts to 
better their own estates benefited the smaller 
surrounding zamindars.
3. Bengal Zamindars, p.71.
4. Whos Who, pt.VIII, p.39.
5. The Bangalee: 22 Jan. 1911> p«7.
6. Whos Who~j pt.VIII, pp.47-48.
7. B.D.G.: Burdwan, p.85.
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Two years later another Bs.10,000 was contributed for
the construction of a separate female ward.'*' He also
offered a lakh of rupees for building a sanitarium
at a health centre, so that the people of Bengal could
2
recuperate from illnesses in pleasanter surroundings.
The Nawab of Bogra founded the Tahumissia Female Hospital
on his estate.^ The Raja of Chanchal spent Rs.75,000
on the construction of a building at the local hospital
4
and its equipment. The Dighapatia estate maintained 
the hospital and dispensary at Rampur Boaliya and a 
charitable dispensary at Nakhila. According to the 
Calcutta Review, they proved to be inestimable boons
5
to the sick poor of that part of the country. The
Joy Kissen Hospital at Uttarpara was maintained by
g
the Mukerjee family. The Maharaja of Tripura
7
established the much needed dispensary at Noakhali.
The Raja of lalgola donated a lakh of rupees for the 
building of the Raja Rao Jogendra Narayan Female
Q *
Hospital at Murshidabad. Moreover, he made it
possible to open the eye ward at the local hospital
at Berhampore. He had already donated a large sum for
1. The Englishman: 13 Dec. 1912, p.6 .
2. ’Amended Draft Financial Statement 1914-151,
B.F.P.: March 1914, Vol.9369, p.354.
3. Whos 7/ho, pt.V, p.27.
4. The Englishman: 15 Apr. 1914, p.6 .
5. *Rajas of Rajshahi', C.R.no.CXI: 1873, p.40.
6 . The Bengalee: 21 Feb. 1911, p.8 .
7. Tours: 31 July-9 Aug. 1912, p.65.
8 . The Bengalee: 19 Jan. 1911, p.5.
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the hospital before he gave the Rs.84,000 to the Dispensa­
ry Committee.’*' The Raja of Bhagyakul also established
2
an eye infirmary at Dacca. The Maharaja of Nashipur
built the Nashipur Raj Dispensary where medical aid
was given free to all during the morning and evening
hours.^ The Raja of Sovabazar maintained many charita—
4
ble dispensaries on his zamindari. The Raja of Hetampur 
surpassed all by establishing a number of free dispen­
saries dealing not only with the allopathic system of
5
medicine but with the homeopathic and ayurvedic also.
The Raja of Santosh, apart from inaugurating charitable 
dispensaries at Tangail, built a vetinary hospital at 
Mymensingh for the benefit of his tenants.
Apart from financing and maintaining medical 
institutions within their zamindaris, they also took some 
interest in the larger question of public health at 
the provincial level. The Raja of Ehagyakul was the 
Life G-ovemor of the Dacca Mitford Hospital, and .the 
Raja of Sovabazar was the Governor of the Mayo .
7
Hospital at Calcutta. The latter was also a
g
trustee and donor of the Albert Victor Hospital.
Nawab Khwaja Mohammad Yusuf Husain was a member of
1 . The Englishman: 2 Aug. 1911» p.5.
2 . Whos 7/ho, pt.V, p.6 .
3. D.C. Boulger: Maharajah Devi Sinha, p.117
4. Whos Who, pt.VIII, p.39.
5. Chiefs, Nobles & Zamindars, p.499.
6. Whos Who, pt.V, p.7.
7. Ibid, pt.V, p.6 ; pt.VIII, p. 39.
8 . The Englishman: 5 Dec* 1912, p. 6 .
the managing committee of the Dacca Mitford Hospital and 
Secretary of the managing committee of the Lady Dufferin 
Hospital. He was a life member of the St. John Ambulance 
Executive Committee as well.'*' The Raja of Chanchal con­
tributed large sums of money to the Bengal Ambulance
2 } 4
Corps. The Rajas of Kakina and Kassimbazar made
generous donations to the Red Crescent Society, the
Muslim equivalent to the Red Cross.
A large number of people were also influenced
directly by the nobles. They were the ones who served
on the zamindari staff as personal attendants, kutcheri
officials and menials, military personnel, and so on and
so forth. They were not only dependents of the nobles so
far as their salaries were concerned, but the chakran lands
5
set apart for their maintenance usually continued to 
provide for them in their old age and for their 
dependents thereafter. It was common for all the house- 
hold servants to get such land in lieu of service. 4
Moreover, it was not uncommon for their children to 
be taken into the service of the family when they 
attained maturity. The number of people thus subject to 
influence had increased as some of the nobles began to 
divert their estates1 finances from pure agriculture to trade 
and commerce. Workers and officers were required to run 
the enterprises and, like the zamindari staff, came
!• Whos Who, pt.V, p.27.
2. G-ourlay to DuBoulay 15 March 1916, C.P.I.: 1916,
Vol.Val5, pt.l, p.1 8 0 .
3. The Englishman: 7 Nov. 1912, p.5. 4. Ibid:20 Dec.1912,p
5. McAlpin to Sec.Rev.Dept.Beng. 30 July 1915* B.R.P.:
Sept. 1915, Vol.9656, p.43, (Kahisadal).
6. B.C. Sinha: Changing Times, p.12.
141
into the direct or indirect sphere of influence of 
the relevant nobleman depending on whether the enter­
prise was directly managed or leased to a second party.
The Law family was considered the foremost members 
in the Indian commercial community in Bengal. Their 
Prawn Law & Co. had very wide interests with branch 
offices even at London and Manchester.^- It was closely
followed in the business world by the Bhagyakul and
2
Azimgunj families. The Raja of Azimgunj's firm,
Mool Chand Hurrack Chand,^ was a thriving concern.
The Maharaja of Muktagacha was one of the founder-
A
promoters of the Cooperative Navigation Ltd. The
patrons of the India Equitable Insurance Co. Ltd.
were the Maharajas of Cooch Behar and Kassimbazar,
the Rajas Peary Mohan Mukerjee and Kishori Lai Gosv/ani
5
with the Raja of Sovabazar as Vice President. The
g
Maharaja of Kassimbazar had pottery works, silk
7 8factories and a construction company. Moreover,
he owned stone quarries at Barua, Gopalpur and
Birbhum, managed by his company called Rajgaon 
g
Stone Co. The Sumbhoo Oil Mill was also purchased 
by him and renamed Manindra Oil Mill.^ He was also 
the owner of a number of collieries0 Kassimbazar 
Raj Ward Estate had about 37 collieries by 1938."^
Chiefs, Rajas & Zamindars, p.25.
2. Gourlay to Maffey 17 March 1917, L & T (India),
Vol. 18, pt.I, p.190.
3. Mackey to Sec.Rev.Dept.Beng. 20 Jan. 1914, B < R. P .:
Feb. 1914, Vol. 9388, p.16.
4. The Bengalee: 27 Apr. 1911, p.7.
5* Ibid: 14 May 1912, p.9«
Ind.IT.P. : week ending 27 Nov. 1915, p.1712.
7. Ibid: week ending 4 Sept. 1915, p.561.
8* The En g I i s bin an: 6 Jan. 1917, p. 6.
9. Ibid: 5 wurch 1919, p. 10.
10. ' A b u ,Ren.Pres.Div1 ,' Oct.1911, Vol.8677, p . 60.
11. L.R.C.m Vol. y, p 17 7 , ~
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Like Kassimbazar Estate, the Tagore^ and Burdwan 
estates owned a number of collieries. Their divergence 
of zamindari funds from pure agriculture to commercial 
enterprises not only further increased their patron­
age over the people but also made it possible to 
dominate the Indian commercial community to a great 
extent. By the second decade of the century amongst 
the most influential members of the Bengal National 
Chamber of Commerce were the Law, Kassimbazar, and
2
Burdwan families, along with Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee.
Education also received their attention as 
much as any other social sphere. In this field the 
nobles were at an apparent disadvantage. A number of 
them had not been to school, others had not been to 
college, while a handful of them did not even speak 
the English language properly. The difficulty was 
by-passed by patronage of educational institutions 
in the mufassil areas and, to a lesser extent, in
*
the cities. They maintained innumerable schools and
colleges from their estate funds. Financial control
was at times supplemented by physical participation as
presidents of college councils^ or chairmen of advisory 
4
boards.
Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee claimed that his
father once founded thirty-one schools scattered
5
over his estates in a single day. The Raja’s
1 B.D.G.: Burdwan, p.130.
2. Addresses Presented at Cal.: Montagu, Vol.34,
List of Deputation, Biographical details of members, 
and list of office bearers.
3. The Englishman.: 2 May, 1911, p.8. (Burdwan)
4. Ibid.: 11 Dec, 1317, p.S. (Kassimbazar)
5. Ibid.: 29 July, 1313, p.6.
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eminence in the educational field was such that he
presided over the independent body that conferred
Sanskrit diplomas to the pandits*1 A free High
2
English school was established at Chakdighi.
The proprietor of the Rajah Suryya Kumar Institute
at Rajbari was the Muktagacha family.^ The Raja of
Santosh founded a girls' school at Dacca. The Raja of
Sovabazar maintained many schools and madrassas in his
zamindari. Nawab Khwaja Mohammad Yusuf Hosain was a
member of the managing committee of Dacca Ashanullah
School of Engineering, Dacca Jaganath College and
Dacca Madrassa. The Raja of Naldunga founded and
maintained a higher class English school. The Nawab
of Murshidabad established a high school at Murshidabad.
The Maharaja of Dinajpore was the founder of the
Diamond Jubilee School, a weaving school and a Sans- 
4
krit school. The two storied Lyon Hindu Hostel 
capable of accommodating fifty boarders, which was 
attached to the Dinajpore zilla school was also 
built under the supervision of and with a large
5
contribution from the Maharaja. Moreover, he 
promised to supply omnibuses for conveying pupils 
of the Pramathanath Girls' School founded by his
r
predecessor. The Raja of Kakina gave Rs.20,000 to
1. Ind.N .P .: week ending 11 March, 1916, p.369.
2. B.D.G.: Burdwan, p.176.
3. The Eng1ishman.: 27 Aug. 1912, p.3.
4. Whos 7/ho, pt.V, pp. 4,7,27; pt.VIII, pp. 4,5,39,41,42
5. The Englishman: 19 Eeb. 1917, p.17.
6. Nat.N.P.: week ending 15 Aug. 1914, p.834.
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build the High English School at this estate headquarter. ^
The Raja of Azimgunj constructed the Jiagunj Edward
Institution at a cost of Rs.24,000, and contributed
2Rs.4,000 to the Krishnagar College. Nawab Mohammad 
Ali Chaudhury kept an excellent girls' school where the 
needle-work, according to Lady Carmichael, was as good 
as could be seen anywhere.*^ The Raja of Lalgola con­
tributed Rs.7,000 for the construction of a boarding 
house attached to a school at Jungipore; likewise 
Rani Amakali Devi of Kassimbazar spent over a lakh 
of rupees for the estiblishment of the Berhampore
A
Jubilee Tol. The Natore Maharaja's High School
was opened in 1911. The High School at Nayabasan was
maintained solely by the Mayurbunj (Orissa) state.
The Raja of Hetampur started a high school at Hetampur,
and at Mathrun the Maharaja of Kassimbazar founded a
school with a hostel attached at a cost of half a lakh 
7of rupees. The latter also maintained an excellent college
it
at Berhampore called Berhampore Krishnath College, at an 
annual expense of Rs.60,000. Several boardings and a 
number of messes were attached to the college. Along with 
the school, these cost the Kassimbazar Estate another 
Rs.15,000 per annum. Owing to the large influx of
1. The Englishman: 4 Dec. 1912, p.4.
2. Bengal Zamindars, p.102.
3. Carmichael to Hardinge 7 Nov. 1913> C.Pil.* 1913,
Vol.ValO, pt.l, p.401.
4* Nat.N.P.: week ending 18 Nov. 1911, pp.1389,1392.
5. The Bengalee: 18 Feb, 1911, p.6.
6. 'Rep.V/ards Estates 1913-14', B.R.P.: Jan. 1915,
Vol.9656, p.110.
7. Chiefs, Nobles & Zamindars, pp.449,523.
students, additions had to he made, and the sum of
Rs.150,000 was spent to build another large building.
He further spent Rs.60,000 annually to maintain schools
of higher education at Beldanga, Saidabad, Saktipur,
Jabagram, Ranchi, Kamargaon, Habaspur, Bilka, Ethora,
Srisgunj, Kamarpanch and Panchigram where children of
his tenants received education at a nominal fee.'1' He
also founded a Zamindari Training College to train
2people who wished to join zamindari staff. The 
Maharaja of Nashipur founded schools at his zamindari 
to which children born on his estate had free access.^ 
The Raja of Paikpara at his death left one lakh of 
rupees to raise the status of the Kandi School to
A
that of a College. The only college in Burdwan
district was maintained by the Burdwan family to
which a collegiate school was also attached. It
also maintained a high school at Kalna affiliated to 
5
the college. The college further had a girls1 
school, a Sanskrit Chatuspathi, a Hindi Pathsala 
and a Muktab under its supervision.
The nobleman who outshone all others in the 
educational field was the Maharaja of Kassimbazar.
His unique ideas and far-sighted approach were things 
unto themselves at that time. He advocated the need
1. Bengal Zamindars: p.2.
2. The Bangalee: 17 Aug. 1911, p.2.
3. B.C. Boulger: Maharajah Bevi Sinha, p.ll8 .
4 . The Englishman: 17 Jan. 1919, p.12.
5. B .B .0.: Burdwan, p.182.
6 . The Englishman: 24 Apr. 1916, p.11.
for a superior system of education. From the chair 
of the Bengal Landholders Assocation he proclaimed: 
"I say that the work of education is the most 
urgent and pressing need of our country. iVe want 
better education and more varieties of it." ^ He 
backed up his words by establishing a mining school 
at Ethora and a polytechnic at Calcutta. The former 
was founded in 1 9 1 5  to fill the shortage of colliery 
managers in the country. He realised that the 
shortage made it imperative to import such experts 
from abroad. Before a man could sit for the second- 
class colliery managers certificate examination, 
he was required to have spent three years at a 
mine, and for the first-class certificate another 
two years. At Ethora the students were given 
practical training which could be counted as time 
spent at the mine itself, alongside the normal text­
book studies. There was also a scheme whereby the 
student spent every morning at a mine, while the 
evenings and weekends were used for theoretical 
instructions . The polytechnic was even more 
revolutionary in character. The Maharaja aimed 
to train students in a manner which would give 
them a better chance to make a living later. 
Simultaneously with the usual preparation for 
the matriculation examination, industrial 
instruction was imparted. The staff consisted of 
not only theorists but engineers actually practising
1. The EngIishrnan: 8 July 1912, p.9.
2. Ibid: 11 Dec. 1917, p.9.
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as consultants, making it possible for students 
to get the same opportunity as apprentices. More­
over, the students* handiworks produced at the 
institute were sold on their behalf with the 
profits subsequently being used by them to pay 
their fees*^The training commenced in the primary 
class with little boys being given some idea of 
the practical application of geometrical principles
2
in paper cutting, clay modelling and basket weaving.
The nobles looked at education as an instrum­
ent for the earning of a living.- Keeping that in 
mind, they laid emphasis on teaching practical work 
in their institutions. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar*s 
mining school and the polytechnic were perfect examples 
of such an education. The introduction of weaving and 
needle work in the curriculum of the institutions of 
the Maharaja of Dinajpur and Nawab Mohammad Ali 
Chaudhury were also directed towards the same 
end. It was because of this attitude that nobles 
such as the Maharaja of Burdwan, Raja Peary Mohan 
Mukerjee and the Nawab of Dacca opposed the intro­
duction of compulsory education at the primary level, 
with over-emphasis on literary work in the form they 
suspected was being advocated by Gokhale and his
associates. The Maharaja of Burdwan pointed out 
that such a method could turn people away from
1. The Englishmans 14 Apr. 1916, p.3.
2. Ibid: 13 Nov. 1918, p.6 .
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traditional occupations leading to a vacuum in the fields
of manual labour. Simultaneously, there would be an
increase in the number of semi-educated unemployed
drifting towards the cities.'1' Raja R£shee Case Law
vehemently advocated that literary education should
never be allowed to encroach upon the boys* time
normally devoted to work upon their ancestral occupa—
2
tions. He maintained that, along with literary 
education, traditional occupations should also be 
taught. In other words, a boy from an agricultural 
family should not only be taught to read and write 
but also civics, handicrafts and scientific agric­
ulture, so that he might secure a better preparation 
for his life’s occupation.^ The Nawab of Dacca 
pointed out that the emphasis should be placed on 
improving the country's industrial and agricultural 
’know-how’ and business acumen, rather than 
encouraging the poor to spend money they could 
hardly afford on primary education.^ Such 
nobles were able to put forward their views effect­
ively, since their influence permeated a large portion 
of the educational institutions in the province.
The position of the nobles as founders and 
financiers of the educational institutions made it 
possible for them, despite their lack of formal 
education, to come into direct contact with and
1. B.C. iuahtab: Studies, pp. 6,7* 54-59 •
2. ’Beng.Primary Education Bill 1917', B.L.C.D. : 1919,
pp. 152-153.
3. Ibid:
4. The Englishman: 13 Oct. 1911, p.7.
influence the student body. Individuals such as
the Nawab of Murshidabad^ and the Maharajas of
Burdwan and Kassimbazar regularly presided over the
annual prize distributions, festivals and other
important functions of their institutes. The
Maharaja of Burdwan even invited the students'
faculty to periodic tea parties at his house,
while the Maharani entertained the students from the
2
girls' school affiliated to the college. Apart 
from their own institutions, it was possible to
find senior nobles like the Maharaja; of Burdwan^,
4 5Kassimbazar and Nadia being invited by indep­
endent institutions like the Kahakali Pathsala, the 
Sanskrit College and the Krishnagar C.M.S. School 
to preside over their prize distributions.
Their contact with individual students 
were made further possible by the number of scholar­
ships financed from their estate funds. The Maharaja 
of Kassimbazar supported five free students and paid 
half the cost of five others in his polytechnic ,
7
and allotted fifty scholarships at the Sanskrit College: 
He also sent students to Japan, America and Australia
g
at his own expense to learn industrial work. The 
Raja of Naldunga established scholarships for
1. The Eng1ishman: 6 June, 1911, p.6 .
2. Ibid: 5 May 1915, p.7.
3. Ibid: 7 Dec. 1915? p«9«
4. Ibid: 24 Feb. 1917, p . 3.
5* The Bengalee: 8 March 1911, p.6 .
6. The Bng1is hrian: 14 Apr. 1918, p . 3.
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Sanskrit learning, and donated medals for female
education.^ The Dighapatia Estate endowed the Rajshahi
Girls1 Aided School with an amount yielding Rs.l80 per
annum for needy students, and founded three scholar-
2
ships for the Girls' School at Boaliya. The Maharaja 
of Nadia had the right as a founding memher to 
nominate a number of free students at the Krishnagar 
College.*^ The Kumar of Paikpara founded two scholar­
ships at the Calcutta University for the students of
4
the High School at Kandi.
Simultaneously with schools and colleges, a 
number of noblemen established and maintained 
libraries which were open for the use of the 
general public. Out of the five public libraries 
at Burdwan, the Burdwan Raj library was the largest
5
and the most visited. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar
g
built a large library at Nawadwip, and Nawab Syed 
Mohammad ALi Chaudhury founded a public library
7
at Comilla. Half the cost of the Woodburn Public
Q
Library at Bogra was borne by the Nawab of Bogra.
Nawab Khwaja Mohammad Yusuf Hosain was a member 
of the executive committee of the Dacca Northbrook
Q
Hall Library, and Raja Reshee Case Law was a trustee
T. Whos 7/ho: pt.VIII, pp.4-1,7^
2. 'Rajas of Rajshahi', C.R.no.CXI: 1873, p.40.
3* Ind.P.P.: week ending 20 Feb. 1915, p.2 7 2 .
4. Kumar to Lt.Gov. 19 July 1910, B.J.P.: Apr. 1911,
Vol.8676, p.41.
5° 3.D.G.: Burdwan, p.l82.
6. Bengal Zamirdars, p.2.
7* Whos brio, pt.V, p.29*
8 . Nat.N.P.: week ending 7 June 19-3, p. 93.
9. V/bos Y/ho, pt.V, p. 27*
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of the Ram Mohan Library.1 The Jorhat (Rangpur) family
donated a monthly subscription to the Mahagunj Library
and Reading Room. The Sureunali Sahayya Bhandar and
Prativa Library received large contributions from
2
the Sovabazar family. Raja Jyot Kumar Mukerjee
donated the substantial sum of Rs.25,000 for the
construction of the Duke Library at Howrah.^
Their interest in educational facilities
often went beyond the limits of their zamiridaris.
The Rational Medical College of India was largely
financed by a number of noblemen of Indiaf and
continued to receive substantial help from the
5
Maharaja of Kassimbazar even later. The large 
donation given by the Maharaja of Burdwan to the 
Calcutta University^ was surpassed by the Maharaja of 
Kassimbazar who was appointed a Honorary Fellow for
7
life for his generosity. He also specified that 
Rs.20,000 was to be allotted for research in ancient
Q
Indian mathematics and astronomy. He further granted
one lakh of rupees for the founding of the Benaras
q
Hindu University , and was arrpointed one of the first 
trustees of the University His contribution was 
closely followed in amount by Raja Reshee Case Law.1 1
1. Bengal Zamindars: p.71.
2. The Bengalee: 18 Feb. 1911, p«5*
3. Hookyns to Comrn.Burd.Liv. 26 Feb. 1914, B.G.P. :
Aug. 1915, Vol.9640, p.246.
4. ’Rational Medical College1, R & S.P.P.: 1913,
Vol.7625, File.4510.
5. The Englishman:15 May 1911, p.6 .
6 . Ibid: 2 July 1917, p.11
7. Carmichael to Hardinge 25 June 1912, C.P.I.:1912,
Vol.Va7, pt.I., p.304.
8 . The Bengalee: 10 Jan. illl, P*7.
9. ' Gov.Con..i.-egis.Coon. 22 March 1915* , R S: o.P.P. : 1915
Vol.853, File.7762, p.526 (of proceedings).
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Out of Rs.37,000 donated by private individuals for 
Surendranath Banerjea's Ripon College Building Bund, 
Rs.24,700 were provided by noblemen.**” Similarly for 
the upgrading of the Ananda Mohan College at Mymensingh 
the nobles contributed Rs.104,320 out of a total sum of 
B s .123,245. 2 ■
The second decade of the century experienced a 
forceful movement by the Indian Muslims to establish 
a Muslim University, A meeting was held at Aligarh in 
1911, at which it was decided to form a Committee for 
the Foundation of a Mohammedan University. The Aga Khan 
was elected the president and the vice presidents were 
selected from the various provinces. Prom Bengal the 
two nominees were the Nawabs of Murshidabad and Dacca.^ 
At a following meeting held at Calcutta, Nawabs Shamsul 
Huda and A.P.M. Abdur Rahman were prominent speakers,
4
the latter making a stirring speech for the movement.
By the middle of the year a public meeting was held at 
Dacca under the presidency of the Nawab of Dacca to 
form a provincial branch of the fund raising committee. 
After the presidential speech, Nawab Syed Nawab Ali 
Chaudhury explained the objects of the proposed 
university. He later published an article in the 
Moslem Hitaishi urging the necessity for founding a 
Muslim University in India on the ground
1. S.N. Banerjea to Kerr 29 March 1912, B .G-.r . : May
1912, Vol.8923, p.52.
2. ’Proceedings of College Council 25 June 1912’,
B.C.P.: Jan. 1913, Vol.9137, p.52d.
3. The Bnglishman: 21 Jan. 1911, p.7*
4. Ibid: 25 Jan. 1911, p.3.
5. Ibid: 18 July, 1911, P*5.
that the existing universities as currently constituted
could not be expected to make proper arrangements for
the education of the Muslims.^ His sincere work for
the advancement of education of his fellow religionists
made him a leading figure in the eyes of the Muslim
students. It was not surprising that at a largely
attended meeting organised by the Bengal Mahommedan
College Students Association he should be invited to
2
preside over the occasion.
Along with educational institutions, intellectual 
societies greatly influenced the intelligentsia of Bengal. 
Once more the nobles could be found taking a prominent 
place in them. They contributed both financially and 
physically towards the formation of a number of 
intellectual circles within the province. The most 
renowned gathering of the Bengal intellectuals was the 
monthly meeting of the Sahitya Sabha held at the Sovabazar 
Rajbari and presided over by the Raja. After his^demise, 
the leading figure of the Sabha became the Maharaja of 
Kassimbazar.^ The Maharaja of Burdwan was the vice 
president of the society, and his contribution to the 
publication fund made it possible to publish the
4
Banger Kobita, so popular amongst the reading public.
He later became the president of the Provincial
5
Literary Conference. Another important intellect­
ual body was the Bangiya Sahitya Parisad, also founded 
by the Raja of Sovabazar,^ to which the Raja of Lalgola
1. Rat.P.P.: week ending 19 Aug. 1911, p.1027.
2. The Englishman: 14 Apr. 1913, p.6.
3* Ibid: 3 Rov. 1913, p.5*
4* Ibid: 26 Aug. 1912, p.3.
5. Ibid: 16 Aur. 1915, p.6.
contributed Rs.30,000 for the publication of useful books.^ 
The Raja of Lalgola was well known for his liberality
p
and his patronage of literature. In 1915 the Maharaja 
of Burdwan issued a letter to the Secretary of the 
society for circulation among the members of the Parishad 
throughout the country. As a staunch patron of literature, 
he invited the attention of those interested in the 
progress of Bengali literature to the fact that, though 
the Literary Conference held regular sittings, there had 
been no real, visible progress in that sphere. As a 
remedy he proposed the offering of money prizes for 
learned essays to be read at the Conference. He person­
ally offered one such prize and requested others to 
follow suit! The North Bengal Literary Conference 
also received the support of nobles such as the Rajas 
of Linajpur, Kassimbazar, Susang, Lalgola, Gouripore, 
Chanchal, and Dighapatia.  ^The fourth Bengal Literary 
Conference found the Maharaja of Susang as the president
of the reception committee, in which the Maharajas of
5
Muktagacha and Kassimbazar played important roles.
The fifth session was presided over by the Maharaja
of Kassimbazar where reference was made to his"uniform
association with every cause and effort towards the
advancement of literature in Bengal". The Maharaja
7
of Natore presided over the Kalighat Sahitya Samity
 ________ _.......„ „ ■ — Kagame—
1. The Englishman: 2 Sept. 1914, p.8 .
2. Ind.N.P.: week ending 12 June 1915, p.863.
3. The Englishman; 10 Lee. 1915, p.8 .
4. The Bengalee: 10 Jan. 1911, p.6 .
5. Ibid: 16 Apr. 1911, p.6 .
6 . Ibid: 3 I'K.rch 1912, p.4.
7. Ibid: 2 June 1914, p.2.
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and the Bhowanipore Sahitya Samity.^
Though less than the humanities, science was 
given its due importance by the nobles. The Raja of 
Santosh played an important role in its popularisation 
as a member of the Executive Committee for the Advance-
p
ment of Scientific and Industrial Education in India. 
With the object of founding an Astronomical Society 
of Bengal, a meeting was held under the presidency 
of the Maharaja of Kassimbazar, and supported by the 
Rajas of Susang and Sovabazar at the Kassimbazar 
Rajbari at Mirzapur.^ The Maharaja of Kassimbazar 
was so closely identified with the movement for the 
improvement and dissemination of Bengal literature, 
scientific knowledge and general education that the 
Surhid Parishad, a Bengali intellectual club at 
Bankipore, welcomed him as a prominent celebrity.^- 
The Maharaja Kumar of Dighapatia ventured into 
the field of archeology, and organised the Varendra
A
Research Party to work on archeological sites and 
5
relics.
Like the Hindu nobles the Muslims, too, were 
interested in intellectual circles. Nawab A.P.M. Abdur 
Rahman was the Honorary Secretary to the Mahommedan
g
Literary Society of Calcutta, and the Nawab of 
Murshidabad was the patron of the Calcutta Historical
1. The Bengalee: 5 June, 1914, p.2.
2. Whos Who, pt.Y, p.7.
3. The Englishman; 28 Feb. 1912, p.6.
4. Ind.owned Png.N .?.: week ending 28 Feb. 1914, p.145.
5. The Bengalee: 19-Jan. 1911, P*6.
6. A.P.LI. A. Rahman to Sec. Gen.Dept .Beng. 27 Nov. 1914,
R &  S.P.P.: 1912, Vol.725, File.1797.
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Society.'*' The gathering of the intellectuals in the
Muslim Anjumans also had immense influence over the
educated Muslims of the province. Nawab Syed Nawab Ali
Chaudhury was the president of the Anjuman-i-Mifid- 
2
ul-Islam, and the Nawab of Murshidabad was the patron
of Anjuman-i-Muslaman-i-Bangala.^ Nawab Syed Jahandar
Mirza was the president and the Nawab of Dacca the
vice president of the Musalman-i-Bangala lalbagh
subdivision.^" But the most important body of Muslim
intellectuals was the Provincial Mahomedan Education
Conference in which it was common to find writers,
philosophers, religious thinkers, social theorists,
political commentators, jurists and all others of
similar standing. Its aim was to afford an opportunity
for them to meet annually for an interchange of views
tending to foster good feelings and create a spirit
of sympathy, solidarity and cooperation; to provide
a fit place for the discussion of local wants and *
needs of Muslims; and to constitute a recognised
5
centre of thought, education and culture. Nawab 
Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury presided over the Conference 
in 1911. The Mussalman, reporting on the Dacca 
Sitting of the Conference, stated: "the success of 
the Conference was not to a little measure due to the 
personality of the Chairman of the Reception Committee
V/hos Tho, pt.VIII, p.4*
2* The Englishman: 7 Aug. 1917* p*6.
3. Whos 7/ho, pt.VIII, p.4.
4. ’List of Associations', 3.P.P.: Sept. 1911»
Vol.8683, p.46.
5- The Englishman: 6 Oct. 1911? P-5- 
60 Trie Bengalee: 1'3 Aor. 1915> p. 8 .
157
Sir Salimulla, Nawab Bahadur of Dacca.” ^ Another such 
association, though of less importance, was the Malda 
Education League, which counted among its patrons
o
Nawab Sujat Ali Beg and Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury.
Musical circles also found the nobles taking an
interest in their sphere of intellectual activity. The
Indian Sangit Sangha was presided over by the Maharaja
of Natore, while the vice patrons were the Maharanis of
Cooch Behar and Burdwan.^ The Raja of Narajole usually
presided over the meeting of the Midnapore Sangit Parishad,
and substantially helped the music circle with men and 
4
money. Raja Jyot Kumar Mukerjee was the president of
5
the Saraswati Sangit Samity of Bally. The Maharaja of
c
Burdwan patronised the Bharati Musical Association.
He further, along with the Maharaja of Kassimbazar,
7
supported the Sangit Sangha. As a matter of fact, the 
Burdwan Estate’s court musician was the celebrated
g
Prof. G-opesur Banerji. His fame was closely contested 
by the Raja of Tajhat's court musician, Ustad Ramohodhi
Q
Misra. The Raja of Kakina's string orchestra was also 
highly a d m i r e d . A s  for Raja Saurindra Mohan Tagore, 
it would not be far wrong to suggest that he was the 
most renowned musician in Bengal during his time.^
1. Ind. o;/ned Eng.N .P . : week ending 25 Apr. 1914, p. 265.
2. Ind.N.P. & Per.: week ending 16 Sept. 1916, p.1257.
3. The Englishman: 18 Feb. 1915* p.6.
4. Ibid: 8 Feb. 1917, p.4. 5. Ibid: 3 Feb.1914,p.3.
6. The Bengalee: 11 June 1914, p.2. 7. Ibid: 1 July, 1918,
8. Ibid: 3 Feb. 1915, p.3. P ’4 *
9. Ibid: 12 July 1914, p.2.
10. The Englishman: 15 Feb. 1911, 1*5.
11. 7/hos 7/rho, pt.VIII, p.12,13.
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The evolution of institutional education usually 
goes shoulder to shoulder with the development of 
organised sport. It is especially true in regard to the 
system of education introduced into India by the British.
But the love of sports was not restricted to the intelli­
gentsia only. To this day sporting events in Calcutta 
cause such intense excitement that frequently the police 
have to use force to curb the agitated spirit of the 
spectators. In the second decade of this century the 
enthusiasm of the sporting public greatly increased.
For the first time, in 1912, a Bengali team, the Mohan 
Bagan, had defeated a team consisting wholly of European 
players. It was one of the strongest military teams in 
India.^
The nobles patronised sport as they did any other 
aspect of social life in Bengal. A number of them donated 
cups and shields to be awarded for sporting events. The 
ones most frequently reported in the newspapers were the
2 3 'Cooch Behar and Sir Salimulla caps for football, closely
4
followed by the Ban Bihari League cup at Burdwan. Raja 
m  Bihari Kapur was the patron of the Burdwan Boys
5
Athletic Club. The R.N. Shield was presented by the Bhowal 
family.^ The Murshidabad cup, open to the football clubs 
of Murshidabad, Nadia, Rajshahi and Birbhum, was also
7
very popular in the area. The finals of the Cooch Behar 
tournament were frequently played on the ra.jbari grounds at
I* The Bengalee: 14 Feb. 1S12, p.4.
2. The Englishman: 5 Aug. 1911» P-3.
3. Ibid: 16 Aug. 1911» p.3.
4- Ibid: 11 Oct. 1S15, p.4.
5. The Bengalee: 3 Sept. 1914, p.2.
6. The Bn ■j; 1, i shm an: 2 Oct. 1917 > p. 6.
7. The Bengalee: 4 July, 1916, p.7«
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Cooch Behar in the presence of the Maharaja.^" The 
Maharajas of Cooch Behar,^ Natore^ and Mymensingh^ 
financed and managed popular cricket elevens. The Maharaja 
of Burdwan organised an annual athletic event for his 
Darjeeling tenantry. The Cooch Behar family’s interest 
in sport persuaded the Sovabazar Sporting Club and 
the Kalighat Sports Association to nominate the 
Maharaja as president. Similarly, Raja Jyot Kumar 
Mukerjee was created a life member by the Aheritolla
Q
Sporting Club.
Their prominence in social life and their
seniority in the zamlndari class allowed the nobles to
be in touch with other important personalities and
groups in Bengal. Their parties were attended by a
variety of prominent personalities of all creeds and
communities, of industry and commerce and of public
thought. At such meetings it was possible to associate
q
without formality. Even the reception at Calcutta in
honour of Gandhi was given at the residence of the
Maharaja of Kassimbazar.^ Festive occasions like the 
11 1?Jhulanjatra and Holi ' were frequently used by the 
nobles as opportunities for the throwing of at-homes 
and garden parties. On such occasions the prominent 
personalities of the locality, including other
1. The Englishman: IS May 1914, p.3.
2. Ibid: 27 Nov. 1914, p.3.
3* Ibid: 6 Bee. 1912, p.2.
4. Ibid: 24 Sept. 1912, p.3.
5. Ibid: 16 Oct. 1912, p.5.
6. Ibid: 21 Feb. 1914, p.11.
7. Ibid: 2 Feb. 1915, u.5.
Ibid: 28 July, 1915, p.7.
9. Ibid: 16 Feb. 1911, pn.5,6 (Darbhanga)
10. Ibid: 15 March 1915, p.6.
11. -'B.C. Boulger: Maharaja Bevi Sinha, p. 141.
12. 'Rajas of Rajshahi'. 0. R.no. U-J.: 1873, p. 40,
(Dighapatia}~«
1 2zammdars, pleaders, officials , planters and all 
persons with any claim to importance received special 
invitations from the nobles.^ In the same gathering, 
it was possible to come across members of the Executive
Council, lawyers, jurists, university professors and
4 *journalists. At times when such invitees were expected
from Calcutta, special trains were provided in which
5
the guests could travel free.
In short, the nobles* claim to "natural” leader­
ship was not without substance. By "natural” they meant 
that they were naturally, or by virtue of their birth, 
placed in the advantageous position whence they could 
influence the majority of the people and the largest 
number of interest groups. Their economic and social 
influence over various interest groups effected 
practically every aspect of life in rural Bengal, and 
to a certain extent even affected the life of the city. 
These economic and social links built over the generat­
ions provided benefits to a large number of people 
which generated feelings of obligation and loyalty 
amongst the recepients. Subsequently the institution 
being hereditary and continuous assisted in the 
growth of a depersonalised charisma which helped the 
nobles to retain traditional authority in their 
territories. Thus a network of channels which could
1. The Englishman; 7 march 1911, P«5 (Bogra)
2. * Rajas of Hajshahi*, C.R.no.CXI; 1873, p.39
(Dighapatia)
3. D.C.Boulger: Maharajah Devi Sinha, p.141.
4. The Englishman: 19 Jan. 1911, p«6 (Sovabazar)
5. Ibid: 20 Jan. 1911, p.6 (Jyot Kumar Mukerjee)
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"be utilised to influence the population developed.
Sociologists maintain that three different processes 
of influence can be distinguished. Compliance can be 
said to occur when an individual accepts influence 
because he hopes to achieve a favourable reaction 
from a person or group. He adopts the behaviour 
because he expects to gain specific rewards, and avoid 
specific disapproval by conforming. Identification can 
be said to occur when an individual wants to maintain a 
satisfying self-defining relationship to another person 
or group. This relationship takes the form of a 
reciprocal role relationship. Internalization can be 
said to occur when an individual accepts influence 
because it is congruent with his value system. He 
may find it congenial to his needs. The basis of the 
power of the influencing agent thus .are means control, 
attractiveness and credibility. The above analysis 
shows that the nobles of Bengal answered to the 
definition of influence-agents in all respects.^"
This entire network of influencing channels was 
sustained by the income derived from their large estates.
To sum up, we find that as far as the zamindars
were concerned, the nobles were their obvious leaders.
They set the pace for the entire class. During times
of financial difficulties, they were known to step in
and act as the junior zamindars * trustees and managers.
Moreover, their interests involving the permanent
1. H.C. Kelraan: 'Compliance, identification, &
internalization - three processes of attitude 
change1, Journal of Conflict Resolution', 
no.2: 1958, pp.53,54.
estates being identical, the nobles* easy access to 
people in authority provided a bridge for the other 
zamindars. Added to this was the fact that during 
social gatherings at the local nobleman’s residence 
the others could also conveniently meet important 
dignitaries and draw their attention to their own 
group or individual needs. Lastly, as the large 
estates of the nobles more or less surrounded the 
properties of the smaller landlords, improvements 
in the form of canals and waterworks within their 
zamindaris tended to benefit others as well.
The tenure holders, who formed the bulk of the 
rural bhadralok community, also had their economic 
interest linked with their respective zamindars. The 
income of their joint families varied from the 
reasonably affluent to the very poor. The income of 
the landlord shared by the multi-layered section of 
the community acted as a supplement which, in times 
of economic distress, became all-important. When an 
earning member lost his job, became disabled or died, 
the tenure income was the primary cushion that sustained 
the dependents through the difficult period. Thus, it 
acted as a social safety-valve for the unemployed, for 
the old and the retired, for widows and orphans, for 
the sick and the disabled, and other such people who 
could not earn a living. Moreover, their links with 
the zamindar, being personal and intimate, entailed 
that in times of stress they could derive benefits in 
the form of remission , allowing them time to
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readjust to their new situations. This intimate relation­
ship also made it possible to place their difficulties 
before the zamindar for his perusal during his periodic 
tours. At such times the zamindar could take an immediate 
•spot1 decision to relieve the grievances of the tenantryQ 
The Maharaj Kumar of Mymen'singh gained tremendous popula­
rity during one such tour. He settled all disputes 
with the tenants amicably and remitted nearly the 
entire unbarred interests and damages of the pra.jas.
In addition, another mahal got remission of half the 
principal rent from two to five years owing to their 
deplorable condition.^
The income that did come into the nobleman’s 
coffers was further utilised for various purposes than 
their personal consumption. A large portion of it was 
doubtless used for the essential expenses required for 
estates managements. Moreover, the above examination of 
their social activities show that their position as 
zamindars cum noblemen called for substantial expendi­
tures in various other fields. These functions had 
been established by their forbears of an earlier era,
and the amount ear-marked for such purposes was not 
2
a small sum. The amount expended for welfare purposes 
acted as an indirect method of providing the society 
with social services. In a society where the welfare 
state had not yet taken shape, the indirect processes
_-----    -      —     I, ,1 in -,ir.w  I   Ill r .niii n w iin w T irrrTinir iinwniTTTfi— tt 1 ’ '1 "~  
1. The Bengalee: 6 Sept. 1912, p.l.
2. See Appendix II.
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served an important purpose. Apart from the civic 
activities which benefited the entire area, the rural 
bhadralok community was provided with inexpensive or 
free schools, colleges, libraries, medical facilites, 
etc. It was acknowledged in the Bengalee that more 
than half the educational institutes, dispensaries, 
hospitals, etc. were founded and maintained by the . 
zamindars of Bengal.^ The numerous temples and mosques 
that they maintained also served socio-economic purposes. 
Aside from their role in providing food for thousands 
of poor people daily, they also acted as places of 
refuge where food and shelter could be found by the old 
and the helpless. The caste establishments which they 
maintained as dalpatis and the numerous benevolent 
funds which they managed as zamindars also provided 
refuge for widows, orphans, the disabled, the old, 
and in addition acted as ’stopgaps1 for poor students 
and also new graduates searching for employment. Since 
none .of these indigenous institutions had the disagreable 
reputation of being tantamount to ’handouts1, it obliged 
n0 bhadralok recipient of such benefits to lose face 
in his society. On the contrary, to retire to a temple 
or mosque, or to eat and to live in an unpolluted caste 
ashram, were considered acts of piety. Finally, during 
times of scarcity and epidemics the system provided 
a machinery which could be quickly mobilised to 
alleviate the peoples’ distress. Thus rescue work
1. The Bengalee: 27 Sept. 1911» p«3«
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and the supply of emergency provisions, together with 
refuge for the homeless etc., could he promptly carried 
out.
Bengal society’s reliance on the large,
permanently settled landholdings is markedly visible
in the replies received by the Land Revenue Commission
in 1938, which surveyed the situation existing in Bengal
from the turn of the century. The Twiddle Class Peoples’
Association of Mymensingh emphasised that Permanent
Settlement did not cripple the financial resources
of the country. On the other hand ”a secured tenantry,
a strong middle class, and an affluent aristocracy
emerged as a result of the Permanent Settlement”.
Its abolition would lead to complete disaster, since
it would render the question of 'unemployment more acute.
”The middle class people who form the backbone of
society ... will be extinct”, said the Association
o m i n o u s l y I n  the same tone the Peoples* Association
of Dacca stated that the long continuance of the
Permanent Settlement had ’’induced the middle class
intelligentsia to invest their savings in land and
annulment of the Permanent Settlement will ruin
2
the middle class”. Its continuance was also advocated 
by all the Bar Associations that sent replies to the 
questionaire.^
The Manager of Paikpara Estate, who came in
T. iTrTcTTToTJiTT pp.78-so.
2 . Ibid: Vol .VI, p.9 1 .>
3. Ibid: See Vol.VI - argued from economic and
1egalistic point of view.
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constant contact with the zamindari staffs, pointed 
out that its abolition would result 1 in the unemploy­
ment of their officers; also in the partial unemployment 
of the people dependent on them - people such as 
pleaders, local craftsmen depending on the patronage 
of the local landholders and so on; also in the 
limitation in the source of supply of capital to 
indigenous or modem industries; and in the fall 
ii national demand so far as the purchasing power of 
those classes is concerned."^ Speaking of the intermed­
iaries, the Manager of Kassimbazar predicted that "these 
middlemen form the bulk of the bhadralok middle classes
and they will be driven by want to join the communists 
2
or socialists".
The Bengal Landholders Association, comprising 
the different categories of landholders,argued that 
because of the Permanent Settlement "there may be 
a loss [to the StateJ according to mathematical Calcula­
tion but on the whole it is a gain to the people. 
Ultimately individual wealth alone contributes to the 
wealth of the nation and on that depends all prosperity."^ 
The Bankura Landholders Association succinctly pointed 
out that if the system was abolished "the Government 
officials and their myrmidons will prove to be more 
oppressive than the zamindars1 agents who are generally
T. l7p~ . c .7 ToiTTvT'TTTso7
2. Ibid: Vol.V, p.111.
3. Ibid: Vol.III. p.68.
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local m e n " T h e  British Indian Association emphasised :
that under such conditions "everybody and everything
2will be thrown out of gear".
The Director of Land Record and Survey, B.B.
Mukerjee, summed up the situation with: "the large per­
centage of population depended upon land in some shape 
or other is proof of the influence of the land system 
on the social organism as a whole in Bengal. It is 
essential to bear in mind when one is asked to deal 
radically with it.... To pull down that structure will 
have repercussions so widespread that the consequences 
are certain-to be chaos and anarchy".^
The Permanent Settlement, with the nobles at its 
apex, was the very foundation on which the Bengal society 
rested. The above examination leaves no doubt that there 
was a great deal of truth in the nobles' claim to being 
the natural leaders. Their social eminence as zamindar- 
noblemen, and their prominence in social activities, 
supplemented by the fact that a huge portion of the 
population was economically linked with them, created a 
situation whereby the group generated traditional 
authority activated by depersonalised charisma over 
virtually the entire population of the province.
L.R.C.: Vol.Ill, p.32.
2. Ibid: Vol.Ill, p.194.
3- Ibid: Vol.V, p.43.
CHAPTER III. 
INTERMEDIARIES IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
The socio-political function of any group in British 
India, and its importance and position within the Indian 
fabric, must necessarily be measured from two different 
standpoints: its authority over its compatriots, and its 
capacity to influence the Raj. Without the former the 
latter would not be possible, and without the latter 
the former would be authority but with little value.
The previous chapter analysed -the former; this chapter 
Examines the latter.
The nobles’ traditional authority over the socio-
economic life of the province did not mean that the
Government would automatically invite them to "collaborate
with it in politics. Mere socio-economic influence
without any political competence would never have
induced the British to rely on the group to act as a
*
supplementary support to uphold the administration.
There was a time when the Bengal nobles actually 
supervised the administrative machinery within their 
own territories. A study of the sanads recognising and 
appointing a new zamindar even until as late as the 
twilight years of the nizamat reveals that he was 
regarded as the local embodiment of the executive, 
legislative and judicial authority in his zamindari 
by the imperial and Bengal authorities. He played an 
important role as the revenue collector and the 
keeper of the peace. His political power increased
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conversely with the centre1s decrease of administrative
control over the provinces.^ He not only defended the
territory against external enemies, with the aid of
armed retainers, hut also administered the lav/ and
maintained peace and order with a large force of rural
police known as thanadars, phanridars, chaukidars,
and paiks, who helped in protecting the property,
collecting the revenue and in carrying out other
2services personal to the zamindar. In the Fifth Report 
it was stated that the Burdwan Estate retained 2,400 
armed constables and 1,900 paiks for the maintenance 
of law and order. For the same purpose the zamindar 
also maintained law courts with himself as the highest 
court of appeal.^ In the bigger estates there were 
bakhshis immediately under the zamindar, who were 
responsible for compensating the sufferers for their 
loss. Moreover, travellers were furnished with safe 
convoys, and merchants protected in the conveyance of 
their merchandise. The zamindars were also in charge of 
village ponds, village ferries and village roads, and 
performed more or less the duties of the justice of
4
the peace.
The nobles were later divested of most of this 
administrative authority apart from the collection of 
the revenue and the administration of the machinery
5
involved in its collection. The only exceptions
1. P.B.Calkins: 1 Ruling Groups in Bengal’, J.A.S.,Aug.1970,
pp.791-303.
2. Administrative Report British India (Bengal):1911-12,
3. L.R.Ci Vol.V, p.98.
4. A .0 .hoy: History of Bengal, p.353•
5. They were also expected ~to help maintain law and order. 
But this police function was based on convention
rather than statutes. The point is further elaborated 
in Chapter V.
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were the tribal chiefs of the Chittagong Hill tracts.
As late as the decade under review, the tribal
chiefs retained considerable political authority.
Complaints of various types were laid directly
before the chiefs despite the presence of the
Government Superintendent*. Petty cases brought
to the notice of the Superintendent were transferred
immediately for trial at the chiefs' courts. In
cognisable cases the complainants were allowed to bring
matters directly to the chiefs' notice without having
to seek prior permission of the Superintendent or the
police. In cases of petty theft the police forwarded
the matter to the chiefs and, having done so, made no
further investigations of their own. For such purposes
the chiefs themselves had a crude type of investigating
agency. Their local agents were known as darogas and
their peons acted as the local constables.^ They also
had jurisdiction over offences of extortion, robbery,
dakoitv, lurking, house trespass or house breaking
in cases where the property did not exceed Rs.500 in 
2
value. They were capable of enforcing fines and 
restitutions and imposing imprisonment. Even the law 
was to an extent their own, as the Code of Criminal 
Procedure was limited in its application within 
their estates, and the chiefs' courts were expected
1. K.C.De to Chief Sec.Beng. 24 Feb. 1917, B.P.P.:
May, 1917, Vol.10116, p.165.
2. Chakma Raja to Comm,Chittagong Div. 23 July 1916,
Ibid, p.167.
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to follow the spirit of the Code rather than being bound 
to the letter.'1'
The tribal zamindaris being remote and relatively 
inaccessible, and most of the tribal villages being 
inconstant in location, it was found expedient by the 
political authorities to .allow the chiefs to retain 
a considerable amount of political function. But their 
case was rather the exception than the rule. Even 
the native princes, in whose name all the administrative 
functions were carried out in their respective principa­
lities, had lost all such authority within their 
zamindaris in the directly administered part of British 
Bengal. Doubtless it was possible to come across refer­
ences to zamindari courts even in the twentieth 
2
century. But in reality that was the misuse of a popular 
term to signify a place for the amicable settlement of 
rent disputes by mutual consent. The withdrawal of all 
political authority is noticeable in the language used 
in the sanads of the twentieth century. It consisted of 
a mere line or two conferring the noble title and 
recognising the proprietory right over the inherited 
zamindari .
One might conclude that the nobles had no political 
function. It was frequently said that politically they 
had become antiquated and useless. Yet one is also
1. Llawson to Comm.Chittagong Div. 26 Sept. 1916,
Ibid, p.171*
2. P.Sinha: nineteenth Century Bengal, p.31.
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faced with the contradictory observation that the 
’’collaboration” of the large landholders was of prime 
importance to the Raj.^ This was so because the nobles 
had lost their position as the official class. Their 
political function had undergone a change and, over 
the years, they had acquired the position of inter­
mediaries in public affairs. This conversion of 
political role came about gradually over the 
duration of the nineteenth century.
In the beginning of the nineteenth century 
a great number of young and inexperienced British 
officials holding key positions, such as local 
magistrates and district officers, administered Bengal 
with little or no respect for the desires and aspira­
tions of the indigenous inhabitants, since these were 
not considered essential for effective administration.
From the elevated heights of unquestionable authority 
they were doubtless cloaked with the belief that *
their mission was to impose the superior systems of the 
west on the uncivilised east. They apparently felt no 
need to rule nor introduce innovations by careful 
persuasion.
In time the system went through considerable 
dhange. With the increase of responsibility and 
experience,one aspect of the change was the conviction 
that greater Indian participation at different levels 
of administration was necessary for more effective
1. A. Seal: Emergence of Indian Nationalism, p.10.
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government. It was felt necessary to increase the 
number of Indians who had been educated -through English 
methods and matured with English ideas, and could act 
as interpreters of British policy and educate the local 
population in the benefits of British r*ule.
By the middle of the century it became further 
apparent that communications between the rulers and 
the ruled had still not improved or become as effective 
as had been hoped. The terrible events of the Sepoy 
Mutiny brought home to the Administration the dangers 
arising from the total exclusion of Indians from the 
legislative process.^ This realisation resulted in 
a further change of approach. Legislative Councils with 
nominated Indian members were created, and it became 
an accepted practice to circulate proposed legislation 
for the purpose of seeking advice from the leading 
political ' associations and eminent individuals as 
well. This principle was founded on the conviction that 
the government of a country such as India by a handful 
of Civil Servants, acting through hundreds of thousands 
of Indian subordinates could very easily be made impossi­
ble. It depended upon the passive consent of the masses, 
and the entire cooperation of a large number of educated 
men. Without their support, control of India could be 
lost. The process of consultative politics was at its 
height during the first two decades of the twentieth
1. Ind.Constit.Ref., p.31.
2 • Ferr:1 Kemorandurn on the Representation of India
(Round ! ab 1 e)1 lest on • Vol. 10, Loose Papers .
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century. Practically no law was enacted nor reform advocated 
without the issuing of circulars and the making of a 
close survey of the replies to fathom the public1s recept­
ion of the proposed schemes. The question that follows 
is 7/ho were these eminent individuals and which were 
the political associations utilised for assessing public 
reaction to contemplated legislation? A careful examina­
tion shows that the people and the societies selected 
for this purpose were not chosen at random. Over the 
nineteenth century they had gradually established 
themselves as the political leaders of the province.
In the early nineteenth century, Administration 
encouragement of this process of spreading English methods 
and English ideas was taken advantage of by the Bengalis.^ 
Government policy, combined with indigenous interest 
resulted in the growth of a group of local people who 
considered the need to adapt western views to the Indian 
fabric of prime importance for the progress of the 
country. At that time the leadership of this group of 
'reformers' was primarily in the hands of the noblemen 
and other large landholders of the province. 7/hen cir­
cumstances necessitated the formation of a method of 
consultation in politics the leading figures of this 
group were called upon by the Government to participate.
In time this group enlarged and more or less 
polarised into two rival groups or parties. Each section 
was convinced that the other's attitude towards western 
ideas was harmful for India. The key word in the older 
group's approach was adaptation. They advocated remoulding
1. U.S. Bose: Indian Awakening 1 Bengal, p.152.
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western institutions to suit the local background.
On the other handjthese conservatives maintained,
the younger elements were so keen on trying to prove
that their views were similar to the British in every
respect that they tended to lose sight of the local
conditions. Surendranath Banerjea and other leading
personalities of the new group, who were frequently
described as more English than the English, doubtless
fanned their fears even further. Such an attitude, they
felt, would undoubtedly erode the very foundation on
which the society was based. It was leading to a
systematic loss of regard for indigenous institutions
which in turn was draining the vitality of the Indian
2
society as such. Describing them, the Maharaja of 
Burdwan said that they were the ’'extreme section of 
the England returned community, who look upon every­
thing appertaining to orthodox India or orthodox Hindu 
beneath their contempt and in that sense are the 
real enemies of the country.... "■? Despite the efforts 
of the nobles to restrict the leadership of these 
new elements, the latter gradually acquired strength
1. f,The educated Indian now regards himself as a full
grown man, the equal in every respect of the cultured 
European, not to be set aside as an Asiatic, or as a 
member of a dark race. He claims the right of 
thinking his own thoughts, and he is quite prepared 
to burn what he has hitherto adored and to create 
a new heaven and a new earth". - J.C. Ker:
Political Troubles in India, p.vii.
2. Their effort to retain the caste structure free from 
the domination of "modern" leaders discussed in
the previous chapter is a perfect example of their 
reaction to this fear.
3. The Englishman: 7 Dec. 1915, p»9* -In this the 
Maharaja was one with the extremists who also believed 
that the Moderates were over ’westernised.
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until, by the twentieth century, they became the 
acknowledged leaders of the urban intelligentsia.
Thus we find that in the early decades of this century 
two groups of political leaders with divergent attitudes 
had emerged.
Before going any further, it is imperative to 
keep in mind that during the period under review, mass 
participation in politics was a factor that did not 
exist, leadership was assessed by the Government from 
the standpoint of the breadth of interest represented 
by an individual or group as much as how far that 
individual or group could influence and lead the 
ignorant mass towards progress. The elective principle 
was still in its infancy, and direct representation 
was limited to only a handful.^" Such being the case, 
the nobles were at an advantage as they had numerous 
channels described in the previous chapter by which 
they could make themselves heard by the general public.
The difference in attitude between the two groups 
did not rest only on their divergent attitude to westerni­
sation. Another such difference existed in their 
attitude towards what their own position should be 
viz-a-viz the Government. The nobles for their part 
advocated sincere criticism of Government policies 
and programmes. It was not their aim to embarrass 
the Administration, but rather to correct its short­
comings, Writing about the Maharaja of Nashipur ,
1. Discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
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even as radical a paper as the Amrita Bazar Patrika
acknowledged that "a scion of one of the most ancient
families in the land... can still serve his countryne-R
without the fear of frown or favour." ^ Reporting on
the annual meeting of the Burdwan Moharnmadan Association
the Ivlusalman pointed out that "unlike most of the
so-called Muhammadan leaders Nawab Abdul Jabbar had the
courage to speak out his mind frankly, and by the
independence he showed he left a deep impression on 
2
his audience". Writing about the Raja of Sovabazar
the Bengalee stated that "the Raja Bahadur had the
courage of his convictions and did not hesitate to
face unpopularity, both with the Government and his
own compatriots to act according to the dictates of
his conscience
There is clear evidence that such efforts at
criticism on the part of the nobles were not resented.
One of the severest critics of the Government was Raja
Peary Mohan Mukerjee. Although ■ he had the unique
record of being awarded the titles of raja and C.S.I.
in the same year,^he remained a persistent critic.
The Criminal Investigation Department had compiled
a considerable file on the Maharaja of Kassimbazar.
His outspoken criticism led the Department to suspect
him of harbouring anti-government sympathies. But we
still find Carmichael and Duke considering him one of the
1. id.Chattopadhyay: Eanajit Lahima, p.3*
2. Ind.owned Eng.N.P.: week ending 19 Dec. 1914,
“ " p.742.
3. The Bengalee: 6 Dec. 1912, p.2.
4. Carmichael to Kardinge, 17 March 1914, C.P.I.:
19 ..4, Vol.Val2, pt.I, p.205.
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best landlords, and arguing with the Central Government
in favour of giving him a K.C.I.E.'1' The Mymensingh
family were well known anti-partitionists and even took
2
to open boycott of foreign goods* But that did not cause
them to be deprived of official recognition.-^ During the
discussion for the appointment of a new Indian member
in the Secretary of State's Council it was suggested
that, as the Administration was being accused of
invariably appointing a 'safe1 man, it would be wiser
to nominate a well known critic in the future. The two
names suggested were those of Bhupendranath Basu and
4
the Maharaja of Burdwan. Althuugh he was considered a 
critic, the Maharaja was called upon for his services 
time and again. The Raja of Narajole, who was suspected 
of being involved in terrorist activities by the official 
circle, nevertheless was allowed to lead the deputation 
that received Carmichael during his tour of Midnapore, 
and later was accorded a private interview with the 
Governor.^
On the other hand, it seemed to the nobles and
other like-minded conservatives that the leaders of the
intelligentsia, instead of acting as a corrective influence,
had, over the years, acquired the habit of constant
opposition to the Government. At the beginning,
>
when the Congress movement had just been initiated
_  IM(^ p.204. ‘ ’
2. S.N. Banerjea, p.l86.
3. Carmichael to Hardinge 19 Nov. 19-2, C.P.I.: 1912,
Vol.Va8,pt.I, p.394.
4. Sec.St. to Viceroy 7 May 1917, Telegrams:
Chelmsford, Vol.8, pt.I, p.110.
5. The Englishman: 18 J..n, 1313» p.4.
179
and its leadership was confined to apparently loyal men, 
the nobles gave unstinted support to its cause. But as 
time passed it seemed to them as though its leadership 
was being taken over by a more radical group of men, 
forcing even the loyalists to give lip service quite 
frequently to their doctrine. The nobles, who continued 
to maintain a loyalist stance, found this new approach 
objectionable.^ In their eyes it seemed as though the 
new leaders' political philosophy rested on perpetual 
attack on Government endeavours even if they had to 1 
undergo a complete turn-about in their own previous 
demands. There was no denying the fact that the group 
which included "so learned a lawyer as Rash Behari Ghose, 
sp fervid an orator as Surendranath Banerjea, so subtle a 
politician as Bhuoendranath Basu, and so skillful an
2
organiser as Ambica Charan Majumdar" was an awe-inspring body. 
But, despite their brilliance, it seemed to many that one , 
day they would say that the Government could find crores 
of rupees to finance education and sanitation, and the next
■3
day take it to task for spending too much money.-' The 
maharaja of Burdwan condemned their inconsistent behaviour 
by publicly announcing that their attitude combined "hysteri­
cal outbursts of loyalty on the one hand, and adverse
4
criticism in the press on the other."
1. Discussed in more detail in Chapter V.
2. The Bnglie haan: 17 Deb. 1912, p.4.
3- Ibid, 26 Jan. 1911, p.4.
4. The Bengalee: 2 Apr. 1915, p.4.
Another such basic difference that the nobles
believed existed between themselves and the other leaders
was their respective concept of patriotism. Unlike the
new leaders, who were primarily nationalists, the nobles1
loyalty went way beyond the provincial, or even the
national, boundary. They believed that Bengal in particular
and India in general would benefit tremendously if the
country acquired an equal status in an integrated,
federated empire in the same manner as in the case of
England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland being formed into
a united kingdom. Independence was not as beneficial
as mutual dependence in their eyes. Their desire for
the type of administration best suited for the country
was clearly expressed by ITawab Shamsul Hud a when he said
that it was not self-government that the common Indian
cared for, but good government. The majority did not
much care for Home Rule, or for any political reform
whatsoever.^" The nobles believed that England was
virtually the centre of modern civilization, enlighten-
2
ment’and progress. It was due to the Empire that India was 
fast awakening from her dream of the past.^ The Empire 
had rescued the country from poverty and misrule, and 
converted it into a centre of material and intellectual 
progress: "the greatest feat achieved by any nation since 
the downfall of the Roman Empire."  ^ They were the 
citizens of a great and compact Empire, and not people
1. The Englishman: 23 Apr. IS18, p.4. (Nashipur)
2. Ibid: 5 Sept. 1914, p.6. (Kakina)
3. Ibid: 6 June 1911, 'p,S. (Ifurshidabad)
4. Ibid: 30 Ilarch 1911, p. 6. (Peary Rohan Hukerjee)
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of an isolated dependency of the Crown.^ They strove for 
the day when the individual components would all have an 
equal voice at the Imperial Council at London, forming
o
the Federation of G-reater Britain, complementing one
another, rather than remain superior and subordinate,
or become opposing forces. 1 V/hat was best for the
country, they claimed, was not Home Rule but equality:
equal laws, equal rights and equal treatment as fellow
subjects of the same sovereign. They disagreed with
the liberal Englishman who conceded to the demands of
the other leaders as they felt that in the long run such
a process would retard the progress of the country.^"
The goal should be equality and not similarity as the
leaders of the intelligentsia with liberal western views
5
were suggesting.
That their imperial patriotism was sincere and 
not merely a matter of drawing official attention on them­
selves was well illustrated by the maharaja of Burdwan 
during his tour of the European continent. While going 
for a boat trip at Lucerne, away from the possibilities 
of frown or favour from British officials, he requested 
that the boat’s flag be changed from the American Stars 
and Stripes to the imperial Union Jack. His remark that
1* Lee. IS 11» p.7. (Ivlurshidabad)
2. The concept of G-reater Britain was the product of growing 
liberalism in Britain’s attitude towards her white 
settlement. The nobles extended the idea to embrace 
India also - A. Seal: Emergence of Indian Nationalism,
^  _p
3. Carmichael to Chelmsford 20 Aug, 1916 (Enclo.), ^*°
G.B.R., p. 146. (Shamsul Huda)
4. Burdwan to Curzon 14 Aug, 1907> Letter?: Curzon, T;el.e26, p
5. e.g. Representative legislature should be createo.
in EnglandQ But - unlike England representation sricuo.a
be sccording to a sectional raiser tran a teiri Loriai.
basis, as India had too many minority interests which
would otherwise not be adequately represen tea, leaning to
discontent which woplq epd iip chaos. - 3ee Addresses 
r.revenue! e.t our. : onta vu, — hcevi
England was his fatherland while India was the ever 
dear motherland, clearly illustrated the feeling of a 
Bengali nobleman.
The difference between the nobles and the leaders 
of the intelligentsia widened even further with the 
former*s growing conviction that the latter were 
subtly undermining their reputation as zamindars.
They felt that the ever widening belief that the nobles 
left their estate management to naibs, who in turn 
sucked the blood out of the peasants, was being spread 
with the tacit consent of the new leadership. But the 
nobles knew that these naibs came from the same group 
of intelligentsia whom the new leaders claimed to 
represent: no doubt they suspected the sincerity 
of these critics. In an attempt to counteract this 
growing belief they publicly emphasised that "it is 
too sweeping a remark to say that all the Officers of 
Zemindars are unscrupulous. Almost all the Managers and 
responsible officers, at least of the bigger Zentindars, 
are men of high education now-a-days and if persons of 
the same class do not prove unscrupulous while in public 
service, there is no reason why they should prove to be 
only because they happen to be in the service of the
p
Zemindars". Many men in their service were outstanding 
in their own fields. For example, Shamboo Charan
1. B.C. Mahtab: Impressions, p.83.
2. The Bengalee: 27 Sept. 1911» p.3.
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Hookerjee, editor of Rais and the Eayat, president of 
the India League, rose to be a minister in the Maharaja 
of Tripura’s service.^ Sarada Charan Mookerjee, the 
Superintendent of the Nawab of Dacca, was a prominent
2
member of the so-called middle-class educated community. 
K.B.Dutt, the legal adviser of Burdwan Estate, was a 
well known Barrister-at-Law.^ Amalananda Bose, the 
Superintendent of Kassimbazar Estate, was elected a 
Eellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain
A
and Ireland for his historical researches. Even
Surendranath Banerjea, the leading light of the
new element, had once been offered a managerial
5post by the Maharaja of Tripura. Being aware of 
the calibre of men in their staff, the nobles rather 
resented the insinuation that they appointed 
inconsiderable men. Maharaja Tagore voiced the 
zamindars1 resentment of these "people who never 
miss an occasion to run down the zamindar" during 
the Great 7/ar Conference. *
Their exasperation at being thought that they 
were callous of the well-being of the people in their 
care, can be assessed from a letter that Maharaja Tagore 
published in the Englishman. In it he wrote, "I should 
like to know how many philanthropic, patriotic, educat­
ional and industrial movements of the present day would 
have survived, had it not been for the Maharajadhiraj
1. B.B. Majumdar, p.140.
2. The Englishman; 19 March 1911? p.8.
3. Macpherson to Chief Sec.Beng, S Aug, 1910,
B.A.P.: Feb. 1911, Vol.8 6 7 9 , p.46.
4. The Eng 11shman: 10 June 1915, p.6.
5. S.IT. Banerjea, p. 125.
6. The F.n"Iishmun: 4 Jure, 1918, p.6.
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Bahadur of Burdwan, the Maharaja of Cossimbazar, and
let me add, the Maharaja Bahadur of Darbhanga? In
intellectual eminence and experience of public affairs,
Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee, C.S.I., and Raja Kishori Lall
Goswami would take the front rank in any assemblage of
their countrymen" Gradually the nobles were more and
more convinced that many amongst the new leadership
were not only opposed habitually to the British, but were
also systematically undermining the reputation of the nobles
by misrepresenting them to the public as the "pampered
2
vampires of the Empire".
Their doubt about the new leaders’ motives became 
even greater with the progress of the anti-partition 
movement.^ The Muslim nobles could not remain unaffected 
by the fact that the revocation of partition, which 
the new group demanded, would cost their communal 
followers the chance of catching up with the primarily 
Hindu-dominated intelligentsia of the province, In 
the eyes of the nawabs it seemed that the ’national­
ists’ , who claimed that the needs of the poor and the 
downtrodden were represented by them, denied to the 
Muslims, who were undoubtedly the more backward, the 
chance to rise out of the quagmire. The Nawab of Dacca 
put into words the opinion of the nawabs and their associates 
at such a contrary attitude when he warned his followers
1. Ibid: 22 Nov. 1917, p.4.
2. Ibid: 22 July, 1911, p.3
3. Discussed in fuller detail in Chapter V.
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that the Hindu-dominated intelligentsia was the primary
enemy of Muslim interest.'1' According to the nawabs the
climax was reached when the Calcutta leadership, which
claimed to be the champions of universal education, turned
against the proposal for Dacca University on the ground
that they would have no control over it, and that it
was communal in character. Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury
came forward to oppose what he considered was an agitation
2based on hypocricy. Such apparently contradictory stands 
on the part of the Calcutta leadership gave further 
stimulus to their doubts of the new group's sincerity.
From their point of view it looked as though the so- 
called nationalists methodically reacted against the 
groups - landholders, Muslims, caste bodies, etc. - 
over which the nobles had the greatest influence.*^
The differences of attitude that had taken shape 
over the decades had become vast and unmistakable by 
the twentieth century. Thus the original group of 
'reformers’ had undoubtedly diverted into two distinctly 
different courses, and had emerged as rival groups in 
Bengal. The question that follows is whether the nobles 
had the potential to be acknowledged as an effective 
rival political group. 7/e are already aware that political 
activities were carried out via political associations 
which acted both as pressure groups and sounding boards 
for public opinion. In other words, the associations
1. Discussed further in Chapter V.
2. Ibid.
3. The same tendency was apparent in 1912 when, in
contradiction to their previous stand that there
should be no special representation in the Legis­
lative Council, they opined that the member repres­
enting the Indian co mercial interest should be
chosen from the Indian Association in their
control- rather .than tip? National Chamber dominated 
by the Law ivwily. - Discussed iurtner on in Cua ter J.Y.
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acted as intermediaries in public affairs. To analyse 
the effectiveness, if any, of the nobles in the political 
life of the province, it is necessary to examine the 
development, the aims and objects, and the membership of 
the major associations of the time.
Numerous associations had been formed to 
represent different group interests over the last 
century. By the turn of the century they had gained 
tremendous importance in the political life of Bengal.
Though there were many officially recognised assoc­
iations which the Government consulted, all of them 
were not consulted at the same time. Each association 
was considered well-versed on particular subjects, and 
when such matters arose, those particular bodies were 
asked to opine. But there were six such associations 
which were called upon practically every time any advice 
was required. Doubtless it was so because they could 
influence the largest number of people and affect the 
most important sections of the community. They were 
the British Indian Association, the Bengal Landholders 
Association, the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, 
the Bengal Presidency Moslem League, the Central 
National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta, and the 
Indian Association.
The oldest of the six was the British Indian 
Association. The introduction of European ideas was 
the primary factor which led to the formation of the
1. Amongst others there were 14 associations recognised
by the Govt, in Calcutta, 4 in the Presidency Division
and 10 in the Burdwan Division. -'List of Associations’,
B.P.P.: Sent. 1011, Vol.8683, pp.43-48.
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Association, The 'reformers' felt the need to play an 
effective part in public affairs."^ The culmination of 
this desire was the formation of the National Assoc­
iation in 1851 at a meeting held in the Paikpara 
Rajbari. Most of the members of the well known 
zamindari families of Bengal attended the meeting.
V/ithin a month and a half of its inauguration, a 
bigger and more representative body, the British 
Indian Association, presided over by Raja Radhakanto 
Deb of Sovabazar as president, with Raja Kali Krishna 
Deb as vice president, Debendranath Tagore as 
Secretary and Raja Digambar Mitra as assistant 
secretary, came into existence. It was to act for
some time as the leader of what was then acknowledged
2as Indian public opinion.
The object of the Association was to promote 
the improvement and efficiency of the British Indian 
Government by every legitimate means in its power and 
thereby to advance the common interests of Great Britain 
and India in order to ameliorate the condition of the 
native inhabitants of the subject territory . ^ At the 
inaugural meeting it resolved to try and "remove the 
existing defects in the laws and the civil administration 
of the country and to promote the general welfare and
A
interest of its people." T
1. B.B. Kajurr.dar, p.33-
2. B .I . . *, pp.4,5*
3. The friends of India: 27 Nov. 1851, Vol,17*
p.755.
4. Sujata Ghose:'British Indian Association',
Report of the Regional Records Survey Co: mittee
for ,/est Ren gal, p. 20.
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The leadership of the Association was retained
by the nobles even later. T.7hile the l.-.st century was
coming to its close, the dominating figures in the
Association were Raja Rajendra Hitter, Maharaja
Narendra Krishna, along with Babu Kristo Das Pal who
declined a rajaship on the ground that he was too poor
for such an honour.^ The turn of the century found
MahaTaja Jotindra Mohan Tagore the leading personality
in the society. With his death his adopted son and
successor, Maharaja Prodyot Coomar Tagore, followed
by the Maharaja of Burdwan along with Raja Reshee
Case law as the secretary, dominated the proceedings.
The vice presidents were the Maharajas of Kassimbazar and
2
Susang, and Raja Peary Mohan Mookerjee.
At the outset the Maharaja of Burdwan was 
reluctant to seek membership. He felt that it had 
become "too full of that barrister and doctor element" 
who, according to him, were "the real discontented 
mischief making element in India". But then he changed 
his mind. He felt that since the death of the late 
Maharaja 1 -gore things were going badly for the 
Association.^ Presumably he joined their ranks to 
guide them back to the path he considered politically 
healthy and socially useful. Prom his survey of the
1. B.B. Majumdar, p.73.
2. The Englishman: 1 Apr. 1912, p.12.
3. Burdwan to Curzon 6 Aug. 1908, Letters: Curzon,
Vol. 426, p. 77.
183
Bengal scene we find that he was disturbed by the possi­
bility of "some Ra.ias and Maharajas'of Bengal ... being led 
by the collar" by discontented people.^ This was quite possi­
ble, he asserted, as some of the nobles liked "sitting on
p
the fence". His intentions were to regenerate a conserva­
tive attitude, and make it more representative by limiting
3the influence of the intelligentsia.
For most of the decade under study, the Maharaja 
presided over the Association. It coincided with the time 
when it became progressively difficult to retain popular 
support without at least giving lip service to radical 
policies. Simultaneously, it was obviously not possible 
to retain the Government1s confidence if radical views 
were voiced. Under the circumstances it was very diffi­
cult to be effective as an intermediary. The Maharaja's 
aim, to judge from his presidential speeches at the annual
general meetings, seem to have been to retain the public
4leadership without breaking out of conservative bounds.
By 1914 he seemed satisfied with the first h$lf of his pro­
gramme. Speaking from the chair he stated that he was proud 
to say that the Association "acted as a board giving advice 
to the Government on any particular measure on which the
5
Government chose to consult it". Two years later he took a
1.B.C.Mahtab: Studiest p.66
2.Burdwan to Curzon 6 Jan.1909.Letters:Curzon. Vol.426,p.81
3.Burdwan to Curzon 6 Aug.1908, Ibid. p.78
4.See the Englishman and the Bengalee 1911-19
5.The Englishman:31 March 1914, p.8
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bolder stand, and made an attempt to push the Assoc­
iation into a more positive stance. Doubtless his 
intentions were to recapture the attention of the public 
which had begun to doubt the Association's vitality. He 
stated, "I cannot help feeling that at the present the 
British Indian Association is much behind the times, 
and that whilst it is our duty to give our matured 
opinions on pending legislations and other important 
Government proposals, it is equally our duty to find 
out the under current of all modern movements which 
are rolling the ball of national development in India ..
.. V/e must show our activities and interests in all 
legitimate aspirations which have for their object 
the real and true welfare or the advancement of India, 
whether they be political, social or otherwise".^"
The Association's prestige was based on the fact 
that its leaders and members were considered the "natural"
leaders of rural Bengal. Through them the governor
2could easily learn of the needs of the mufassil.
Moreover, the socio-economic channels available.to 
them could be effectively utilised' in educating public 
opinion.
Like the 3ritish Indian Association, the Bengal 
Landholders Association owed its origin to several 
prominent zamindars of Bengal. But unlike the British 
Indian Association it was an institution representing
1. Ibid: 1 Apr. 1916, p.7*
2. Ibid: 19 March, 1917, p.9«
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the interests of the landed class alone. As the leader­
ship and the membership of the two resembled each other 
so much there were many like Hardinge who could not see 
the point of having two institutions representing the 
same interests. The differences could be traced to the 
fact that, contrary to popular belief, the British 
Indian Association was not in reality a society of land­
holders exclusively. It was professing to be an organi­
sation of all classes of people, and remained so 
till the end.^ The only way it differed from the other 
political associations was that it charged high 
annual fees and was therefore an association of the 
affluent. It was doubtless the result of the belief 
that to retain prestige it was necessary to be remote 
and exclusive: a byproduct of the attitude of the 
nobles.
The Bengal Landholders Association, on the 
other hand, was exclusively for the zamindars. ,The 
majority of the superior landholders lived in the 
mufassil, and they wished to found an association in 
Calcutta where they could meet periodically, and 
discuss the problems related to their own class 
interests. The zamindars were being accused by a 
very vocal section of the public of being parasitical 
and oppressive, and the permanent settlement was 
under attack from various quarters. It was considered necessary
1. B.3. Llajumdar, p.36.
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"by the prominent landholders to induce their juniors 
to take a more active interest in their zamandaris, 
and appreciate the current mood of the people or face 
dangerous consequences. With this in view the nobles 
and other superior landlords took a lead in forming the 
Bengal Landholders Association and its subsidiary 
bodies.
The Association was inaugurated in 1911 under 
the presidency of Maharaja Surja Kanta Acharjya of 
Muktagacha, the secretary being the Maharaja of 
Natore. The majority of the Hindu and Moslem land­
holders of Bengal were its members. Other than the 
two nobles mentioned above, the prominent members 
of the society were the Nawab of Dacca, Nawabs 
Hossain Haidar, Shamsul Kuda, Syed Moazzin Hossain, 
and the Maharajas of Kassimbazar and Dighapatia.
The Maharaja of Kassimbazar succeeded the Maharaja 
of Muktagacha as president with the Maharaja of 
Dighapatia as vice-president and Nawab Shamsul Huda as 
secretary. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar in his turn 
was succeeded by the Maharaja of Dighapatia with 
Nawab Ali Chaudhury as one of the joint secretaries.
Presiding over the annual general meeting in 
1911, "the Maharaja of Kassimbazar pointed out the 
basic aim of the Association when he stated that 
"the Association is not a mere name, but is meant to 
be an institution with a well defined sphere of 
work, which the landholders alone can duly perforin .
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There were various works of public utility which fall 
within the special province of the Landholders to initiate, 
organise and develop.” ^ Another fundamental aim being the 
linking of the outlying areas with Calcutta, it took consider­
able pains to advocate the necessity of creating an inexpensive
and effectual system of communication betv/een Calcutta and the 
2
suburbs. Moreover, it also aimed to create a fellow feeling 
between the intelligentsia, the tenants and the zamindars.
With that in view the Association organised periodical social 
gatherings in an attempt to promote better understanding 
between themselves and the other sections of the community 
considered important at the time. ^
Its approach to and treatment of issues ran on parallel 
lines to the British India Association. That is not surpris­
ing since the leadership was vested with the same status
group. There had even been an instant when the Association
4
made overtures to amalgamate with the older organisation.
- Presumably it later decided against such a move because
*
the landholders felt the need to have an association 
representing their personal interests exclusively.
1. The B n g l ishman: 1 July 1911, p.3
2. Ibid: 23 Jan. 1911, p.4
3. Ibid: 1 Jan. 1912, p.2
4. Ibid.
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The importance of the Association rested on the 
same principle as the British Indian Association: their 
connection with rural Bengal. In a country where the 
cultivator had not yet received an education which 
would make him competent to express opinions on public 
questions the Administration necessarily had to rely 
on landlords and tenure holders for advice on rural 
matters.^*
Although Bengal, like the rest of India, was pre­
dominantly agricultural, commerce also played an 
important role in its economic life. In this sphere also 
some senior noblemen were at the very forefront. The 
political supremacy of the British favoured the exercise 
of economic power by European residents who derived special 
advantages from linguistic and racial identification with 
the rulers. They established organisations and institu­
tions for building up their advantages and protecting 
them against intruders all over India. They were 
organised in chambers of commerce to which very few Indians 
were admitted. The Bengal, Madras and Upper India 
Chambers of Commerce had practically no Indian members 
before the first world war. Thus in most commercial 
fields the European businesmen were well organised
2
to maintain something approaching collective monopoly.
The formation of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce 
by the Lav; family and its associates was an attempt to 
organise the important Indian merchants into a unified 
body to advocate the needs of the Indian commercial 
community and work parallel to the Bengal Chamber
1 Ibid: 19 --arch 1917, p. 9.
2. A.K.Bagchi:1 Entrepreneurship in India1, Elites in 
South Asia: ed.Leach & iJuh'erjee, pp.224,22y.
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of Commerce.
The National Chamber was formed in 1887. Its 
object was to protect the industrial, commercial and 
general political interest of the Indian commercial 
community. It challenged the monopoly of the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce by gaining the Government’s recog­
nition and acquiring the privilege of returning a 
member to the Calcutta Port Trust. By the second 
decade of the century it was represented on all the important 
boards of the province throughout the period under 
review. The Chamber was presided over by Raja Reshee 
Case Law,"*" and claimed to be the true spokesman of 
Indian interests in trade and commerce. It consisted of 
nearly all the principal rice, jute and coal merchants, 
the owners of jute and cotton presses, and a large 
number of joint stock companies. Apart from Raja Reshee 
Case Law, the other prominent noblemen who were members 
of the Chamber were the Maharaja of Kassimbazar, Raja
Peary Mohan Mukerjee, Raja Shew Bux Bogla and Nawab 
2Sujatali Beg. But the most effective members were the 
Laws of Uttarpara. They dominated the proceedings to 
the extent that the Indian Association maintained that 
the "Bengal National Chamber of Commerce is a one 
family show".^
In 1912 Raja Reshee Case Law wrote to the Bengal 
Government, MI hope you will be pleased not to put our
1. The Englishman: 1 Jan. 1912, p.10.
2. Hon.Sec. to Chief Sec.Beng. 24 March 1912, B.A.P.,
Aug. 1913, Vol.9133, p.177.
3. J.H. Broomfield:1 Vote & Transfer of Power1, J .A .S.,
Feb. 1962, p.170.
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Chamber in the same category with the associations of 
shopkeepers, petty dealers and other people whose ways 
are not our ways and whose ideas are not our ideas, 
otherwise it will lower us in public estimate”.^
Apparently the domination of the Law family and the 
presence of other fellow nobles caused the Chamber to 
acquire an exclusive and arrogant character in keeping 
with the behavioural pattern of the nobles in Bengal, 
Remoteness and depersonalised influence were being 
advocated as the prime necessity to maintain public 
esteem.
Along with rural and commercial issues the Muslim 
problem in Bengal was also of primary importance. It 
was considered a separate and special issue leading to
p
its independent treatment by the Government. The 
leadership of Muslim political interests and social 
advancement was vested in the Bengal Presidency Moslem 
League, the provincial branch of the all-India body,
A
and the Central National Muhammadan Association of 
Calcutta.
The objects of the two Associations ran practically 
parallel to one another. The aim of the Moslem League 
was to protect and advance the political, educational, 
commercial and other interests of Muslims in Bengal.
The Muhammadan Association varied from the former to 
the extent that it was founded for the purpose of 
looking after not only the political but the general
1, Ibid. *“ ~  ~  _  ~~~~ —
2. Carmichael to Crewe 27 July 1912, Lett,ers Carmichae 1:
Crewe, BoxC/6.
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advancement of the Muslim community at large and the
Muslims of Bengal in particular.^ Deriving its inspiration
from the traditions of the past, it proposed to work in
harmony with western culture and the progressive tendencies
2
of the age, so Nawab Abdul Jabbar told Chelmsford. Thus 
once more we find the approach being one of remoulding 
and the adaptation of "western culture and the progressive 
tendencies of the age" without losing sight of the 
"tradition of the past".
During the period under review, the most prominent 
personalities in the Moslem League were the Nawab of 
Dacca, and Nawabs Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury, Shamshul Kuda 
and Serajul Islam, while the dominant members of the 
Muhammadan Association were Nawabs Abdur Rahman, Abdul 
Jabbar and Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury. After the death 
of the Nawab of Dacca the Moslem League came close to 
losing its identity to the Indian National Congress,
i
and temporarily the nobles lost control of it. But such 
was not the case with the Muhammadan Association."^
Apart from five of the six major associations, the 
influence of the nobles penetrated many of the minor 
ones also. The Bengal Mahajan Sabha, a significant body 
in the commercial life of Bangal, had the Maharaja of Kassim­
bazar as its president.^” The Burdwan Mohamedan Association,
1. ’List of Associations’, 3.P.P. Sept. 1911? Vol.8683?
p.47.
2. Speeches b.y Chelmsford, Vol.I, p. 174.
3. Discussed in more detail in Chapter V.
4. Hon.Sec. to Chief Sec.Beng. 4 June 1912, B.A.P.
Aug. 19-3, Vol.9133, p.181.
which was the chief organisation through which the Muslims
of the District worked out their social, religious and
political matters, was presided over by Nawab Abdul Jabbar.
The LTaharaja of Susang was on the Chair of the LIymensingh 
2
Sammilani. The President of the North Bengal Zamindars
Association was the pLaja of Kakina.^ The Llaharaja of
Kassimbazar was the president of. the Murshidabad Assoc-
4
lation at Berhampore.
The only association out of the major six which 
was not influenced by the nobles in any effective sense 
was the Indian Association. This association was 
founded by Surendranath Banerjea and his associates.
It was primarily the product of frustration caused 
in the ranks of the urban intelligentsia by the over­
bearing domination of the political and social life of 
Bengal by alien rulers and indigenous noblemen.
It has been suggested that, in spite of its promises, 
there was plainly visible a growing reluctance on the 
part of the British Government to admit Indians in 
large numbers to the service. This attitude created a 
great sense of resentment in the mind of the intellig­
entsia. They were convinced that there was no truth in 
the British argument that they were still not competent 
enough to handle the work, as they considered themselves 
to be as capable as the British in every respect. Soon
2. Ibid: 3 Larch, 1912, p.3.
3. The Englishman: 15 Dec. 1515» p.4.
4. 'List of Associations', B.P.P. Sept. 1911> Vol.8683,
p. 46
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incidents occured which changed this passive discontent 
into an active agitation. After a short period of service 
Surendranath Banerjea was struck off the list of civil­
ians. It resulted in his taking to public life, and 
founding the Indian Association. In his memoirs he 
states, "After my return from England ... I began 
seriously to consider the advisability of forming an 
Association to represent the views of the educated 
middle-class community and inspire them with a living 
interest in public affairs".^ Thus the Indian Assoc­
iation came into existence which "was to be the centre 
of an All-India movement" based on "the conception of
a United India, derived from the inspiration of ,
2
Llazzini". In time the Association became a subsid­
iary body of the Indian National Congress. After 
1886, the Indian Association confined its activities 
mainly to matters connected with Bengal, leaving the 
national programme to the Congress.^ Hence a political
4
association came into being which aimed to prove that 
Indians were as capable as the British in all respects 
and which drew its inspiration from its programme of 
united India from a western source. A programme so 
un-Indian doubtless caused discomfort in the minds of 
the traditional leaders, since it was in total contrasty 
to the policy of modification of western ideas that 
they had preached and practised for such a length of
1. S.N. Banerjea, p.40. ~~~
2. Majumdar, Ray Chaudhuri, Dutta: Advanced
History of India, p.8 8 9 .
3. B.B. LTajumdnr, pp. 141,157*
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time. It is in contrast to the demands and activities 
of this Association that the others have heen condemned 
as unpatriotic'and reactionary. Nevertheless the 
nobles were the founder members of numerous political 
associations and could he found in key positions even 
in the twentieth century. Indeed they were the one 
group which could he considered as truly inter- 
organisational political leaders in Bengal. More­
over, the aims of the various associations, as 
expressed in their speeches, were similar. They 
all sought to influence the Administration so 
that it would look at Indian needs and interests 
with greater understanding.
As all the six associations apparently had 
the same* aim, it is necessary to see how far 
they were permitted hy the Government to influence 
its decisions as intermediaries in public affairs.
The Government sought the Indian Association's i
advice on matters connected with proposed legislation 
on municipal questions and on matters of general 
interest to the educated community in particular, 
and on matters of public interest in general. Both 
the Muslim associations were consulted on the 
political, educational, commercial and other 
interests of Muslims in particular and in matters 
of public interest in general. The Government 
consulted the National Chamber in connection with 
the interests of industry, trade and commerce in
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particular and all matters of public interest in general.
The British Indian Association was consulted on questions 
relating to the protection of the interests of the 
landholders in particular and on matters of public 
interest 'in general.^ The Bengal landholders1 Assoc­
iation was also consulted about land questions and
pother major legislation in the province. The Indian 
Association, dominated by the leaders of the intelli­
gentsia, was consulted on legislation, on municipal 
questions, and on matters concerning the educated 
community. On the other hand, the associations 
dominated by the nobles, if taken together, covered 
a wider area. They were expected to advise on political, 
educational and commercial matters, and other matters 
of interest to the Muslim community, on questions 
connected with industry, trade and commerce, and on 
issues affecting land and landholding. As to whether
they actually did affect the Government decisions,
*
more later.
The domination of the nobles over these political 
organisations is visible in the deputations that 
visited Government House to mark such occasions as the 
arrival of new governors or the reception of senior 
dignitaries. It is significant that the deputations 
that called at Government House to welcome Carmichael 
as the new Governor comprised the Maharaja of Burdwan,
Nawab Gerajul Islam, Raja Reshee Case Law, the Maharaja
1. ’List of Associations’ , B.P.P. S,eptP 1911*
Vol.8683, pp.43-48.
2. e.g. 1917-18: Bengal Tenancy Amendment. Bill,
Burra Bazar Improvement Scheme, Additional Powers 
to Courts, Criminal Procedure Code, Calcutta 
University Commission. - The Englishman: 9 Apr.
19 jl c, p. 3 •
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of Kassimbazar, and Rash Behari Ghose representing the 
British Indian Assocation, the Bengal Presidency 
Moslem League, the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, 
the Bengal Landholders' Association, and the Indian 
Association respectively.'1' Moreover, when a combined 
effort of the associations was called for, even the 
Indian Association accepted a nobleman as the spokesman 
of the deputation. To insist on one of their own 
group being selected as the spokesman would most 
probably be outvoted by the others. Doubtless this 
was so because unlike the nobles the leaders of the 
intelligentsia were unable to claim, inter-organisational 
leadership. An example of such a joint deputation was 
during the reception organised for Hardinge. It com­
prised the British Indian Association, the Indian Assoc­
iation, the Bengal Presidency Moslem League, the 
Imperial League, the Bengal National Chamber of 
Commerce, the Uarwari Association and the Bengal Land­
holders Association. The joint address was presented
on behalf of all parties concerned by the Maharaja of 
2
Burdwan. Ke was the president of the British Indian 
Association, a founder member and president of the 
Imperial League, a prominent member of the National 
Chamber of Commerce, and the biggest landholder 
in the province. Thus he was in a position directly 
to represent four of the seven associations forming 
the deputation.
1. The Bnglirhrnan: 5 Apr. 191?» p*5*
2. The Bengalee: 27 Dec. 1913? p.2.
The points that still remain'obscure are whether 
the associations dominated by the nobles concentrated 
merely on issues affecting the vested interests of the 
landholders, and whether they actually influenced the 
Government in its decision making. The association 
most criticised as an ineffective club of landholders 
was the British India Association. Both modem and 
contemporary authorities have suggested that the 
Association's leadership was rejected by the people 
of Bengal because it refused to take the initiative 
ever since the latter half of the nineteenth century.'*’ 
Surendranath Banerjea stated that, "it was
2
essentially by its creed an Association of landholders". 
During the debate on the Calcutta Improvement Bill,
1911> M.N. Das provoked the Maharaja of Burdwan to 
refute the insinuation that it was an exclusive club 
of the zamindars since the "association was composed 
entirely of landholders". The Maharaja explained that
A
"the British Indian Association, as at present constitu­
ted, is certainly not purely a landholders' assoc­
iation.... In the present, while representing the 
interests of the landholders, it has not failed in 
its duty to bring before the public matters of import­
ance, which not only have affected the landholders, 
but the general public...."  ^ A selective examination 
of the opihions forwarded by the Association during 
the period under review reveals the wide variety of
1. A.Seal: Emergence of Indian Nationalism, pp.209-210.
2. S.N. Banerjea, p.40.
3. 'Calcutta Improvement Bill 1911, B.L. P . : 1911f
Vol.8689, App.E, p.21.
subjects that the body advised upon, and which were 
accepted by the Government corroborating the Maharaja’s 
claim.
In 1911-12, the Government brought forward a 
Bill to amend the Indian Post Office Act. The British 
Indian Association strongly protested against the pro­
posed abolition of the maximum rates for parcel post 
on the score that they were unremunerative and also 
complained against the proposed fees to be charged for 
enquiries into complaints regarding the disposal of 
postal articles. The Government took their first 
advice and redrafted the second clause to mean that 
payment was to be made only if an enquiry was demanded 
as to the delivery of value payable articles.
To reduce the pressure of work upon the provin­
cial High Court, the Government proposed that there 
should either be no appeal from the judgement of a 
single judge in a civil case passed in revision, or 
in exercise of the Court's general power of superint­
endence over subordinate courts, or that there should 
be no right of appeal from the decision of a single 
judge sitting in appeal unless the subject matter in 
dispute exceeded a specified sum. The Association felt 
that the right to appeal, with which the Government 
proposed to interfere, was highly valued by the 
people, and advised the Government to drop the pro­
posal. The advice was accepted.
With a view to passing Life Insurance Laws
on the lines of those prevailing in Britain, the Govern­
ment introduced a Bill in 1912-13, for the proper control 
and growth of insurance companies in India. The Assoc­
iation generally approved, hut felt that there should 
he some provision requiring the investment of all life 
insurance funds in approved securities. Apparently the 
advice was accepted; as that very year a Bill to regulate 
Provident Insurance Societies was introduced.
The Bill introduced in September 1913, to amend 
the Penal Code so as to give protection to young girls 
was supported by the Association. It approved that 
the age of discretion for girls had been raised to 
sixteen from fourteen. When, however, next year the 
Government proposed in an amendment to afford greater 
protection to minor girls by separating them from their 
mothers or near relatives leading immoral lives, the 
Association pointed out the futility of any such reform 
until proper rescue homes could be provided. The 
latter portion was shelved.
In the same year the Association accorded 
approval to the project of building the Grand Chord 
Canal between Calcutta and Eastern Bengal, after consult­
ing the merchants of Ultadanga, Beliaghata and other 
such places principally to be affected. But it objected 
in 1917 to a more elaborate scheme for a Grand Trunk 
Canal for inland steamers and boats between Calcutta 
and Eastern Bengal. It feared that the scheme would
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deprive Calcutta of a lot of trade and diminish its 
commercial importance. The project was dropped.
The British Indian Association gave strong 
support to the continuance of hackney carriage trans­
port in Calcutta. The Bill to amend the Calcutta Hackney 
Carriage Act was introduced in 1916. In deference to 
public opinion and the disapproval expressed by the 
Association the Bill was withdrawn. Consequently, the 
Select Committee recommended that a new Bill be framed.
The decision was primarily brought about because the 
Association apprehended that the changes proposed in 
the original Bill were of a drastic character, and 
suggested certain alterations to remedy the faults, 
which the Select Committee accepted.
The War caused the prices of foodstuffs and 
cloth to rise to unprecedented heights. A Conference 
comprising the Association and other invited associat­
ions was held in 1919 in the rooms of the British Indian
A
Association, The Conference adopted a resolution 
urging a reduction of rice exports from Bengal, importa­
tion of rice from Burma, and its sale at reduced prices 
at convenient centres in the mufassil through local 
agents, establishment of cooperative societies, reduc­
tion of freight rate, prevention of profiteering, and 
appointment of a food and civil supplies advisory 
committee. Most of the recommendations were accepted 
and acted upon.**"
I* B.I.A., pp.Iw6,190, 194,196,245,251,255,259*
In short, the advice given by the Association 
covered a vast area of governmental activity, affecting 
the life of the people of the province. It was not 
confined to questions affecting the landed class. More­
over, most of its suggestions were acted upon by the 
Government and the original drafts were modified in 
keeping with its advice.
Thus it appears that the difference between 
the nobles and the other leaders was not that the 
latter were more active in the political life of the 
province than the former, nor that the leaders of 
the intelligentsia represented wider interest groups 
than the nobles, nor that the nobles refrained from 
being the Government’s critics, but in the approach 
and attitude to various problems which virtually 
divided them into two divergent political groups.
It could also be argued that the nobles, both as 
an inter-organisational leaders, and as ’'natural” 
leaders of rural Bengal, were better placed to ac£ 
as political intermediaries between the rulers and 
the ruled. Under the circumstances, it was inevitable 
that they would be called upon by the Administration, 
both as individual leaders of political associations, 
and as a group, to act as Indian intermediaries in 
public affairs.
A detailed study of their effort-s as inter­
mediaries reveals that they were rather effective 
during the decade under review. Often their advice
was attended to, and support appreciated. For certain 
issues they acted in a group, while for others, as indivi 
dual leaders of specific political associations repres­
enting various groups1 interests. As a body they were 
well suited for purposes such as making arrangements 
for ceremonials, issues pertaining to landholdings, 
mobilization of public opinion for war efforts, and 
providing conservative opinions on constitutional 
reforms. As individuals they were able to represent 
specific political associations. Over and above the 
fact that a nobleman was able to represent a particular 
political association, he had the added advantage of 
having territorial, socio-economic, and inter- 
organisational influence. Raja Reshee Case Law was a 
perfect example of such a person. His influence and 
experience in the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce 
made him a prime candidate whenever the Government 
required an Indian representative for issues pertaining 
to trade and commerce. Moreover, being the secretary 
of the British Indian Association, a senior zamindar 
and an important dalpatl his influence
covered a much wider area than merely the Indian commer­
cial community. Regarding Muslim questions, the 
triumverate comprising the llawab of Dacca, and Nawabs 
Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury and Sharasul Hud a was a 
formidable combination to rely on. Even Surendranth 
Banerjea, the ITawab of Dacca's constant opponent, 
was forced to make an acknowledgment of the fact that
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"as a politician he was narrow, but shrewd, with a 
fund of common sense that made him a tower of strength 
to his supporters and to the Government" For controv­
ersial issues which could upset the educated Bengalis 
as well as the European residents, requiring a person 
capable of exerting balanced influence over both 
sections of the community, the Maharaja of Burdwan 
seems to have been relied on. Being a conservative 
loyalist, the premier zamindar, an important dalpati, 
a well known patron of education and intellectual 
societies, and the chairman of the British Indian 
Association, made him well suited for the delicate 
tasks.
The nobles1 role as intermediaries in public 
affairs generated a specific attitude which underlined 
all their efforts as such during the decade. They 
prided themselves on being the bridge, as advisors 
and interpreters, between the rulers and the ruled, 
and between the different sections and interests 
in the community. Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee's 
comment in a public meeting illustrates this 
attitude well: MI take my stand here before you as a 
representative of the past, eager to clasp the hands 
of the representatives of the present, in the
2
interests of the representatives of the future".
Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury1s remark in a 
a mammoth meeting organised by the Muslim community
1. S.IT. Banerjea, p.285.
2. The Bengalee: 29 July 1813 > p.2.
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*to demonstrate what v/as considered an outrage to a 
mosque at Kanpur illustrated the above even more 
lucidly. He stated: "I am not one of those who would 
rush into the arena of political agitation for the sake 
of notoriety, or would consent to publicly criticise the 
action of the authorities unless I am sincerely and deeply 
convinced that such criticism is imperatively necessary in 
the interest of the administration itself.” Then he went on 
to say that he was there 1 in order that I may discharge my 
duty to the community to which I have the honour to belong 
and also the Government ... by interpreting to the authori­
ties the true feelings of the Mahomedan community in these 
matters
The first occasion that the nobles were called upon 
as a group to act as intermediaries was during the royal 
reception. The turn of the decade was marked by the visit 
to Calcutta of the King. After the darbar at Delhi he was 
to proceed to Calcutta. The royal visit was not a mere 
social function but was, to a large extent, motivated by 
political considerations. It was a calculated move to 
stabilise the political conditions prevalent in the
country. The Imperial Government hoped that a
darbar in India, followed by an Imperial visit to 
Bengal, would persuade a large section of the
community to identify themselves more with the
1. The Englishman : 4 Aug. 1913, p.6
Sovereign and regenerate a sense of loyalty to the throneri A  
which had been badly shaken by the partition of Bengal in 
1905.
It was essential to carry out the programme with a great 
deal of diplomatic efficiency. An untoward incident could 
not only jeopardise the political move but also tarnish the 
Imperial image beyond repair. Those who supervised the 
occasion needed to have expert knowledge of ceremonial 
procedure. The nobles, bred in an atmosphere permeated with 
ceremonial, were the obvious choice. Regarding the Maharaja 
of Burdwan, Carmichael at a later date opined that on any 
ceremonial occasions his assistance was extremely valuable."^* 
That they would take care that no untoward situations arose 
was also beyond any doubt. Thus the British Indian Associa­
tion was heavily relied upon to formulate the programme for 
the occasion. Most of the functions connected with the royal 
reception were entrusted to committees and sub-committees 
comprising and presided over by noblemen. Even the seating
arrangements, which could so easily lead to embarrassments in
*
a multi-communal society saturated with social taboos and
including pardarashin ladies, were handed over to the Maharaja
2
of Burdwan and Maharaja Tagore. Only in the insignifi 
cant school entertainment sub-committee people like 
Gurudas Banerjee and E.P. Sarvadhikari allocated the presid­
ing offices. ^
1. Carmichael to Chamberlain 28 June 1916,
Governors letters: 1915-17, p.181
2. The Englishman: 22 Nov. 1911, p.2
3. Ibid: 22 July, 1911, pp.5,6.
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With, the transfer of the capital to Delhi after 
the darbar, the Government proposed modification in the 
internal structure of the administration. It was proposed 
to abolish the Board of Revenue from 1912, and transfer its 
powers to the Executive Council along with the seven division­
al commissioners of the province. According to the Indian- 
owned press, the proposed act was an excellent move. At a 
time when retrenchment was being demanded in all branches of 
the administration, the abolition of the Board would effect 
enormous financial savings, maintained the journalists.^* But 
the act would primarily affect the zamindars of the province, 
and they were not happy with the proposal. To make their 
disapproval appreciated it was necessary to mobilise their 
opposition collectively. With that in mind, the Maharaja 
of Burdwan, speaking from the chair of the British Indian
Association, called on his fellow zamindars to raise concert- 
2
ed protest. The result was a memorial to the Government
that such a move would cause the greatest inconvenience to the
*
public in general and to the landholding class in particular. 
Their cases would be dealt with at a "semi-amateur" level, 
instead of being handled by able and experienced officers as 
before. The permitted appeal to the Executive Council 
would be a mere formality due to the fact that, 
by convention counsel could not appear before it.
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Moreover, the High Court would lose its power to pass
injunctions on the decisions, as the Governor-in-
Council was exempted from its jurisdiction.^ The
memorial, forwarded by the British Indian Association,
was signed by 156 eminent zamindars of Bengal, Bihar 
2
and Orissa.
The objections put forward by the memorialists 
carried considerable weight since they were drafted 
by the group which was considered not only well versed 
in land laws but also thoroughly acquainted with the 
intricacies of revenue administration. The matter was 
forwarded to the Legal Remembrancer and the Advocate- 
General, for further clarification and necessary adjust­
ments.^ The Legal Remembrancer, supported by the 
Advocate General, suggested that the title of the 
Board of Revenue should be retained but that the Board 
should consist of the members of the Governor’s Council 
excluding the Governor himself. Moreover, the Members 
should remain susceptible to injunctions from the High 
Court in their corporate capacity as the Board of 
Revenue. ^ To make doubly sure, a committee was 
appointed to examine the question, and this met on 
the 27 July 1911• The Indian members of the 
committee were the Maharaja of Burdwan, Raja Peary Mohan . 
Mukerjee, . a lawyer recommended by the British Indian
1. Sec. 45 of Specific Relief Act of 1877•
2. 'Memorial of B.I.A. 26 Aor. 1911* R. & S.I).P .,
1912, Vol.719, Lt.nos.12-13, pp.1-4.
3. Sec.Beng. to Sec.Rev. & Agri.Ind. 14 Nov. 1911,
Ibid: 1912, Vol.719, Lt. no.3157, p.2.
4. L.R. to Sec.Rev.3eng. 30 June 1911, T3.R.P. : Feb. 1912,
Vol.8939, p. 3 .
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Association, and a minor zamindar.^
The Act was modified and redrafted, with the error 
that the Government was on the verge of making remedied.
In its final stage, the Sengal Government recommended that 
the Board comprise two members of the Executive Council,
p
and be subject to injunction from the High Court. The 
matter was forwarded to the Secretary of State for final 
sanction. After careful consideration the Secretary of 
State accepted the opinion of the memorialists, and
decided that even the modified version would not counter\
balance the harm that abolition might cause, and rejected
the proposed legislation. His decision was in favour of
the retention of the Board as a separate unit.^
The Imperial declaration announcing the change
of capital did not signify that the commercial centre
of India had also shifted. The bulk of trade and
commerce continued to flow through the port of
Calcutta. The port had developed without any systematic
A
planning and had become cumbersome and unwieldy by the
twentieth century. Its inadequacy for the rapidly
increasing demands of trade had been engaging the attention
of the Government and the.Port Commissions for some time 
4
past. In 1913 the Administration decided to look into 
the problem. A conference of non-officials, railway 
experts, port and municipal authorities, was summoned 
on 8 August 1913 to consider the appointment of a
1. Resolution 1976 17 July 1911, Ibid, p.9.
2. Minutes Paoer 10171-1.343.2000.2/1911; 3 & S.D.P.:1912,
Vol.719, Pile 639.
3. (Telegram) Sec.St. to Viceroy 7 ±..ay 1312, 3.R.P.:
Aug.1912, Vol.8939, p.120.
4. Reoort Port Facilities Cc^ * , R & S.I).P . : Vol.758,
Pile 3772, p.l.
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Government Commission to investigate the question of 
development of the port and transport facilities feeding 
it. The problem involved both the economics of the 
internal Government and questions effecting imperial 
trade.
The only Indian invited to the conference was 
Raja Reshee Case Law. The conference was about to 
decide that a committee comprising the president of the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce, another representative of 
the Chamber, a railway expert, and an officer expert in 
port affairs, was to be recommended when the Raja 
reminded them that there had been no mention of an 
Indian member to represent Indian interests, and 
emphasised that considerable Indian interests were 
involved in the matter.^- The subject covered such a 
wide range and the individual projects required such
2enormous expenditure that 'it was imperative to
4
select the committee with Cc.re. Eour months elapsed 
before the Government released the names of the members 
of the enquiry committee. Raja Reshee Case Law was 
the only Indian in a committee of seven. ^
Amongst the many issues discussed was a pro­
posal to discontinue bookings from the Eastern Bengal 
State Railway to the section of the Port Commissioner's 
line to the immediate south of Chitpur. According to
The Ting lie hrnan: 9 Aug. 1913, p. 10.
2. 'Report Port Facilities Co,', R 1 S. ~D. P . : Vol. 753,
File 3772, p.l.
3. Ibid, p.2.
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the Commission this was one of the most controversial 
questions which it had to consider.'*' The move was con­
sidered economically necessary, as large quantities of 
jute brought down by the Eastern Bengal State Hhilway 
were made over to the Port Commissioner's Railway for 
delivering at over-congested stations, localised in a 
small area, known generally as EatkWLa Bazar. The 
optimum capacity at this point was about 275 wagons 
a day. Any bookings in excess caused congestion 
resulting in many wagons under load at Chitpur
being held up. This generally disorganised the
2
railway traffic of the entire area. 7/hen the general 
resolutions were put to the vote, the Raja signed the 
document but put on record a note of dissent regarding 
the shifting of Hatkhola Market.
One may presume that, unlike the others, he was 
not merely looking at the problem from an economic view­
point; but was aware of the suffering it would cause 
the handful of his countryman who had come to rely on 
Hatkhola as their primary source of income. If the 
market was closed, all the jute that came there would 
have to be consigned to Cossipore. Such being the case, 
the trade would very likely change hands, and the present 
Bengali dealers and the capitalists of Hatkhola would, 
in all probability, be ousted by merchants and capitalists 
at Cossipore who were not Bengalis.^ This would increase
T. Ibid, p.4ll ' ~
2. Ibid.
3. Ind.owned Eng.K.P.: week ending 23 lay 1914,p.322.
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the already large ranks of the discontented. As a 
matter of fact, the Port Facilities Committee in recomm­
ending the transfer utterly ignored the interest of a 
large number of Bengali aratdars. Large trading interests 
would suffer. The maha.jans in removing to Cossipore 
would be forced to break up their existing business 
and start new ones at a new site. There would obviously 
be many who would fail to restart their business.^" The 
Committee, refuting the suggestion, pointed out that 
the mills were unconcerned by the move. Moreover, the 
majority of the balers and the I.larwari Association 
were in its favour. It pointed out that the only 
people who were against the move were those who had a 
vested interest in Hatkhola. By their last remark
the Committee corroborated rather than refuted the Raja’s
2assessment 01 the issue.
With these dangers in mind, the Raja suggested 
that the congestion could be removed by the acquisition 
of lands near N&ndibari station, for the construction 
of sidings and store yards, relieving the pressure 
on Hatkhola without physically shifting the market 
itself.^
The Committee countered that the primary function 
of a port railway was to bring down goods for actual 
shipment or remove goods dislodged from vessels. It 
was not the duty of a port railway to afford terminal
1. Nat.N.P.; week ending 30 Lay 1$14, p.520.
2. ’Re-oort Port Facilities Com.’, R. & s. P . ? . :
Vol.758, File 3772, p.43.
3. Ibid, p.71.
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facilities for the town as distinct from the docks- and
jetties. Just because it had done so in the past did not
justify its continuance.'1' Despite this strong opposition
the Baja's strong note of dissent was accepted by the Govern- 
2
ment. Reporting on the Baja's activities, the Bengalee 
stated that the press congratulated him for not having 
failed in his duty as the only Indian member of the 
enquiry committee.-^ Thus the Raja dexterously satisfied 
the Indian needs and, at the same time, safeguarded 
imperial trade interests.
It was in this very port that the Government faced 
a most unexpected crisis in the following months. For 
a number of years people from the Punjab, in small numbers, 
had been emigrating to Canada for more lucrative employ­
ment. A time arrived when the Canadian authorities 
decided that the optimum had been reached, and Asian 
immigration needed to be discouraged. Legislation was
enacted to comply with which would be next to impossible
*
for Indians wishing to travel there. The journey from
the port of departure to the port of destination had
to be continuous, and each immigrant was required to have
4
at least two hundred dollars in his possession.
The new laws caused great inconvenience and bitter­
ness in the ranks of the Indian residents. As no line 
of steamers sailed between India and Canada "continuous 
passage" acted as a visible barrier to the aspiring
1. Ibid, p.42.
2. B enga1 Z a mi nda rs, pp.69,70; - found no corroboration
from official sources.
3. In d . own eel Fn • ■. IT. ? . : week ending 6 June 1914, p345.
4. Ibid: week ending 23 may 1914, p.323.
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immigrants. In exasperation three Sikhs came to India
to seek the cooperation of the Indian Government,
and various other public organisations in redressing
their difficulties. 1 In response to their appeal a public
meeting was held at Simla, with Surendranath Banerjea
in the chair, to discuss the position of Indians in
Canada. Immediately the issue was converted into
a weapon with which to strike the Authorities. The
chairman loudly proclaimed that the issue raised the
wider question of the status of citizens of the British 
2
Empire.
At this stage the aspiring emigrants were given a 
helping hand by a Sikh named Gurdit Singh. He chartered 
a Japanese steamer, the Komagata Maru, for six hundred 
Indians.*^ An apparently simple act. of no importance 
turned explosive when the I>Iaru reached Vancouver.
The Canadians refused the passengers entry. The Indian 
press picked up the cause , and converted the episode 
into a test of British sincerity regarding the free
a
movement of all subjects of the Crown within the Empire!
Under the auspices of the Indian Association a public 
meeting was held in which Jitendra Nath Banerjea 
proclaimed that "the keynote of the meeting was not 
peace but war, because •' . war had already been declared
5
by the people of the colonies against the Indians ' .
1. The Dn g 1 ishman: 11 July 1913, p.4-.
2. Ibid: 19 Sept. 1S13, p. 5-
3. I rid. owned IT. P .: week ending 23 Nay 1914, p. 323*
4. Ibid: week ending 30 hay 1914, p.329.
5. The EngIIshman: 11 July 1914, p.6.
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After six months the struggle came to an end, 
and the ship sailed back to Calcutta. With its arrival 
the second phase of the i.laru incident began. The Authori­
ties decided that it would be unwise to allow the passengers 
to disembark in Calcutta proper. Arrangements were made 
for the ship to ari’ive at Budge Budge, and be kept 
in isolated surveillance till they could be despatched by 
train straight from there, instead of travelling on 
from Howrah as was usually done. This unusual procedure 
created doubts as to the G-overnment1 s intentions in the 
already strained minds of the passengers. When they were 
allowed to leave the ship, a large section of them 
started marching towards the city, and were already 
four miles away before they could be induced to return.^"
The tension increased further and snapped during the
evening, resulting in a riot between seven and eleven
2
o'clock at night.
The affair was of an extremely delicate nature.
The War had begun, and lord Kitchener had predicted that 
it would last for at least three years. The passengers 
were primarily composed of Sikhs and Jats, the most 
important sections of the military population of 
India.^ Kany of them were retired sepoys who wished
4
to emigrate for pecuniary reasons. Furthermore, the matter
1. Nat.IT.P .: week ending 17 Oct. 1914, pp. 1093,1094.
2. Ind.owned Eng.N.P . : week ending 10 Oct. 19-^ 4, p. 556.
3. Ibid: week ending 19 Sept. 19-4, p.555.
4. Ibid.: week ending 17 Oct. 1914, p. 615.
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involved inter-provincial, inter-colony and imperial 
relationships/ There could have also been the manipula­
ting hands of Germany at the back of it. If handled 
badly, the incident could gain inflated proportions and 
get out of hand. The Viceroy decided to appoint a commiss­
ion of officials and non-officials to look into the 
matter'*' while the rioters were kept in police custody.
It was difficult to select a Bengali suitable for 
the work. The members of the Bengal Council concluded 
that S.P. Sinha would inspire most confidence among the 
type of people likely to criticise the Government. But, 
as Carmichael pointed out to them, the problem was not 
a localised one calling for a personality who could 
satisfy the Bengalis as well as the rest of the country. 
Obviously, the person selected would have to be one 
who would not use the opportunity to damage the image 
of the imperial commonwealth. However, he would also 
have to be satisfactory to the European residents of
Bengal. The choice ultimately fell on the maharaja of 
2Burdwan. Carmichael was right in his assessment that »
the Bengalis would accept his nomination as much as
Sinha's: this was shown by the reaction of the Indian
press. The Bengalee acknowledged the wisdom of the
appointment, as the Iiaharaja was the recognised leader
of both the "landed nobijity" and the "other educated
community" and was universally "admired for his private
3
worth and public virtues".
During the enquiry the maharaja established points
which helped to clear the air. The Indian press alleged
1. Nat.b .p .: "weeK ending 24 Oct. 1914 p.1123
2 . Oarinl Ca.ael to rjc,i'Q. ) _Ll 0ct.x91zf j o «jr .1 . • 1514,
Vol.Val2, pt.I, p.293.
3- Ini-owned Dr, v. IT. p.; week ending 24 Oct. 1914, p. 626.
that none of the passengers, including the Indians 
returning to Canada, had been allowed entry. The 
Maharaja brought to light, during the interrogation, 
that the twenty-two returning passengers found no 
such difficulty. He also established that the 
allegation that the British Indian authorities had 
been telegraphically advised by the officers of the 
Maru to take an aggressive attitude towards the 
malcontents among the passengers was totally false. 
Moreover, the shooting that followed their arrival 
was not caused by any undue recklessness on the part of 
the forces. The casualties, which did not include 
women and children, as alleged, did not exceed reason­
able numbers under the circumstances. Finding the 
situation critical, the commanding officer was within 
his rights to take the decision to open fire in the 
absence of the District Magistrate, and the only 
Executive Counsellor available in Calcutta. 7/hile 
questioning the Chief Secretary of Bengal, the Maharaja 
probed deep into the question at this most sensitive 
point. It was also alleged that the scuffle originated 
when some Sikhs who stepped forward to drink water were 
pulled back by their hair. The Maharaja brought to ligd 
that in fact all that they had been asked to do was to 
wait where they were, as the water could be brought to 
them.
Having dealt with all the questions troubling 
the Indian press and the public, he went into the
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allegation of the European community that the Sikhs were 
disaffected German agents who, in collaboration with the 
Bengalis of Calcutta, created the trouble for ulterior moti­
ves. It was suggested that a signal had been given when 
the first shot was fired, and the Sikhs rose as one man 
against the forces. He brought out that the Sikhs were 
all sitting quietly on the grass when the first shot was 
fired, and that the Bengalis present did not make any 
undue noise, nor did the Sikhs have any contact with 
the Bengali leaders of Calcutta. Moreover, there were 
forty-eight other guns in the possession of the steamer 
officers, as against the usual two, indicating that they 
could just as well have been used for the first shot. 
Furthermore, the alleged sabre (kirpan) wounds on 
the casualties could just as well have been bayonet 
wounds.^
Thus the Maharaja found answers to the questions
bothering the Indian community of Bengal and Punjab.
He also satisfied the agitated Europeans of Calcutta.
His presence undoubtedly counteracted the possibility
of fomenting panic in the public mind caused by
sensational headlines like "armed Sikhs in Uidnapore"
published by irresponsible papers describing the arrest
2
of a solitary fugitive on the run.
It is not surprising that the European community
1 * Korns gat a I'aru Piot Enouiry Com.Pro.’. 23 Oct. - 4 Eec.
19141, J & P.P.P.: 1914, Vol.1338, Vol.II of Pro.
pp.16,33,34,42,43,46,62,68.
2. Nat.P.P.: week ending 17 Oct. 1914, p.1090.
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saw the intriguing hands of the Bengali terrorists in 
all things. The King1s visit and the modification of 
the partition had only acted as a temporary lull for 
the terrorist movement in Bengal. The tempo gathered 
speed soon afterwards and the Bengali poison of "anarchism", 
as the Times miscalled the*movement, showed tendencies 
of spreading into other parts of India. There had 
even been an attempt on the Viceroy's life at Delhi. The 
police were quite unable to stem the rising tide of law­
lessness in the urban and mufassil areas. The complete 
collapse of law and order seemed to lurk just around 
the coiner. Fleetwood Vilson was convinced that 
collapse had already taken place. In his report on 
Bengal he wrote that, "the Bengal police authorities 
are almost satisfied to sit down in a hopeless and help­
less frame of mind. The whole situation in Bengal appears
1
to be one of moral and administrative collapse." An
increase in the numerical strength of the forces had
already been tried, and although the ITawab of Dacca
informed the authorities that "a recent increase in
the local police had effected a really great improvement
2
in Dacca itself", tne overall situation had not shown 
any effective improvement. Bven as late as 1913, Nawab 
Serajul Islam wrote in an infuriated tone in the ‘English­
man, "I do not see any sufficient reason why the police
\. 'On Bengal deport 15 hay 19111, Official Dotes: 
Fleetwood hilson, Vol.14, p.51*
2 . Barle's liirutes on Bncoities h Police 13 - ay IS jl i' 
Ibid, Vo1.14, p.59.
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is unable to put down the gundas and the bud mashes of 
Calcutta. 7/hat is really wanted is a set of energetic 
and vigilant officers. If such can be secured every­
thing will go right”.'1"
A number of senior officials realised the danger 
of an absolute breakdown and searched for an answer which 
could prevent such a situation arising. Hardinge appar­
ently decided to seek out local help. During his visit 
to Calcutta he suggested to the Maharaja of Burdwan 
that he and other leading men of the province should 
give the problem their serious consideration.- A few 
weeks after, the Viceroy1 s suggestion, the Maharaja made 
a speech from the chair of the -British Indian Association 
pleading for greater sympathy between the police and the 
public."^ It was a topic that had been engaging the 
consideration of the leading Bengalis for some time.
The public complained that the police were unsympathetic
A
and inefficient and, instead of being a protection for
the people had added a new terror to their existence.
They very rarely succeeded in preventing or detecting
serious crimes. On the contrary their activities were,
more often than not, directed towards the karassment
and oppression of innocent men. The situation had come v
to such a stage that the people put up with the misdeeds
A
of the miscreants rather than seen police protection.
1. The Znglishmi-r.; 7 may 1913, p. 3.
2. Ind .IT. ?. 3; Per. • weea ending 20 131o, p»425*
3. In--". owned Eng.IT.P. : week ending 10 Apr. 1915, p. 213.
  i_______  . .   . - '
4• P e n g .PoIioe P r o c e o d i n s : Au g , 1915, Vol.9&4S, p.21.
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On the other hand, the police complained that they 
received little help from the people in their increasingly 
difficult task of detecting serious crimes, and were 
prone to ascribing to that fact much of their failure and 
loss of reputation.^*
The Llaharaja was doubtless aware of the fact that 
he was entering a hazardous field. He was conscious of 
the high-handed behaviour of some of the police, and 
the tacit approval of their behaviour by some well- 
placed Englishmen. Alienating these Europeans would mean 
the loss of respect in the eyes of an important section 
of the community depriving him of the possibility of 
acting as a bridge between them and the others. He 
had personally witnessed an incident which showed 
the attitude of some influential Europeans in Calcutta.
The Bengalee reported that, arriving to conduct the 
dress rehearsal of the Oriental Pageant for the 
royal reception, he found "a crowd gathered on the
A
IJaidan to view the rehearsal.... The crowd, of course, 
chiefly consisted of Indians, and a policeman ... was 
using his authority in a high handed manner. At this 
instance ... Burdwan came, and seeing the merciless 
behaviour of tne constable, gave him a sharp reprimand.
After a few minutes entered from the other side of the 
pandal a European gentleman, who happened to be no less 
a personage than a non-official member of the Bengal 
Council. He came with a whip in his hand and began to
1. Ind. ownsd Eng.IT.P . : week ending 17 Apr. 1S15» p. 273.
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treat the crowd to its slashes".1 Doubtless such
2
thoughtless Englishmen were in the minority. Despite 
their small numbers, their very existence made it just 
as necessary to avoid a breech with them, as that would 
destroy any possibility of being able to approach them 
as intermediaries. ;
Apart from some of the English at home who approved 
police high-handedness, there were senior personalities 
in England who sympathised with the difficulties that 
the police claimed they found encountering them. It 
was not uncommon to find prominent figures like Montagu 
declaring that "no praise could be too high for their 
conduct in dealing with anarchical conspiracy of recent 
years at the risk of their lives".^ Moreover, Bliupend- 
ranath Basu's motion in the Imperial Council in 1912 
for a commission of officials and non-officials to 
enquire into police administration was abruptly turned 
down with the sarcastic remark that, as the dakoitis 
were committed by gentlemen "the police of this country 
would not be expected to have a morality above a class
4
to which they belonged".
Treading his way carefully, the Maharaja, unlike 
Bhupendranath Basu, diplomatically abstained from throw-
5
ing the blame on one side or the other. The antidote,
according to him, was the appointment of a mixed comm­
ission ,l?:o enquire into the real cause of the strained
1. I?at. owned Eng.IT.P .: week ending 13 Jan.1912, p.16.
2. J.C.Xer: loli+ical Troubles in India 1907-17,p.viii.
3. The Englishman: .2b oept. 1911, p*5«
4. Ibid: 2 9 ieb. 1912, p.7«
5. Ind.owned BngM;.P .: week ending 17 Apr.1915, p.225.
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relationship between the public and the police”.1 The 
proposal received wide acclaim in the Indian press. The 
recommendation was submitted as a memorial of the British 
Indian Association for the Government's perusal.2
Carmichael acknowledged the necessity of enquiring 
into police affairs by appointing an impartial official, 
Gourley, to make enquiry into the internal condition 
of the police.1 His task was to look into the relation­
ship between the Bengal and the Calcutta police, and 
put into effect the recommendation made in 1903 regarding 
the personnel, training and pay of the men. Moreover 
he was instructed to generally tone up the police force.^
The Indian press urged that the Government had undoubtedly 
deputed an able and energetic officer, in whom the public 
had implicit trust, to look into the matter, but pointed 
out that nothing short of the independent commission 
recommended by the Maharaja would satisfy the people,^ 
as the enquiry thus set in motion would fell short»of 
looking into the relationship between the police and 
the people.
Ultimately the outcome was that Carmichael managed 
to satisfy the demand by a compromise. It was officially 
announced that Gourley would extend his enquiries from 
merely looking into the internal conditions of the police
1. Ibid: week ending 10 Apr. 1915, p.215.
2. Ind.N.P.: week ending 15 May 1915, p.718.
3. Ind.IT.P. y. Per.: week ending 8 May 1915, p.682.
4. Beng.Police Proceedings: Aug. 1915, Vol.9648, p.15.
5. Ind.owned Eng.P.P.: week ending 8 May 1915, p.275.
to the question of improving the relationship between 
the police and the public.^ It resulted in the reorganising 
of the superior staff of the Calcutta Police. The most 
important change was the substitution of Superintendents 
who had risen from the ranks by Deputy Commissioners 
chosen from the Imperial Police Service. They were to 
be the chief police officers of the various divisions 
of the city. In this manner it was hoped that a high 
calibre of men, known for their honesty and administ­
rative efficiency, would be introduced. The drawback 
of such a reform would be that such men, being virtually 
outsiders, would lack knowledge of the city and its 
conditions. As a solution for this, it was suggested 
that people who had risen from the ranks should not 
be totally overlooked but also promoted to similar 
standing. In this way the two could combine and
perform the "administrative" and "executive" duties
2more efficiently. When Carmichael forwarded his report
*
to the Secretary of State, it drew the comment from
Chamberlain that it seemed to him that the Governor
had treated the matter too lightly for too long.^
Internal security was an essential need in the
second decade of the twentieth century. A catastrophic
war was being fought by the world powers in Europe.
Conditions turned critical from the previous decade,
and remained so until 1919* The Balkans and the Near East 
were in a state of crisis. Persia too was a ’tender spot’
1. Beng;. Police Proceedings: Dec. 1915, Vol.9648 p. 89
2. Kerr to Comm, of Police Cal. 11 Apr. 1916.
Beng. Police Proceedings Apr. 1916, Vo. 9891 pp81,82
3. Chamberlain to Chelmsford 5 may 1916, Correspondonce
S .S.: Vol.2. nt. I ., p.33*
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on the globe. It worried the British authorities that, 
a number of Muslim states being involved in the power 
struggle, the Muslims of India might have found the British 
attitude unpalatable. Throughout the troubled years bet­
ween 1907 and 1910, the Indian Muslims held severely aloof 
from the revolutionary movements in Bengal, secure in the 
feeling that their interests were safe in the hands of 
the Government. The first feeling of disquiet arose from 
the war between Italy and Turkey in 1911 when Great Britain 
remained neutral. Many prominent Muslims of Calcutta 
met at the residence of Mohidul Islam to protest against 
the Italian occupation of Tripoli. A telegram was 
despatched to the Home Secretary at Simla, requesting 
the intervention of Great Britain.^” Before the feeling 
had subsided the modification of the partition was 
announced. The struggle against the hegemony of Turkey 
in the Balkans was a further cause of estrangement, since
it was represented as a struggle between the Cross and the 
2Crescent. Assessing the situation, Fleetwood ’Vilson 
wrote at the beginning of 1913 that "there is no doubt 
that the long succession of what the Muhammadans consider 
to be acts of aggression on the part of the Christian
99 3nations of Europe has had a very upsetting effect in India.
At such a time the problems in Persia would not help matters
in .any way.
The Government of Bengal feared that the feelings 
of the Muslims of Eastern Bengal were turning dangerously
1. The Englishrnan: 2 Oct. 1'911, p.5*
2. Ind.Constit.Bef., p.22.
3. Wilson to Hirtzel 10 Feb. 1913, Correspondence:
Fleetwood V/ilson, Vol.3. p.92.
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bitter towards British rule. There existed the danger of
the Muslim peasantry retaliating by joining together in
refusing to pay revenue to the Hindu landlords. In that
»
case the Government would find it next to impossible 
to realise its dues from the zamindars. It would take a 
long time and endless trouble in the law courts to put 
things right. The Government decided that the Nawab of 
Dacca and his associates were the Government’s best asset 
during this critical juncture.^ Promptly the Muslim nobles 
were consulted and asked to assist. The Nawab of Dacca,
Nawab Shamsul Huda, and several others informed the Govern­
ment that the Eastern Bengal Muslims cared very little 
about Persia. They were for the most part Sunnis, and 
"loved the Shias of Persia as much as Irish Roman 
Catholic peasants love Ulster Protestants". They felt 
more strongly about the Sultan of Turkey, but had lost 
much of their regard for him since he lost the position 
of absolute ruler. The Nawabs calmed the Government’s 
fears by pointing out that there was an idea among 
Muslims that it was always well to frighten rulers a 
little. They quoted a proverb to that effect, and 'warned
that any British official who enquired would be told that
2
things were worse than they actually were.
Difficulties in the Middle East created new problems 
in the Muslim sphere connected with the annual pilgrim 
traffic to Mecca. Further discontent on that account 
could heighten the Muslim disrespect for the British Crown;
1 Carmichael to rlardinge 1 June 1913, C.P.I♦: 1913,
Vol.Va9, pt.I, p.301.
2. Carmichael to Hardinge 23 Aug. 1912, C.P .I .: 1912,
Vol.Vau, pt.I, p.12u
1314 was an especially important year and required more 
serious treatment than others. It was the year of Akbari 
Haj which came once every four years. It was estimated 
that about twenty five thousand pilgrims would like to 
perform the Haj from India that year.^
To overcome the difficulties, the Government of 
India favoured a scheme worked out by the Bombay Government, 
for the regulation of pilgrim traffic to Hedjaz, involving 
the grant of a monopoly of the traffic to a single firm, 
and the adoption of a system of compulsory return tickets. 
But it was felt that the mood of the Muslim community 
should be measured before proceeding any further. Letters 
were forwarded to local governments instructing them to 
assess the reaction to the proposed scheme.^
The Bengal Government consulted leading Muslim 
personalities and associations before wording a reply. 
Although the Bengal Presidency Moslem League disapproved 
of the plan,^ the Nawab of Dacca in his private capacity
a
approved of the proposal but put forward a suggestion 
for consideration which he felt had been overlooked, 
and could use ill feelings in the future. He advised 
that, in the event of the death of a pilgrim who had paid 
for the return journey, or in the event of a devout pilgrim 
wishing to remain in Hedjaz, or if one desired to return 
by overland route, his return fare should be made over to 
the Central Kaj Committee Fund to be used for the general
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"benefit of the pilgrims. Being a man of independent will 
he did not hesitate to support the traffic monopoly scheme 
despite the fact that it was gradually generating a sense 
of opposition all over the country. The Nawab of Mursh- 
idabad on the other hand disapproved of the proposed 
measure
The preposition had* aroused a general controversy
and the Government recognised the necessity of revising
the scheme, The Nawab of Ilurshidabad and his associates
from other parts of India had made it abundantly clear
that the 'scheme was unpopular, and even eminent IJuslims
like the Nawab of Dacca, who favoured the proposal, pointed
out that dangerous loopholes were discernible which needed
blocking. A fresh proposal was put forward, suggesting
that paid secretaries should be attached to the provincial
Haj committees, and that a repatriation fund should be
established with a lakh of rupees contributed by the
Government and an egual amount raised by the I.Iuslim
community. This proposal was also circulated round
the provinces. This time the Nawab of Ilurshidabad
2
enthusiastically endorsed the scheme. Nawab A.F.r-I.
Abdur Bahman, speaking on behalf of the iluhammadan 
Literary Society of Calcutta, pointed out that, though 
they were against the previous scheme, the new one was 
positively acceptable.^
On the ether hand, Nawabzada Syed Ashrafuddin 
Ahmad, President of the Hoogh'Jy District Haj Committee,
1. Ofig.Sec.Hunioip.-l Deng, to Dducation Sec.Ind. 12 Sept.
1913, I! & S.I. ; 1914, Yol. 142,Lt.n o .8 , Dnclo.7, p. 1.
2. Hurshidabad to Sec.-Deng, 10 Sept. 1914, B_
ISIS, Yol.729, Pile 1797-
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pointed out that the latter half of the proposal would
greatly strain the Lius I i ins of Bengal who were poorer
than their fellow religionists in Bombay, and he asked
the Government for more financial help than a mere fifty
percent.^ The Central National LIuhammadun Association
also generally approved of. the scheme but opined that
the repatriation fund should be totally borne by the
government as a fair amount of its revenue was levied
from the liuslims of the country. It suggested that
2
individual contributions should be voluntary.
On 10 September 1914, the Calutta Haj 
Committee met in the office of the Commissioner of 
Police to discuss the above issue. The most prominent 
speaker in the meeting was Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury. 
A proposal put forward and carried was the prescribing of 
higher minimum space for each pilgrim on board. The Nawab 
dissented, as he considered that that would increase the 
fare per head, and prevent poor Liuslims from being able 
to perform the Haj. Another proposal discussed was 
raising the minimum tenrage of pilgrim ships from five 
hundred to two thousand tons, to be further raised to 
two thousand five hundred after an interval of five 
years. That too was opposed by the Nawab. He argued 
that the increase of tonnage to any figure nore than 
one thousand five hundred tons would result in the 
virtual rant in ^ of ■■ 1 • ■ to one c ■ * 1 sli
firms. Ir effect this would introduce the already 
rejected uroaosai by the back door.
1. S.A. Ahmad to ITnd,3ec.Benw. 8 Oct. 1911, O il .
2 , I . to I i.S( . . t.Beng. v .1914, IIid
■t >3. Or.a. of folice to Chief Gee,Bor- . 1 S< i . 193
Ibid, pp.I,2,
When the Government ultimately worked out the 
scheme in the light of these opinions, it was decided 
that the minimum space per pilgrim would be settled in 
accord with the recommendations of the Life Boats Comm­
ittee. Regarding the minimum tonnage for ships the 
subject was deferred till after the war.^ But as far as 
the question of the repatriation fund was concerned, the 
government was met by conflicting opinions. MSome Bengal 
Associations think that Government should subscribe the 
whole of the repatriation fund [instead of one half, as 
proposed], while some Punjabi opinion holds that any 
Government assistance at all as regards expenditure is 
inappropriate”. It ultimately decided against the advice 
from Bengal, and instructed the local authorities to more
actively persuade the Muslim community to contribute 
2to the fund.
The problems of the Government further increased 
with the escalation of the War into a global conflict.
A
Both the Maharajas of Cooch Behar and Tripura immediately 
informed the Government that the entire resources of 
their states were at the disposal of the Imperial Govern­
ment for the period of the Y/ar. The other nobles also 
reacted by giving their full sup:ort to the British 
cause. A mammoth public meeting was organised at the 
Town Hall for 16 August 1914. The meeting, presided
1. Haclagan to Sec.Gen.Dept.Beng, 13 Apr. 1916, Ibid, p.l.
2. I-Iinute Paper Registration no.2402, 15 Hay 1916,
Ibid, pp.1,2.
3. Chelmsford to Cooch Behar 30 June 1919, I 3- T(India),
Vol.22, pt.2, p.203.
4. I.S.A.P. (Tripura), Vol.17, Report 1914-15,' p.1.
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by the Maharaja of Burdwan, was one of the biggest gather­
ings ever witnessed in Calcutta. The President, in no 
uncertain terms,appealed to his fellow-countrymen to 
stand firm behind their Emperor. He said, MI appeal 
to you present here not only to shov; your enthusiasm 
and eagerness to serve the British Government or to 
offer your loyalty to the Throne, but if needs be and 
if, Heaven forbid, our enemies were to attack India, 
to rise to a man to defend our Motherland under the 
Union Jack.* The Maharaja of Nashipur emphasised 
the point further by remarking that MIndians should 
not remain passive spectators. They had a duty to 
perform - a duty to their Sovereign”. The Raja of ICakina 
in the same tone suggested that volunteers should be 
created to help in the war.'*' Their speeches expressed 
both patriotism and loyalty to the concept of the Imperial 
Commonwealth. Their attitude stands out in contrast to 
that of the nationalist leaders. An extreme example 
of nationalist attitudes was discernable from Bipin 
Chandra Palfs remark in a meeting held five days earlier.
He ”gave the nationalist view of the situation and said 
that as they were integral parts of the universal humanity, 
the loss of any of the powers at war was a loss to them­
selves”.^
In the same pattern as the Calcutta Town Hall 
meeting, the nobles exerted themselves in their capacity
1. The Englishman.: 15 Aug. 1S14, p.3.
2. Ibid: 10 Aug. 1914, p.6.
as intermediaries in directing public opinion in support 
of the British cause in other parts of the province. A 
public meeting was held by the Maharaja of Kassimbazar 
supported by the Baja of Azzimgunj at Murshidabad on 
16 August. ^ The Maharaja of Nashipur being busy with 
the Calcutta meeting, the public meeting at Nashipur 
was conducted by the Maharaj Kumar*~ The Maharaj Kumar 
of Eetampur resolved at a meeting that the "officers and 
tenants" of the estate and the "nobility and gentry" 
of the locality express their fervent loyalty to the 
British Raj and would not be forgetful of their duty 
in case of need. Moreover, the meeting decided to 
hold similar meetings all over the district, and dis­
tribute pamphlets to campaign for greater loyalty.^
At Burdwan, Raja Ban Bihari Kapur presided when 
resolutions "were unanimously passed affirming stead­
fast devotions to the British Crown and requesting
Government to enlist Indians as volunteers to fight
"4 1for and serve the British Crown and the Empire «
The Raja of Kakina conducted the public meeting at 
Kurseong.^ The list of nobles1 efforts to mobilise 
public opinion in support of the British in the war 
was vigorous and continuous all through the war. Their 
attitude was summed up by the Nawab of Cbmilla in a 
public meeting in the town where he said that it was 
their duty to express their "profound devotion
1. The Bengalee: 20 Aug. 1914, p.4.
2. Ibid: 16 Aug, 1::14, p.2.
3. Ibid: 9 Aug. 1914, p.l.
4. Ibid: 13 Aug. 1 ? 1 4 p.l.
5. • The Englishman: 5 September 1914. p.6.
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to the Emperor""^
Even before public opinion could be consolidated 
Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers. Her 
entry would obviously cause serious strain upon the 
allegiance of the Indian Muslims. A section of the 
Indian press held that as.Bengal was one of the largest 
Muslim provinces, it would be useful if a manifesto 
w&s:. issued headed by the nawabs calling on their co­
religionists to remain loyal to the King.*^ What the 
journalists were not aware of was that the Government 
had already contacted them. Carmichael had been keeping 
in touch with the Muslims in Calcutta through Nawab 
Shamsul Huda. Even before Turkey’s entrance, the 
Nawab had a proclamation signed by all the leading 
Bengali Muslims expressing the view that loyalty to
the King was their first duty, and kept it ready to put
4out ix war was declared by Turkey. The Governor made
5
it a point to see the Nawab every day and hear his views.
4
The Nawab of Dacca replied to Carmichael’s enquiry regard­
ing Eastern Bengal with hopeful news about the feeling 
of the Liuslims. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities 
the ITawab summoned a meeting at Dacca with the injunction 
that he "desired every Mahomeden to attend without fail" 
to understand the communique issued by the Government
7
relating to the war.'
1* Nat.N .?. : week ending 22 Aug. 19-4-, p. 871.
2* Correspondence with Sec._St.__on Post V/ar Reforms:
Montagu, Vol.33? pV3<T
3. Ind.owned Eng.N .?.: week ending 7 Nov. 1914, p.659.
4. Carmichael to Hardings 26 Aug. 1914, C.P.I.: 1914,
Vol.Val2, pt.I, p.140.
5. Carmichael to Hardings 6 3eot. 1914, Ibid: p.169.
6 . Carmichael to Hardinge 2 Nov. 1914, Ibid, p.358.
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Other such meetings were held "by the Muslim nobles
of Bengal. One at the Calcutta Madrassa to discuss what
steps should be taken to help the Government during
the present crisis was presided over by Nawab Wali
Qadr,^ while an emergency meeting of Muslim students
and the members of the Moslem Institute to consider
the same question was held under the presidency of
2
Nawab Syed Llahomed Khan. Another one for college
students exclusively found Nawab Serajul Islam as one
of the principal speakers."^ Nawab Mahomed Ali Nawab
Chaudhury, who had great influence among the Liuslims
of Tripura, was doing his utmost to explain the
4
position of the Government in the war. But the 
most forceful remark against the pro-Turkey group 
came from Nawab Abdul Jabbar. Presiding over the 
Burdwan Llahomedan Association he said, "We all know 
that 98 percent of the congregation who assemble every 
Priday, do not understand the Khutba but the foolish
4
discussion which has emanated from some gentlemen
who seldom attend the prayers in mosques may injuriously
5
produce unrest where there is calm "r Such a remark 
from a well known devout Muslim could not be easily 
ignored.
—  Ibifi. 1P Aup.' :J<4> ; ' r
2. Ibid: 4 Nov. 1914, p.l.
3. Ibid: -5 Nov. 1914, p.2.
4. Ibid: 19 Bee. 1914, p.3.
5. Ibid: 9 Dec. 1914, p.4.
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To cap all their efforts the Nawab of Ilurshidabad 
issued a manifesto supporting the British. He pointed 
out that the Ottanan Sultan had started the war 
unprovoked, for his own good, and under no circum­
stances could the act be interpreted as a Holy War.
Moreover, the British had guaranteed to leave the 
holy places unmolested. Such being the case, it was 
only proper to remain loyal to the British Crown\
The Nawab wasthe premier nobleman of Bengal, the living 
reminder of the glorious past of the Muslims in the 
province, and the Amir-ul-Cmra of the followers of 
the Prophet. No doubt many Muslims would heed his words.
A mere declaration of loyalty was not enough, 
in the view of the nobles. Financial help for internal 
use and control of the domestic market was also urgently 
required. For the former task the Imperial Indian Belief 
Fund was created. It was a fund to be utilised primarily - 
for the relief of Indians effected by the war; thus
4
relieving the Imperial exchequer of the burden. As
large sums of money would pass through its coffers,
people were needed who could handle it with care and
caution. Of the fifteen Bengali members selected
for the task twelve were noblemen. The Indian joint
2
secretary was also chosen from their ranks. Maharaja 
Tagore was called upon as joint secretary to raise 
subscriptions. He communicated with the Ward commiss­
ioners in connection with the formation of Ward
1. Ibid: 26 Nov. 1914, ..4.
2. The Bnglishman: 22 Aug. 1914, p.5.
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organisations for the purpose of raising subscriptions 
for the Fund. The Maharaja threw himself earnestly into 
the work.^ Ke personally attended every meeting that 
the Wards organised. In stirring speeches he hammered 
home that any contribution, "from a pin to an elephant", 
would be welcome. He called upon the ladies to set 
aside their pin money. He suggested that collection 
boxes be placed in front of all temples and mosques.
The Indian merchants were implored to set apart a
p
portion of their britti collection for the pujas .
Due to his efforts a very substantial sum was collected 
and forwarded to the Central Fund for Bengal.
The people who contributed the largest sums of' 
money were the Nawab of Kurshidabad^ the Rajas of
Chanchal and Hetampur, the Kumar of Paikpara, the
4 5Maharajas of Kassimbazar and Burdwan , with the
Maharaja of Tripura heading the list as the largest
g
contributor. Apart from giving personal donations,
A
Raja Jyot Kumar LIukerjee gave variety entertainments in 
his rajbari at Uttarpara to raise contributions to the 
Fund.^
The war also caused a rapid increase in the 
prices of essential commodities in the province. If 
allowed to go too far, the hungry could become a major threat 
to the Government. To keep a check over the market
1. Ind.owned Bnv.N.?.: week ending 12 Sept. 1514* p .539*
2. The Hn ;liri vv-.n: 22 Sept. 1914, p.?.
3* Ibid: 30 j.iarch 1910, p.4-.
4. ’Beng's 7ar Contribution1 B.P.P.: Nov. 191S»
Yol. 10526, p.34.
5. Burdwan to Chelmsford 9 Jan. 19171 B 1 T(India):
Vol.18, pt.I, p.11.
6. Tripura to Chelmsford 4 March 1919? Ibid: Vol.22,
pt.I, p.103.
7. The Bnpilehman: 17 lay 1916, p. 6.
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the Raja of Chakdighi suggested that a standing committee 
on food prices in Calcutta he formed, and weekly state­
ments on the prices of articles he kept and studied.
Kis advice was accepted and weekly statements were 
issued.'1'
Apart from financial contributions towards the 
War, some of the nohles even contributed materials 
for the wounded and maimed. The Nawab of Murshidabad 
went so far as to offer the use of his house as a 
convalescent home for ill and wounded soldiers.
According to the Englishman, "it was highly apprec­
iated, as Ilurshidabad is one of the most beautiful
p
and coolest spots in Lower Bengal". A number of them 
presented ambulances for use at the front. The 
Maharaja of Mymensingh headed the list with six of 
them, closely followed by the Raja of Retampur 
who gave five. The Maharaja of Tripura, over and 
above an ambulance car, presented the army with an 
ambulance launch.^ The public also presented an 
ambulance launch, and raised an ambulance corps 
trained by Er. Sarvadhikari to man it. The President 
of the Bengal Ambulance Corps thus formed was the Maha­
raja of Burdwan.^" As an added incentive the Maharaja 
offered purses of Rs.1,000 to the winners of the 
Victoria Crosses, Bs.500 for ^Distinguished Service
5
Orders and Rs.250 for minor decorations.
1. S & B.P. Singh Roy: Chakdighi Singh Roy family, p.. 30.
2. The Englishman: 19 Peb. 1:17, p.12.
3. Ben g ’s Mur 5ontributi on s *, B.P.P.
Vol .10526, o.35
4. The Enr lishm an: o iu;ay 15 "! B - 7  ■O) ± • / .
5. The Ben guloe : 23 Oct. 15 1 o , p * 4 *
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It was not the first time that an experiment had 
been made in raising an organised first-aid unit 
in Bengal. As' early as 1911, the Raj Kumar of Tahirpur 
had attempted to form a corps of Hindu youths to 
send to Turkey for nursing the wounded during the 
Turko-Italian conflict.^
As long as the conflagration was confined to Europe 
and other distant places, the help given by the 
nobles was of an impersonal nature. *7ith the 
expansion of the theater of war they assumed more 
positive posture and prepared for further participation.
The Raja of Kakina was the first to come forward.
He wrote to the Government that "if at a time like 
this, when the Empire is engaged in a life and 
death struggle,we remain completely detached 
from the mighty efforts organised for its defence, 
what would our children and our childrens’ children 
say and think of us?.... I now crave leave to ^e 
allowed to raise, train and maintain entirely at 
the expense of my estate an armed force ... and
~9 2
hold them ready for internal duties. But he soon 
merged himself with the larger movement of forming 
a provincial army.
For some time past the Government had been 
turning a deaf ear to the appeal of the intellig­
entsia for the formation of a Bengal army. The 
change of attitude can be noticed from about the
1 . Nat.IT.p . :week ending 18 Nov. 19H, p.1391*
2. Kakina to DuBoula” 11 Feb. 1915, C.P.I.:
1915, Vol,Val3, pt.I, p.60.
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time the Maharaja of Burdwan convinced the British 
Indian Association that they should support the 
demand.1 They appealed to Chelmsford to give a 
sympathetic support to the popular call.^* By 
August 1916, the formation of a Bengal army was 
a certainty.1 The promoters of the scheme were 
twenty in number, equally balanced between nobles 
and others.^ The army w^s to begin with a strength 
of two hundred and fifty. This would gradually 
be raised to a complete regiment. Cne of the 
primary reasons that convinced the Authorities 
that the move was for the best was the hope that 
its formation 'would be *an outlet for the energy 
and ambition which otherwise wou-d be directed wholly 
against the Government," ^
The task of actual recruiting was alloted to 
Dr. Ivlullick, a prominent figure in Calcutta.
As the nucleus of the Bengal Double Company, 
as the Bengal Regiment came to be known, pre­
pared to leave for training, the Maharaja of Burdwan 
stated rather emphatically that on them depended 
the future glory of Bengal, and that they 
should remember that Bengal vias on trial.
The initial reports on the progress from the 
training centre were very encouraging. But it
1. The ^n ;lishman: 1 Apr. 19^6, p.7
2. Nat.N . I . :week ending 19 A p r .1916, p . 541.
3. Ind.B .P . -1 Per. :week ending 19 Aug. 1915, p. 1140.
4. The Dr.ylishmun : 14 June 1916, p.7.
5. Chamberlain to Chelmsford 18 Dec. 1916,
Cor •err:, 0 r d e n c •- 3.3. : Vol. 2, pt.I, p. 329.
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soon dawned on the Administration that Dr. Llullick’s
and his associates’ influence was limited to the urban
areas. That was unsatisfactory. To rectify the defect
the Commander-in-chief wrote to the Viceroy, "We want
to recruit a battalion of at least 1,000 men. I
understand that there would be no real difficulty in
doing this if the matter is taken Up in the right way.
I am advised that the best method of so doing would
be to invite the assistance of His Excellency the
Governor of Bengal with a view to his forming a
strong committee which would include members of
the provincial nobility and great landowners . ..."
Based on his assessment, the next Bengali Begiment
Committee that was called had a larger element of
noblemen. It comprised sixteen nobles and eight
others. Lloreover, the chair was given to the
2
Laharaja of Burdwan.
The nobles encouraged recruiting from the
a
m f s e l l . The IJaharaja of Kassimbazar^ and the Raja 
Aof Tahirpur announced that any rayat joining the army 
would be exempted from paying rent. The I.Iaharaja of 
Nashipur offered a sum of Rs.10 per month from his 
estate funds for the support of the family of men who 
enlisted.' The haharaja of Bighagatia not only exempted 
them from paying the rent but further added
1
_h .
oc.
“I n  c
I b l .  i ■ j  j
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a sum 01 Rs.4 a month as bonus until the Government
increased the pay of Indian soldiers.J The Kaliaraja
of Ginajpur offered his tenants ten bighas of free
2
land to each of the recruits in active service.
Raja Sreenath Roy of Sovabaz&r applied the full
weight of his personal influence to stimulate
■5
interest in enlisting.-' The Raja of Kymensingh called 
on his tenants to rebutt the charge so often made 
that the Bengalis were mere talkers and not men of
4
action. • The Raja of Hetampur entertained the sold­
iers with the hope that contact with them and hearing 
of their adventures would induce others from his
5
estate to join the forces.
Even the ladies of some of their families came 
forward to encourage the men at the front. Kawabzadi 
Amina Banu, sister of Nawab Salimulla of Dacca, was 
one of the chief participants in the Dacca branch of
r
the Bengal 7/omen' s ’7 a r Relief Committee. The Ilaharaj
Kumaris of Burdwan sent gifts of clothes, food, and
the e:m ; u-s for the feast of Bhratridit;/a (Brothers Gay)
to the -Uandant, officers and soldiers of the
Arabulane -■ lorps, with the message that their sisters
in Bengal were praying for their safety and success. 1
“I
~i~ 9 Ibid: 23 Kay 191.8, p.4 .
2 . Ibid: 1] June 1113, p.4 .
3. Ibid: 21 Sept.1913, p. Q
A4- • The B engalee: 24 Sa it. 1
r • -1 rrlo, X * *
5. 7 Vi O -r, :r 1 j o. Vs:., ■!,}'! • f, Jul V"- * ,' Z~ ' 7 ^ I91B, P . 6 .
r The Bengalee: 12 Oct. 1 f 15, • J •
i-y 
1 • Ibid: 9 Nov. 1919) P•4 •
Apart from persuading and encouraging others a
number of them decided to join the forces themselves.
Maharaj Kumar Hitendra Narayan of Cooch Behar saw active
service in France.^ Nawab Habibulla Khan of Dacca,
after making a stirring appeal:.-to other Muslims to
2
enlist, volunteered himself for service, and served
one year on active duty.*^ The nephew of the Raja of
Kakina was one of the first to enlist after the form-
4
ation of the Bengal Double Company. Nawabzada S.E. 
Haider, son of the Nawab of Comillaand son-in-law of 
Nawab Serajul Islam, finding that to get a commissioned 
rank would take some time, enlisted in the Double Com-
5
pany as a sepoy, and proceeded to Karachi for training.
There was also a plan to constitute a mounted 
unit to form a corps d1 elite for men of well-to-do 
distinguished families of any religion, any caste or 
any race so long as they were physically fit, within 
the age limit and able to purchase a horse. The last 
condition could easily prevent a number of families 
faced with pecuniary difficulties from enlisting.
Thus the Maharajas of Cooch Behar and Kassimbazar 
offered the cost of providing chargers. The proposi­
tion was put to Col.A.J. Pugh, commandant of the 
European Light Horse, who threw himself heart and soul 
into the scheme, with the result that it reached a 
practical stage by August 1917. The Maharaja of Cooch
1. Chelmsford to Cooch Behar 30 June 1919, L & T(India),
Vol.22, pt.2, p.283.
2. The Englishman: 19 Feb. 1917, p.4.
3. Ibid: 28 Dec. 1918, p.8.
4. Ind.N.P. & Per.: week ending 11 Nov.1916, p.1499.
5. The Englishman: 28 July 1918, p.4.
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Behar offered two plots at the comer of his Calcutta
residence for the training school and also the stable
facilities. Among those who enrolled were the members of
the Cooch Behar, Putya and Paikpara families and the son
of Raja Kishori Lai Goswami.^ Though it was technically
open to all, the Bengal Light Horse primarily enlisted
2nobles and other affluent people.
It was lucky for the nobles that the Bengal Light 
Horse did exist, as the infantry proved a great disappoint­
ment. The exhilaration at their success at being able to 
persuade the Government to permit the formation of the 
Double Company could not have lasted long. It was not 
long before the Indian press began to assert that if the 
army was to be opened to the Bengalis as a career, the 
current salary would attract none. They suggested that 
it should be raised by nearly one hundred and fifty 
percent to satisfy them. The argument put forward was 
that if any objection was raised on the ground that 
sepoys from other parts of the country ’’sold their 
lives” for the lesser amount it should be remembered that 
”Bengali bhadralokes may claim that their lives are more 
valuable than those of the common sepoy”.^  The worst of 
it was that the Bengalis never said anything about the
generally low pay of the Indian soldier before their
4
demand for the Bengal army was conceded. On the other
1. Ibid: 30 July, 1917, p.8.
2. Ibid: 25 Feb. 1919, p.5.
3. Ind.N.P. & Per, week ending 19 Aug. 1916, p.1140.
4. Ibid: week ending 16 Sept. 1916, p,1269.
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hand they maintained that they were willing to join 
but that the British disallowed Bengali recruits as 
they wished to spread the myth that Bengalis were 
cowards. The nobles must have felt that their compat­
riots merely made demands to humiliate the Government 
with the firm conviction that their demands would never 
be met. When the nobles helped to realise their demands 
they promptly backed out with some clumsy excuse. More­
over, the recruits when put to actual service did not 
prove very battle worthy. They lacked stamina, and the 
percentage of the sick was abnormally high.^ On the 
other hand, according to the official report the ’’Indian 
Princes, and the great landed proprietors responded
splendidly from the very beginning of the war to the
2
calls made upon them.”
While the war was in full progress the Bengal 
Government stood on the verge of a social problem which 
could have become explosive. A rumour spread round Cal­
cutta that the ghi (clarified butter) sold in the market 
was thoroughly adulterated. Being the product of the 
sacred animal of the Hindus and the normal cooking media 
for all, ghi played a paramount part not only in the diet
3
but also in the religious practices of all orthodox Hindus. 
Such being the case its adulteration could produce angry 
and dangerous reactions from the public.
1. Ronaldshayto Montagu 10 June 1918, Letters:
Montagu, Vol.29, p.17.
2. Ind.Constit.Reform., p.17.
3. L.J.L. Dundas: Essayez, p.80.
To nip it in the bud before the issue gained 
gigantic proportions, a deputation of eighty eminent 
Hindus was formed, headed by the Maharaja of Burdwan, 
to call upon the Governor. The deputation comprised 
most of the well known leaders, both nobles and others, 
of the province.^ The Maharaja pointed out in his address 
of 31 August that, if the question was not dealt with 
immediately, it would lead to considerable trouble during 
the forthcoming festival of Durga Puja. Ghi was an 
indispensable article in religious ceremonies, and if 
it was adulterated with animal fat its use amounted 
to defilement and was destructive to the merit of the 
ceremony. He emphasised that "when the inferior article 
is such as to be injurious to health and revolting 
to the religious sentiments of the bulk of the people 
by whom it is used, surely then it becomes the duty 
of the Government to step in and prevent such adulte­
ration".^
Ronaldshay appreciated the importance of 'the 
situation. He was aware of the fact that it had been found 
put that of sixty-seven samples analysed for purity, only 
seven were found to consist of pure ghi. One was found 
to contain only five percent of ghi, another no ghi at 
all. At this stage the Hindus reacted by summoning 
learned pandits from Benares to advise them on the action 
to be taken. After two days of deliberation the priests 
pronounced their edict which had an electrifying effect.
1. This is one more example of the Indian Association 
group submerging under the leadership of the nobles.
2. The Englishman: 1 Sept. lyl7» p.3*
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The defiled Hindus had to perform a purification cere­
mony on the "banks of the G-anges. Three thousand Brahmins 
gathered at the ghat on the Hughli river, and a vast 
multitude of people waited to he purified.^
Ronaldshay assured the deputation that he would 
see to it that emergency.measures were introduced in 
the shortest possible time. He introduced an Emergency 
Bill in the Council, suspended the rules of business so
that it might pass through all its stages in a single 
2
day. Consequently the Act was put into effect before 
the situation got out of hand.
The last important task that the Bengali leaders 
and the major associations were called upon to perform 
as intermediaries before the turn of the decade was to 
opine on the proposed constitutional reforms which came 
into effect after the war. Ten associations' representa­
tives were selected for interview with Montagu, and 
seventeen individuals were required to give their 
opinions in writing.Of the delegations that called on 
the Secretary of State, seven were led by noblemen 
and of the individuals eight were of the same group.^
The contrast in attitude between the two status groups 
was blatantly pronounced in the advice which they gave.
The Indian Association emphasised the need for 
a very strong element of self-government. They suggested
1. L.J.L. Dundas: Essayez; p.3*
2. 'Cal Municipal (Amend) Bill 1917f> B.L.P.: Jan. 1918,
Vol.10304, p.15.
3. Addresses Presented at Cal.; Montagu, Vol.34.
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that the entire body of members of the Legislative 
Councils or at least four fifths of them, should be 
elected; every district being adequately represented 
with due reference to its wealth, population and educat­
ional advancment, under a system of direct voting.^- 
Surendranath Banerjea went further and said that the 
Executive should be controlled by, and be responsible to, 
the Legislature. All branches of the provincial admin­
istration should be made over to a popular cabinet 
ordinarily holding office for five years, but liable 
to be dismissed upon a vote of censure. The popular
2cabinet was to be formed by the leader of the house.
Moreover, communal and special interests' representat­
ions were turned down. Bhupendranath Basu as early as 
the previous reform had suggested that such a method was 
a new form of caste system.^
The British Indian Association, on the other hand, 
was of the opinion"that the condition of India is so 
peculiar that it is gravely to be doubted whether any 
of the various forms of government prevailing in self-
governing countries could be introduced here without
4
material modifications". Once more the basic difference 
lay in accepting western institutions in their entirety, 
and in arguing for their adaptation to suit local situat­
ions. The reasons for the latter attitude is clear from 
the remarks in the individual written opinions forwarded
— — f— w w — — w m ' i w u n w  ■ ,i , n »ir~ n irinrionr^fi ■m i n - m  rn " ir^irr~ m --- r>---Tjr~ r-i-- r—j----
1. Based on the English model.
2. Addresses Presented at Calcutta: Montagu, Vol.34, Memo.
3. Basu to Maffey 23 Aug. 1918, L & T(India): Vol.15, pt.I.
p.320.
4* Addresses Presented at Calcutta: Montagu; Vol.34,
Memo (Enclo.).
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by the nobles.
Nawab Shamsul Huda wrote that "self-government is 
not an end by itself, but only a means .to an end, the end 
being the happiness and contentment of the great mass of 
people who have no clear idea of self-government and no 
particular anxiety for it. To them good government is 
much more important than self-government. Their happiness 
can only be secured by material prosperity Raja Peary 
Mohan Mukerjee elaborated the point stating,"The different 
races in India speak 1 8 5 different languages and profess 
as many religious creeds. Many of her peoples are as 
much alien to one another as the English are to them....
In such circumstances unity of purpose and policy among 
Indian races are impossible and ideas of Home Rule and 
responsible Government by Indians are mere idle visions...
The salvation of India and the prosperity of her people 
lie in the continuance of British Rule.
, The other point on which they disagreed with the 
leaders of the intelligentsia was the abolition of special 
interest representation. The Maharaja of Burdwan even before 
the question of any reform came up had voiced his conviction 
to Cyrzon that Democracy as practised in the west would 
definitely lead to a revolutionary situation in the country.^ 
They were conscious of the fact that such a method would not 
satisfy the needs of the complicated society of the country 
since too many sections would feel that they were not rep­
resented. As a matter of fact their own landholders' 
interests would be handled by people involved in profess­
ions and services. The Muslim nobles further had the
1. Carmichael to Chelmsford 20 Aug. 1916,(Enclo),G.B.R.,p.!35.
2. Addresses Presented at Calcutta: Montagu,Vol.34, Memo.
3. Burdwan toCurzon 3 Aug.1911, Letters: Curzon, Vol.426.
pp.105,106.
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ominous fear that it would lead to the legislative bodies
being swamped by representatives not interested in their
community. The nobles involved in trade and commerce also
worried that they would lose their voice in the assemblies
to professional politicians.
Nawab Serajul Islam maintained that "Home Rule in
the form demanded by the Congress will be prejudicial to
Muhammadan interests".^- At the time nineteen non-official
members of the Imperial Legislative Council had handed
in a memorial with the demands for reforms. Nawab Syed
Nawab Ali Chaudhury refused to be a party to it as he felt
2
it was prejudicial to the Muslim community. Fearing a 
similar threat, Raja Reshee Case Law stated that Home 
Rule was not suited for India and the executive councils 
should be left undisturbed. He wrote,"I am not at one 
with some of my fellow-countrymen in getting Indians 
appointed to every high post of great responsibility."
He supplemented the remark by suggesting that if,any 
change was necessary in the Legislative Council, the 
franchise should be given to "mining, mills, and to 
Indian commerce and important minorities".^ The Kumar 
of Paikpara said that self-government without proper 
training from the lowest level "must in the end inevit­
ably lead to the forming of oligarchies leaving the
4
bulk of the people untouched".
^ ^ M B   ................................................ .. ........................ ...................  ! ! « I« IM     I I Mi V W  rgiHWirlgVB.'
1. Addresses presented at Calcutta: Montagu, Vol.34, Memo
2. Chelmsford to Chamberlain 13 Apr. 1S17, Correspondence
S.5., Vol.31,pt.II, pp.107-114.
3. Addresses Presented at Calcutta: Montagu, Vol.3 4 Memo.
4. Kumar M.C. Sinha: Constitutional Reform for India, p.3.
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How far their opinion counted as against the other 
is difficult to ascertain. But what is possible to say is 
that by the end of Carmichael* s stay in Bengal, the 
Governor's view on the subject had become similar to the 
nobles', contrary to his initial desire to be remembered 
,as the People's governor as he wished on his arrival.
In his recommendation to the Viceroy he wrote that "the 
goal must necessarily be a distant one... A few years ago 
I should not have said this ... but I realise that Indians 
as a people look much further into the future than we do, and 
are more likely than we should be to accept a goal which 
clearly cannot be reached for many years’1.^ Obviously he 
was not paying a great deal of attention to those who 
demanded Home Eule and self-government in the immediate 
future.
Prom this study of their activities during the 
period under review it becomes apparent that the nobles 
were not only very active but also very effective<as 
intermediaries in the political plane. Their political 
function had undergone a complete change: from being political 
administrators they had become intermediaries in public 
affairs. Their effort in acting as a bridge was acknowledged 
by the Administration. That is apparent from the numerous 
occasions when they were called upon to help in enquiries, 
assess public mood and mobilise public opinion. They were
expected to keep the officials informed of the overall
2 3condition of the province, both social and political,
1. Carmichael to Chelmsford 20 Aug. 1916 (Enclo.) G-.B.R. ,p89»
2. J.H. DuBoulay to Butler 25 Nov.1910fC.P.I.:1910-11
Vol.Va5f pt.II, p.35. (Burdwan)
3. Ivlinto to Llorley 2 Jan. 1907, Letters:IJorley, Vol.II,
p.5 (Darbhanga)
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and help them maintain efficient control over the local 
situation. Carmichael, on his arrival in April, learnt 
much of the present condition of Murshidabad, its local 
needs and other matters of public importance, from the 
local zamindars and nobles such as the Nawab of Murshidabad 
and the Maharajas of Kassimbazar and Nashipur. Similarly, he 
was briefed on the situation at Burdwan by the Maharaja of 
Burdwan.^ It was for such discussions that they were given 
the right of private entree to the Government House. Frequent 
interviews were granted to them by the head of the province.
Apart from that they were called to social gather­
ings where matters could be discussed in informal surround­
ings. Carmichael relied rather heavily on such informal 
gatherings. In his biography it is stated that no one
knew better than Lord Carmichael how to smooth difficulties
2
away at a dinner party . Ronaldshay also stated that the
Simplest means of achieving the object of meeting important
residents were small and intimate dinner parties.^ The
first thing he did on his arrival was to meet Indian
4
noblemen, officiers and other public persons. Chelmsford's 
first visit to Calcutta was a private one. He wished to 
get acquainted first with the problems that he would have 
to face and then hold a public entry at a later date.
That was necessary, as the problems were many and no time
1. Tours: 7-13 Dec. 1913, pp.29,53.
2. M.Carmichael: Lord Carmichael, p.149*
3. L.J.L. Dundas: Essayez, p.70.
4. Ronaldshay to Chamberlain 21 Apr.1517, Governors
Letters: 1915-17. pp.360,361.
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could be wasted due to the War.^ He explained that his
first aim and basic reason for coming was to familiarise -
himself with the measures taken by the G-overnment of
Bengal to repress political crime and the powers required
by it to continue to do so after the expiry of the Defence 
2
of India Act. One of the^  things he did during his visit 
was to give a dinner party. The guest list comprised 
five Bengalis, of whom three were nobles. Due to inter­
dining difficulties, due to caste barriers, all such 
notables could not be called for the meals. Such diffic­
ulties were overcome by inviting more people for after- 
dinner tete-a-tete. Por that fourteen more Indians were 
invited by Chelmsford, of whom ten were noblemen.^ Curzon, 
even after his departure from India continued to rely on 
the Nawab of Dacca and the Maharaja of Burdwan to keep 
him abreast of Bengal affairs and he kept up informal
L
correspondence with them all along.
Apart from keeping the Administration abreast
A
with the overall situation, we find that the nobles were 
further relied upon to advise the Government on aspects of 
administration for which they were non-official special­
ists. The obvious ones were on rural Bengal and on revenue 
administration. The Muslim nobles were also expected to 
have an intimate knowledge of the needs of their community.
1. The Englishman: 12 Apr. 1916, p.6.
2. Chelmsford to Chamberlain 14 Apr. 1916, Correspondence
o«2. • V o 1» ^ , pt*H, P P • 3,4 •
3. The Englishman: 12 Apr. 1916, p.6.
4* Letters: Curzon, Vols. 426,427*
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With, the partition of Bengal, the Nawab of Dacca was 
installed as the Eastern Bengal and Assam provincial 
administrator's chief non-official adviser and main 
agent for the distribution of patronage.^ Even after 
the revocation of the partition, the Nawab, with Nawab
p
Shamsul Huda, remained important advisers of Carmichael. .
Moreover, the nobles were entrusted with tasks 
as Indian representatives in public committees.which 
required delicate handling, presumably as they dealt with 
problems involving imperial issues. Such matters included 
imperial trade, colonial relationships, internal security, 
international war. Such being the case, it is not surpris­
ing that when the Imperial Government in London felt the 
need to consult individuals on tleposition of Indians in 
British Guina, Trinidad and Fiji, the only two consulted 
from Bengal were the Maharajas of Kassimbazar and 
Burdwan.-^ At times it was even felt useful to put nationa­
list leaders into committees expected to sit for some 
length of time, so that they would be kept occupied and 
thus remain manageable. According to Fleetwood Wilson
it was so in the case of Gokhale's appointment in the
4
Public Service Commission. He laid great stress on
5
appointing Gokhale with this very purpose in mind.
1. M. Carmichael: Lord Carmichael, pp.168,169.
2. J.H. Broomfield, p.51.
3. Donald to Div.Commissioners & Maharajas 3 Oct. 1917,
B.F.P.(Emigration).: July 1918, Vol.10298, p.9.
4. Wilson to Lady Hardinge 25 June 1912, Correspondence:
Fleetwood Wilson, Vol.7, pp.27,28.
5. Wilson to Hardinge 2 March 1912, Ibid, Vol.5, p.63.
In this way the more delicate problems doubtless could 
be left to the officials and the noblemen to handle. 
Their political attitude, their aptitude as inter-organi 
sational leaders, and their personal eminence in the 
socio-economic life of the province made them ideally 
suited for the work.
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Over the years consultative politics became more 
formal. Legislative and executive councils were created 
and developed into the focal points of political activities 
within the province and the country as a whole. In the 
second decade of this century the Bengal nobles found 
themselves entrusted by the Administration with a 
specific task of acting as a counterpoise to the bellige­
rent intelligentsia in the councils. Consequently, 
there ensued a bitter conflict with the leaders of the 
intelligentsia. Despite their efforts to retain the 
leadership in the political field, the nobles wore out­
shone at every turn by the new group in the Chamber.
Thus began their downfall. Gradually they were eased 
from their eminent position and superceded by the 
rival group. 4
As pointed out before, the IJutiny convinced the 
Government and Imperial Authorities of the dangers arising 
out of the entire exclusion of Indians from association 
•with the legislation of the country. Amongst other 
factors, this attitude resulted in the passing of the 
Indian Councils Act If'6.1. In accord with the Act a 
legislative cc mcll for Bong f as created. Its funct­
ion was strictly limited to 1 chelation. It v.»as expressly 
forbidden to transact any business except for the conside­
ration nd ictr eni of ■ i^sl; tiv ui* s.sures introduce d 
\. ■ t} e lov -ii! nt. Boreov *. i rnber was
forbidden to entertain any motion for leave to intro­
duce a Bil!),^ " Apart from the Executive Council and 
additional members summoned from time to time for 
specific subjects, the Act brought into existence a 
permanent legislative counci], in Bengal consisting of 
twelve nominated members comprising four European
officials, two Indian officials, four European non-
2
officials and two Indian non-officials.
It was another thirty years before the councils
developed further. The Bengal Legislative Council
had included Indian members since 1861, but it was not
until 1892 that the elective principle was introduced,
and Indian members had gained some parity in numbers
with the Europeans.*' Lord Bufferin’s Committee suggest
that the British bring into public affairs the "gentry”
and"nohilitv" of the country, and that elections be
introduced as fen'’ as possible. The franchise was to be
assessed in accord with a high property qualification
for the direct electors, and by local bodies,universitie
associations, and other similar groups, by recommended
delegates acting as electoral colJeges. Based on these
A-
recommendations, the Act of 1832 was formed.'
The Act resulted in the creation of a large le 
lative body with a council comprising a maximum of ten
1. Ind.Constit.Ref., pp.31,32.
-• Parliamentary Parers Great Britian I89O: Vol.LIV,
pp.106,107.
3. J.H. Broomfield, p.l8.
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nominated officials, a minimum of three nominated 
non-officials, and seven elected members. The seven 
elected members consisted of one from the Calcutta Cor­
poration, two from municipalities, two from district
V
boards, one from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, and one
from the University of Calcutta.^ Five years later, one
seat from the municipalities located in the mufassil
2was transferred to the large landowners. Despite the 
introduction of elections, the principle behind the 
process of legislation remained unaltered: members 
were still unable to introduce Bills in the Council.
The first decade of the century experienced the 
next constitutional concession. It was this Act that 
was in force during the period under study.With the 
object of satisfying the constitutional aspirations of 
the day, Minto told his legislative council in 1907 
that his Government had been considering how to give 
the people of India wider opportunities of expressing 
their views on how they should be governed. The 
increasing readiness of the landed and the commercial 
classes to share in public life and to render assistance 
to the Government, and the desire of the rapidly growing 
numbers of educated Indians to have a larger voice in 
administrative questions, had convinced Morley and 
himself that it was time to carry to a further stage 
the reforms previously effected. The underlying idea
1. Parliamentary Papers Great Britain 1894: Vol.LVTII,
pp.6 5 .
2. Ind.Const.it.Ref. , p.36.
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of the Morley-Minto changes , introduced in 1909, was 
to associate the non-officials to a greater extent with 
Government in the decision of public questions.
With the above end in view, one seat on the executive 
council was, in practice, reserved for an Indian. Moreover, 
the legislative council was expanded and given a larger 
elected element. It was also given a non-official - 
elected and nominated - majority. The idea was to give 
members a wider opportunity of exercising influence on 
questions of administration and finance. The institution 
of finance committees in the council also gave the non­
official members a direct share in forming limited 
portions of the budget.^* But it must be kept in mind 
that the functions of the legislative council continued 
primarily as that of an advisory machinery to gauge 
public aspirations. The Executive was not made respon­
sible to the legislature. The legislative council was 
a formal sounding-board for assessing public opinion 
acting as an aid to the Executive in formulating policy.
Even when leave to introduce a Bill proposed by a non­
official member was granted, it was with the object of
2
eliciting public opinion on the proposal.
The nature of the council reforms was worked out 
between Morley and Minto. The two men were agreed that 
the aim should be to increase the indigenous support 
for the Government. Where the two disagreed was the
1. Ibid, p . 6.
2. Gov.Gen. to Crewe 18 Jan. 1912, L .L.: 1912, Vol.464,
Lt.no*-!. of 1912, p.l.
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relative political importance of various Indian communities 
and the manner in which they should be represented. Worley 
maintained that the essential object of the reforms must 
be to satisfy the intelligentsia and to provide their 
leaders with opportunities for worthwhile political serv­
ice. Minto dissented. He insisted that there were other 
groups, communities and interests equally important to 
consider.^"
As early as 1906, Minto stated that "it was
absolutely necessary to guard the. important interests
existing in the country." According to the Viceroy,
the important interests could be classified into four.
The first listed was the interest of the hereditary
nobility and landed classes who had a great and perman-
2
ent stake in the country. He clarified the reason for 
his observation the following year in a circular forwarded 
to the various local governments. In it he stated,"The 
ruling chiefs and the landholding and commercial
i
classes, possessing a material stake in the country, 
and representing the most powerful and stable elements 
of Indian society, have now become qualified to take a 
more prominent part in public life, and to render a 
larger measure of public assistance to the Executive 
Government".-^ In the opinion of the Viceroy, the"ruling 
chiefs", the "landholding"classes, and the "commercial" 
class represented not only the most powerful but also the
1. J.H. Broomfield, pp.36,37.
2. ’Minto's Minutes of 15 Aug. 1906', Letters: Llorley,
Vol.9, p.25.
3. ’Circular from Govt, of India 24- Aug. 1907',
P . Mukherji: Indian Constitutional Documents Vo1.1 .,
p.255
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most stable elements in the country. Indeed, in Bengal, 
the seat of viceregal authority until 1911, the leader­
ship of all three was vested in the nobles.
A close scrutiny of Minto*s letters to Morley 
reveals that he was greatly preoccupied with what he 
described as the "Bengalee agitators".^ Fraser, the Lieut. 
Governor of Bengal, held similar views. Commenting on 
Minto's suggestion, he stated that what was required was
a "system of election which will secure truly representa- 
2
tive men". He later explained that by true representa­
tion he did not mean a more extended representation 
but a more balanced one of different interests in the 
country.^ Unless the Administration proceeded "on 
lines which will secure the representation of those who 
have a real stake in the country and their cooperation 
with us in matters concerning the Government, we must 
look for growing dissatisfaction. The present policy 
is developing a large number of men who talk recklessly 
and make impossible demands. Those who do not agree 
with them are silent, and do not express their views 
of unwisdom of those so-called leaders. They are averse 
to joining these leaders; and the Government fails to
4
attract them".
Doubtless activated by the same motive, it was 
further suggested by the Imperial Government that, apart 
from the legislative councils, there should exist advisory 
councils at the centre and the provincial headquarters.
1. See Morley Collection 1906-10, Vols 7-25
2. 'Frazer's Reply to Arundell Committee's proposals
25 March 1907', Letters: Morley:Vol-II, p.35.
3. Frazer to Minto 28 May 1907, Letters:Morley,Vol.12,p.3.
4. Frazer's reply to Arundell Committee's proposals
25 March ICO?1, Letters: Morley, Vol.2, pp. 35,36 .
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it was advocated that both in the centre and the provinces 
the advisory councils should comprise the superior land­
holders as nuclei. In this way there would be formal 
political bodies of influential Indians who could provide 
the country and the Government with an alternative group 
with different ideas to the Congress.^ The central body 
would meet once a year for approximately a fortnight in 
Calcutta. This would allow it to be in full view of 
what Minto considered the turbulent Bengali people.
Minto informed Morley that Fraser "strongly agrees with 
me that the point we have to keep in view at present is 
the creation of an Imperial Council of Chiefs and great 
landowners to belong to which would be a marked Imperial 
distinction"; On the other hand, the Lieut.Governor 
was doubtful whether he could find more than three or four 
in Bengal who would qualify for the esteemed position 
on the provincial'advisory council. Moreover, leading 
noblemen such as Darbhanga (Bihar) informed him that 
they were able to express their opinions without
restraint in private, but they would find it impossible
2to do so in public. Appreciating their difficulties, 
the Bengal Government suggested that the provincial 
council should comprise about thirty members repres­
enting large and small landholders, feudatory states, 
European and Indian commerce, tea and indigo,
L. Minto to Morley 28 May 1906, Letters: Morley, Vol.o,
pp.75,76.
2. Minto to Morley 7 June 1907, Letters: Morley 
Vol.12, pp.22,23.
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the professions, the University, the district hoards 
and municipalities. ■*"
The proposed Council, being considered of little 
value by Morley and his associates and repetitive by 
people such as Fraser was dropped altogether. But the 
Viceroy insisted that, i n ‘the legislative councils at 
least, the influence of the "professional classes'1 
should be diminished. It was pointed out that "the 
Government of India are far from denying that the 
professional classes are entitled to a share of repres­
entation ... But they are not prepared to allow them a 
virtual monopoly of the power exercised by the Councils, 
and they believe that the soundest solution of the 
problem is to be found in supplying the requisite counter­
poise to their excessive influence by creating an addit-
2
ional electorate from the landed and the monied classes".
In Bengal that would signify giving the nobles an advan­
tage by the backdoor over the so-called "Bengal agitators".
Doubtless, from his seat in remote London, Morley 
unlike the local officials, could not help being impressed 
by the most vocal group in far away India. The others, 
as Fraser pointed out, were relatively silent. It is 
not at all surprising that the Authorities in London 
should conclude that the leadership of the Indian people 
rested entirely in the hands of the leaders of the 
intelligentsia. They controlled most of the Indian owned
1. 'Council Reforms 1908-09’, Papers:Morley, Vol.33, p.7.
2. Circular from Govt.of India 24 Aug.1907',
P. Mukherji: Indian Constitutional Documents Vol.I.
pp.261,262.
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newspapers and periodicals; they frequently called public 
meetings in the great cities; and members of their group 
constantly travelled to England which allowed their views 
to filter into the minds ofvthe British public.
Moreover, since Morley was a liberal, the liberal 
principles advocated by the leaders of the intelligentsia 
would undoubtedly find favourable reception with the 
Secretary of State. Indeed his position in England was 
analogous to that of the leaders of the intelligentsia in 
India. Being born without a title he lacked the advantages 
that peers acq.uired by the mere fact of being b o m  in a 
noble household. Like the Indian nationalists, Morley*s 
eminence was based on personal merit and diligence. He 
chose to join that political party in England which 
advocated the reduction of the status of the House of 
Lords. Despite this attitude of many English people in 
general, and Morley in particular, one must keep in mind 
that Great Britain had formally declared India to' be 
beyond the spheres of party platforms. It is undeniable 
that, despite the declared policy, a difference of treat­
ment by the Conservatives and the Liberals would exist.
Yet it is safe to assume that the differences would not 
stretch beyond limits which would endanger the very 
existence of the Imperial Commonwealth. The terrorists 
would never be able to find support from either party. 
Y/hile looking around for reliable people in the ranks 
of the Indian leaders, the Liberal Authorities in London 
laid down a general directive by dividing the leadership
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of the intelligentsia into the moderates and the 
extremists and placing their reliance on the former.
On the other hand, the local Authorities necessa­
rily had to look beyond mere objectives. Their task was 
to supervise the day to day administration in the most 
effective manner. Coming in regular contact with the 
different sections of the community, they were not only 
better placed to understand the true situation in the 
country, but were also faced with the need to seek the 
most effective support available for the sake of smooth 
administration. They could better appreciate the factors 
enumerated in the previous chapters, despite their lack 
of notoriety. Elaborating on this point, Minto stated,
111 can imagine a want of knowledge at home, an exaggerated 
idea of the value of Western forms of Government, and the 
eloquence of political agitators from the East, who could 
not hold their own for an instant in their own country, 
proving very dangerous to India... I am afraid of , an 
assumption of too much authority by the House over' questions 
at a distance, of which few people at home can possibly 
have any intimate knowledge - questions affected by conditions 
and sentiments unknown to English political life.
The local authorities were fully aware of the 
intelligentsia being primarily localised in the city 
and having very small influence over the other sections 
of the population other than the educated community.
1. Minto to Morley 28 May 1906, Letters: Morley, Vol„8,
p.75
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Moreover, they were doubtless aware that apart from the 
extremists and the moderates there was the group of 
noblemen who did. not even consider themselves as a part 
of the intelligentsia. As Fraser said, they were averse 
to joining their leaders. Yet because of their surface 
similarities, the latter two were frequently denominated 
together as the moderates by the Authorities in London.
Despite the attitude of some liberal leaders in 
London, most of the local officials continued to look 
with suspicion on the Indian moderates. This attitude 
was rooted in the conviction that the moderates were as 
bent on disruptive actions as the extremists, Moreover, 
they had taken up a rigid stance of opposition rather 
than remain content to be what were considered healthy 
critics of the Government. They appeared to be led 
by the popular tide rather than leading towards channels con­
sidered proper by the authorities. Suspicion became 
acute following the viceroyalty of Curzon. Their unreas­
onable demands, relentless opposition, and conciliatory 
attitude towards extremist pressures did little to con­
tain the worsening law and order situation. On the cont­
rary, it gave the extremists indirect impetus to indulge 
in further terrorism. Commenting on the Barisal agitation 
of 1906, Minto opined that, contrary to it being inspired 
by a patriotic spirit, it was"simply the work of agitators 
who feel themselves defeated and are bent on doing as much 
mischief as they can".^ Surendranath Banerjea's activities
1. Minto to Morley 5 Apr. 1906, Letters: Morley,Vol.8,p.31*
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prompted Hardinge to opine that he "was a poisonous creat­
ure" who "must always have some agitation in progress".^In 
reference to the Congress, the Viceroy wrote that 
’’though there are many honest men connected with the Con­
gress movement, I cannot disguise from myself that we are 
every day being brought more face to face with absolutely 
disloyal:intentions, the ultimate object of which is the 
overthrow of British administration. I know how serious 
these words are, but we must not blink the fact, and that 
the whole initiative emanates very largely from the so- 
called Bengalee agitation under cover of plausible argu­
ments claiming to be put forward on behalf of popular 
2
demands? Bending to extremist pressures even well known
moderates such as Naoroji were forced to compromise.^
It was so with Gokhale too. He startled Dunlop Smith
by his uncompromising statement that "our standpoints
are bound to be different" and that "we must be content
4
to work on opposite sides". K.N. Chaudhuri, another
*
moderate leader, while speaking to a German, "talked 
about the spilling of blood and said that the next time 
it happened ... the English will not have only a few 
mutinous sepoys to deal with, but the whole of the 
people of India". He further added that the only 
reason the moderates restrained the people for the 
moment was because the time for starting an armed 
insurrection was not quite ripe. Chaudhuri's unguarded
1. H. Chakrabarti:1 Government & Bengal Terrorism',
B.P. & P .: July-Dec.1971, p.166.
2. Minto to Morley 1 Aug.1906, Letters: Morley, Vol.9
p • 13 •
3. Minto to Morley (enclo) 16 Jan,1907, Letters: Morley,
Vol.11, p.13.
4. Dunlop Smith to Gokhale 5 Jan.1907, Letters: Morley,
Vol.12, p.105.
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remarks were incited by the lack of knowledge that the
German was, in fact, a naturalised British citizen.^
Surendranath Banerjea once, quite frankly, confessed to
Ronaldshay that newspapers in this country were obliged
to attack the Government even in matters in which the
editor or owner knew that the attack was unjustifiable,
2in order to retain their circulation . Such behaviour 
hardened the attitude of the local officials towards 
the moderates.'
Thus in India as a whole, and Bengal in particular, 
the local officials felt the need to form a counterpoise 
against the advocates of agitational politics: whether 
they were extremist or moderates. Since there were 
already other influential status groups and communities 
in existence who distrusted the motives of the "denationa­
lised" leaders as much as the British did, it wa3 not 
difficult for the Administration to select them for the 
task. Minto wrote, "personally my object has been in
i
the proposed reforms to secure the representation of landed 
proprietors, and tf those who have a stake in the country", 
and of communal interests. Supported by his subordinates 
officials in India, he emphasised that the great land­
holders and the Muslims should be given special conside­
ration as conservatives cn whom the Administration could
1. Minto to Morley (Enclo) 1 Aug.l$06, Letters: Morley:
Vol. 9, p.14.
2. Bengal Diary Beb.1917-Nov.1919: Zetland , Vol.I.,p.89.
3. Extremists like Tilak claimed in private that their aim 
was a confederacy of Indian provinces, possessing colon­
ial self-government, with England retaining control over 
imperial questions and, simultaneously, in public 
stirred up the mass to a revolutionary pitch by the 
slogan ’Swaraj is my birthright, and I shall have it’. 
However, the extremists of Bengal, who v/ere inspired
by the Ghose brothers, regarded Tilak as touched with 
a sense of cautious moderation. - Nevinson: New Spirit 
in India, pp.72,221.
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rely. In Bengal the leadership of both groups rested 
in the hands of the nobles. Moreover, as mentioned before, 
they also dominated the Indian commercial community.
Thus, it came to pass that the functions of the nobles 
in the legislative bodies - as leaders of the rural 
community, commercial or monied classes, and the Muslims 
- became the preservation of loyalty and conservatism in 
the council chamber. Their socio-economic functions and 
their activities as intermediaries in public affairs 
had been the product of natural evolution. But now, 
for the first time, the group found itself in a situation 
with a specific responsibility thrust on it by the 
Authorities.
Minto and his fellow officials were not gambling 
on a group who seemed devoid of any other experience 
than zamindari management. In a previous chapter it 
has already been explained that they were the inter-organ­
isational leaders of the province, and were well exper-
*
ienced in political activities. Moreover, many of them 
had acquired experience in administrative work. Nawab 
Syed Mohammad Khan was a very popular Inspector General 
of Registration. During his term in office he thoroughly 
reorganised the whole department and introduced a number
2
of useful and salutary reforms to improve its activities.
The Maharaja of Nashipur was a commissioner of the 
Murshidabad Municipality. While its chairman, he tried 
to improve the sanitation of the town and supply it with
1. J.H. Broomfield, p.37.
2. The Englishman: 1 Apr. 1912, p.8.
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pure drinking water.^ After his term in office, Maharaj
Kumar Bhupendra Narayan Sinha was nominated to fill the
2
vacancy thus created. Abdur Rahman was considered a very
able and impartial judge.^ Nawabzada Abul Khair Abdus
4
Sobhan was the Musalman Press Censer. Nawab Syed Nawab
Ali Chaudhury was a very important member of the Ifymen-
.5
singh District Board, Raja Reshee Case Law was a Comm­
issioner of the Calcutta Port Trust, a member of the 
Corporation of Calcutta, a member of the consulting 
committee of E.I and E.B Railways, first non-official chair­
man of 24 Parganas District Board, and first Indian
g
Director of the Imperial Bank. Nawab Khwaja Yousaff was
a long standing member of the Dacca Municipality, and
7
acted very effectively as its chairman. Raja Dinendra 
Narayan Roy was a prominent member of the Calcutta
o
Corporation. Nawab Badruddin Haidar was one of the
9
oldest commissioners of the Calcutta Corporation. As 
a matter of fact most of the nobles of Bengal had 
experience of the sort enumerated above.
They also had definite ideas of the method of govern­
ment best suited to India, giving the appearance of mature
understanding of the country's needs. As mentioned in the
1. D.C. Boulger: Maharaja Devi Cinha. p. 122
2. The Bengalee: 14 Aug. 1913» P»3
5* Ind. N .P.; week ending 2 Dec. 1916, p.1610
4. Ibid: week ending 4 Harch, 1916, p.333
5. Nat. N.P. week ending 25 July, 1914 p.750
6. Bengal Zamindars, p .69
7. Chiefs. Nobles & Zamindars, p. 541
8. Ind. owned Eng. id.?.: week ending 24 Apr. 1915 » p.1245
9. The Bengalee: 11 July 1913, p.3
previous chapter, their slogan was ’’good government”.
Their conservative ideas may have gone against the views 
of many liberal Englishmen, but the liberals could not 
deny that the nobles were loyal to the Imperial Common­
wealth.
The opinion of the Maharaja of Burdwan on the method
of administration expected by the nobles of the Government
well illustrated what they considered good government
to be. He said that Indian administration was a sacred
duty of England, and that it should never be brought on
to the platform of party politics. It was the duty of
the Government in India to direct the legitimate
aspirations of the people of India into ’’safe and
proper channels”. Since India’s rulers lived in the
west and her Government was also a westernised one, she
had to be, no doubt, westernised to a great extent.
But to westernise her in entirety would be an act of
gross folly. Change had to come in India as everywhere
else in the world, but he asked the rulers never"to
hustle the East.^ He was convinced that it was a major
mistake to overdose a. country like India with western
2ideas of liberty,equality and fraternity. The nobles 
believed that immediate rule by the people as understood 
in the west, without any supervisory control, was not 
feasible, since the country was not yet ripe for it.^
If traditional institutions were ignored by Indian 
leaders as antiquated, because they were so in the west, 
and local background overlooked as unnecessary, it
1. B.C. Mahtab: Impressions, pp.113»114.
2. Burdwan to Curzon 3 Aug.1911, Letters:Curzon,Vol.426,
p.108.
3. Ranajit Sinha: Reforms in the Administration of India,
p. vi.
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would not only lead to loss of racial identification,
but also prove impractical, since indigenous institutions
served a definite purpose in the country. Democratic
government, as it existed in the west, was bound to
create a revolutionary situation.^"
Territorial representation would mean that the
legislature was dominated by the intelligentsia
leaving too many other interests unrepresented or, at
the most, represented by an outsider. Moreover, once
the discontent had set in, the Government could expect
no help from these "denationalised” leaders of the
intelligentsia in combatting disruptive forces thus let 
2
loose.
Thus we find the attitude of the nobles regarding 
the legislative and executive bodies best suited for 
the country, was quite different from that of the 
intelligentsia. The most glaring difference was that 
they did not accept the intelligentsia's conviction 
that the Indian councillors were to function in the same 
fashion as the opposition in the British Parliament. On 
the contrary, they advised that there should be no party 
politics. It was their duty as a body to guide the 
Government to direct the legitimate aspirations of the 
people into "safe and proper channels”. The 1909 kit was 
worded in a manner that would make it possible for the 
nobles to justify their theories by putting them into
1. Burdwan to Curzon 3 Aug. 1911, Letters: CJurzon,
Vol.426, p.109.
2. Nat. owned Eng.IT.P .: week ending 15 Apr. 1911. p. 165,
(Tagore)
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practice. It placed the burden of counter-acting the 
rapid swing of opinion towards rigid opposition squarely 
on their shoulders.
The reforms gave the nobles an exclusive place in 
the specially reserved seats of the landholders' constitu­
encies. The franchise was bestowed on persons who held 
titles not lower in rank than that of.raja or nawab. The 
idea underlying the concession was that these title- 
holders would ordinarily be men of local eminence and 
territorial influence.
The reforms gave them no less of an advantage in 
other constituencies as well. The requisite qualificat­
ions for elections from the municipalities and district 
boards were limited to the members within the bodies.
In the mufassil the limitation rendered it almost 
impossible for an educated Hindu who had not Bought 
election to local bodies to find his way into the 
legislative councils. Furthermore, the concession to 
the Liuslims to choose their own nominees deprived the 
predominantly Hindu intelligentsia of some more seats 
in the chamber. It was similar in the case of the 
seat reserved for a nominated member representing 
the Indian commercial community. The Indian commercial 
community for all practical purposes was considered 
subordinate to the influence of the Law family.^
That left the leaders of the intelligentsia the possi­
bility of being returned only from the Corporation of 
Calcutta and the Calcutta University. But a closer 
analysis shows that even in the latter two places their
1. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.Home Ind. *5 June 3.911,
B.A.P.: July 1911, Vol.8679. pp.34,38.
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influence was thoroughly curtailed. Doubtless fifty 
percent of the members of the Calcutta Corporation were 
elected representatives of the ratepayers of Calcutta.
But the fact remained that the other fifty percent 
were nominated by the Government, the chambers of 
commerce, the trade associations and other bodies.
Similarly, though the University had a hundred Fellows,
eighty of them were nominees.'1' Thus the leaders of
the intelligentsia were hampered at every turn. The situation
was made worse for them by the fact that, though they
were barred from contesting the landholders1 and the
Muslim seats, the nobles and the Muslims were permitted
to stand in the mixed constituencies.
Finding themselves in such unfavourable conditions, 
Surendranath Banerjea and his associates appealed to 
the Bengali community to boycott the forthcoming elect­
ions in the two provinces of divided Bengal. Y/hen the 
elections took place, it was found that only that 
section of the Bengali community which followed the lead
of Surendranath Banerjea responded to the call for boy- 
2
cott. The nobles and their fellow zamiridars, as leaders 
of the rural population, the Muslim community and the 
commercial classes had ignored the appeal and participated 
in the election. In the Legislative Council of Eastern
1. 'Report on Revision of Election Rules', Ibid: July,
1911, Vol.8679, p.19.
2. Chief Sec#Beng. to Sec.Home Ind. 5 June 1911, Ibid,
pp.34,38.
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Bengal and Assam nine noblemen found their way into the
assembly, while five others took their seats in the
Bengal Legislative Council. Moreover, Raja Kishori
Lai G-oswami was selected as the first Indian member
in the Bengal Executive Council, and accepted the
nomination without any protest.^ Apart from the nobles,
most of the other Indian non-officials were also their
2
fellow landholders.
Minto's expectations had been more than satisfied 
in Bengal. For the very first time the superior land­
holders had openly disassociated themselves from the 
"professional" politicians. In circumstances where no 
formal parties existed, it was as formal a break as possible. 
Moreover, they had counter-acted the boycott call, 
depriving it of the impact it could have had if the 
returned representatives had all been Europeans and 
officials, and the Administration had found no Indian 
non-official willing to serve in the Executive Council 
of Bengal.
At the outset there were some misgivings among 
officials that the nobles and other superior Landholders 
would not participate in the elections, despite the 
advantages secured by Minto. It was possible that they 
would find stepping into the electoral-arena embarrass­
ing. Except for a handful, the electorate did not com­
prise fellow noblemen in the constituencies other than 
their own. Moreover, senior noblemen might have found
1. India Office List, 1911, pp.45,55.
2. J.H. Broomfield, p.59.
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it detrimental to their dignity even to stand for election 
in their own constituencies.
When the election actually took place, however, 
it came to light that such fears were quite unfounded.
Leading noblemen such as the Maharaja of Burdwan, Kassim- 
bazar ahd Kashipur came forward freely to contest the 
elections of their special representatives. The two 
former were particularly active in canvassing the 
voters and succeeded in getting themselves returned.'*' 
Landholders also achieved a high degree of success in
t
the mixed electorates. Of the twelve members elected in 
the Bengal Legislative Council by municipalities and 
district boards, most were zamindars, of whom three were 
proprietors of large estates. Moreover, nobles who 
were thus elected were considered toberepresentatives 
in the best sense of the term of the returning bodies. 
According to the official record "many of them have 
rendered long and approved service as Chairman and Vice- 
Chairman of these institutions and are at the same time
m
men of high local position and influence." The report
cited Raja Kishori Lai Goswami and Raja Reshee Case Law 
2
as examples.
The Maharaja of Burdwan's capacity for manipula­
ting votes for himself quite startled the British 
officials of the time. In order to secure the votes of 
the Midnapur zamindars, he came to an electoral under-
11 Collin to Chief Sec.Beng. 29 March 1910, B.A.P.:
Reb. 1911, Vol.3679, p.21
2. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.Home Ind. 5 June 1911,
Ibid: July 1911, Vol.8679, p.31
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standing with K.B. Dutt, the retained barrister-at-law
of the Burdwan estate. Apart from being a trusted
retainer of the Maharaja, he was also the legal adviser
of various other zamindars of the locality. He was
persuaded by the Maharaja to canvass votes for him, and
in return the Maharaja agreed to exercise all the legitimate
influence he could in favour of the candidature of the
latter for the suffrage of the district boards in the
Division. Since the District Board of Burdwan had
chosen as its delegate Raja Ban Bihari Kapur, the
Maharaja's own father, and exercised more votes than 
%
any other district boards, little difficulty was exper­
ienced in securing the election of K.B. Dutt. A similar 
reciprocal influence operated, though not so fully, in 
favour of the election of Raja Ki3hori Lai Goswami to 
represent the municipal boards. It resulted in Rai 
Bahadur Nalinaksha Basu, who had been elected by the 
same bodies to be a member of the former Bengal Council, 
only seven months earlier, not being able to secure a 
single vote.^
Having secured an entry into the legislative 
councils, the nobles and the zamindars managed almost to 
monopolise the proceedings of the assemblies. No other 
Indian voice;apart from the Muslim couricillors; could be 
heard within the council chamber. Moreover, their fellow 
zamindar-nobleman, Raja Kishori Lai Goswami, was the 
Indian spokesman in the Executive Council of Bengal.
1. Macpherson to Chief Sec.Beng. 9 Aug. 1910, Ibid:
Feb. 1911, Vol.8679, p.46.
Amongst other portfolios, he was also appointed Member-in- 
charge of Education:'*' a field highly prized by the intelli­
gentsia as their private preserve.
The nobles’ conscious neglect to heed the boycott 
call and the Raja’s accepting of office were thoroughly 
resented by the Indian press which reflected the views 
of the intelligentsia. The Na.yak took umbrage and 
reported in 1911 that "the heat of the Bengali Councillor 
- a very small person in comparison with the real rulers 
of the country - is becoming unbearable to us. Govern­
ment's secrets are leaking out, and those amongst us who 
are rich and frequently visit this councillor are
creating all sorts of worthless stories which are in
2many cases defamatory, and scandalous". The Bharat Mitra 
went so far as to suggest that the entire Morley-Minto 
scheme was a failure because people like the Raja were 
appointed as Indian executive councillors. The paper 
maintained that people had no admiration for them^since 
they were not familiar with the requirements and aspira­
tions of the public. Even if they did have the necessa­
ry knowledge, they abused their authority by neglecting 
to represent the true desires of the*people.^ It is not 
surprising to find the Indian press and the intelligent­
sia vindictive towards the group that had taken the wind 
out of the much publicised boycott call.
1. The Englishman: 14 Jan. 1911, p.4.
2* Nat.N.P.: week ending 1 July, 1911, p.800.
3. Ibid: week ending 1 Apr. 1911, p.345.
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Doubtless the activities of the nobles and their 
fellow zamindars during the initial years of the Morley- 
Minto scheme would not be taken in docile resignation by 
the intelligentsia. The reforms had promised greater 
Indian participation in the councils. This was under­
stood to mean the educated Indians. But when the scheme 
was put into effect it was found that the balance 
was in favour of the landlords. A measure so heavily 
in their favour inevitably caused a great deal of resent­
ment among the Calcutta intelligentsia. They had been 
barred from competing in the landholders' constituencies, 
and, for all practical purposes, were unlikely to be able 
to compete with the nobles over the Muslim electorate 
as long as Eastern Bengal remained another province.
The grievance was accentuated amongst the Hindu- 
dominated intelligentsia by the superior advantage 
accorded to the Muslims for seats in the council.
It also had been made almost impossible for the
A
intelligentsia to find a way into the Council through 
the local bodies. The regulations further failed 
to provide an opening for the educated Bengalis living 
in Calcutta proper, since he could not even stand as a 
candidate unless he happened to be a member of the Cor­
poration or the University Senate. Thus the Hindu intelli­
gentsia complained that their group as a whole in
Calcutta were defranchised by the Ivlorley-Minto scheme
2as they were disqualified from sitting in Council.
They refused to accept the explanation that Calcutta
1. see Appendix IV. for their respective qualifications.
2. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.Home Ind, 5 June 1911, B.A.F.:
July 1911, Vol.8679,p.34.
wgs partially represented by other agencies such as the
Trades Association, Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the Indian
commercial community, and the Muslim community, besides
the Calcutta Corporation and the University.'1' The Calcutta
intelligentsia indignantly protested that "wealth and
ignorance are the only things thought worthy of repres- 
2
entation".
Pressure was brought upon the Government to revise
these apparently unfair regulations. This resulted in
the formation of a committee to revise the regulations
for elections to the Legislative Council. But still the
local officials attempted to keep the scales tipped in
favour of the landholders. Out of the ten Bengali
representatives selected for the committee, six were
noblemen.^ It was left to Bhupendranath Basu and Dr.
Rash Bihari G-hose to voice the claims of the Calcutta
intelligentsia.
During their first sitting, Bhupendranath Basu
suggested that Calcutta should have two representatives,
4one of which should be for the educated Bengalis.
The second should be for the "well-to-do" residents, 
based on payment of a high consolidated rate or income 
tax. Nawab Serajul Islam agreed with these suggestions, 
but Nawab Badruddin Haidar put forward a counter proposal 
by suggesting that the two seats recommended by
1. ’Commission on Revision of Election Rules’ Ibid pp.18,10
2. Carmichael to Crewe 29 Sept. 1912, Letters 
Carmichael: Crewe, Box C/6.
9. Kishori Lai Goswami, Snamsul Huda, burdwan, Law,
Serajul Islam, Badruddin Haider.
4. Registered voters of 5 years standing residing at
Cal., lawyers of ten years standing, medical men 
of 5 years standing, engineers duly qualified residing 
in Cal., professors of private colleges & journalists.
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Bhupendranath Basu should remain confined to the Calcutta 
Corporation, however, elected separately by fhe nominated 
and elected members. Raja Reshee Case Law tried to bring 
about a compromise between the two opposing suggestions 
by recommending that the Government should give up 
two nominated seats for the purpose. Raja Kishori Lai 
Goswami, as an Executive Councillor, promptly grasped 
the opening presented by Raja Reshee Case Law, before 
there ensued a complete deadlock. The Raja pointed 
out on behalf of the Executive Authority that it was 
impossible for the Government to give up two seats, 
and advised that the demand should be reduced to only 
one seat. Except for Nawab Serajul Islam, the noblemen 
were apparently still attempting to restrict the 
influence of the intelligentsia.
. Prom an examination of the proceedings of the 
second day, however, there emerges a picture of 
confused attitudes on the part of the nobles. Bhupend­
ranath Basu, after consulting his associates, indicated 
that one seat would be regarded as adequate, provided 
that the constituency was sufficiently restricted in 
favour of the educated population.'1' To make that 
doubly sure it was proposed that the wealth require­
ments necessary to allow a person to vote or stand for 
office should be considerably lowered. By this the 
leader tried to ensure that the electorate was further
1 Graduates of 10 years standing and residing in
Calcutta for not less than twelve months, lawyers 
above the class of muktiars and revenue agents of 
five years standing, and medical men and engineers 
of five years standing, and editors of 1 year 
standing of papers of 5 years standing.
expanded numerically yet confined to the educated 
population; this would make it practically impossi­
ble for the nobles to compete against them in the 
city. This fact is made clear by a reply of Bhup­
endranath Basu to a question put by the President.
He said that he had deliberately excluded the 
propertied people, since to do otherwise would be 
to cause the electorate to be swamped. In other 
words it was to prevent a person like the Maharaja 
of Burdwan, who was actually resident in Burdwan, 
from standing for election in Calcutta, which he 
otherwise could do on the grounds that he had 
valuable house properties there. By such a manoeuv­
ring the educated population could easily be 
deprived of true representation. After discussion 
on the last point, Dr. Rash Bihari Ghose and Bhupend­
ranath Basu agreed with the Maharaja of Burdwan and 
Raja Reshee Case Law that the property qualification 
should be lo'/vered to a certain extent, but both the 
nobles appear to have conceded the point that being 
"well-to-do" by itself was not a sufficient reason 
to allow a person to vote in that constituency.
Later the crucial point that affected the 
nobles and other "'well-to-do" persons directly 
was deliberated upon. The question was then put to 
the vote as to whether representatives should be 
confined to the educated.or whether the "well-to-do" 
having no formal education should also be allotted 
a seat. Surprisingly enough the former proposal was
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carried by eleven to nine. Rajas Reshee Case Law and 
Kishori Lai Goswami, the Maharaja of Burdwan and-Nawab 
Serajul Islam voted for its rejection, while only Nawab 
Badruddin Haidar voted along with the British and the 
officials for its retention. Nawab Shamsul Huda 
abstained from casting his vote. Apparently the 
nobles were conceding points which would deprive them 
of their exclusiveness on which they based a great deal 
of their prestige.
Similar contradictory attitudes were noticeable 
on other issues. The advice of the Committee was 
sought on whether Knight Companion as a title' of 
any order created by the Crown, and of Knight Bachelor, 
be included in the electoral list in the Landholders 
constituencies, as long as the titles were no lower 
than those of Raja and Nawab. The Maharaja of Burdwan 
strongly opposed the principle. He maintained that 
"knights should have the power of voting if they were 
landholders as well, but not otherwise. The general idea 
under-lying Indian titles was that they implied ownership 
of lands". The British titles on the other hand did not 
necessarily follow the same principle. The members, 
with special emphasis by Raja Reshee Case Law, generally 
supported this view.^ On the other hand, when it came 
to extending the franchise to zamindars, other than the 
nobles, they apparently acquiesced, since the point was
carried. Thus the requisite qualifications became the
1. ’Commission on Revision of Election Rules’, B.A.P.:
July 1911, Vol.8679, pp. 18-22, 25, 26 .
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holding of certain titles or the payment by zamindars of 
land revenue or road cess of a certain minimum sum.'*'
Although the constituencies'remained the exclusive 
preserve of the superior landholders, they were no longer 
confined only to the nobles.
A proposal to include patnidars and talukdars in 
the landholders electorate coincided with the sitting 
of the committee. Raja Kishori Lai G-oswami had pointed 
out in the Executive Council that in certain parts of the 
province, permanent tenure holders, in spite of not 
paying land revenue to the Government, had attained 
considerable importance. But the recommendation was 
rejected by the Lieut.Governor, on the grounds that, 
when the rules were originally formed, eminent land-
p
holders of the province were consulted, and showed 
unwillingness to enter into the political arena with 
their subordinates. At the time they were unanimously 
against the proposal with the exception of Raja Peary
4
Mohan Mukerjee who alone urged that the system would be un­
satisfactory which exluded the major patnidars. Thus 
the Lieut.Governor pointed out to his executive councillors 
"the facts show clearly that the great zamindars of Bengal 
to whorcit is particularly sought to give a substantial 
representation are as a body altogether opposed to the 
inclusion of tenure holders." ^
1. See Appendix IV.
2. Burdwan, Girdhaur, Tagore, Kassitnbazar, Nashipur,
Balasore, Sovabazar, Kakina, Peary Mohan Mukerjee,
Kristo Das Lav;.
3. Chief Sec.Beng. to Sec.Home Ind. 5 June 1911,
B.A.P.: July 1911, Vol.8679, rp.38,39.
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The discussions on the revision of election rules 
bring to light an aspect of the nobles' attitude hitherto 
unknown. In their behaviour pattern, in their functions 
as socio-economic leaders of the province, and in their 
activities as inter-organisational intermediaries, in 
public affairs, they had exhibited a cohesive and 
uniform attitude, with marginal differences. But as 
councillors, both legislative and executive, they 
appeared to be unable to combine into a single group.
At the outset, when they unanimously decided against 
the boycott call, they gave the impression that they 
would Justify Kinto's reliance by becoming an effective 
counterpoise against the rising influence of the intelli­
gentsia. With that hope, the local officials continued 
to create as many advantages as possible for them. But 
at the Committee of Revision of Election Rules, the 
nobles showed symptoms of confusion instead. Knowing 
that their leadership was built on patriarchal influence, 
they had made it a policy to remain as exclusive as 
possible. Instead of putting up a united front to 
retain that exclusiveness, they allowed the opportunity 
to pass, going their individual ways. When the question 
of extending the franchise to tenure holders was brought 
up, a senior nobleman such as Raja Peary Mohan Ivlukerjee, 
unlike other large landholders, dissented, and suggested 
that the doors should be open to them. Later the point 
was again raised in the Executive Council, not by the 
officials but by Raja Kishori Lai Goswami. Similarly, 
the nobles who were in the majority in the Rules
Revision Committee, conceded that the franchise in the 
landholders' constituency should he extended to other 
landholders apart from themselves, reducing the qualifica­
tion from a status to an economic basis. The Maharaja 
of Burdwan voted in favour of extending the franchise 
when he had great doubts of its value.'*'
They were even unable to close their ranks regard­
ing the question of the mixed constituencies. Nawab 
Serajul Islam and Raja Reshee Case Law quite willingly 
accepted Bhupendranath Basu*s proposal to extend the 
franchise, and Raja Kishori Lai Goswami differed only 
in the number of nominated seats the government was 
to relinquish for the move. There is no doubt that 
they were not working in unison. On the second day 
of the proceedings Bhupendranath Basu's reply to the 
President had all the colouring of a subtle attack on 
the landholders residing in Calcutta. The only objection 
raised by the Maharaja of Burdwan and Raja Reshee Case Law
A
was that the property qualification should be raised to 
the payment of a higher rate. Moreover, when the question 
of the exclusion of the "well-to-do" people without 
educational qualifications was carried, the only opponent 
was Nawab Badruddin Haidar. 7/e are aware that they did no 
hold formal education in much esteem, and senior noblemen, 
like the Maharaja of Burdwan, Raja of Sovabazar, and Nawab 
Mohammad Ali Chaudhuri did not have a formal education in 
the form expressed in the recommendation.
1. Burdwan to Curzon 6 Jan. IS09, Letters: Curzon,
Vol.426, p.84.
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There were two fundamental reasons for this confusion 
that prevailed in their ranks. The first was their 
opposition to party politics which deprived them of the 
use of the party whip to keep the group in line. The 
second and more important reason was obviously motivated 
by the changing circumstances in the political life of 
the time. A sense of fear that, in spite of their* 
obvious loyalty, the British were beginning to rely more 
on the moderate leaders of the intelligentsia, had begun 
to take root in their minds. They sensed that, when the 
time came, the support of the local officials would not 
be able to prevent the pressure1 of the liberals from 
London. The Maharaja of Burdwan expressed this doubt 
in a private letter to Curzon when he stated that, 
viewing the treatment of the British nobility by the 
Liberal Government in England, he worried about “what 
will be the fate of our limited miserable community of 
aristocrats out here."'*' He later publicly warned, his 
fellow landholders in the Legislative Council that
2
they must remember that the zamindars were on trial.
It was not easy, to retain their position in a small 
constituted body which so easily drew the attention of 
liberal officials in London without being condemned as 
a reactionary force. It was essential to show a liberal 
attitude in the quasi-parliamentary institutions, or 
face the danger of being forced into oblivion. But
1. Burdwan to Curzon 3 Aug. 1911, Letlfcrs: Curzon,
Vol.426, p.2.
2. 'Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Bill 1917*> B . L . C. D .:
1918, p.57.
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instead of achieving that end, all that they did was to 
lose their outer semblance of unity, and put themselves 
in a position where they would be forced to compete 
with others on equal level. Under the circumstances 
they would not be able to remain depersonalised or 
exclusive for long.
Thus the Bengali intelligentsia found a number of 
openings and, along with the revocation of the partition 
being announced, declared their willingness to contest the 
forthcoming elections. Their leaders went into the contest 
full of confidence and sure of victory. All the factors 
pointed to their being able to capture a majority of the 
seats in the Legislative Council. The two groups thus 
created could be readily identified. The political group 
led by Banerjea could be recognised as the educated, 
westernised elite. All its members were graduates of the 
Calcutta University and a few had even received a higher 
education in England. They were professional men from various 
parts of the province. All had won reputations for 
their opposition to the partition and their agitation 
for constitutional concessions.^ On the' other hand, 
the nobles and their fellow zamindars. as Raja Peary 
Mohan Mukerjee pointed out, found no charm in formal 
education. nKe looks upon it in open scorn as a thing 
by which humbler people got their bread. He has hardly 
any regard for men without title and a long pedigree,
1. J.H. Broomfield: 'Vote & Transfer of Power1, J.A .S.:
Feb. 1962, p.164
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however great their natural gifts and acquirements may 
be.f'^  Thus for the first time the two groups took to 
the field primarily as opponents and the conflict for 
leadership, which was to last throughout the decade, 
intensified.
At the beginning the nobles proved to be the more
powerful. They exercised their full influence to
contest the elections. The Maharaja of Burdwan tried
for the landholders seat for Burdwan Division. As the
proprietor of the largest zamindari in British India, he
was a formidable candidate. Nobody came forward to
challenge his claim, leaving him uncontested throughout
the election. The Maharaja of Eassimbazar changed his
mind and. withdrew his candidature for the landholders
electorate from the Presidency Division on behalf of
Byomkesh Chakrabarfci, because he dedided to contest the
2
seat for the Supreme Council instead. Byomkesh Chakrabarti, 
the Secretary of the Bengal Landholders Association, which
a
was presided over by the Maharaja of Eassimbazar, was 
returned to the Legislative Council.^ The Maharaja of 
Natore stood for the landholders seat from the Ragshahi 
Division and did not have any difficulty in being 
returned.^ The Maharaja of Susang proposed the Raja of 
Santosh for the landholders constituency of Dacca 
Division.^ It was rumoured that Benode Eumar Roy 
Chaudhury, another aspirant, would step aside for
1. B.I.A. p. 143..
2. The Bengalee: 14 Dec. 1912, p.2.
3. India Office List: 1913, p.44.
4. The Bengalee: 25 Dec. 1912, p.2.
5* Ibid: 6 Dec. 1912, p.2.
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the Raja, giving him a clear way for the seat. Later, 
the rumour was denied and the votes were divided, endang­
ering the chances of the Raja. At this stage the Maharaja 
of Mymensingh entered the contest. Being far more 
influential in the locality than any other candidate, 
his entry made it practically impossible for any 
non-noble candidate to win. The Maharaja's return was 
further assured by the fact that the Nawab of Dacca 
proposed his candidature.^
Apart from the landholders' constituencies, 
the nobles also took a keen interest in the elections 
of their community representatives. Nawab Syed Hossain
Haider stood for the Chittagong Division and was elected 
2
comfortably. The Nawab of Dacca nominated and assured
the return of Fazlul Haq to the Council.^ Nawab Abdul
Jabbar nominated Maulvi Abul Kasem from the Burdwan
Division who was also successful 'in securing a seat in
4
the Legislature. But all was not smooth for the nawabs 
any more. A large section of the Muslims were losing 
their trust in the conservative approach of the nawabs 
towards the British Authorities. As far as they were 
concerned, the Hindu-dominated intelligentsia had proven 
that agitational politics paid off much more than the 
approach so far advocated by the nawabs, by forcing 
the revocation of the partition. Thus the 1912 
elections found the nawabs with a feebler grip on the 
Muslim community than previously. Its effect came to
1. The Englishman: 23 Dec. 1912, p.4.
2. Ibid: 14 Jan. 1913, p.10. .
3. J.H. Broomfield:1 Vote & Transfer of Power', J.A .S.:
Feb.1962, p.176.
4* The Bengalee: 14 Dec. 1912, p.l.
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light in the Lius lira, const it uencies of the other two
divisions. The Nawab of Bogra's nominee, K. Ahmed,^
lost the contest to the reactionary Muslim, Musherraf
2
Hussain in the Rajshahi Division. Similar was the case
of A* Basul on whose behalf Nawab Badruddin Haidar withdrew
3
from the contest in the Presidency Division. However, 
if he had not done so, there might have been a better 
chance of defeating the reactionary Golam Hossain 
Cassim Arif.^
It was in the mixed electorates that the nobles 
actually came into hitter conflicts with the leaders 
of the intelligentsia. In the other spheres the hold 
of the nobles was still too powerful. To weaken this 
hold of the nobles in the mixed constituencies, their 
opponents began to present the view that they were the 
exclusive constituencies for the"educated middle class',' 
and that the nobles had no business to enter the contest
,s
5
against them. Abul Kassem , in a letter published in
the Bengalee, condemned the Maharaja of Dighapatia for
standing for the District Board from Rajshahi Division.
The reasons he gave were that in the last election the
Maharaja had not stood aloof "like a patriot" and had
gone'hgainst public opinion". Moreover, he was
6"encroaching on middle classes' preserve". As far as 
they were concerned, the activities of the nobles
l7~ y b i d T T l ) e c TTsi2^ ~ p 7 2   " — —  —  -
2. The Englishman: 14 Jan. 1913, p.10.
3* The Bengalee; 15 Dec. 1912, p.l.
4. J.H. BroomfieldVote & Transfer of Power', J.A.S.:
Feb. 1962, p.176.
5. Ti\e Bengalee: 10 Dec. 1912, p.3.
6. Ibid: 28 Nov. 1912, p.7.
should cease without actual participation in the elections. 
They should stop at the stage that the Maharajas of 
Natore and Dighapatia did while sponsoring the election 
of Kishori Mohan Chaudhury for the Rajshahi Division 
Municipality seat: call on the people to vote for 
their nominee and not enter the contest themselves.^
The newspaper The Bengalee, even went to the extent of 
appealing to Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury to step 
down on behalf of Ambica Charan Majumdar'so that the 
latter could feel safe to stand for the Dacca Division 
district board instead of the municipalities, 
allowing another "nationalist" to stand for the 
latter. The newspaper argued that in this way the
p
Nawab would prevent a "national calamity". This was 
a strange request to make of a Muslim nobleman on behalf 
of an anti-partitionist Hindu leader! The Nawab ignored 
the request and refused to withdraw.
*
Group differences and the struggle for leadership 
led to an embarrassing situation in the election for 
the Presidency Division district boards. Jadunath 
Majumdar, a prominent personality of the locality, 
had proposed the name of the Maharaja of Nashipur 
for the seat. Later on such pressure was brought to 
bear on Jadunath Majumdar that he was persuaded to 
offer himself for election against the very person 
he had proposed. It was concluded that it was
absolutely necessary to keep the nobles out of the
297
"middle classes1 preserve”.^ Only by constant attempt
to keep the nobles out of the Council could the leaders
of the intelligentsia hope to wrest the leadership
of the Bengal society away from them. In this case
the attempt failed and the Maharaja was returned 
2to the Council.
The contest that attracted the greatest attention 
was between Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri and the Raja of 
Kakina for the Rajshahi Division district boards. A 
great deal of prestige was involved since Jogesh Chandra 
was the son-in-law of Surendranath Banerjea. At an 
early date Abul Kassem tried very hard to discredit the Raja. 
His attempts were counteracted by the Raja's followers, 
and a letter was published in the Bengalee stating 
that;’the Raja is neither a mere theorist nor a 
follower of political 'shibboleth' but is a practical 
worker in the field which has been amply shown by
t
his holding the balance equally between his Hindu and
Mahomedan tenants during the most critical period of
our recent history".^ It was important to assert an
anti-communal colouring, since a majority of the
4
Division's population was Muslim. Hoping to win 
the Muslim votes Jogesh Chandra persuaded two Muslims 
to propose and second his nomination. His selection 
of the seconder was unwise. He proved to be the chief 
electoral agent of the Raja of Kakina, and instead did
I* Ibid: 10 Dec. 1912, p.3.
2. India Office List: 1914, p.44.
3. The Bengalee: 5 Dec. 1912, p.2.
4. Census (India): 1911, Vol.5, p.257.
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his best to wreck Jogesh Chandra's chances. Moreover,
to add to his weight the ITawab of Dacca gave him public
support. The Raja was ultimately elected."^
It was only Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury
who managed to get elected by the Dacca Division
2
district board without much difficulty.
The election for the seat alloted to the 
Corporation of Calcutta was also rather keenly con­
tested by Radhacharan Pal and Nawab Badruddin Haider.
The Nawab had been returned unopposed for twenty seven 
years from the 7/ard Koluttolla. It was one of the 
biggest Wards in the city and was inhabited not only 
by Muslims but also by a preponderating number of 
Hindu ratepayers^ After a rigorous contest Radhacharan
Pal was eventually elected by seventeen votes as
4
opposed to twelve for the Nawab.
In these elections there were no formal parties.
A
Individual position in the locality, influence over
the electorate, and manipulation by the contestants
to secure votes was what ultimately counted. Emanuddin,
the election agent of the Raja of Kakina, assured his
victory over Jogesh Chandra by informing the voters
that the Rajshahi District Magistrate was opposed
to the latter1s candidature, and that his wrath would
be felt by anyone who voted for him. Moreover, he
spent Rs.2,000 on inducements, offered travelling
1. J.H. Broomfield:1 Vote & Transfer of Power', J.A.S.: 
?eb. 1962, p.174.
2* The BngIishmon: 14 Jan. 1913, p.- 10.
3. The Bengalee: 11 July, 1913, p.3»
4. Ibid: 18 Dec. 1912, p.5.
expenses to many and entertained those who came to cast 
their votes on a scale they had never before experienced. 
He further let it be known that the Raja was willing to 
pay off the local Muhammadan Association's debt of 
Rs.1,500. A.Rasul, the nominee of Nawab Badruddin 
Haidar, was also defeated* by parallel means. The 
biggest mistake of the Nawab was in deciding to give 
his support in a Muslim constituency to not only a 
friend of Surendranath Banerjea but also a Muslim who 
had taken an English wife.1 Ariff, the opposing 
candidate, spread the rumour that Rasul was not a good 
Muslim, insinuating that he would sabotage Muslim 
interests when the time came to defend the rights of 
the community. He also had a number of Rasul's graduate 
friends warned that the Government was angered at the 
support Rasul was receiving and that there would be no 
further hope of official employment for any who voted 
for him. During the election, Ariff entertained all 
those who came to cast their votes. Moreover, he dis­
tributed travelling expenses and promised large sums
for the construction and maintenance of Muslim
2
institutions in many parts of the Division. Under 
circumstances where local influence counted to such 
an extent, the nobles and their fellow landholders 
were at an advantage.
The results of the elections turned out to be 
totally unexpected for the followers of Surendranath
1. Risley to Smith 21 May 1906, Letters: Llorley,
Vol.8, p.72.
2. J.H. Broomfield:1 Vote & Transfer of Power',
J.A.S.: Feb. 1962, pp.174,176.
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Banerjea. Only three of his immediate followers were 
elected to the Legislative Council.^ The rest were from 
the landholders’ community.
Moreover, out of the four Bnegalis nominated as 
non-official members by the Governor, two were Raja 
Reshee Case Law and the Nawab of Dacca. The former was 
an obvious choice to represent the interests of the 
Indian commercial community. But the latter caused some 
surprise in official circles since the Nawab was prac­
tically a permanent invalid by this time. The choice 
which was made was based on the prevailing political 
mood in Bengal. Carmichael’s greatest initial problem 
was with the Muslims. Due to the reunification of 
Bengal, many of the younger Muslims were convinced that 
after this betrayal there could be no question of 
maintaining the old loyalist stance. Others, equally 
angry, were determined to make the British pay for their 
action. Under the circumstances, the Authorities 
felt that the Nawab was the one person who could be
expected to hold a reasonable balance between the
2
different factions in the Muslim community. Some,
like Carlyle, even felt that he was the only hope
for preventing a disastrous situation.*^ Thus,
although the Nawab made no secret to the Governor
that ’’the events that brought him to Bengal
were not such as the Nawab Bahadur could w €l~~
4
come in his own personal interest,”
^hid: p.166.
2. J.H. Broomfield, pp.4-9, 50.
3. Carlyle to Hardinge 28 Dec. 1911, C.P.I.: 1911,
Vol.Vau, pt.I, p.341
4. Th e Bengalee: 20 Jan. 1915, p.4.
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Carmichael still chose him for his Legislative Council. 
Explaining his move to the Viceroy, Carmichael wrote,
"I have put the Nawab of Dacca into one of the seats 
for which I might have nominated an official... The 
Nawab is still very ill, and is also very hard up, and 
may, I am told, find it difficult to come to Calcutta; 
still the possibility of his attending may have a good 
effect. Some of the new Mahommedan members are said 
not to be over-scrupulous".^ The Hindoo Patriot comm­
ented in appreciation of the Governor's choice, 
since "the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca was bound to come 
in, for no Legislative Council for Bengal would be 
complete without the uncrowned king of Mahommadans 
of East Bengal."^
The position of the nobles in the councils was 
further strengthened by the announcement of the new 
Indian Executive Councillor designate. The office was 
offered to the Nawab Shamsul Huda. Apparently the choice 
dissatisfied the Hindu dominated intelligentsia even 
more than the selection of Raja Kishori Lai Goswami 
for the previous Council. The very same newspapers 
which had voiced displeasure at his choice began a 
chorus of support for his retention. The Bengalee 
questioned the decision to change the Raja for the Nawab 
on the ground that the Governor had stated that "Raja 
Kishori Lai had fully justified his selection as the
1. Carmichael to Hardinge 3 Feb. 1913, C.P.I.: 1913,
Vol.Va9, pt.I. pp.42,43*
2. Nat.owned Eng.N.P.rweek ending 1 Feb. 1913, p.83.
first Indian member of the Bengal Executive Council." ^
The Samay alleged that "Sir Edw.a±d Baker and Sir Y/illiam
Duke were strongly in favour of his being retained in
consideration of the great ability shown by him in
2
the discharge of his duties". The Bharat Mitra,
supporting the same demand, further showed surprise
that the Raja should be replaced by the Nawab, the
President of the Moslem League. The Ananda Bazar Patrika
stated that "the supercession of Raja Kishori Lai by
Mr. Huda has displeased the Hindus..."."^ The Indian
Empire verged on libel by printing that the Nawab "is
a prominent anti-Hindu Muslim and notes his appointment 
4
with concern." The Kitavadi summed up the resentment
of the educated Bengali Hindus when it stated,"that his
replacement by a Muslim is a sop to Muslims to allay
the discontent among them caused by the undoing of 
5
partition". Even the Na.yak, which so bitterly 
criticised the Raja previously, changed its tone and 
stated that "although a Zamindar he had done his work
g
very well". Later on the same newspaper wrote in a 
mood of despair, "What has the Raja done to deserve 
this. Is this being done merely to please Eastern 
Bengal Muslims?" ^
1. Ibid: week ending 13 Apr. 1912, p.237.
2. Nat.N.P.: week ending 13 Apr. 1912, p.409.
3. Ibid: v/eek ending 17 Feb. 1912, pp.210,211.
4. Nat. owned Bng.N : week ending 17 Pebl912, p.125.
5* Nat.N .PL: week ending 9 March 1912, p.286.
6. Ibid: week ending 13 Jan. ^912, p.41
7. Ibid: week ending 3 Feb. 1912, p.150.
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In spite of the disappointment of the Hindu 
press, Carmichael appointed Nawab Shamsul Huda as his 
Executive Councillor. Unlike many of his fellow noblemen, 
the Nawab did not rely totally on his family background, 
for he was also a well qualified Barrister-at-Law who had 
risen high in the legal profession by his personal merit.
His aim had been to be a judge of the High Court, and he 
had already been recommended for the Bench by the late 
Chief Justice and the Acting Lieut. Governor of Bengal.
11 It was because Hardinge asked him to act as the first 
Indian member of the Executive Council in Bengal, and 
because he felt that it was his duty - especially to his 
fellow Moslems - to do so when asked, that Sir Syid agreed 
not to take the Judgeship with its advantages of a secure^ 
position for a considerable term of years and the prospect 
of a pension, in order to act for 5 years on my Executive 
Council", explained Carmichael.^
The Nawab’s first task was to assure the public that 
his intentions were not limited by Muslim communal 
spirit as had been insinuated by the Indian press.
Shortly after his appointment, the Nawab made a speech 
at Darjeeling where he expressed his ideas and programme 
of work. He stated, " I shall never forget that I am not 
the Mahomedan Member of His Excellency’s Council but its 
Indian Member and as such it is my duty to serve equally 
the interests of the Hindus and the Mahomedans. I shall, 
however, be perfectly frank with you and I would add to 
what I have said that I shall never purchase a reputation
1. Carmichael to Chamberlain 28 June 1916, Governors
Letters: 1915-17, p.175
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for impartiality by sacrificing the interests of my
community and I am certain none of you would wish me
to do so. But you may be perfectly sure that whatever
I may do to advance the interests of my community in
any particular matter I shall always be prepared to
do exactly the same thing-with reference to other
i
communities when they are similarly placed." The 
question that arises is whether the Nawab proved 
worthy of his promises of being the spokesman of 
Indian interests, the guardian of Muslim interests 
when necessary, and the rjrotector of interests of 
other similarly placed under-privileged communities, 
and simultaneously whether he succeeded in keeping in 
view the fact that he was a member of the corporate 
Executive Council: a body collectively responsible 
to the Crown, rather than to the people.
The Nawab's first major task as the Indian 
representative on the Executive Council arose with 
the discussion on the Public Service Commission. Dis­
agreeing with the views of his fellow Councillors regarding 
the practice of recruiting young and inexperienced Civil 
Servants for the Judicial Branch of the Indian Civil 
Service, he signed a note of dissent. He disagreed 
with the process of calling men without any special 
legal training to fill the posts of District and 
Session Judges. He suggested that they should be, as
1. The Bengalee: 4 July 1912, p.2.
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far as practicable, appointed from the Bar. He knew
that there existed a large number of Indians perfectly
competent to fill the posts, and he emphasised that
his recommendation would allow many more Indians to 
1
participate. Apparently he was not one to quietly 
affix his signature as a mere cypher when Indian 
interests were at stake. From this it follows that 
it is an incorrect belief that Nawab Shamsul Huda did 
not stand up for Indian interests. Presumably the 
misconception arises because, unlike the nationalists, 
he did not stand against the British with the demand 
for self-government. Kis belief, like most of the 
other nobles, was that Indian interests would not be 
served by self-government, since that would only help 
to create what Maharaja Tagore described as the 
"vakilra j".
With the intention of serving Indian interests, 
the Nawab recommended that in any future reform schemes, 
self-government should not necessarily be aimed for, 
rather that more openings should be created for Indians 
and further incentives given to them. The goal of 
British rule in India should be the general public's 
happiness which could only be secured by material' pros­
perity. He believed that the existing' discontent in 
Bengal was mainly due to economic causes and not because
1. S. Moore to Asst.Sec.Royal Commission Public Service
19 Apr. 1913, B.A.P.: S e p t .  19 13.  Vol. 9133,  p .  2 7 .
of the lack of self-government, as many suggested.
The answer was to make the Indians economically strong 
rather than simply introduce political reforms. The 
latter would help only to satisfy a handful of Indians 
involved in a power struggle with the British. The 
extension of India's trades and commerce and the prot­
ection and development of her industries were much more 
important than the means' of securing India's prosperity 
than conceding to boycott and opposition, he maintained.
Despite his disagreement with the demands of 
the intelligentsia the Nawab did not overlook the needs 
of the educated community. It has already been noted 
that he stood firm on his belief that the district and 
session judges should be Indianised. Moreover, for the 
educated community's benefit, he suggested that there 
should be more responsible employment of Indians under 
the Government. The first step must, therefore, be 
further improvement of education in all its stages.
He clarified that he did not mean literary education 
alone but also scientific and technical education which 
gave expert Knowledge. The absence of such qualified 
knowledge was the justification for filling most of the 
higher posts in departments of engineering, medicine, 
forest, agriculture by men imported from England.
In order to secure these ends, it would be necessary 
to establish quality educational institutions as well 
as to create a new educational atmosphere in entirely
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new surroundings. ^  According to the Nawab, this was the 
best way to strive towards political maturity, rather than 
by either further extending the Legislative Council and 
increasing the Indian element in the Executive Council, 
or by introducing self-government. How far the Nawab’s 
efforts and recommendations affected the decisions 
arrived at in London is impossible to assess since 
questions connected with the Public Service Commission , 
and the Post War Reforms were of all India importance.
The Nawab’s recommendations were some of many that the 
officials in London considered before formulating the 
post war reforms.
What is possible to assert is that, keeping the 
above principle in mind, the Nawab played an important 
role in the appointment of an Indian Advocate General 
in the place of a British one. Kenrick was mismanaging 
the deli-cate situation created by the numerous -eases
t
involving the terrorists. The Nawab advised the
Governor that it would be better if he was replaced by
2
an Indian such as S.P. Sinha. Soon after, Sinha replaced 
Kenrick as the Advocate General.
The Nawab also fulfilled his promise to look after 
the interests of his own community. The Muslims greatly 
resented the abolition of the post of Assistant Inspector 
of Schools of Muhammadan Education in the Presidency 
and Burdwan Divisions. Under his persuasion the
1. Carmichael to Chelmsford 20 Aug. 1916, (enclo)
G.B.R. p.136.
2. Carmichael to Hardinge 8 May 1914, C.P.I: 1914,
Vol. Va. 11, pt.l, p.339
308
Government later revoked the order permitting the Nawab
to assure the community on behalf of the Government at
a meeting of the Legislative Council that the posts would
be restored. The Mussalman higly praised the Nawab
for the step.**" Later when a crisis took place, due to
the delay at implementing the proposed Muslim Arts
College at Calcutta, the ITawab promptly intervened and
2brought the situation under control. He also acted 
as a spokesman for the Dacca Madrassa which urgently 
required funds.^
Apart from keeping a vigil over the Muslim institu­
tions, the Nawab continuously tried to demonstrate to 
the Authorities that the Muslim community was under­
privileged and required special treatment. He advocated 
the ^ presentation of the Muslims in the Legislative 
Council be put on a more logical basis than had been 
enacted in the 1909 Act. They had been given the right 
to select their representatives upon a separate-Register 
and had at the same time been allowed to vote in the 
mixed constituencies. The Hindus considered that favour­
itism; the more so since the difference in voting quali­
fications between the two communities seemed incon­
sistent. Since numerically -' both were on a par, 
the Nawab recommended that the disparity should be 
removed by dividing the “popular electorate” into 
eight territorial divisions with one Hindu and one
1. Ind.owned Png,N .P.: week ending 18 Apr.1914, p.253
2. Ibid," 'week ending 24 Apr. 1915, p. 248.
3* Nat.N.P.: week ending 3 May 1913, p 310.
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Muslim being returned from each.'*' If his recommendation 
had been acted upon, it would have foiled the argument 
that the Hindus were being unfairly treated. The Muslims 
then would have been guaranteed eight representatives 
instead of five, with the intelligentsia finding a veiy 
strong counterpoise against them since the two would be 
put on equal levels. Thus he took the intelligentsia1s 
arguments and subtly used them to benefit the Muslim 
community. If his advice had been put into effect, there 
would have doubtless been great consternation in the 
ranks of the intelligentsia.
Although the Nawab tried to better the prospects 
of the Muslims, he never lost sight of the fact that he 
was an officer of the Crown. His presence in the Execu—  
tive Council was proved beneficial to the Government 
when the Turko-British relationship began to deteriorate. 
Realising the explosive situation, the Nawab did not hesitate
i
to advise the Governor to take exceptional measures 
ajga’inst individuals if nedessary. He kepi in constant 
touch with the leading Muslims of the province, keeping 
a day to day vigil over the' developing situation.^
As the situation further deteriorated, the Nawab felt 
more and more anxious. He kept in daily touch with the 
Governor in order to allow Carmichael to hear his views.
He pointed out to the Governor that the tension was caused
1. Carmichael to Chelmsford (enclo) 20 Aug. 1916,
G.B.R., pp.141,146.
2. Carmichael to Hardinge 21 Apr. 1914, C.P.I.: 1914,
Vol.Vail, pt.I. p.306.
3. Carmichael to Hardinge 26 Aug. 1914, Ibid : Vol.Val2,
pt.II, p. 14-Q-
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not only by the emotional ties with Turkey but also by 
the economic hardships faced by hundreds of Muslims who 
had been left unemployed due to the closure of the German 
hide trade, and he recommended immediate action.'*' More­
over, as the political climate continued to worsen, 
he recommended the need for carefully directing public 
opinion. For this he suggested subsidising the newspaper 
Moslem Hitaishi to put forth the Government viewpoint
and the appointment of two leader-writers in Bengali and
2Urdu employed under his private direction. Ultimately, 
under his direction a special Muslim Censor, Nawabzaba
A.K.S. Sobhan, was appointed.*^ Between the two of them 
they controlled the Muslim press with a strong hand
A
during the critical period.
The Nawab*s efforts as an Executive Councillor 
earned him such contradictory reputations as being a
c g
Muslim communalist and anti-Muslim, anti-Indian and an
7
Mable exponent of popular views". Doubtless the
contradictions were provoked by the fact that he favoured
no one more than the other and in fact proved an
effective Councillor. Carmichael must have been of
the same opinion. Apparently the Nawab*s work was
so appreciated by the Governor that he appointed the
Nawab Vice-President of the Executive Council in
1 Carmichael to Hardinge 6 Sept. 1914, Ibid, Vol.Val2, 
pt.I. p.165.
2. Carmichael to Hardinge 28 Oct. 1914, Ibid, Vol.Val2
pt.I. pp.346a-347.
3. Ind.N.P. S: Per.: week ending 2 Jan, 1915, p.22
4. Ibid: week ending 4 March 1916, p.333
5. Nat.owned Eng.N .P .: week ending 11 Jan. 1913, P»23
6 t Ind.N.P. Sc Per.: week ending 4 March 1316, p.324
7. Nat.owned Eng IT.P. : week ending 11 Jan. 1913, p.23.
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succession to P.C. Lyon : the first Indian to be so 
appointed,^
Both in the elections and in the Executive 
Council the nobles showed signs of proving Minto's 
assessment correct once more. All indications pointed 
towards the Ex-Viceroy being proved correct in the Legis­
lative Council also. The intelligentsia had failed to 
gain sufficient seats in the Council to become effective.
But Surendranath Banerjea was not the type of person 
to be discouraged by such adversities. In spite of the 
fact that he found himself without a following in the 
newly elected Council, he did not despair. On the other 
hand he concentrated successfully in organising the 
Indian members behind him to form a group closely 
resembling a formal party. Prom the day the new Council 
assembled it was obvious that Surendranath Banerjea was 
to be the leader of theMopposition". His ability as 
a debater was unmatched in the Council, and his judgement 
as to when to remain silent could be rarely faulted.
Outside the chamber he worked with the industry of an able 
chief whip.
It was also apparent from the beginning that, 
despite the revocation of the partition, his interpreta­
tion of the nationalist cause had not changed. before, 
he continued the policy of constantly opposing the Govern­
ment. Always the opposition continued, unremitting and,
2
as far as the Government could see, unreasonable.
1. The Englishman!, 14 Apr. 1917, p.6.
2. J.H. Broomfield, p.68.
It came to a stage, as the Nayak pointed out, where the
Government hesitated to accept any proposal emanating
from any spokesman of the party of which Surendranath
Banerjea was the leader."^ * The officials were quite
aware of the danger of allowing their guards to drop
since the day was past when they could answer Indians in
2
the Council with "airy nothings".
Thus a stage arrived, as Surendranath Banerjea pointed 
out, when the rule became that the officials must vote 
with the Government unless released by the authority of 
the President.^ In time it also became apparent.that, 
in practice, the European non-officials sided with the 
Government. Ultimately, in spite of all endeavours by 
Carmichael, the line in the Legislative Council was drawn 
with the Officials and Europeans on one side opposing 
the Indian non-officials on the other.^
Keeping the above in view, it would appear that 
the Chamber was divided into the Government's party compris­
ing twenty one Europeans and officials with three Execu­
tive Councillors and twenty seven Indians as the 
5
opposition. A study of the divisions taken for the various
motions,^however, shows that out of the twenty seven
Indians, Surendranath Banerjea was unable to bring the 
7
nine noblemen quite in line with the others: thus once more 
justifying Llinto's calculation. Under a formal party
!• Nat.N.P.: week ending 13 Dec. 1913, p.1290.
2. 7/ilson to IL.rdinge 2 Harch 1912, Correspondence?:
Fleetwood Yfilson, Vol. 5, p. 64.
3. ,S.N. Banerjea, p.124.
4. ,J.$. Broomfield^. p.77.
5. India Uffice List: 1914, p.44.
6. See: 3.L.P. 1913-17.
7. Dacca, Burdwan,Law,Uymensingh,Kashipur,Kakina, Kossain, 
Haider,Nawab All; after Dacca's demise the number 
still remained 9 as Danindra Narayan took his seat in 
Council.
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system the above three would have been described as the 
Treasury, the Opposition, and the Independent members.
The leaders of the intelligentsia put great 
stress on the possession of independent views. But the 
nobles were convinced that the intelligentsia had no 
independent views. Their approach was not one of 
independence but one of perpetual opposition to the 
Government to gain mass appeal the easy way. The 
nobles’ approach on the other hand, which according 
to them was truly independent and responsible, was 
voiced by the Maharaja of Burdwan in a Council meeting 
when he said that he ’’did not recognise any sides in 
Council. There was only one party here that was to 
carry on good Government.”^ This difference in their 
attitude made the nobles unpopular with the intellig­
entsia.
As early as 1911 in the previous Council,
Maharaja Tagore was viciously accused of misuse of 
responsibility from the platform of the Indian 
National Congress. Speaking on the Calcutta Improvement 
Bill, A.Chaudhuri stated that the Maharaja ’’found 
himself in a dilemma. Ke thought his nomination carried 
with it the obligation to vote with the Government.
But the noble scion... was unable to be present when 
the matter came to the vote... and we did not get
1. The Bengalee: 23 Aug. 1311, p.2.
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the benefit of this vote one way or the other.”1 The 
speaker quite overlooked the fact that, if there was 
any question of obligation which made it imperative on 
the Maharaja to vote with the Government, his withdrawal 
from the scene was an act of diplomatic defiance rather 
than otherwise.
The Raja of Kakina was also severely criticised
by the press for having abstained from voting during
the resolution on the Sanitary Committee. Because the
Bill gave the impression that the Government was
attempting to gain powers of interference over the
autonomous local bodies, it provoked a lot of criticism
in the press* The Raja was accused of being afraid of
drawing official displeasure bn himself. He refuted the
allegation by pointing out that he did not vote, since
he had gone to the Council meeting ’’wholly unprepared
one way or the other”. He explained the reason by
*
stating, ’’The Hon'ble Mr. Chakravarti and other supporters 
of it had a private conference on the previous date.
They discussed the resolution. Mr. Chakravarti wanted 
to invite me to it but did not do so being wrongly 
informed that I was not in town.” Since he had not been 
briefed, nor had the opportunity to weigh the matter, 
he refused to cast his vote. His treatment of the issue 
was clarified by a supporter in the columns of the 
Bengalee. He wrote ”As he was not convinced of the 
usefulness or otherwise of the measure he was quite
1. I.N.C.R.
right by not siding with any party;;- for would it be in 
keeping with his sense of duty if he, only to avoid 
ungenerous criticism of an irresponsible critic, 
insisted upon the resolution without understanding 
its utility".^ The Raja's behaviour speaks volumes on 
their attitude. Their duty was to guide the Executive 
in the "right channels" after matured consideration 
of the issue involved and not simply oppose the Gov­
ernment, like Surendranath Banerjea's followers, nor 
blindly support it, like the Europeans and the officials.
The perfect example of an independent approach was 
shown by the Maharaja of Nashipur. The Bengal Medical 
Bill was introduced with the intent of registering all 
properly qualified medical practitioners in the province. 
Sihce the definition covered only those qualified in allo­
pathic medicine from Government or Government recognised 
institutions, it created a great deal of controversy. Under 
the circumstances, such eminent institutions as the 
Belgatchia Hospital and the National Medical College 
would be left out. Fazlul Huq moved that the draft should 
be circulated for a longer time before forwarding it to 
the Select Committee. All the non-official speakers 
supported his proposal except the Maharaja of Nashipur.
He maintained, "I am not at all anxious that it should be 
postponed because ample opportunity will be available 
to those who would like to submit their suggestions
1*. The Bengalee: 19 Sept. 1913, p. 5.
to the Select Committee". Reluctantly, Pazlul Huq took 
the floor again, with the remark that he had to do so 
since a member from their own side of the House had 
unnecessarily advocated the Government's cause when 
there were enough people on the Treasury side to do 
so. The leaders of the intelligentsia found it very 
difficult to appreciate that the nobles, unlike 
themselves, refused to acknowledge that the House comprised 
the Treasury and the Opposition. Pazlul Huq elaborated 
his motion by explaining that the postponement was 
advisable because the public required more time to 
discuss not merely the details of the Bill, but the 
very principle of it. He also drew attention in the 
House to the fact that a member had informed him only 
a day before of a number of medical practitioners 
complaining of the short time allotted to examine an issue 
of such vital importance to their profession. Apprec-
A
iating the validity of the arguments, the Maharaja 
cast his vote against his own previous opposition 
when a division was called for.^
In spite of their impartial approach to issues a 
survey of the Council of 1913-17 shows that the nobles 
proved a failure in the Council chamber. The Nawab of 
Dacca, a highly respected and influential nobleman, was 
absent more often than not. Doubtless it was due to his 
failing health and pecuniary difficulties. Yet the fact 
remains that his absence deprived the nobles of a powerful
1. 'Bengal Medical Bill 1914', B.L.G.D.: 1914, vv.18-26,
27-28, 30.
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voice.
The nobles also proved inadequate in their capacity 
to debate and hold the floor. In that respect they 
were totally out-clashed by the leaders of the intelli­
gentsia. The Maharaja of Burdwan and Nawab Syed Nawab 
Ali Chaudhury, who were capable of swaying the masses in 
public meetings with their powers of oratory, were 
hardly ever heard in the Council chamber. They chose 
to remain silent too often. Even when the Maharaja did 
speak, the speeches lacked the vigour necessary for a 
parliament ari an.
Lack of vigour was noticeable even when issues 
were brought forward by one of them. Frequently they 
lost the initiative to others. During the debate on
i
the Public Demands Recovery Bill 1913, Raja Reshee 
Case Law had tabled a number of amendments. Most members 
agreed with him that too little time had been given to
A
them to study the proposed Bill and the amendments 
that followed. But the actual motion to postpone the 
Bill did not emanate from the Raja. It was Surendranath 
Ray, supported by Surendranath Banerjea and Byomkesh 
Chakravarti who did so. The Raja appeared to be satisfied 
by merely casting his vote in favour of the postponement.
If he had voted against the motion, one may have presumed 
that he would be satisfied with a mere debate on his 
proposed amendment and that he did not feel the need 
for a delay. But since he did not do so, it can only
1. ’Public Demands Recovery Bill 1*913' , B . L . C. D : 1913, 
pp.424-427, 437-446.
be interpreted as otherwise. Later he again moved a very 
controversial amendment. The Bill allowed the certificate 
officer to take arbitrary actions against a defaulter.
He could summon a debtor, examine the issue, and pronounce 
the verdict all by himself. In other words it went against 
all principles of separation of power. It was felt by 
the members that, due to the inefficient system of 
issuing notice, the debtor could quite inadvertantly 
get into trouble with the certificate officer who was 
provided with such exceptional powers by the Bill. Thus 
it was moved that all notices should be delivered by 
registered post to make sure that the person involved 
had received the notice personally. Only in this way 
could it be assured that the summons had actually come 
to the responsible person’s notice, rather than risking 
the possibility of its disappearing somewhere in between 
the long chain of servants from the outer gate of his 
residence to the inner personal chambers where he would 
normally be found. Otherwise, unjust exparte verdicts 
could be easily passed. The point was so controversial 
that it provoked the independent tabling of three amendments 
- including the Rajafs - calling for the notices to be 
forwarded by registered post. Raja Reshee Case Law had 
taken the initiative. But during the debate, the other 
speakers - S.N.Ray, Nalinaksha Basu, S.N.Banerjea,
B.Chakravarti, and I/Iahendrariath Roy - far outshone the 
Raja in every respect and made him appear incompetent.^
1. 'Public Demands Recovery Bill 1913', B.L.C.D.: 1913, 
pp.424-427, 437-446.
Even the Raja of Kakina*s reason for having 
abstained from casting his vote explained previously, 
though admirable on the surface, shows signs of incompet­
ency on closer examination. The question that comes to 
mind is whether the Raja was unable to take a decision 
on his own. Was his competency so limited that he could 
not weigh the pros and cons for himself in order to come to 
a decision? The Bill generated considerable controversy 
since it involved the important issue regarding autonomy 
of local bodies. This is obvious from the fact that there 
were three dissenting notes signed in the Select Committee'!'
But during the debate, except for a few remarks by Raja
Reshee Case law no other noble ’was heard taking part.
The failure to do so seems all the more glaring when we
2
notice that the Bill affected the rural areas. More­
over there were occasions during the debate when a number 
of them did not even attend.^
Their weakness was further visible in the manner 
in which they voted. Their ideas of independence went 
too far. They not only remained independent of the Govern­
ment and the "opposition", but also continued to remain 
independent of each other. They had been able to secure 
the number of seats which could have given them the decisive 
position in the Council. By their combined strength they 
could have tipped the scale for or against any motion.
1. 'Bengal Municipal Bill 1913* B .L .P .i 1914, '
Vol.9378, Select Com.Repl
2* B.L.C.P.: 1913, pp. 420-440.
3. Ibid.
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But they never appreciated their potentiality and failed 
to work as a group.
Repeatedly this weakness was noticeable. When
the motion to postpone the Public Demands Recovery Bill was
put to a division, it was lost by a single vote.'*' Although
all the nobles voted together with Raja Reshee Case Law
he neglected to make sure that the Maharaja of Nashipur,
the Raja of Kakina, Nawab Hossain Kaidar, and the Nawab
of Dacca would also be in the chamber to assure him of 
2
victory. Similar was the case when the Maharaja of Burdwan 
moved that the controversial Calcutta Improvement Bill 
1914 be postponed because the War had started and it would 
be unwise to discuss issues of such controversial nature. 
Doubtless the motion was permeated with the sobriety and 
conservative approach predicted by Minto. But when the 
division was taken the vote went against him.^ It was 
one of those unusual occasions when even a European voted 
for a motion introduced by an Indian member. But the 
Maharaja had not assured the presence of Nawab Hossain 
Haidar, and the Maharajas of Natore and Nashipur, 
despite being aware of the fact that the very powerful 
President of the Improvement Trust was doing his 
utmost to push the Bill through. Moreover, he was unable 
to prevent the Raja of Kakina from abstaining from casting 
his vote.^
_  2Q: 21>
2. ’Public Demands Recovery Bill 1913*f B.L.C.D.: 1913,
p.427.
3. 18:22.
4. ’Calcutta Improvement Bill 1914’, B-.L.C.D. : 1915,
pp.35,38,39.
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Unfortunately for them, their approach was more 
idealistic than practical. Their inability to appreciate 
the necessity for parties in Council politics negated 
any possible collective effectiveness. The consequences 
of their weakness was apparent in the ensuing elections.
The end of 1916 found Bengal preparing once more for a 
Council election. By the time of these elections nationa- 
list politics had begun to play a more important role 
than-in the 1912 elections. While the hobles wasted their 
chance by not concentrating on becoming a cohesive political 
block, the moderate-leaders of the intelligentsia had 
diligently worked towards that very goal.
While local influence was still to some extent imp­
ortant for securing votes, a nationalist reputation 
or conviction now carried considerable weight at the polls. 
Surendranath Banerjea and his followers' work in the 
Council from 1913 had attracted a great deal of attent- 
ion and provoked considerable comment extending their 
spheres of influence even into the mufassil .^ Moreover, 
as the Dainik Basumati pointed out, they had given up 
the apparent habit of merely talking of "ambitious 
reforms like autonomy, simultaneous Civil Service 
Examinations and the like", and had "begun attending
2
to the alleviation of practical evils like malaria".
Such issues affected the general public rather than 
only a microscopic minority comprising the intellig­
entsia. The nobles were unable to claim any more 
that they, rather than the so-called nationalists repres­
ented local needs. Thus the argument that, while they
1. S.IT. Banerjea, p. 300.
2. Ind. IMP. & Per.: week ending 4 March 1916, p.330.
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came to grips with particular issues which affected 
various interest•groups, the nationalists wasted their 
time on nebulous demands, became redundant. Furthermore, 
a strong movement was afoot leading towards the amal­
gamation of the Congress the Moslem league^", which
gave a further boost to the leaders of the intelligentsia 
increasing their charisma in the rural areas even further.
It must not be presumed from the above remarks 
that the nobles withdrew altogether. The landholders'- 
constituencies were primarily still in the hands of the 
group under reviewi The Maharaja of Burdwan stood once 
more unchallenged from the Burdwan Division, and was 
returned uncontested. But from the other divisions it 
was apparent that a younger element had gained in 
popularity and had wrested the limelight away from their 
senior members. The older representatives had proved 
a disappointment in the previous Council, and even their
4
fellow zamindars apparently lost faith in their capability 
as Councillors. It was one thing to respect such awe­
inspiring, depersonalised figures surrounded by semi­
legendary aura, and quite another to see them being 
out-shone in all respects when forced out into the 
open by people considered ordinary and mundane. Over the 
last few years the imaginary giants shed their illusory 
affect in the eyes of the public, and turned out to be 
very ordinary men after all. The nobles seen and heard 
rather smashed the mythology that had been built up in
1. Discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.
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their absence. Its effect was felt in all other con­
stituencies than the reserved seat for the landholders 
of Burdwan Division.
From the Rajshahi Division the Maharaja of Digha- 
patia stood for election, supported by the North Bengal 
Zamindars Association.^ He was challenged by Kumar 
Shibsekhareswar Hoy of Tajhat. The Kumar was a graduate 
of the Calcutta University. Since his graduation some 
eight years before, he had remained on his estate, 
devoting himself diligently to the interest of his
prajas, and had gained .a reputatinn as an energetic 
2
young man. When the results were announced, it was 
the Kumar who won the greater number of votes and was 
returned to the Legislative Council.^ A similar trend 
was noticeable in the Dacca Division. The two contest­
ants were the Raja of Santosh and Kumar Brojendra 
Kishore of Gouripur. A third contestant, Deva Kumar 
Roy Cahudhuri, withdrew his candidature on behalf of 
the Raja, and asked his supporters to support his 
election. Along with this, the Raja's nomination by
influential Hindus, Muslim and European landholders of
4
the locality, practically assured his victory* Yet 
when the results were disclosed, it was found that he 
had managed to secure only 63 votes against a 156 for 
the Kumar. At the Presidency Division, Provas Chandra
1. The Bengalee, 23 May, 191-6, p. 2.
2. Ibid: 5 dan. 1916, p.3.
3. India Office List: 1917, p.44.
4. The Bengalee: 17 Kay 1516, p.2.
5* Ibid: lb June 1916, p.4.
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Mitra quite comfortably defeated Byomkesh Chakravarti)
the person in whose favour the Maharaja of Kassimbazar
had withdrawn during the 1912 elections.1 It was only
in the Chittagong Division that Kumar Arun Chandra Singh
of Paikpara managed to easily defeat his rival contestant,
Prassana Kumar Roy, with 33 votes against the latter1s 
2
22. But it must be kept in mind that the representative 
of the noble family was a kumar and not a nobleman in 
the sense applicable in Bengal.
In other constituencies the nobles fared even 
worse than in the seats reserved for landholders. Prom 
the Muslim constituencies not a single one stood nor 
nominated candidates for the elections. Apparently the 
impact of the Congress-Moslem League pact resulted in 
the Nawabs being totally disconcerted for the time being.
Prom the Corporation of Calcutta also no nobleman stood 
for election. In the municipalties, the only division 
that found members of noble families contesting whs 
the Presidency Division. Surendranath Roy was opposed by 
the Maharaj Kumar Bhupendra Narain Sinha of Nashipur, 
and the Raja of Azimgunj. The Raja later withdrew in 
favour of the Maharaj Kumar with the intention of 
strengthening his chances. Yet, wheh the results were 
announced it was found that Surendranath Roy had been
■A
returned.
Even in the District Boards, where the nobles 
had considerable influence, they seemed to have slipped 
from the forefront. Prom Dacca and Chittagong not one
1. Ibid: 8 June 1916, p.4.
2. Ibid.
3. I hid:, 28 May 1916, p.2.
4• India Office List: 1917, p.44.
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of them contested. Presumably the death of the l'Tawab of 
Dacca had sapped • the courage and confidence of the local 
nobles to contest the claims of the leaders of the intelli­
gentsia. In spite of the Congress-Moslem League pact, 
the Nawab's personal support may have persuaded many to 
vote for his nominee. But without him the chances were 
negligible. In Burdwan the Raja of Chakdighi was 
defeated by Mahendra Chandra Ivlitra.
The most unexpected incident of the entire 
election was the defeat in the Presidency Division of 
Raja Reshee Case Law by Bhabendra Chandra Roy by 28 
votes to 12. ^ The Na.yak was startled into publishing,
"We are surprised at the defeat of an able man like 
Raja Hrishikesh Laha. 7/e must say that persons who can
ignore his claim in favour of a stripling are capable
2
of doing anything.1 Obviously the Raja’s poor rating 
in the previous Council had convinced the electorate 
that it was he rather than the "stripling” who was 
unsuited for parliamentary politics.
In the Rajshahi Division Nawabzada Altaf Ali of 
3ogra managed to just about get the majority vote of 
14 against 11 for Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri. Although 
in this Division a member of a noble family had managed 
to retain the District Board seat, it must be kept in 
mind that once more the choice of the electorate fell on 
a younger nobleman. The Raja of Kakina, who also had 
stood for the same seat, and had managed to defeat
1. The Bengalee: 7 June 1’915> p.l.
2. Ind.N.P. 1 Per.: week ending 17' June 1916, p.830.
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Jogesh Chandra in the 1912 election received negligible 
support in the 1916 election.1
V/ith the election completed, the G-overnor 
announced his nominations. In spite of their unfavour­
able rating at the polls, the Governor still found it 
worth-while to nominate two nobles - Raja Reshee Case 
Law and "the Nawab of Murshidabad - out of the four Bengalis.
The Raja's nomination received a favourable reaction from 
2
the Bengali. But the Dainik Basumati justifiably condemned
the nomination of a person who had actually been defeated
in open election in a mixed constituency, pointing to the
fact that the electorate lacked confidence in his ability.^
Likewise the leading Muslim newspaper, the Muhammadi,
reacted in anger to the nomination of the Nawab. It
pointed but that he took no part in any social or political
movement of the Muslims. The community knew him only
as "a pensioner, a great zamindar, and a scion of an
4 »ancient ruling family."
Doubtless, the Raja was still the undisputed prince 
of the merchants of Bengal. Despite his defeat in the polls, 
he still was the obvious person to represent the interest 
of the Indian commercial community. His importance in 
the commercial community was such that even the British
5
oriented chambers of commerce respected his ability. As 
for the Nawab, with the death of the Nawab of Dacca and
1. The Bengalee: 8 June 1916, p.4.
2. Ind.N.P. & Per.: week ending 8 July 1916, p.936
3. Ibid: week ending 8 July 1916, p.936.
4. Ibid: week ending 15 July 1916, p.974.
5. Carmichael to Crewe 15 July 1916, Letters Carmichael:
Crewe, Box c/6.
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the departure of Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury to the 
Imperial Council.the Governor's choice for a Muslim 
member had become rather limited. He felt that the Nawab 
of Murhhidabad's presence in the Council might keep a 
considerable section of the middle-of-the-road Muslims from 
joining the disaffected extremists. ^ Carmichael's intent­
ions were "to try to get the Nawab of Murshidabad to come
to the front. He has family position and traditions at
2any rate, and is well educated and intelligent". More­
over his influence could still work magic amongst the 
Muslim population. Although the Muhammadi insinuated that the 
Nawab carried no weight with the Muslims, it could 
not be overlooked that it was not the efforts of the 
educated people that had stemmed the communal riots of 1912, 
but a manifesto issued by the Nawab calling on his co­
religionists to stop the unnecessary blood bath.*^
Thus the Council -which assembled after the election
had twenty two officials and Europeans with twenty eight
4Indians of whom seven were members of noble families.
Xn spite of their loss of reputation as parliamentarians, 
by a stroke of good fortune the nobles once more found 
themselves in a position from which they could become 
effective as a power block. If the younger members 
managed to infuse a dynamic approach into debates which 
the former group had failed to do, they still had the 
opportunity to become a powerful voice in the Council.
1. Carmichael to Crewe 28 July 1915? Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Nat. owned Eng. N . P , : wee:*: ending 30 Nov. 1912, p.731.
4. Murshidabad, Law, Burdwun, Tajhat, Bogra, Paikpara, 
Gouripur.
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At the outset it appeared that the maharaj Kumar of 
Tajhat would prove to he such a debater. He was articulate 
and his debates were argumentative. He could hold his 
ground in the House as well as any other Indian member 
of the Legislative Council. If he had concentrated on 
gaining the respect of his senior members he could have 
done so. In that case he.could have brought the entire 
group into line with him. Instead of which he aliena­
ted them with his unfortunate habit of phrasing his 
speeches without any caution.
The Kumar's speech concerning the Hindu (Inter­
castes) Marriage Validity Bill was one such typical 
example. To substantiate his opposition to the Bill he 
rather offensively questioned the Government and the 
European members as to whether they would "accuse a 
Christian, who on religious grounds opposes a Bigamy 
Bill, as one showing determination to uphold a narrow 
Bibical rule of monogamy with all its miseries and the 
wretchedness for the poor helpless maids".^ It was 
impolite, to say the least, to compare the act of 
opposing bigamy to the opposition of giving children 
born of inter-caste marriages inheritance rights.
Doubtless both injunctions could be traced back to the 
respective sacred texts. But that is as'far as the 
comparison could be stretched. Raja Peary Mohan Liukerjee 
found it necessary to declare in a public speech that 
the opponents of the Bill did not say it was wrong to 
inter-marry. They merely took their stand that it was 
wrong to legislate against the scriptures when
1. The English am: p Dec. Iyl8, p.8.
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there existed no immediate need to do so. If the people 
wished to inter-marry there was nothing to stop them.
This being the case, there was no call for the above legis­
lation. He supplemented his remark by citing several 
cases of intercaste marriages that had taken place long 
before the Bill was even considered.^ The contrast 
between the language used by the two is blatantly striking 
in the above example.
Moreover, the Kumar showed a lack of mutual 
understanding with the other nobles in the Council.
Speaking of the Select Committee on the Village Self- 
Government Bill, he vehemently complained that though 
the zamindars 'were vitally interested in the legislation 
there was not a single representative of the zamindars 
in the Committee. He quite ignored the fact that, although
Representing the District Boards, the Nawabzada of Bogra was
2a member of the Select Committee. Furthermore, his 
undiplomatic remarks were noticeable once more during 
the debates. He repeatedly proposed amendments on the 
grounds that they were necessary to help the poor villagers. 
But the amendments were so phrased that they left no doubt 
that it was an attempt to help the landholders only. One 
such amendment was that the Union Boards should meet half 
the cost of tanks’ and ponds1 clearance. He ignored the 
need for clearing pits, ditches, wells and other such places.
T. Ibid: 14 Dec. 1916, \-.3. ' ~
2. ’Village Self-Government Bill 1913’, B .L.C.D .:
1918, pp.1064,1065.
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It was the latter which would benefit the poor villagers since 
the former -were.usually owned by the relatively affluent 
landholders.^ Such undiplomatic language most certainly 
further diminished the reputation of the landholders and 
undermined their claim of being the natural leaders of 
the rural population.
It was frequently necessary for the older nobles to 
take the floor simply to retrive their reputation 
from jeopardy by the careless remarks of the Kumar.
Speaking on the Primary Education Bill, Raja Reshee 
Case Law pointed out that "hitherto the primary schools 
have not been attractive, as the instructions given in 
them are too theoretical and have no reference to the 
condition of employment and livelihood of the people 
... what is wanted, is practical education. Instructions 
in handicrafts and agriculture should go hand in hand with 
vocational guidance which would secure a better preparation 
for life's occupation In contrast to the Raja's
careful phrasing, the Kumar of Tajhat moved that to have 
the Bill introduced in the mufassil it should not be 
brought about by a mere majority of the Commissioners, but 
by three fourths of * the total number of Commissioners.
He stated that "there are impatient idealists everywhere who 
in their enthusiasm often overlook the practical diffic­
ulties that will stand in their way. If such a person 
be in authority, it would not be very difficult for him
Ibid, B.L.C P.; ^919, PP 7^ *7,790.
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at one of the meetings to have his own ideas 
regarding the introduction of compulsory education system 
carried, even if the bulk of the ratepayers do not want it 
... As I know something about the condition of our mufassil 
municipalities, and union committees, I cannot but hold 
that it would be dangerous to allow the municipalities 
to decide the fate of such an important matter by bare 
majority." The Kumar's ill-phrased remarks infuriated 
Surendranath Ray who countered the accusation by stating 
that "if there are impatient idealists in the mufassil 
towns, there are also retrograde reactionaries there too".
The situation deteriorated to a dangerous level. Raja 
Reshee Case Law tried to retrieve their position by- 
proposing that it should be a majority in a meeting in 
which not less than two-thirds of the total number of 
Commissioners were present. The motion was at last 
accepted by the House.^
It was during the discussions of the Bengal 
Tenancy (Amendment) Bill 1917 that the differences 
between him and the older nobles came glaringly to 
focus. The Bill dealt with the aboriginal tribes' needs to 
be protected from the possibility of losing their ancestral 
lands and being reduced to the position not far removed 
from serfdom. The Bill forbade the transfer of property 
by an aboriginal tenant to an outsider. He could- sublet or 
make usufructuary mortgage of land "under his own cultivation" 
to another aboriginal, Debendra Chandra G-hose and Ambica 
Charan Majumd&r moved that the phrase "under his own culti­
vation" should be changed to "in his own possession"
f ‘ Trinity E d u c a t i o n  Bi l l  ] 8 ] 7 ,  3-L-C P . ■ 11111 -pp. 152153,187
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or "held by him", since it could otherwise lead to tenure 
holders not cultivating their own land being unable to do so. 
A division was taken and lost. Although the amendment would 
benefit them, the nobles present voted in a body against 
it, substantiating their claim that they were the guardians 
of the cultivators' interest.
But the uniformity did not last for long. The Bill 
stated that, if an aboriginal tenant surrendered his 
tenancy or abandoned his residence, the landlord might 
settle the tenancy with another aboriginal or "with the 
approval of the Collector in writing, settle the same with a 
person who is not an aboriginal or retain it in his ovm 
possession". The Kumar of Tajhat moved that the section 
threatened the zamindars with a serious encroachment on 
their rights as landlords were required not only to seek the 
written approval of the collector to settle the tenancy with 
a non-aboriginal but also if he wanted to retain it in his 
ovm possession. The reason given for the prior sanction 
of the Collector was to avoid the collusive transfer 
between a zamindar, an aboriginal tenant and an outsider, 
with the intention of securing a bigger registration fee.
The Kumar pointed out that the maximum fee in one transaction 
hardly exceeded Rs.25; "so the prospect of getting a rupee 
or two more is certainly not so big a temptation as to 
make a respectable zamindar stoop so low". Moreover, the 
other potential conspirators would also run a grave risk.
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Under the prevailing Bengal Tenancy Act, an abandoned 
holding could be reclaimed by a tenant at any time within 
a period of two years of abandonment. Surely no sensible 
person would risk money on so doubtful a transaction. 
Furthermore, if the zamindar was really unscrupulous 
and all three parties were bent upon the conspiracy, 
many ways could be manufactured to secure the desired end. 
Thus, the only result of this section of the Bill, which it 
would achieve, would be in persuading the zamindars 
not to settLe any land with aboriginals in the future - 
defeating the very purpose of the proposed legislation.
The speech was full of well argued points with some 
substance behind them. Moreover, the motion was concluded 
by the Kumar in keeping with the tradition established 
by the nobles of the previous Council. He emphasised 
that in the Council since there were no party programmes 
it was the duty of all the members to vote as they thought 
proper. But then he ruined it all by adding, "V/e may 
succeed or fail in carrying a motion, but it does not affect 
the Government in the least, because our opinions are only 
a kind of recommendation to the Government." The words 
implied that the Government was callous of the opinion of 
the Council since it was a mere advisory board of no 
value. When the division was taken all the younger members 
of the group participated in the voting. But, although 
the amendment dealt with matters closely affecting their 
personal interests, the Maharaja of Burdwan and Raja Reshee
Case Law decided to abstain. Presumably, they refused to
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associate their names with a motion worded so discourteously
in thir opinion:■insulting both the Government and the Council.
It is not possible to know how the Nawab of Murshidabad
would have reacted, since he was absent from the proceed- 
1
mgs.
Later, the Kumar moved that the entire Bill be
sent back to the Select Committee for review. It was this
motion which brought the differences to a head and created
a more or less permanent schism between the Kumar and
the older nobles in the Council. He argued that some of the
provisions made . unnecessary encroachments on the zamindars*
rights and endangered the position of their tenants. Not
only did he make this unprecedented demand, he also
worded it in a most •undiplomatic fashion. He suggested
.that the Bill as originally drafted advocated "extreme Civil
Service views" which was opposed to "the honour of the
Bengal zamindars", placing the two, as such, in opposing
*
groups. Cummings, the Llember-in-charge, infuriated, replied,
*1 cannot congratulate the Kon'ble Member on the attitude 
which he has thought fit to adopt in connection with the 
legislation. I gather from his amendment that his view 
is that sufficient safeguards have not been given to 
protect the vested interests of the landlords and tenants; 
but from his speech it is fair inference that it was 
directed almost entirely to the interests of the landlords..."
The motion was too full of dangerous connotations 
for the older nobles merely to withdraw their support in 
silence as before. The Kumar had suggested that the Select ,
1. * Beng. Tenancy (Amend) Bill 1917', 3. b. C«I). : 1917, 
pp.949-951,953, 954,
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Committee had neglected the interests of the zamindars 
when the Maharaja of Burdwan and Raja Reshee Case Law 
had been members of the Committee. Abul Kassem replied that 
the landholders Were represented by the foremost zamindar in 
the land". Moreover, the Kumar had insulted the Government 
and the Civil Service. Furthermore, he had come close to 
confessing, as their representative, that the zamindars were 
negligent of the well-being of their tenants and other 
residents on their estates. The Maharaja of Burdwan in a des­
perate attempt to retrieve the zamindars1 reputation publicly *■ 
took the Kumar to task in the Council chamber. He stated,
"... there are some zamindars who do not grudge the Santhali 
having lands in his own khas mahal zamindari. In fact I 
know of zamindars in these parts who welcome them as being 
good tenants. I, therefore, think that for those zamindars 
at least the defence the Kumar has made does not apply, 
because they can defend themselves and their good under-
A
standing between themselves and the aboriginal tenants."
The he added, "...I am not only sorry but in fact unhappy 
in the way the Hon'ble Kumar has tried to defend the rights 
of zamindars ir his fighting speech, according to his light.
I cannot help thinking that at the present time more than at 
any other moment it is essential for the zamindars not only 
to show the spirit of friendliness and cooperation towards 
their tenants but it is also, I think, not fair to the 
other zamindars to try and make out that the zamindars in 
their desire to protect their rights - and I am more 
zealous about protecting their rights than anybody else - 
for I have a right to be - are trying - which unfortunately
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is the impression that has been created in my 
mind at any rate by the Kumar*s attitude - to 
wrest from the Government those rights and privileges, 
in such a way as would be misconstrued or would give the 
impression that the zamindars are anxious to safeguard their 
rights more than to extend protection to their own tenants. 
That would indeed be a most unfortunate impression to be 
created in the Council, especially at a time when the 
zamindars are on trial".
Paying no attention to the Maharaja, the Kumar 
reacted by replying } "I am not surprised at the attitude 
taken by the Hon'ble Uaharajadhiraj Bahadur - he has 
to keep up the family tradition". Not stopping at that, 
he continued with "I prayed for justice and fairness and it 
is my keen disappointment to realise that I prayed 
in vain. However, I have one consolation in that the 
official reply has hopelessly failed to prove that I 
stand not on firm grounds of fairness and justice, 
afad this fact sends a ray of hope to my disappointed 
soul and thus encouraged I stand before the Council for its 
verdict on my humble, and I think not unreasonable, prayer." 
The verdict was blatantly clear. He' hopelessly lost the 
motion, with two other votes than his own cast in his 
favour and thirty six votes against.^
Unfortunately the Maharaja of Burdwan very 
rar.ely took the floor as he did on the above occasion.
His inherited seniority alone would have made it possible
1. 'Bengal Tenancy (amendment) Bill 1^17, B.L.C.D.:
1918, pp.51,54,56-59
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for him to make the group into an effective power block if 
he had put himself to it. Even in the proceedings of 
the Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Bill 1917, which dealt 
with ghi adulteration, he did not say more than a few 
sentences.^* Being aware of the fact that he was the spokes­
man of the delegation that called on the Governor only 
a few days before, which instigated the Bill, the attitude 
seems inconceivable. His lack of participation in debates, 
the Nawab of Murshidabad's frequent absence, Raja Reshee 
Case Law's loss of prestige due to the election defeat, 
and the Kumar of Tajhat's break-away from the group, forever 
ended the possibility of the nobles forming an effective 
block and sitting as a counterpoise to the moderate leaders 
of the intelligentsia.
But the Maharaja of Burdwan found another chance to 
be effective from a different platform. He was appointed 
the Indian Executive Councillor by Ronaldshay. As early 
as 1916, the Maharaja had been considered for the. vacancy 
but was placed very much lower than S.P.Sinha and R.N. 
Mookerjee by Carmichael. V/hile recommending the three to 
the Secretary of State, Carmichael wrote that the points 
in favour of the Maharaja were that he was a "premier 
Hindu nobleman", was"distinctly intelligent, fairly broad­
minded and well educated” was "hard working" and "of 
good moral character and respected". Moreover, he had taken
1. 'Calcutta Muni dual (Amendment) Bill 1917',
B.L.C.D.: 1917, pp.723-742.
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H
more personal interest than most landlords in Bengal do in 
the management of his own affairs and seems honestly anxious 
for the prosperity of those who live on his property”. But 
the Governor placed him much lower than the other two 
because he had a number of points which went against him. 
Firstly, he was "very conceited, and has a most exaggerated 
idea of the importance of everything which concerns him­
self". Moreover, "he does not like to be thought ignorant, 
and often assumes an appearance of knowledge which he does 
not possess. This is apt to mislead persons who consult 
him, for he often professes to agree with opinions, which 
in reality he only does not try to controvert, because 
he could not do so without betraying his ignorance". 
Furthermore,Mhe attaches so much importance to forms 
that he would ... be of little use in doing anything 
which it was essential should be done quickly".'*' Thus
the next Indian Executive Councillor to be appointed
*
was S.P.Sinha.
The Maharaja was once more recommended along with
Bhupendranath Basu for the executive vacancy created in
the Secretary of State's Council by the retiring
2
of Daljit Singh. He lost his chance to Bhupendranath Basu.
With the arrival of the new Governor, the Maharaja 
at last got the opportunity for the office which he had 
desired for some time. Ronaldshay was an old Conservative
1. Carmichael to Chamberlain 28 June 1816, Governors
Letters: 1915-17, pp. 177-181.
2. Sec.St. to Viceroy 7 may 1917 (Telegrams),
L & T(India), Vol.8, at.I, p.110.
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member of Parliament who had served as Curzon1s A.D.C during
his term of office.1 The Maharaja, though of a different
race, held similar views as the Conservatives in England.
He was a member of the Conservative party in England and
2
was proud of being a Tory. His political ideas, concept 
of the Imperial Commonwealth, inherent respect for the 
sovereign, and pride in being the subject of the Crown, 
were in no way different to the Conservatives in England.
His political ideas had taken shape under the careful 
guidance of Lord Curzon whom the Maharaja held in great 
esteem and affection.1 Even after the Viceroy returned to 
England, he continued peronsal correspondence with the 
Maharaja, giving him advice on various matters.^" He 
quite exasperated Carmichael and Kardinge by his habit of 
starting his suggestions with the prefix that he had 
discussed the matter with George Curzon. Many even 
insinuated that the Maharaja went to the extent of imitating
a £
the mannerisms and the mode of 'dressing of Lord Curzon.
An English Conservative serving in Bengal would doubtless 
find considerable affinity with a person like the Maharaja.
As soon as the vacancy was created by Sinha's 
departure, Ronaldshay recommended the Maharaja for the office. 
Montagu, a liberal Secretary of State, replied advising the
1.J.H.Broomfield, p.95
2*Burdwan to Curzon 6 Jan. 1 909.Letters: Curzon, Vol.4-26,p.84 
3.In his book Studies the Maharaja writes at length of Curzon. 
Every line speaks of his devotion, admiration, and profound 
respect for the Viceroy. He considered Curzon the greatest 
of all Viceroys, even more so than Wellesley - B.C.Mahtab:
Studies, pp.83-91 
4.See Curzon1s Letters (1907-12) Vol.426
5.Carmichael to' Hardinge 10 July 1 91 2.C.P .I.: 1 91 2,Vol.Va8,pt. 1 ,
p . 18
C.Charmichael to Chamberlain 48 June 1916.Governors.. Letter^:
1515-17,p.181
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Governor to change his mind."^Ronaldshay refused to do
so. In the view of the Conservative Governor the very
arguments .that the liberal Secretary of State gave against
the appointment seemed to go in favour of his choice.
Ronaldshay wrote in his reply to Montagu, "It is true
Burdwan is not a professional politician and it is
also true that he holds reasonable and moderate views.
This, however, appears to me to be a qualification....
He is the acknowledged leader among those possessing a • • •
stake in the country. He has always taken an active and
prominent part in public affairs. He was a prominent
member of the Legislative Council. He has discharged his
duties courageously and with credit. Now if he is turned
out it will be thought that the Government wants to placate
2
the agitators. And that wouj-d be correct, would it not?” 
Montagu replied back that Ronaldshay had ignored his 
suggestion to appoint able and experienced men. Ronald­
shay refuted the accusation by stating that he regarded 
the Maharaja as *"fulfilling both these conditions. He is 
certainly able, and he was also the most experienced of men 
available, since he hacJ already acted twice for Sinha, 
and I feel sure that he will prove worthy of the trust which 
has been imposed on him".^
1.Montagu to Ronaldshay 17 Feb.1919, Letters: Montagu,Vol.27,
pp.52,53
2.Ronaldshay to Montagu 4 Reb.1919, Ibid,Vol.30,pp.13-16
3.Ronaldshay to Montagu 2 Apr.1919, Ibid. Vol.30, pp.27,28
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Ronaldshay got his own way and the Maharaja 
was appointed. Many years later Ronaldshay, reviewing the 
dialogue, wrote in his memoirs the reason for his adamant 
demand.He wrote, "Montagu wanted a politician. Since 
however, under the new Constitution, half the Government 
would consist of politicians, I considered it of import­
ance that the more conservative section of the population, 
which would be unlikely to subject itself to the rough 
and tumble involved in an appeal to the electorate , 
should be adequately represented in the Government, 
and I told him that I adhered to my recommendation." ^
The Maharaja accepted his new responsibility, 
determined to make the Government's work a success 
during his term in office. He wrote to Ronaldshay that
this was his primary aim and that he would not lose
2
sight of it as long as he served in the Council.
His sincerity was appreciated, and very soon after his 
appointment he was given a delicate task to perform.
The police had arrested two women under the Defence of India 
Act. Surendranath Banerjea promptly took the matter up in 
the Imperial Council and Mrs. Besant lodged a number 
charges against the Bengal police. She accused them of 
taking recourse to torture of the most atrocious type. 
Ronaldshay reacted by instructing two Executive Counc­
illors, Stevenson Moore and the Maharaja, to enquire 
into the charges.^ The Maharaja, soon after, justified
1.L.J.L.Lundas: Bssayez, p.133
2.Burdwan to Zetland 24 Jan.1919.Correspondence: Zetland,
Vol.5, P-5C
S.Bengal Diary:Zetland, Vol.1, p.127; There is no record
of the results of the enquiry.
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Ronaldshay1s opinion that he would not hesitate to 
take a strong stand even if he earned unpopularity 
with the public. The Atarita Bazar Patrika's strong 
criticism against the Rowlatt Act was causing a great 
deal of unrest in the province. The Government felt 
that the paper's security should be forfeited as a 
disciplinary act. The Maharaja unhesitatingly concurred 
with the unpopular decision.'1' Moreover, his vested 
interest as a zamindar did not decrease his sense of res­
ponsibility in any way as an Executive Councillor.
He was asked to handle the Rent Bill in the Legislative 
Council.Doubtless, it was not very pleasant for him 
to perform this task since it went counter to his own 
interests. He pointed out to the Governor that "it 
was no easy task for a property owner like myself 
to pilot the introduction of the Rent Bill in Council 
today". But as he also appreciated that his "position 
as a landlord instead of being a disqualification
ought to have a good effect on the public mind",
2
accepted the task with good grace. Having conducted 
the Bill successfully he felt more than pleased with 
the way it was passed without any drastic changes.
Ronaldshay congratulated him on his efforts and 
emphasised that the success was a feather in his cap.^
One of the most complex questions that Ronald- 
shay's Executive Council had to face was the amnesty 
order passed after the War. The order to extend amnesty
1.Ibid. p.226
2.Burdwan to Zetland 15 March 1920, Correspondence: Zetland,
Vol.5, pp.6 1 - 6 2
3.Ibid. 14 Apr.1920, p.63
to political detenus and state prisoners was sprung 
upon the Government without any warning. According 
to Ronaldshay the proclamation placed the whole onus 
of making exceptions upon the Viceroy; hut the 
animus which would inevitably be excited would 
have to be faced by the* local Government. Moreover, the 
order had been passed at a time when the Government had 
received information that there was a serious attempt 
to revive the activity of the Jugantar Party. It was 
said that dakoity was being contemplated and that the 
assassination of a police officer was also being discussed 
After serious consideration, Ronaldshay's Government 
recommended that the release of at least 57 detenus 
be postponed. But Montagu refused to contemplate such 
exceptions. The Executive Council met again to 
decide on whether to take a stiff attitude as far 
as the externment orders were concerned. Cumming 
was a little doubtful of the usefulness of such a course. 
He pointed out that in light of Montagu's instructions, 
to defy it would be pointless. With the intent of over­
coming the obstacle, Lowndes suggested that the Indian 
Moderate Party should be consulted and the responsibili­
ty thrown on them if they refused to support the
policy. At this stage the Maharaja intervened. He 
concurred with the Governor that strong measures be
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adopted. But in answer to Lowndes' suggestion, he 
pointed out that he had some confidential conversations 
with friends and had concluded that the Moderate Party 
would be bound to join the extremists in an agitation 
against the Government on this question."^ Based on 
his findings, the Government came to a definite decision 
on the attitude that it should adopt. Doubtless the 
Maharaja, like Nawab Shamsul Huda and Raja Kishori 
Lai Goswami, was proving an able and careful Executive 
Councillor. His work had led the Government to consider 
appointing him as an Indian member for the Imperial Execu­
tive Council. But Ronaldshay did not wish to part with
p
him and the matter was dropped. The only factor which 
gives rise to a feeling of doubt in him is that he was 
so keen on making the task of the Government a success 
that one is forced to conclude he must have fallen 
short in his capacity as the representative of the 
Indian interests. There is no evidence to establish 
the above. But at thersame time there is little 
evidence to show otherwise either. Despite the lack 
of evidence, one is left with the uneasy feeling that 
a person with his Government-biased attitude must 
have necessarily found it hard to support Indian 
views if they ever went contrary to the Government.
1 Be-nc-W D i a r y  : Z c t 1 a n cl  t Vo  1. 2 Z3/5- 7~ 7^
to l lc-ntncu 2 3 Ju.»e7^2o; L e t t c n : Z r t  1 »  A
Vtl.31, i>M.
In spite of that shortcoming, the experience of the 
three nobles show that, in their capacity as Executive 
Councillors they proved successful. It was undoubtedly 
so because of their experience as intermediaries of 
public affairs. The function of the Indian Executive 
Councillor, apart from departmental responsibility, 
was primarily an extension of the former. But when 
it came to the Legislative Council, the proceedings of 
which;unlike the Executive Council, was not behind 
closed doors, their efforts proved quite disasterous. 
Thus, at the most one can conclude they justified 
Minto's prediction only partially. Their inability 
to "compete" with the "professional politicians" 
as parliamentarians undermined any possibility 
of the nobles becoming a counterpoise to the leaders 
of the intelligentsia, as the authors of the Morley- 
Minto scheme had intended.
CHAPTER V.
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THE FREEDOM MOVEMENTS.
The twentieth century political history of 
Bengal was largely concerned with what have been popul­
arly termed the freedom movements. These movements 
resulted in the severance of the sub-continent from 
the Empire and the division of it into two different 
countries with an international boundary splitting 
the province into two. The movements revolved round 
the activities of the Indian National Congress. The 
subsidiary activities of the swadeshi and boycott, 
the terrorist and the Muslim separatist movements 
were either led or inspired by different groups of 
Congressmen, or were a defensive mechanism to counter­
act the Congress Party's over-bearing influence. The 
thesis would be quite inadequate if an attempt to analyse 
the participation by the group under review in the various 
movements and their attitude towards them was left unex­
amined .
The success of the anti-Ilbert Bill agitation i* 1&&3 
demonstrated to the Bengali leaders the value of 
combination and organisation even more than it had 
done until then. This could be Considered as the 
formal initiation of the movements that dominated 
the political history of the twentieth century. 
Surendranath Banerjea took advantage of the political 
climate created by the Bill, and within a year he 
initiated the Indian National Conference, the fore­
runner of the Indian National Congress, which met
at Calcutta. In the same year Hume addressed an open 
letter to the graduates of Calcutta University urging 
them to organise an association for the mental, moral, 
social, and political regeneration of the people of 
India, This, along with other factors,led to the emer­
gence of the Indian National Congress.^
The first Indian National Congress met in Bombay 
in 1 8 8 5 . About the same time the second session of the 
Indian National Conference was held in Calcutta. The 
latter was, like its predecessor, a conference of all-India 
character, held upon the same lines. By then the potent­
ialities of the movement had caught the imagination of 
other leading associations of Bengal. The second 
session found three leading associations situated at 
Calcutta working together to make it into a success.
They were the British India Association, the Indian
Association and the Central Mahomedan Association of 
2
Calcutta. It was soon agreed that it was undesirable
*
that there should be two such associations, the Con­
gress and the Conference, working independently. Thus 
the two merged into the Indian National Congress the 
next year.^ The Indian Association joined its ranks and 
became a subsidiary body of the Indian National Congress.
In the year 1886, the Indian National Congress 
met for the first time in Calcutta. The nobles
1. Majumdar, Ray Chaudhuri & Datta: Advanced History of
India. p.892.
2. S.N.Banerjea, p.98.
3. Majumdar, Ray Chaudhuri & Datta: Advanced History of
India, p.892.
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of Bengal welcomed it and participated in the meeting 
with unrestrained enthusiasm. According to Surendranath 
Banerjea, the British Indian Association, "the conser­
vative conscience of the community, threw themselves 
heart and soul into the matter". In many ways they 
were at the forefront during the sitting. Raja Rajend- 
ralal Hitter was elected the chairman of the 
Reception Committee, and Joy Kissen Mukerjee of Uttar- 
para proposed the election of Dadabhai Naoroji as the 
President of the Congress. The Congress of 1887 was held 
at Madras. Though away from the home province, among 
the delegates from Bengal senior noblemen like Raja 
Kishori Lai G-oswami and the Raja of Tahirpur could 
be found. In the year 1896 an Industrial Exhibition was 
organised by the Congress to give an impetus to Indian 
Industry. On being invited, Sir John V/oodburn declined 
to open the function. As an alternative the Maharaja 
of Cooch Behar was requested to perform the task, , 
which.he did.^ The Raja of Sovabazar also was an 
ardent supporter of the movement. In its early days 
he was a zealous worker. He even acted as its Honorary 
Secretary and Treasurer for a year.' He cooperated with 
Hume and others in establishing the Bengal National 
League, and v/as the President of the Bengal Social Confer­
ence held at Calcutta as well as the Bengal Provincial
2
Conference at Bhagalpore. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar
1. S.N.Banerjea, pp.101, 102, 103, 108, 146.
2. The Bengalee: 6 Dec. 1912, p.2.
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was another prominent supporter. The Director of 
Criminal Intelligence described him as a staunch supporter 
of the Congress and put him on the list of suspects 
for his sympathetic attitude.'*'
A close examination of their participation in the 
succeeding decades, however, reveals that in due course 
the nobles withdrew their support from the Congress. There 
was a gradual watering down of enthusiasm on their part.
Even nobles such as the Maharaja of Kassimbazar who conti­
nued to contribute substantial sums of money to its
funds did not speak in or attend the Congress meetings
2
as an active member. As a matter of fact they had withdrawn 
from acting in any executive capacity in the Congress 
organisation. Doubtless one came across the name of 
Raja Surja Kant a G-uha Ray of Faridpur as a member of 
the Reception Committee in 1 9 1 1 Sut it is safe to 
assume that his name was added as an after-thought 
and that he played no significant role. That is apparent 
from the fact that his name was not included in the 
original list of office bearers and committee members.
Indeed there was a total absence of any noblemen in the 
manifesto.^ The nobles apparently continued to withhold 
their support until 1917. It is significant that the 
list of delegates comprised not a single nobleman from
1. Carmichael to Hardinge 25 Aug. 1912, C.P.I.: 1912,
Va 8, pt.I, p.155.
2. Ibid.
5. The Bengalee: 7 March 1911, P-5
4. Ibid: 5 March 1911, P*5.
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1912 to 1 9 1 7 In the latter year Kumars Arun Chandra
Sinha, Rajas Kanto Ray and Narmada Sanker Roy rejoined
2
the ranks and attended the sitting as delegates. But 
it is not possible to overlook the fact that the members 
of noble families who made the come-back were junior members 
rather than the noblemen themselves.
Throughout the period under review the nobles main­
tained this distance from the Congress movement. The question 
that arises is why this enthusiasm for the movement, which 
was noticeable at the beginning, decreased over the decades 
in such a pronounced manner rather than increased as the 
movement gathered momentum. As we have seen the activities 
of the Indian Association gradually convinced them that 
the leaders of the intelligentsia, who were primarily Con­
gressmen, were not merely interested in battling against 
the monopolistic political hold of the alien rulers, but 
also aimed to wrest the leadership of the Bengal society
at their expense. In short they had emerged as political
3
rivals rather than political partners. Their habitual 
attack' on the landholders' community as being oppressive 
extortionists, their opposition to the landholders' 
representation and their attempt to replace Raja 
Reshee Case Law as the representative of the Indian
1. I.N.C.R.: 1911-187 ! !
2. Ibid: 1917, pp.5, 36, 38.
3. ''The term politics is used to mean collective human 
action performed with a power perspective. In politics 
men aim at gaining authority and influence over certain 
areas of human activity". - S.N.Mukherjee: 'Class, Caste 
& Politics in Calcutta', ed. leach & Mukherjee: Elites 
in South Asia; p.33*
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commercial community in the Legislative Council, their 
attempt in removing the nobles from the mixed constit­
uencies during the elections, their systematic belittling 
of the British Indian Association and other similar bodies, 
and their attempt to dislodge the Muslim nobles from communal 
leadership had convinced the nobles that the Congress was 
a threat to their hereditary prominence. Nobles such as 
the Nawab of Dacca felt that it was not possible for 
the nationalists to give proper advice to the Administ­
ration.^" Moreover, the leading noblemen began to feel 
that they were being used to further their own purpose 
by the Congress leaders. Only when the nobles' help was 
required to advance their own interest did the Congressmen 
seek them out together with their fellow zamindars for 
support, At other times it seemed to them as though they 
were under perennial attack. This once infuriated Maharaja 
Tagore into publicly remonstrating that "this constant 
attack on the Bengal Zamindars compels me to ask that 
if they were such a negligible quantity ... why is there
such feverish anxiety to secure the signatures of the Bengal
2
Zamindars to the Curtis scheme?"
Furthermore, the Congress deviated further and further 
from the demand of forming a Federation of Greater Britain. - 
By the turn of the century it had become obvious to all
1. Dacca to Curzon 24 Feb. 1909, Letters: Curzon, Vol. 427,
p.9.
2. The Englishman: 22 Nov. 1917, p.4.
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that a gap had begun to open between the Raj and some 
of the educated subjects. Their first experiments in 
political organisation gave the appearance of being 
parallel to the demands of the traditional leaders.
They too seemed to support the current Government and 
yet demonstrate their protests by leaving its side 
when aggrieved. But step by step, and with protestations 
of loyalty accompanying each move, the criticisms of the 
new leaders grew louder^ until they seemed to many to 
be insincere and hypocritical. First the Congress conv­
erted their demand for better government to self- 
government within the Empire, which later took another 
step when leading Congressmen like Surendranath Banerjea,
who had at first opposed the Home Rule movement, accepted
2
it as the final goal. This hardening attitude transformed
them from 'critics' to 'rebels' in the eyes of the nobles.
Their opinion was voiced by the Maharaja of Burdwan- when
he declared in a public meeting that as far as the^  political
platform was concerned people such as Rash Bihari Ghose
and himself, more often than not, did not sit together.^
Though it is possible to find conciliatory remarks from
such senior noblemen as the Maharaja of Nashipur, who
stated that he did "not think the supporters of Home Rule
mean to have a rule by the people themselves without
4
any British control," it would not be wrong to assume that 
such remarks were uttered with ' considerable rais-
1. A.Seal: Emergence of Indian Rationalism, p.14.
2. The Englishman: 8 Oct. 1917, p.8.
3. The Bengalee: 18 Aug. 1912, p.l.
4. Ranajit Sinha: Reforms in the Administration of India.
p.vi.
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. . i giving.
What alienated the nobles even more than any factor 
mentioned above were the activities of the Bengal Con­
gressmen in connection with the anti-partition movement.
As the movement deteriorated from constitutional agitation 
to the application of more violent methods, the nobles 
gradually withdrew their sympathy from its cause.
A time came when it was nearly impossible to separate 
the anti-partition movement from the "revolutionary 
movement" in Bengal. The latter was worked up on top of 
the anti-partition agitation. It started before the 
partition took place, and persisted even after it was
reversed, but so long as the partition remained in force
2
the two were very closely inter-connected. According 
to Broomfield, the anti-partition agitation had four 
over-lapping phases. In the first, which opened with 
the publication of the initial partition scheme, its 
leader was Surendranath Banerjea. Against the partition 
he used press articles, public meetings of protest, 
petitions and deputations. Soon it was clear that the 
method had failed, and this realisation led to the second 
stage of the agitation in which verbal protests gave 
way to withdrawal of office holders from Government
1. People such as Tilak would confess privately that 
they believed that British supervision over imperial 
subjects at least should continue for many years to 
come yet insist on working the masses up with fiery 
slogans and speeches demanding British withdrawal from 
India on the basis that by such means pressure could 
be brought on the bureaucracy to make it feel that all 
is not well. - H.W.Nevinson: Hew Spirit in India, p.72.
2. J.C.Ker: Political Troubles in India, p.5.
institutions, the boycott of British products, the 
encouragement of swadeshi or indigenous goods, and the 
foundation of national education institutions."*- The 
inspiration came from Bipin Chandra Pal, Aswini Kumar 
Dutt and Aurobindo Ghose. Under this leadership the 
agitation entered its third phase in which large bodies 
of Bengalis were trained for active participation in 
organisations of volunteer brigades, samitis, trade 
unions and gymnasiums. At the same time from, the pens of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Aurobindo Ghose and Bipin Chandra 
Pal came a call for the revival of indigenous institut­
ions and the use of tradition&LHindu symbols to galvanize
Bengal into action. At times it seemed as though they
were speaking the same language as the nobles. But it
soon became obvious that, although the means were the
same, the aims were different. The authors of this
revival provoked the fourth phase in which violence was
openly preached by Barin and Aurobindo Ghose, whose
pamphlets and newspapers glorified revolution as a
religious duty. They reminded theirTeaders that Kali
was created by the Gods to destory the demons who
2
usurped their kingdoms . All the leaders mentioned 
above were reputed Congressmen. The nobles' enthusiasm 
cooled with the increase of support for violence and 
the preaching of more vigorous agitation.
1. Swadeshi and boycott must not be confused. The former was 
initiated earlier than $he partition; the latter was a 
short term measure. But during the anti-partition movement 
the two were closely inter-linked, and it is difficult to 
examine them separately. The division of the movement into 
phases is for the convenience of study and not for chrono­
logical reasons. This way it is easier to examine the 
attitudes of the nobles towards the different aspects of 
the movement.
2. J.H.Broomfield, pp.29, 30.
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At the beginning, prominent noblemen, along 
with the leaders of the intelligentsia, were at the 
very forefront of the anti-partition demonstration.
The first one who showed his antipathy towards the 
partition scheme was Maharaja Surja Kanta Acharya of 
Mymensingh. He demonstrated his opposition during 
Curzon1s visit to East Bengal. According to Surend- 
ranath Banerjea the Viceroy's visit was ostensibly with 
the object of ascertaining public opinion but in reality 
his motive was to over-awe the local people so as to 
frustrate any potential opposition to the proposed 
partition. If that was his intention he must have 
been sorely disappointed with the reaction of the 
Maharaja. He received Curzon with proper decorous and 
ceremonial hospitality in keeping with the tradition of 
the nobles but, at the same time, told the Viceroy "with 
quiet and dignified firmness that he would regard the 
Partition of Bengal as a grave disaster, and that he 
was.opposed to it". Moreover, "throughout he remained 
a prominent leader of the anti-Partition agitation".
Other nobles were not far behind in voicing their 
opposition to the contemplated scheme. They exerted 
themselves in ■ mobilising public opinion against it.
In a mammoth meeting organised under the presidency of
Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee the Raja stated in no uncertain tent
1. S.N.Banerjea, p.168.
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that the partition would cause immense problems to the 
inhabitants of Bengal. The associations dominated by the 
nobles also joined the agitation against Curzon*s pro­
posal. "The representations of the British Indian 
Association put the case against the Partition in a very 
forcible manner".'1' Even many of the prominent Muslim 
nobles were against it at the initial stages. The Nawab 
of Dacca, the leading light of Muslim individuality,
on receiving the information, described the act as 
2
"beastly". ft Nawab Khaja Athikulla, brother of the Hon'ble 
Nawab Sir Khaja Salimulla Bahadur, K.C.S.I. of Dacca, in 
moving the resolution against the Partition... observed:
*1 may tell you at once that it is not correct that the 
Mussalman of Eastern Bengal are in favour of Partition 
of Bengal*." The same stand was taken by the Central 
National Muhammadan Association. In their memorial they 
stated "that no portion of Bengali speaking race should 
be separated from Bengal without the clearest necessity 
for such separation, and they think, in the present case, 
such necessity does not exist ". The last public demand 
before the partition became a reality was held at the 
Town Hall under the presidency of the Maharaja of Kassim- 
bazar.5
When the Government, disregarding all attempts to
1. The Bengalee: 14 March 1911, p«5*
2. H.W.Nevinson: New Spirit in India, p.191.
3. The Bengalee: 14 March 1911, P«5*
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dissuade it, announced that Bengal was to he partitioned 
the prominent men of the province took on a more positive 
stance. A conference of the leaders was held at Maharaja 
Jotindra Mohan Tagore!s rajbari at Puthuriaghatta. The 
Maharaja took'an active part in the deliberations.
Ultimately the Conference decided that the Maharaja should 
send a telegram to the Viceroy praying for a reconsideration 
of the orders passed. The cohference was followed by almost 
daily meetings which were often held at the residence of 
the Maharaja Surja Kanta Acharya of Mymensingh. It was at 
a sitting held at the Maharaja's rajbari that the celeb­
rated decision in favour of abstaining from the purchase 
of British goods and their replacement by indigenous 
products, so long as the partition was not withdrawn, 
as a protest against the indifference shown by the British 
public in regard to Indian affairs, and the consequent 
disregard of Indian public opinion by the current Govern­
ment of India, was taken.^ To make it really effective 
the impetus to encourage indigenous production and estab­
lish Indian institutions as alternatives to foreign 
enterprises was greatly increased. Thus swadeshi and 
boycott became an important aspect of the anti-partition 
agitation.
Had the senior nobles been opposed to the swadeshi 
and boycott scheme, the agitation might have been 
restricted to the intelligentsia. But as they were not,
1. S.N.Banerjea, pp.187-189, 192.
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it was inevitable that sympathy for that measure of 
agitation would gradually spread into other noble house­
holds also. The realisation of this greatly perturbed 
the Authorities. Even the women folk of the noble 
families were being caught up in the rising enthusiasm 
to support swadeshi. The ladies of Bhukailash family 
were at the very forefront. The Bhukailash Raj 
had been partitioned into three and placed under the 
Court of 7/ards, as the proprietors were purdanashin 
ladies. The estate known as Bhukailash III was rep­
resented by Srimati Abhash Kumari Devi with two daughters 
and a son. Cornelia Sorabji, the Lady Assistant of the 
Court of Wards, was greatly troubled and had to exert 
herself to counteract the possibility of her succumbing 
to the influence of "swadeshi agitators". ^  The Jandazar 
Estate made her even more worried. The owner was a young 
widow named Sindhubala. She was reported to have sold her
A
jewellery to contribute towards the "swadeshi" movement#
She had further enrolled her daughter into a vernacular
school in spite of some inconvenience to herself with
the primary intent of keeping her "fiercely swadeshiV
It was quite difficult for the Lady Assistant to persuade
her to change her mind and have the child sent to the
2
Diocesion School instead.
The incident that perturbed the Authorities most 
was the involvement of the Hatwa family with the swadeshi
agitators, v/hile Bihar was still a part of Bengal the
1. 'E.Beng. & Assam Court of Wards Lady Asst. Annual Report
1909-10', R & S.P.P.: 1911, Vol.894, File 391, p.12.
2. 'Lower rrovince Court of Wards Lady Asst. Annual Report
1909-10*, Ibid, no page number.
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Hatwa estate was one of the largest zatqlndari of the 
province and the Maharaja ranked amongst the most 
senior nobles of the land. In 1896 the estate had 
devolved on a child of three placed under the care of his 
mother the Kaharani. After the partition it came to 
light that the Maharani was bringing the young 
Maharaj Kumar "up to regard all officials, from the 
Lieutenant Governor downwards, with distrust and animosi­
ty, and were inspiring him with feelings of hostility 
towards the Government itself". Moreover, it was 
reported that the Bengali employees had formed a 
secret society to which the Maharani had supplied 
large sums of money. The Commissioner of the 
Division reported that if the Maharaj Kumar followed 
his mother he would fall under the spell of the dis­
affected people permanently. He urged that the Maharaj 
Kumar be quickly removed from Hatwa and sent to the 
Mayo College at Ajmer as a resident student. The recomm­
endation was promptly complied with.^
The nobleman who not only perturbed but actually 
annoyed the Authorities by his participation in the 
swadeshi and boycott movement was the Raja of Narajole. 
Maulvi Luzhurul Hua reported to the Joint Magistrate of 
Midnapore that in the enquiries carried out in connec­
tion with the Llidnapore bomb conspiracy, it had been 
found that the Raja was implicated. Immediately,
1. Gourley to Sec. Rev. & Agri. Ind. 17 Oct. 1910, R.L.: 
Vol.134, It. no. Land Rev. 2129T-R, pp.1-3.
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a warrant was issued and the Raja put under arrest.
After being taken into custody, he was escorted to the 
Kesabpur kutcheri in an open carriage. En route, 
it began to rain and somebody held an umbrella over 
his head. A policeman reacted by snatching it away and put 
a blanket over his heady thus forcing him to travel like 
a common criminal. Moreover, they refused him bail until 
the Vacation Bench of the High Court released him. It 
was further alleged by the Indian press that during 
the interval he was confined to a dark, dingy, narrow 
cell with a toilet inside in the manner of a common 
prisoner.^" Tie anger of the police becomes understand­
able when one takes into account that one of the 
witnesses had informed that the Raja was seen partici­
pating in a demonstration with Khudiram Bose, the
2
celebrated terrorist, and singing national songs.
Under such circumstances, the police would inevitably 
treat him in a harsh fashion as they were the greatest 
sufferers at the hands of the terrorists. . How much 
truth there was in the allegations that he was actively 
involved in terrorist activities or that the police 
maltreated him while in custody is not possible to 
ascertain. 7/hat was true though was that the Raja 
himself maintained in his appeal to the High Court
!• Nat.N.r .: week ending 21 Sept. 1912, pp.1125, 1126.
2. The Englishman: 2 Feb. 1911, p.8.
that it was very hot and the police refused to provide
him with even a hhnd fan. He also stated that he paid
Rs.24,000 as a bribe to the police which they accepted
but did not provide any comforts'!' Ultimately he
was released on the grounds that there was no reliable
2evidence against aim.
Despite the lack of evidence very few were convinced
that the Raja was totally innocent of harbouring
sympathetic views for the terrorists. This was so.
because his involvement in the swadeshi and boycott
movement was somewhat passionate and unrestrained.
He used his full influence with his tenants in order
to induce them to give up the use of articles of
British manufacture.^ He personally corroborated this
when he wrote in a memorial to the Viceroy that he
had incurred the displeasure of officials because he
had taken such a prominent part in reviving the dying
*
industries of the country. He claimed that he had
taken advantage of the partition as it nffered greater
facilities for the development of indigenous industries
and, with this end in view, had taken part in certain
4
meetings advocating the use of indigenous goods.
Under the circumstances, though he was discharged by the 
Court, for insufficient evidence, he was not left 
totally unpunished for his indiscretion. The Authori­
ties attempted to decrease his eminence and thus cur­
tail his influence in the locality, first, he was
1. Nat.N.H.; week ending 4 Jan. 1913» p.X2T
2. Ibid: week ending 21 Sept. 1912, p.1125.
5. 'Quinquennial Admin. Rep.Burd.Div.1905-10', B.G.P.:
Sept.1911, Vol.8677, p.86.
4. The Englishman: 28 Dec. 1912, p.3«
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excluded from the Royal Reception, the most important
social function of the decade. Moreover .his attempt to
become the chairman of the Midnapore Municipality was
vetoed by the Additional Magistrate, and the Raja of
Mahisdal was given the title of Raja Bahadur: this last
move removed the Raja of Narajole from the highly este—
2
emed position of premier nobleman in Kidnapere.
The Maharaja of Kassimbazar was another nobleman 
who exerted himself in encouraging swadeshi enter-
•
prises and in the process had the unpleasant experience 
of getting his name blacklisted in the C.I.D. files for 
his efforts. Nawab Shamsul Huda once pointed out in the 
Bengal Landholders Association that the Maharaja started 
many enterprises "merely for the purpose of encouraging 
others".^ He even came to the rescue of Indian enter­
prises if he found them in trouble. Some time before 
the decade under review the Raja of Sovabazar had helped
to develop the daily Bengalee and the Amrita Bazar Pat- 
4
rika. The Maharaja of Kassimbazar went a step further.
When the Bengalee began to flounder in 1919, he provided 
the necessary funds to salvage it, and became its joint 
proprietor under conditions which converted it into a
5
limited company. His efforts to encourage swadeshi
1. Nat, owned Eng. II.P.: week ending 6 July 1912, pp.406,407.
2. Carmichael to Hardinge 11 Apr. 1913, C . P . I . : 1913, Vol.
Va 9, pt.I, p.214.
3. The Englishman: 1 July 1911, P*3«
4. The Bengalee: 6 Dec. 1912, p.2.
5. S.N.Banerjea, p.173-
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enterprises not only attracted the admiration of his
fellow zamindars like Nawab Shamsul Huda but also won
him glowing praise in the columns of the press controlled
by the intelligentsia.^ He was held in no less esteem
2
by senior officials of Bengal like Swan, Duke and 
Carmichael^ for his endeavours. His swadeshi activities 
were so prominent that the Germans mistook him for a 
rebel and invited him to join them in their war against 
the Empire.^
The nobles also gave their full support to national 
institutions, early in the twentieth century. One such 
example came to the limelight and this was the National 
Medical College of India. Dr. S.K. Mullick had opened 
it with 150 students at 191 Bow Bazar Street. It com­
prised 25 beds and a small out-patient department. The 
college proposed to impart knowledge of both allopathy
5
and the ayurvedic and hakimi systems of medicine. It soon 
grew in proportion and had 3,000 students within a' year of 
starting. It also provided scholarships to Indian students 
to go to England for further studies in medicine. There 
was a finance control committee of four members to handle 
its finances and incoming contributions of which Raja 
Peary Mohan Mukerjee was a prominent member. Moreover, 
senior noblemen sat on its council. They were the Rajas
1. The Bengalee: 4 Jan. 1913, p.4.
2. Ind.N.P. & Per.: week ending 24 Apr. 1915, p.617.
3. Carmichael to Hardinge 17 March 1914, C.P.I.: 1915,
Vol. Va 13, pt.I, p.204.
4. German Letters to Indian Princes: 1914-16, pp.9,11.
5. Gov. to Sec. St. 17 Sept. 1913, R & S.P.P., 1913, Vol.762,
File 4510 (Enclo.), pp.3,7,9,11,17.
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of Mymensingh, Darbhanga, Dinajpur, Kassimbazar and
Dighapatia, Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee and the Nawab of
Bogra. Its first foundation day was celebrated with
Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee in the chair.^ The Maharaja
of Kassimbazar continued to provide it with funds for
2
many years to come; < along -with Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee 
he remained in the governing body for some considerable 
time.^ f
Thus it appears that the nobles of Bengal were very
much in favour of Swadeshi. Even when the movement got
enmeshed with boycott they continued to support its
cause. It was only when swadeshism became associated with
violence and hooliganism that they turned their backs on
it. The Maharaj* of Kassimbazar clarified what true
swadeshism was in their view, when he stated that it
'•was guite different from the Swadeshism that is
4
identified with boycott and picketting". With the 
possible exception of the Raja of Narajole the nobles 
in general considered swadeshi and boycott worthy of 
encouragement but not boycott and picketting. The Maharaja 
of Burdwan, when commenting on Tata enterprises, brought 
this attitude into clear focus. He stated that,"It is 
a pity such projects are not more plentiful in India. If 
those in India who are constantly clamouring for Swadeshi
1. Ibid.
2. The Englishman: 15 May 1911, p.7.
3. The Bengalee: 4 May 1911, p.7.
4. The Englishman: 21 Aug. 1911, p.6.
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industries were able to show deeds instead of empty words, 
we should materially advance the Mother Country*” Comment­
ing on British industries he later added that Indians ”must 
produce the intellect, the energy and the capital to start 
such undertakings all over India on a sound and lasting 
footing. My brother countrymen who show their energy for 
Swadeshism by encouraging hooliganism in the name of 
exclusive dealing, should go to places like Bury to see 
for themselves the qualifications and spirit which could 
justify true Swadeshism. Outcries of Bande Katarm^ cannot 
advance India nor the Indians, but talent, culture, brains, 
and money, all these must form a part of national advance­
ment”*2
Unfortunately swadeshism and boycott initiated 
jointly by the nationalist leaders and the Bengal nobles 
as a protest against partition lost its original colouring 
and came to seem like an extension of the terrorist move­
ment. The swadeshi movement was apparently being used by 
the unscrupulous to encourage strife. A time came when it 
did become practically impossible to draw a line between 
the terrorist and the swadeshi worker. The moderate leaders 
claimed that they advocated swadeshi and denounced terrorism. 
But whether moderate or extremist it was difficult for the 
nobles to overlook that they all were members of the Congress. 
As both sections belonged to the same fold, and gave the 
appearance of being inter-dependent, the claim of the moderates
1. Bande hataram had become the slogan of the disruptive
elements.
2. B.C.Mahtab: Impressionst pp.2, 164.
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that they were opposed to violence seemed hypocritical.
It was this that created the apparently unbridgeable 
gap between the nobles and the Congress for the entire 
decade under review.
Terrorism, which was plaguing the province, was 
abhorred by the nobles. It.gained in proportion because 
of the partition. When anti-partition agitation was just 
beginning Barendra Kumar Ghose, the inspirer of organised 
terrorism, returned to Bengal. He and his associates started 
the Jugantar, advocating total independence, and collected 
weapons to initiate a systematic terrorist movement. The 
persons involved spoke in English or chalit-bhasha, dressed 
in a uniform fashion, and vowed to destroy the British Raj 
by any means.^ At the same time the Swaraj idea was form­
ally introduced to Bengal local leaders at the Indian
National Congress at Calcutta in 1906 hy Dadabhai 
2
Naoroji. Thus the two sided attack on the British Raj 
by the extremists and the moderates intensified the bitter­
ness expressed by the Bengali people towards foreign rule 
and foreigners in general. The symptoms were markedly notice­
able in the capital city itself. Calcutta v;.„3 in a most 
unsatisfactory condition. Fleetwood Wilson reported that 
he was daily appealed to by the leading tradesmen to urge 
the Government to protect them from the uprising of the 
Bengalis- which they anticipated. It was a common thing
1. Ren, ^edition Com. 1916: Chelmsford, Yol. 43, pp.11-14,16,19.
2. J.C.Ker: Political Troubles in India, p.6; This is a typical 
.example where the moderates' move gave strength to the
terrorists.
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during that time to see Europeans being pushed off the
pavements and their women jeered at in a most offensive
manner by the students of the city.^"
Despite the revocation of the partition^during
the period under review the same trend continued
unabated . Matters became even more explosive with the
price rise caused by the War. Fish and meat were
extremely scarce. Rui fish sold at from 12 annas to a rupee
per seer. The supply of Hilsa fish was extremely scarce and
pther popular fish were almost equally dear. The prices of
necessities of life other than foodstuffs were also very
2
high. Even house rents were rising. Doubtless there 
were fluctuations in food prices. But even when the price 
of rice was comparatively low the rayats were unable to reap 
its benefits. Because of the stoppage of the sale of jute 
they were impoverished and could not afford to buy even 
the cheap rice available in the market.^ Moreover, many 
of the German owned enterprises like the hide trade, had 
been closed down leaving a large number of people 
unemployed.^ V/hen Chelmsford came to Bengal in 1316, 
he found the situation explosive. For some time a dis­
cussion had been going on between the India Office, 
the Government of India and the Bengal Government on 
measures to cope with the seditionists in the province.
Ke decided to expedite the matter and take strong action
1.'Transfer of Capital 1 Jan. 1312*, Official Notes:
Fleetwood Wilson, Vol.13, pp.2-8.
2. hat.N .P .: week ending 10 Oct. 1314, p.1073-
3. Ind.N.I. 6c Per.: week ending 27 March 1915, p.480.
4. Carmichael to Hardinge 6 Sept. 1914, C .2.I.: 1914,
Vol. Va 12, Ft. I, p.165.
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to curb the disorder.^ Even the King, though a constitu­
tional monarch, was so concerned by the prevalent 
situation that he defied traditions and personally instruct­
ed Ronaldshay to be firm with the terrorists as "extremists
2
required to be dealt with rigorously". The culmination 
of this attitude was the appointment of the Sedition 
Committee to look into the entire problem of terrorist 
activities in the country. It assessed that between 1906 
and 1918, 311 outrages had been committed in Bengal.
It was not just the number that made it such a vital 
problem but "The list of crimes perpetrated was as 
appalling as the brutality with which they were committed, 
and the material before the Committee showed how wide­
spread was the criminal organisation and how venemous was 
the revolutionary propaganda conducted in schools and 
colleges".^
It has often been argued that the revolutionary acts 
were carried out by a handful of Bengalis and that the 
moderate Congress leaders had nothing to do with it.
Such were the very words used by Surendranath Banerjea on 
behalf of the Indian Association m  their address of 
welcome to Chelwsford.^ V/hat is overlooked is that, 
though they may not have received open support from the 
moderates, it was common knowledge that the terrorists
1. Chelmsford to King 21 May 1919 L & T (India). Vol.l,
pt.II, p.31.
2. Bengal Diary: Zetland, Vol. 1, p.l.
3. Moral & Material Progress of India: 1919, p.25.
4 . Speeches: Chelmsford, Vol.l, pp.200-201.
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received sympathy from the intelligentsia in general.
The considerable daring shown by some of the partici-
pants, and the feeling that they were motivated by a
genuine sense of patriotism evoked a measure of sympathy
even among many of the mature men of the educated section.
Moreover, among students and school boys they were
regarded in the light of self-sacrificing heroes."^
Legends of glory and courage began to be woven round their 
2
activities. Despite the knowledge that the terrorists 
were disrupting law and order the reason for this 
sympathetic attitude was summed up in an editorial 
in the Bengalee in 1915» when it published that "At 
the back of every form of political criminalism 
there always stands some sense of wrong or injustice,
5
whether real or fancied." The paper further elaborated 
that "The accuseds in most cases are young people, 
sometimes mere boys, and the fact that they have 
weeping mothers praying for their acquittal touches 
the inborn instincts of every mother in the community.
The sentiments of the ladies receive support from 
the men of the family. All these things work together 
to create a general sympathy for accused persons in
4
many political cases". Moreover we are already
1. Viceroy to Sec.St. 24 Ifov.1916, Correspondence with Sec. 
St. on Post War Reforms. Vol.33» Lt.no.17, p.4.
2. Such legenas were in circulation even during the author's 
childhood. The fabulous exploits of Kudiram while the 
police searched for him in vain, how he escaped from a 
closely guarded van after being captured, and how, ulti­
mately, he prevented the British hangman from taking
his life by releasing the scaffold's trap door himself, 
were common household tales. Similar stories about Bagha 
Jotin were also in circulation.
3. The Bengalee: 2 Apr. 1915, p.4-
4. Ind. owned nng.U .^ .: week ending 10 Apr. 1915 > p.214.
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aware that the moderates often found it expedient 
to how to the pressure of the extremists like 
Bipin Chandra Pal who proclaimed that the terrorists 
who shot down fellow Indians were "revolutionary pat­
riots". The journal he edited, called New India, 
seemed to have a settTed policy to publish every tale 
that could be found and exaggerated to fill the Indian 
mind with the bitterest and profoundest contempt for 
Europeans, and to urge Indians to train themselves 
to fight these "blackguards"."^ The attitude of such 
Congressmen, and the apparent inability of other 
Congress members to contain them, provoked many like 
the editors of the Nayak to query whether "it was
impossible for our leaders, to stamp out anarchism,
2
or whether they wilfully kept idle."
This tacit consent of the Bengal Congress 
leaders, whether moderate or extremists, appalled 
the nobles, and persuaded them to turn their backs 
on the Congress movement which they once supported.
Not only would such disruption of Law and Order 
jeopardise their own well being, but they also 
realised that it was causing the Indian people 
a great deal of trouble and loss of reputation.
Thus unlike the moderate leaders of the intellig- 
ehtsia, the nobles and their fellow zamindars came
1. J.C.Ker: Political Troubles in India, p.x.
2. Ind.N.P. & Per.: week ending 4 Nov. 1916, p.1473.
out into the open to try to contain the influence
of the terrorists from spreading any further. Their
move was not a mere gesture without substance since
it was possible for them to make a stand against
the nationalists. The large majority of the people
of Bengal were not the English educated section,
dominated by moderate Congressmen, but illiterate
cultivators. Moreover in the Eastern part of the
province, most were Muslims who did not follow
the lead of the Congress. Furthermore the influence
of the nobles even over the local intelligentsia,
especially in the rural areas, was considerable.^
It was in these spheres that they concentrated their
efforts. As early as 1906 it had begun to dawn on
them that the agitational spirit was being fostered
from Calcutta. 7/hen an agitator came, to the mufassil
2
on tour he spread unrest wherever he went. Reacting 
to this, nobles such- as Nawab Serajul Islam suggested 
that quick action was called for to counteract the 
"wire pullers of Calcutta" who were creating discon­
tent in the mufassil.  ^In their opinion, these people 
who spread discontent were not only Hindus. Muslims 
whohad joined the ranks of the intelligentsia were also
1. Discussed in fuller detail in Chapter II.
2. Hare to Dunlop Smith 19 Sept. 1906, Letters: Morley,
Vol. 9, p.65.
5. Serajul Islam to Hare 28 Sept. 1906, Ibid., p.90»
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to "blame. The Nawab of Dacca emphasised that it was 
not true that Muslims were discontented when misled by 
Hindu leaders only Thus the nobles exerted themselves 
over the people they could influence so as to limit the 
spread of terrorism as elaborated below.
In the early stag'es the Maharaja of Burdwan 
apprehending the possibility of the nobles losing sight 
of the swadeshism and being ensnared by seditious doc­
trines instead, appealed to the "Eajas and Maharajas1 
not ;to be"led by the collar by the Bengali Newspaper 
7/allahs.. .For are not we the real representatives of 
the people? Should we not raise our voice against 
the several wrong-headed movements that are every day 
compromising the unsuspecting people of Bengal in the 
eyes of the rulers? How can we better do so than by 
proving to the latter that the masses never dream of
questioning the intention of the Government, or of sitting
2
in judgement on its actions". In time the nobles as a group 
fell into line with his sentiments and took to restrain­
ing the spread of terrorism.
The Maharaja of Burdwan was adamantly against the 
tendency of airing national grievances by the assassin’s 
weapons. It merely led to "compromising the unsuspecting
1. Carmichael to Crewe 26 July 1913, Letters Carmichael:
Crewe, Box c/6.
2. B.C.I-lahtab: Studies. pp.66, 67.
people of Bengal in the eyes of the rulers”. During 
one occasion, finding the Lieutenant Governor, Andrew 
Fraser, in line of an assassin’s gun, he frustrated the 
attempt by throwing himself in the line of fire and 
receiving the bullet himself.^- Ee was convinced that 
the root cause of such evil was the introduction of over- 
westernised ideas by people who had lost sight of 
the local background. This had weakened the founda­
tion on which the Indian society was built. At times 
he himself found it very difficult to put aside his 
western views in favour of local customs. 7/riting 
about his daughter's marriage at a relatively young age, 
he informed Ronaldshay that, although he personally 
found it distasteful to do so, he feared the possibility
of the family being outcasted and provoking the dis-
Xpleasure of his old father if he decided otherwise.
Doubtless, he believed that caste solidarity and respect 
for the karta of the family were two very important factors 
which prevented the multi-racial Indian society from falling 
apart and leading to chaos. The people who neglected to keep 
in mind such local background endangered the very foundation 
of society. In a letter to Curzon he wrote that a "radical 
Englishman" tended to forget that to encourage Indians to 
demand privileges unsuitable for India caused the nation
1. Nat. N.I.: week ending 1 July 1911, P-799.
2. Burdwan to Zetland 1 Jan. 1919, Correspondence:
Zetland, Vol. 9, p .4Y •
3T4
to decline rather than progress.^ A year later he lamented that 
terrorism had come to stay in Bengal and that thanks to the 
so-called nationalists no one's life was safe anymore. Although 
he received letters threatening his and his family's lives if 
he acted against them he exerted himself and persuaded the 
principal nobles of the province to forward a representation
, p
to the Government to take stronger action against the terrorists. 
By 1911 he was hoping that the Authorities would look at the 
problem more seriously and lay down a clear and firm policy 
against the terrorists as he realised that the police were 
thoroughly dissatisfied with the undefined policy of the 
Government. The dissatisfaction of the police would undoubted­
ly cause misgivings in the ranks of the nobles as the mainte­
nance of law and order in the Bengal mufassil was the joint 
responsibility of the police and local elements such as 
themselves and their prominent pra.ias.
The indigenous system of police was organised on the basis 
of land tenure since ancient times. In the pre-British era the 
zamindar was bound to apprehend all disturbers of the public 
peace. Under them were numerous tenure holders who were re­
quired to assist in police duties. Finally there was the 
responsibility of the villagers which was enforced through 
the headman. The British relieved the zamindars of this police 
service. After a brief experimental period, in 1814 it was 
decided that the old village system was more effective as it 
secured the cooperation of the people. Thus it was re-introduced 
though the zamindars were not re-invested with police powers
1 .Burdwan to Curzon 14 Aug.1907, Letters: Curzon, Vol.426, p.69
2.Burdwan to Curzon 24 June 1908, Ibid, p.74
3.Burdwan to Curzon 3 Aug.1911, Ibid. p.107
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officially. The Police Commission of 1903, chaired by Andrew 
Fraser, was also "strongly convinced of the impossibility 
of carrying on an efficient police administration by means of 
official policemen only. It is absolutely essential to secure 
the aid of the village community". Hence, though not officially 
recognised this attitude signified the continuance of de facto 
police function of the large zamindars. Although the local 
police was under the jurisdiction of the magistrate, "it 
remained in some respects the private servants of. the 
zamindars". This was largely ascribed to the power of the 
nobles to influence the local populace. Moreover, despite 
the Administration's contrary stand, the local officials 
continued to hold the zamindar in his personal capacity 
responsible for giving information of crimes and for help­
ing to arrest the perpetrators.^ Such being the case, 
although the Government at times considered sidestepping
the zamindari system to strengthen the powers of the 
2
police, it was difficult to do so for financial
and other practical reasons. On the contrary it continued
to strengthen the ibcal elements. Yfitfcuthis Intention in mind
1 .Rep.on Indian Police Com. 1 902-03 3 Curzoh, Vo17706, ....
pp.4,6,7,22.28-30
2.H.Chakrabarti: 'Government & Bengal Terrorism', B.P & P.
July-Dee.1971, p.168
the Government decided in 1913 to issue arms licenses 
I
more freely. This was done because surveillance in
villages was still•entrusted to the headmen, the panchayats
and the watchmen who were furnished with lists of known
criminals residing within their jurisdictions so that they
• 2could keep a watch on them. All such people still 
remained under the traditional authority of the local 
noblemen. Moreover , the nobles and their fellow 
zamindars utilised groups of followers popularly known 
as lathials to assert their authority and maintain 
order in their localities. The Nawab of Dacca once 
stated, "here in Dacca I have 10,000 men ready to die 
for me if I raise my little finger. That is how I keep 
the peace.”
The Maharaja of Nashipur was another senior nobleman 
who was at the very forefront opposing the terriorist tenden 
cies. He was one of the first to respond to the need to act 
He made several speeches in support of the Government and 
vigorously condemned the terrorists with the aim of persuad­
ing his tenantry to steer clear of their influence. He 
later felt that something further was necessary so that his 
appeal could be heard by a wider public. Thus he drew up 
and widely circulated a pamphlet within his zamindarj 
for everyone to read.^ The Raja of Hetampur was another who 
gained the reputation of having put down all lawlessness 
with a stern hand throughout his zamindari and personally
1. Beng. Police Proceeding: March 1915, Vol.9648, p.89.
2. Ibid: Jan. 1915, Vol.9648, p.44.
3. H.W'.Nevinson: Hew Spirit in India, p. 199.
4. D.C.Boulger: Maharajah Devi binha. pp.131,132.
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saw to it that his pra.jas remained aloof of the political move­
ments of the time.1 Maharaja Tagore reviewing their efforts 
in striking down terrorism in contrast to the moderate Congress­
men ended by stating that "the Government can get . «.» no help
from the representatives of the people in combatting anarchy."^
He later pointed out that those who were so loud in condemning 
the Government sponsored newspaper Sulabh Sanachar "have so far 
done very little to check the prevalence of political crime."5 
This contrast of efforts was noted not merely by 
their own spokesmen but by other sections of the community also. 
The Englishman, airing the opinions of the Europeans in Bengal, 
published in 1917 that "The zamindars contributed more 
than a quarter of the total revenue of Bengal from all 
sources. There are the present day leaders who do not 
contribute a single nickle penny, either by way of income- 
tax, cess or local rates. The irresponsibility of the 
leaders is in inverse proportion to their stake in t-he 
country. ",4- Carmichael, voicing the official apprec­
iation praised the zamindars1 efforts in the Legislative 
Council in the same line as the above. It is not Only from 
European sources that one can assess their effectiveness.
Such opinions can be read in the Indian press also.
The Lainik Chandrika reporting on the speech of Carmichael 
advised the Government to avoid divesting the zamindars 
of their authority any further as "it is the aristocratic •
1. Chiefs, Nobles & Zamindars. p.499.
2. Hat, owned nng. N.P.: week ending 15 Apr. 1911, p.165.
3* Nat. N.P.: week ending 22 Apr. 1911, p.455*
4. The Englishman: 24 Nov. 1917, p.8.
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zamindar families who have always been the leaders of the
Hindu society in Bengal. It is because they have been
allowed to lose their position that anarchy and unrest are
now rife in the country.'*
The culmination of their attempt to contain
terrorism was the formation of the Imperial League. It
was the brain child of the Raja of Chakdighi. Even
before the reunification of the province the Raja had
attended two confidential conferences presided over by
Eraser and Llinto respectively to discuss the prevention
of terrorism. Later the Raja proposed to his fellow
Indians with similar views that they should create
2
the Imperial League. The League's othvr leading members 
were the Maharaja of Burdwan, Maharaja Tagore, the Ilawab 
of Dacca, and the Raja of Bohbili.^Its declared objects 
were to disseminate the feeling of loyalty to the constitu­
tional Government, to keep the people aware of the intentions
4
of the Government and to combat misrepresentation.
The Maharaja of Burdwan as the presid/nt of the League amplified 
on its aim by explaining:"This League was ushered into existence 
at a time when there was a good deal of unrest and 
political discontent in the country, and when the anarchi­
cal movement, which came to all law-abiding Indians as a
1. Ind.N.P. & Per.: week ending 26 Dec. 1914, p.1461.
2. S.& B.P. Singh Roy: Chakdighi Singh Roy.Family, pp.8,11.
3. M.Rahaman: Consultation to Confrontation, p.154.
4. ’List of Associations', B.P.P.: Sept. 1911, Vol.8683, p.47.
painful surprise, was at its height."^
Having founded an association where they could
formulate concerted decisions, the nobles and like-
minded leaders utilised every opportunity to propagate
opposition to terrorist activities. The Maharaja of
Burdwan and Maharaja Tagore.as the League's spokesmen
sought official recognition for a loyal newspaper which it
2
intended to publish. Moreover, the nobles utilised the 
other associations and societies in their control and 
public platfoims at meetings they participated in at all 
opportunities to direct public opinion against what they 
considered wanton atrocities. One such occasion was at 
the All India Kshatriya Conference held in 1912. In a 
strongly worded speech as the president of the body the 
Maharaja of Burdwan told his fellow caste members that 
they should actively help eradicate this evil from the 
country. He concluded by stating that he hoped "that you 
will not fail to use your weighty influence to bear upon
a
the young minds of our community and thus help to ward 
off the spreading of the evil amongst us".^
The vigorous efforts of the nobles persuaded 
Kardinge to suggest to the Maharaja of Burdwan that the 
leading men of the province should mix with their young 
fellow Indians and ascertain their wants^and generally 
prevent them from turning terrorists.  ^ The Maharaja took 
the matter in hand and discussed it at the British 
Indian Association where a definite programme was formula­
ted. The Maharaja as their president made a public
1. Speeches: Hardinge, Vol. Va 2, pp. 43, 44.
2. Hat .IT. r. : week ending 15 July 1911, p.866.
3. The hnglishman: 28 Dec. 1912, p.12.
4. Hau.n.x. a ier.s week ending 20 March 1915, p.425.
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announcement of their conclusions on the subject. He 
proclaimed that the young men of the province had 
to be safeguarded against the snares and temptations 
which surrounded them. To do that the full cooperation 
of their guardians and their teachers were essential.
He suggested that organisations of students and 
teachers be formed all over the province cooperating 
together in the interests of law and order and the 
peaceful and progressive development of the prov­
ince. Moreover, the Association concluded that, along 
with the detection of crimes it was imperative to con­
centrate on character building of the rising generation.
It urged the Government to remould the current system 
of education, which was not in keeping with the 
employment possibilities of the country. They 
also advised the leading members of the community 
to avoid confusing the youth with "hysterical 
outbursts of loyalty on the one hand and adverse
i
criticisms in the Press on the other". Furthermore, 
the members personally took up the task of per­
suading stuaents to avoid participation in politics. 1 
The Raja of Hetampur used his influence to 
the utmost in his zaniindari to assure that the students
in the High School and College remained away from the
2political movements that prevailed. The Maharaja
1. Ind. uwned En^ ;. N.P.: week ending 10 Apr. 1915,
pp.213-215.
2* Chiefs, Nobles & Zemindars, p.499.
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of Nashipur exhorted school hoys on his estate not 
to mix in politics and explained to their tutors and 
guardians their heavy responsibilities in keeping 
the pupils and wards aloof from political agitations, 
Moreover in the pamphlet he circulated amongst his 
tenantry he wrote in rather strong language that 
Mhad these hot-headed boys turned their minds towards 
the welfare of their society and mother-land, without 
taking to these evil courses, they could probably have done 
immense good"-I The Maharaja of Kassimbazar usually 
ended his speeches by sounding a note of warning 
against the danger of being imbued with terrorist 
ideas. He attempted to bring home to the students 
the fact that such ideas were not only improper and 
foolish from a common sense point of view, but also 
highly condemnable if viewed from a religious 
standpoint.2 He even requisitioned the services of 
Prof. Samaddar of Patna College to write a series of 
books in popular English for presentation to schools.
The books were to deal with the deeds of British 
personalities who established the British Raj. It was 
an attempt to counteract the distorted misrepresentation 
of British history being propagated by the extremists-; 
amongst the young. He hoped that in this way a spirit
1. D.C.Boulger: Maharajah Devi Jinha. pp.132,133.
2. The Englishman: 24 Eeb. 1917, p.3
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of cooperation "between the rulers and the ruled could be 
created. Raja Reshee Case law in his attempt to prevent 
the young from turning terrorists advocated that primary 
education should be confined only to reading and writing 
and elementary arithmatic. Moreover the time devoted to 
such training should be limited to two years. In this 
way it would not encroach upon the time of boys for work 
in their ancestral occupations thus avoiding the growth 
of unemployment. Haphazard education led to the unfortunate 
end where one found the young had lost their traditional 
knowledge and had acquired a taste for a standard of living 
for which they were not sufficiently trained. This led to
2
frustration which in turn cultivated the seditious spirit.
The Maharaja of Burdwan issued a letter to the parents 
and guardians of the boys about their training and discipline
at home. He pointed out that in modem times, when there
had been so much student participation in politics, it was
desirable that they should not only be kept away from
political demonstrations during their academical careers
but also that it was necessary for the welfare of the country
that they should devote their attention wholly to studies.
\Vhile inaugurating the debating club of the Raj College
and the Collegiate School he further emphasised the point
by instructing the Principal and the Head Master that the
Ibid: 20 March 1916, p. 6*
2. 'Beng.Primary Education Bill 19171 3.I.C.D.:1919
p.183 ,
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subjects of debates should always be chosen with care 
and caution. Although the boys should be helped in 
developing their oratorical powers, he felt that it would 
be injurious if their minds were polluted by the selection 
of such subjects which were unhealthy for them to discuss.^-
Apparently the Maharaja was the only nobleman who
appreciated the implications of the religious teachings
and symbols which were being used to stir up terroristic
instincts in the young. When he expanded the scope and
popularised the study of Vedantic philosophy in his Raj 
2
Chatuspati the Englishman was startled into remarking 
that there was a tendency amongst the Hindu leaders to 
reintroduce methods of education which dated back to 
almost prehistoric periods. ”Y/e even have so very modern 
and progressive a leader as the Maharaja of Burdwan 
lecturing boys on Karma and Vedanta philosophy”-? But 
his motive clarified over the years. In all his speeches 
to the students he harped on the fact that Indian boys,
A
who had so much to look back to in their Puranas and Sastras
and frame their characters from the lives of the ancients,
should ignore the side which glorified discipline and
4
uprightness in favour of violence and disruption. It 
would not be wrong to assume that he was using the same 
teachings and symbols pushed forward by the extremists to 
counteract what he considered to be their distortion of 
facts. His vigorous activities against the terrorists 
persuaded the Bengal Government, supported by Chelmsford
1. The Englishman: 2 May 1911, p.8
2. Ibid: 4 May 1914, p.5
3. Ibid: 5 May 1914, p.4
4* Ibid:24 Apr.1916, p.11
to recommend him for the Sedition Committee.'1' Apparently 
he was by-passed for people with legal trainings.
It is clearly noticeable that haying decided to stand 
up against terrorism the nobles formulated a programme in 
accord with which they systematically pressured the Govern­
ment to take a firmer stand against the terrorists and 
tried to mobilise public opinion against them. They used 
caste bodies, political associations, the public platform 
and educational institutes for this purpose. Assessing 
their capacity in this field, Hardinge in a reply to the 
Imperial League stated, "...much importance attaches in 
my opinion to that spirit which has inspired so large 
a number of gentlemen of influence and position to band 
themselves together in times of trouble...much of your 
power for good must be in the influence you are able to 
bring to bear, each in your own circle. Ihfluence so 
exercised has a value which it is difficult to appraise 
too highly1’2.
Thus we find that the nobles of Bengal first supported 
the Congress and only gradually withdrew their support 
as more and more party members were identified with using 
the swadeshi slogan for terrorist propoganda rather than 
for economic benefit of the people. Simultaneously the 
Muslim nobles found further cause to withdraw their support 
Soon after the partition they began to doubt whether the 
Bengal Congress leaders were agitating merely with the 
intent of avoiding the racial destruction of Bengal. It
1. Viceroy to Sec.St. 16 Aug.1917, Telegrams: Chelmsford
Vol.o pt.II,p.328
2. Speeches: Hardinge, Vol.Va 2f pp.43,44
seemed to the nawabs that their motives could just as •
well be a desire to retain the advantage of educational
and employment superiority in the province. Their
support to Tilak's and Lajpat Rai' s obvious use of Hindu
symbolisms could not have helped to vitiate this doubt.
moreover the writings of Aurobindo Ghose, Bipin Chandra
Pal and Rabindranath Tagore were undoubtedly written with
the intent of rousing the aggressive spirit of the Hindus
of Bengal. A time arrived when the Muslim leadership was
forced into taking a defensive stance against -fehe Congress
movement* It culminated in the inauguration of the All
India Moslem League at the residence of the Nawab of Dacca.
The League's primary raison d'etre at the initial stages
was the maintenance of the integrity of the province of
Eastern Bengal and Assam and the advancement of the Muslim
population therein.^
It had often been maintained that "when Lord Curzon
skilfully dangled before their eyes the picture of a
prosperous Dacca, which meant the enhancement of the value
of the Nawab's own property, these men came around and
v 2
brought round with them most of their co-religionists.
It has also been suggested that the Muslims were bought 
over by the Authorities by advancing a large loan at a 
low rate of interest to the Nawab.^ In fact the evidence 
available suggests that the main consideration taken into 
account was the steadying influence of the Nawab. It was 
an effort to retain that influence unimpaired rather than
1. M. Rahman: Consultation to Confrontation, p.7
2. Nat. N.P: Week ending 8 July 1911, p.832
3* Nat. N.P: Week ending 6 May 1911, p.524
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purchase the support of a potential opponent. Even if 
he opposed an official move it is doubtful if he would 
ever turn into a seditionist. This is corroborated by 
the fact that another such loan was sanctioned in 1914 
even though the Nawab had been openly condemning the re­
vocation of partition for some time past and adamantly 
demanding special treatment of the Muslims to counteract 
the loss. Hardinge clearly stated on the loan issue 
that ’’the monetary aid granted to the Nawab has. never been 
viewed in the light of an ordinary loan transaction...*
The political importance, however, of averting the ruin 
of the Nawab was so pressing that this risk [loan with 
little security^ was taken without hesitation. In the 
events which followed the partition of Bengal in 1905; 
in 1912 when provincial boundaries were readjusted; and 
again last year when Muhammadan feeling was roused, the
Nawab placed himself on the side of law and order, and
by his influence he succeeded in restraining his co­
religionists in Eastern Bengal.” Elaborating on the 1914 
loan the Viceroy continued that ”The political consideration 
which impelled us to come to the aid of the Nawab in 1907
and 1908 are equally strong now, and we consider it very
desirable that his steadying influence should continue
»» 1
to be exerted on the side of the Government, Moreover, 
one must not lose sight of the fact that the first loan 
was granted in 1907. But the Nawab had already been publicly 
supporting the partition some time before that.
Even if one accepted the .supposition that the Nawab's 
support had been purchased, to imply that the change of
1. Viceroy to Crewe 14 May 1914, F.L: 1914, p.2
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heart of all the Muslim nobles was merely due to the 
prospect of the valuation of one of their fellow member’s 
property going up would be incorrect. One persons growth 
of wealth would hardly suffice to persuade the group as 
a whole to oppose the Congress programme. Similarly to 
suggest that the change of attitude was due to the fact 
that one of them was forwarded a loan by the Government 
is just as fatuous. It would be more correct to say that 
it was primarily the realisation of the benefits that their 
community would derive from the partitioned province where 
they, rather than the Hindu-dominated Congress, would be 
the key group that brought about this change of attitude.
, It is quite clear from the Nawab of Dacca's language
in an article written soon after the partition that the
above was so. He wrote, "There are many good things in
store for us...and the Muhamedans being the largest number
in the New Province, they will have the largest share....
This is the golden opportunity which God and His Prophet
have afforded us, but if we do not now profit' ourselves by
the opportunity, we may not get another chance. Now or never.
Our destiny is in our hands. Vfe must strike while the iron
is hot".'*' The opponents of the Nawab of Dacca and his
associates, who consisted of senior Congressmen like
Surendranath Banerjea, repeatedly stated that such was not the
unanimous desire of the Muslims as Nawab Abdul.Jabbar and
the Vest Bengali Muslims were opposed to the idea of divided 
2
Bengal. What they did not clarify was that though the latter 
claimed that the partition was injurious to the Bengali people
1. K .Salimulla: ’The New Province’, Journal of Moslem
Institute, Apr.-July 1906, Vol.I no.4-, pp.4-10-411
2. Nat.N.P: week ending 3 Feb.1912, p.145
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they proposed that the remedy lay in transferring Burdwan 
and Presidency Divisions to Eastern Bengal and Assam.^ Not 
once did they suggest that East Bengal should be rejoined 
to Bengal (West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa). If the former formula 
had been acted upon, the Bengali people would doubtless be 
reunited but the Muslim majority.in the province would be 
retained. On the other hand the latter policy would allow 
the Hindus to regain their overwhelming majority. Thus 
we find that the nawabs, whether from East Bengal or West 
Bengal, were apparently striving to check the influence 
of the Hindu dominated Congress from reasserting itself.
The Muslim nobles may not have doubted the Congress* sin­
cerity if the so-called nationalists demanded the reunification 
of the Bengali speaking area where the two communities 
would be numerically at par. But unfortunately in their 
view the demands of the Calcutta intelligentsia did not 
appear to be so.
By the Darbar year the Nawab of Dacca and his associates
were satisfied that their foresight had paid off. In 1911
he voiced his satisfaction in the Legislative Council by
stating, "Can any impartial critic deny that our needs and
requirements are now most sympathetically looked after?
Education, industry, agriculture and what not have received
the greatest impetus, and progress in all directions has
V 2
been most remarkable. Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhuri 
also claimed in a similar tone that "...it was only the
1. Ibid; week ending 9 Dec. 19H> p« 1476
2. Ibid: week ending 6 May 1911, p.524
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partition and the change of circumstances brought about 
by it that gave the I.Iusalmans that sense of security and 
freedom, without which real progress was impossible." He 
further asserted that education had increased ten fold and 
even more during those few years.’*'
Apart from such benefits, the nawabs used the opportunity
to decrease the new province's dependency or Calcutta. One
such move was the attempt to form a separate High Court at
Dacca. The newspapers reflecting the opinion of the Calcutta
intelligentsia strongly opposed the move. The Bengalee
maintained that"the educated community throughout the province
2
is strongly, indeed vehemently, opposed to the proposal".
Llany of the Dacca newspapers on the other hand disagreed with
the above view. The Sanjivani replying to the surprise
expressed by a Dacca newspaper at the opposition to the
creation of a High Court at Dacca when such a move would give
pecuniary advantage to the members of the bar and make
litigation less expensive for the suitors stated that "the
correspondent seems to be unaware that there is such a thing
as unselfish regard to public interest".^ However, the public
interest to which the newspaper referred may. well have been -
merely the interest of the Calcutta intelligentsia. The Samay
4
and the Hitavadi took a similar stand, as the other Calcutta 
papers. Reporting on the meeting called by the Nawab of Dacca 
to discuss the issue the Sanjivani threatened "that if he 
held one meeting, a hundred hostile meetings would be held.
1. A.I.M.L. : 1916 (9 Session), 30 Dec.1916, pp.69,70
2. Nat, owned Eng. N.P. week ending 24 June 1911, P* 266
3. Nat. N.P.: week ending 1 July 1911, p.801
4. Ibid: week ending 8 July 1911, p. 835
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Let those who have the welfare of Eastern Bengal at heart 
protest strongly against this proposal that the Nawab will 
not dare speak a word."^ It is significant that the opposition 
was aired by the Hindu-owned press of Y/estem Bengal only.
Like the establishment of a separate High Court, the nawabs
also put forward the need to form a separate university.
They were not for the extension of free primary education 
2
though. Doubtless one of the basic reasons for the negative 
attitude was that primary education would not help them achieve 
what they strove for. They aimed to increase advanced 
education so that the Muslims rojght catch up with the Hindu 
intelligentsia and remove the disparity that existed between 
the two communities. It was Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhuri 
who moved the demand which was carried unanimously at the 
All India Moslem League. He urged on the G-ovemrnent that 
there existed "the desirability of extending the operations 
of the proposed university over districts of Dacca, Rajshahi 
and Chittagong Division, so far at least as the general 
control and supervision of the educational institutions 
in those areas the prescriptions of the curricula of studies 
and the examinations are concerned".^ Later in the columns 
of the Maslfem Hitaishi he urged the necessity for a Muslim 
University in India, on the ground that the existing univer­
sities couldnot, as they were constituted, be expected to make 
a proper arrangement for the education of the Muslims. The 
Calcutta University, he emphasised, did not have a single
Ibid; week ending 20 May 1911* pp. 588, 58 9
2. The Englishman: 18 Oct. 1911, p.7
3. Nat. owned Eng. N .P .: week ending 8 June 1912, p.345
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Lius lira on 'the syndicate. Of 143 members of the Faculties 
only 8 were Liuslims and not a single Muslim sat on its 
sub-committees. ^
Apart from the establishment of the Court and the 
University the ITawab of Dadca, and Nawabs Syed Nawab Ali 
Chaudhuri and Shamsul Huda relentlessly pursued the demand..
for reserved Muslim seats in the district, local and municipal
2 3boards formulated by the Simla Deputation.
When it became known that the partition was to be 
annulled the nawabs and their associates made a last des­
perate effort to hold off what in their view was the inevitable 
revival of Congress domination. At that time the Nawab of 
Dacca was very ill. In spite of that he braved all conse­
quences and approached the Authorities. "When he left his 
house he was so weak that he could not walk and had to be 
carried in an invalid chair to the railway train from his
carriage. He hoped to get an interview with Lord Crewe and
11 4voice his opposition to the scheme. Although he was unable to
persuade the Authorities to retract their decision he
apparently got the opportunity to advise on their treatment
of East Bengal when the partition was revoked. He put
forward demands which he claimed were those of the people
of East Bengal in general and the Muslims in particular.
An examination of these demands shows that the petitioners wanted
to undermine the possible influence of the Hindu leaders of.
West Bengal from spreading to the Eastern part of the province.
I. Nat.N.P.: week ending 19 Aug.1911, p.1027
2* week ending 22 Apr. 1911, p.448
3. Ivi. Kahman: Consultation to Confrontation. App.I
4. Nat, owned Eng. N.P.: week ending 16 Dec. 1911 p.563
Vol. Va 6 pt. I
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They said that the C-overnor should spend an egual amount of 
time at Calcutta and Dacca, that there should be separate 
electoral roles for the Legislative Council, the district 
and local boards, and the municipalities for the Muslims, 
that either a separate budget for East -^engal be prepared, 
or, alternatively, a Muslim from East Bengal be appointed 
Executive Councillor, and that special allotments be made 
in Government services for the Muslims.'*’ In fact all previous 
demands were resurrected by the Nawab. Doubtless he hoped 
that in this way, despite the revocation of the partition, 
the possibility of the renewal of Congress domination, 
in East Bengal would be avoided. As the demands were not 
opposed to the Government's own way of reasoning most of 
them were acceded.
In spite of their bid to retain their sphere of influence 
the revocation of the partition marked a watershed for the 
nawabs of Bengal. It struck a hard blow on their near 
absolute hold over the Muslim population. It provided the 
Muslim intelligentsia the opportunity to strengthen their 
struggle for leadership with the nobles. Unlike the tradi­
tional leaders, the new group were not particularly opposed 
to the Congress movement. Indeed a number of them were 
members of the Moslem League, but not to the exclusion of 
their Congress membership. The Mussalman, which reflected 
their views, in an attempt to discredit the position of 
the nobles^stated that though the reunification of Bengal
1. Dacca to Hardinge 20 Dec.1911, P.P.I.:1911iVol.Va6,pt.f
p. 515
2. M. Rahman: Consultation to Confrontation, p. ix
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had struck a cruel blow at Lius lira progress the traditional 
leaders remained silent. It alleged that their silence was 
bought by a somewhat lavish shower of Darbar honours among 
the leading Muslims of the province.^
Such a stigma could be very damaging to the reputation 
of the nawabs. But apparently the Nawab of Dacca and his 
associates realised that to refute it openly by opposing 
the royal proclamation, without preparing the ground first, 
would lose them the support of the Authorities and place 
them at the mercy of the Congress, Under such conditions 
they could be swamped by the Hindu intelligentsia, defeating 
the very purpose that they were trying to achieve.
The opportunity to assure the Authorities of their 
loyalty came with the retirement of Dr. Ross as the Prin­
cipal of the Calcutta Haarassah. The Nawab of Dacca there­
upon wrote in the Englishman that "It may be questioned 
why the community did not protest against the retirement 
of Dr. Ross from the Calcutta Madrassah. The Mohommedans 
are not given to agitating even in regard to matters of vital 
importance to the community. They have an implicit trust in 
the Government, and they feel that nothing will be done
ti 2
which may tell on the welfare of the community . Later 
he had another opportunity when there was a move to amalgamate 
the Muslim associations of the two provinces into one co­
hesive body. During the occasion, the Nawab took a step 
forward in his presidential speech. He stated that "out of
1. Nat. owned Eng.N .P .: week ending 3 Feb.1912,p.93
2. The Englishman; 19 Jan.l911> p»9
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their loyalty and profound respect, and regard for the 
Throne, Cthe MuslimsJ felt that they had no other alter­
native but to desist from entering a protest" against the 
royal proclamation. But at the same time he put on record 
their deep regret at the modification of the partition.^
Only after having assured the Government, and thus having 
retained its good will, could the Nawab be sure of receiving 
sympathetic hearing when he launched into productive 
lobbying. But before that it was necessary to assess whether 
the Muslims would still accept him as their leader. That 
was made clear at the Bengal Presidency Mahomedan Conference.
At the meeting Nawab Serajul Islam while proposing the Nawab 
of Dacca to the chair said, "Sir Salimulla has always taken 
a deep interest in the welfare of his co-religionists and 
has made many personal sacrifices and even risked his life 
for the good of his community. He will be the right man 
in the right place and our able pilot under whose skilful 
guidance, I hope, the ship of our community will steer clear 
of all shoals and rocks." Nawab Sujat Ali Beg while 
seconding the propose! stated, "To guide us, to advise us, 
how to achieve the union of the two Moslem Leagues of Eastern 
and Western Bengals, we could have no more sympathetic, no 
wiser mentor, than Nawab Sir Salimulla Bahadur of Dacca".
Both remarks were received unopposed by the audience. During 
this meeting a section of the conference broke out in an 
uproar on the ground that they wished to disassociate them­
selves from the All India Moslem League, since it was run 
by a dictatorial leadership which ignored the needs of Bengal.
1. Ibid: 1 Jan. 1912, p.5
395
for a moment it seemed that the conference would end in 
chaos. At this stage the Nawab of Dacca rose and "an 
appeal from him concluded in millifluous Urdu, asking them 
to be quiet served to pour oil over troubled waters and 
the excitement calmed down as if under the influence of 
the magic wand".^ There was little doubt after that that 
his influence and prestige were still very strong with the 
Bengali Muslims.
Having established the grounds carefully it was time 
for him to take positive steps. The very next day, at the 
All India Moslem League,'he made a powerful speech re­
gretting the revocation of the partition. He emphatically 
maintained that it was a return to "a state of servile 
dependence on a dominant community"• He further added 
"Those who are forced to give up a position of their long- 
enjoyed monopoly, however unjustifiable in nature and 
origin , will readily understand the feelings of our enemies 
after the Partition". Making it clear the the Hindu-dominated 
Congress was the enemy of the Bengali Muslims, he 
ventured to point out that unless the Administration changed 
its attitude it would appear that it had "put a premium 
on sedition and disloyalty, and created an impression in the 
mind of the irresponsible masses that even the Government
can be brought down on its knees by a reckless and persistent
» 2
defiance of constituted authority.
The Nawab's strongly worded speech apparently disconcerted 
the Muslim intelligentsia. The Mussalman though being unable 
to deny the principle behind it, condemned the intensity of 
the language used by the Nawab. The paper expressed surprise
1. The Bengalee: 3 March 1912, p.3
2. Nat, owned Png. N.P.: week ending 9 March 1912, p.172 .
396
that the Authorities took no action despite the ferocity 
of the speech.^ It had overlooked that the Nawab had prep­
ared his grounds very carefully before doing so. Once more 
the Nawab had emerged as the undisputed leader of the Muslim 
interest and pushed the leaders of the intelligentsia into
the background. He had caught the interest of the Muslim 
2
community, had counteracted the allegation that he had been
bought off by high honours, and had retained the ear of the
Government^ despite the vehement attack on its policy. The
attempt of Suhrawardy and Rasul to rope the Muslims into
*
the Congress party was foiled.
It is significant that by the end of the year it was the 
Nawab of Dacca and his fellow noblemen who led the informal 
deputation of Muslim representatives that called on the 
Viceroy. All the previous demands were once more brought 
to the fore and given the same importance as before. They 
pointed out that it was essential to bring the Muslims 
educationally into line with the Hindus. Moreover, as long 
as they were not brought to the same level of progress they 
should be allowed to choose their own representatives in the 
Council, boards and the municipalities. The Nawab later 
demanded that sufficient funds be allotted by the Government
g
for the exclusive advancement of Muslim education.
At this stage incidents both inside and outside India 
threatened to disrupt their programme by tarnishing their
Ibid: week ending 16 March 1912, p.182
2. It is obvious from the elections of 1912
3. He was nominated as Muslim representative to the
Legislative Council.
. 4. Bayley to Hardinge 2 Jan. 1912, C.P.I: 1912, Vol Va 7,
5* Viceroy to Sec.St. 14 Nov.1912,
F.L: 1912, Vol 447, Lt 329, Enclo.l,p.l
6. Nat, owned Eng. N.P.: week ending 16 March 1913, p.182
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carefully nurtured reputation, of the Muslims being a 
disciplined and law-abiding community in contrast to the 
Congress which apparently condoned terrorist activities.
A section of the community began to show symptoms of extra­
territorial allegiance to Turkey. The pan-Islamists began 
to teach that their first duty was loyalty to the Khalifa 
and founded a new organisation - Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba- 
whose members vowed to die for the holy shrines. At this 
critical juncture a mosque was demolished at Kanpur by 
official order, creating a tense and explosive situation.^
Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury took on himself the respon­
sibility to calm the ruffled feelings of the Muslim popu­
lation of Bengal. Though a reserved person by nature he 
agreed to preside over the protest meeting called to discuss 
the issue. The Bengalee pointed out that it was no small 
credit "that he should have emerged from the seclusion of 
his quiet life to lead this great movement. ...Those who have
eyes to see and ears to hear will not fail to note this
2fact of tremendous significance". In his presidential 
speech the Nawab tried to strike a balance between the 
officials and the people. While pointing out to the Government 
the follies of such thoughtess acts he simultaneously 
entreated his coreligionists to maintain self control 
so as not to gain the reputation of being agitators. As he 
was better known as a great landed nobleman rather than a 
politician,^ his appeal -could not be misconstrued by the 
people nor by the Government as that of a political opportunist.
1. -End.OonstitiRef., p.22
2. Nat. owned. Eng.N.P.: week ending 9 Aug. 1913, p.545
3. The Englishman: Jl Dec.1920,p.6
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Moreover, he was greatly admired by his coreligionists 
as an ardent Muslim who had had the courage to stand out 
against non-cooperation. Doubtless his presence did a 
lot to prevent the Muslims from losing self-control and 
thus falling into the same level as the Congress agitators 
in the eyes of the Government.
Another such question which nearly caused the Muslims 
to turn violent was the interference in their right to 
sacrifice cows as kurbani during the Bakr Id festival.
The East Bengal mullas were inflaming the minds of the 
Muslims and provoking them to turn violent against the 
interfering Hindus. The Nawab of Murshidabad prevented 
the situation from degenerating into a province-wide blood 
bath. To counteract the dangerous doctrine he issued a 
manifesto and requested his co-religionists to avoid blood­
shed for such a purpose. His effort was made easier by 
the help accorded by the Maharaja *of Burdwan, the premier 
Hindu nobleman, who made a gift of a camel to his Muslim 
prajas for kurbani. The next year the Nawab stopped cow 
sacrifice in his killa-nizamat as an example of tolerence
and compromise between the "two eyes of the community" and
2
asked the Muslims to follow suit. Doubtless this attitude 
of the Nawab, who was still considered their Amir-ul-Omra 
by the Muslims, helped pour oil on troubled water. In the 
year 1914 the Government was able to stop Bakr Id sacrifices 
altogether.^
1. Nat, owned Eng. N.P.: week ending 30 Nov. 1912, p.731
2. Nat. N.P.: week .ending 23 Nov. 1912, p. 1373
3* Ibid: week ending 21 Eeb. 1914, p.162
In spite of their efforts the nobles could not retain 
the monopoly of leadership of the community for much longer.
Too. much of it was dependent on the influence and prestige 
of the Nawab of Dacca. Assessing his importance and influ­
ence in the I.Iuslim community, Carmichael wrote, "The Nawab 
of Dacca died a few days ago. This will I fear give us a 
good deal of anxiety and-perhaps trouble. He could and did. 
control the Mohammedans in Bengal as no other man can.
There will probably be disputes now among would be leaders, 
some of whom are anything but friendly disposed toibeGovernment  ^
This was so because many Muslims considered that they had 
been betrayed by the Government. A small group of younger 
professional men in Calcutta were insisting that the community 
must adopt a more aggressive stance if it were to improve its 
lot. The Nawab of Dacca and his supporters managed for a 
time to prevent any public dissent. But in the Budget debate 
in 1913 Fazlul Huq brushed aside the conventional approach 
and demanded compensation for the past ill treatment. Nawab 
Shamsul Huda was quickly on his feet to deny the allegation;
But the response which.Fazlul Huq’s speech drew from various 
sections of the community suggested that there were many who 
thought as he did. Fazlul Huq brought a new style to Muslim 
politics in Bengal. Here was a political leader of the new 
kind. Unlike the traditional leaders, whose influence was 
locally based on landholding, he had made his way by personal 
ability. In many ways he reacted like the Congress leaders 
and like them his criticism was directed primarily at the 
Government. In 1915 the Nawab of Dacca died and many of
T* Carmichael to Crewe 28 July 1915, Letters Carmichael: 
Crewe, Box c/6
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those involved in the succession struggle that lolloped 
were younger members of the intelligentsia like Pazlul 
Huq. In the twelve months following the Nawab1s death these 
men gained control of the Bengal Presidency Moslem League 
with Huq as secretary.^
The domination of the new group changed the programme 
of the Moslem League. .The proceedings of the very next 
meeting convinced many like the' Lloslem Hitaishi that the 
League had deviated from the purpose for which it had been 
established by the late Nawab of Dacca. It gave the appear­
ance of desiring to be one with the Congress which would
2inevitably result in their aims and objects becoming parallel.
The conservative nobles like ITawab Serajul Islam Loudly
proclaimed in vain that what was wrong with Home Rule in the
form demanded by the Congress was that it would be detrimental
to Liuslim interests.^ The LIcslem League had turned away from
the old principle of working out the salvation of the Liuslim
community without any interference from the Hindu dominated
Congress. The Lucknow Pact changed all that and Hindu leaders
could also be seen making political speeches in mosques. In
exasperation Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury resigned,as President
of the Bengal Presidency Lloslem League when the body embarked
A
on political ventures which he was unable to countenance.
As a matter of fact the withdrawal of the nobles as a group 
was abrupt and significant. In the-1916 Session of the All 
India Lloslem League the office bearers from Bengal were Nawab 
Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury and Nawab Habibullah Khan of Dacca.
1. J.H. Broomfield,pp.64*65
2. . Ind. N.P. & Per. : week ending 6 May 1916, p.650
3. Addresses Presented at Calcutta: Montagu, Vol.34, Llemo
q. ’Lnclo. to Letter to Y. Holderness 16 Ap.l9l8f,
Correspondence with Sec.St. ‘.Chelmsford,Vol 4,pt.II,p.30
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Moreover, m  the list of members comprising twenty nine
people the names of Nawabs Altaf, Ali, Serajul Islam and
Abdul Jubbar could be found.^ By the following year, however,
the League had decided to join hands with the Congress.
It resulted in not a single nobleman from Bengal attending
the session. The meeting resolved that a joint conference
of the All India Congress Committee and the Council of
the All India Lloslem League would form an All India deputation
to move a "Congress-Moslem League Scheme of Reform”. Fazlul
2
Huq and A. Qasim represented Bengal on the Committee.
The immediate cause that forced Nawab Syed Nawab Ali 
Chaudhury to resign was the Moslem League’s disapproval 
of his conduct in the Imperial Council. He refused to sign 
the self-government memorandum submitted by nineteen elected 
members of the Council.^ Amongst the signatories were M.
Huque, Ibrahim Rahemtoola, Mir Asad Ali, Mohamed Ali Llphamed, 
and Jinnah.^ The Muhammadi criticising the LTawab's non­
cooperation queried his motive by stating, ”A11 Indians are 
now praying for self-Government, We know that he is personally 
opposed to self-Government, but as a representative of 
LIussalmans and President of the Bengal Moslem League he ought
If c
to have signed. On the other hand, the Moslem Hitaishi, 
supervised over by Nawab Shamsul Huda, appreciated his motive 
and a week later emphasised that the requested reforms would 
injure the interests of the Muslims. As an explanation it 
stated that the interests of the Muslims in the municipalities
1. ’List of Office Bearers 1916’ A .I .M .L .: Report,pp.6,15-17
2. ’Tenth Session 1917’, Ibid, App.E
3. The Englishman: 16 May 1917, p*4
4* 'Memorandum to Viceroy', G.B.R.. Vol 51, p.257
5. Ind.N.P. & Per: week ending 28 Oct.1916, p.1434
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and district boards were not even then under official 
chairmanships, properly safeguarded. If those local bodies 
were allowed to be managed entirely by elected members and 
elected chairmen,a*advocated by the memorialists, liuslim 
interests would be faced with the perpetual danger of being 
overlooked.^
Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury like the Nawab of Dacca
after the revocation of the partition, realised that his
reputation was at stake, and that the activities of the
leaders of the intelligentsia were bringing the Muslim
community once more to the brink of loss of identification.
It was on the verge of being submerged in'the Hindu dominated
Congress movement. Belonging to the traditional school he
did not react in haste. Instead he went about with great
caution to prepare his ground first. Firstly, he clarified
his stand to the Authorities by a separate memorandum.'He
explained that he was in accord with the signatories in every
way; but found it necessary to withdraw his support as some
of the proposals would give an undue advantage to a single
advanced group. The Muslims in that case would be totally 
2
swamped. He followed the above move with a detailed ex­
planation to his constituency. He pointed out that the Muslim 
member in the Council "Stands on a very unstable ground. It 
is quite apparent that by himself he cannot do much. He is 
to enlist the sympathy of his colleagues of other denominations
1. Ibid: week ending 11 Nov. 1916, p.1503
2. Chelmsford to Chamberlain 13 Apr. 1917 (Enclo. A)
Correspondence with Sec. St. Che lias f ord: Vol.II,pp. 107-1M
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to carry out his point. But as it sometimes happens, his 
point of view more or less based on his communal needs,.... 
does not commend itself to others who being outside the fold 
cannot appreciate it to the desired extent." Thus in any 
future programmes "It must be clearly recognised that what 
India has to get in the shape of rights and privileges is 
to be adequately shared by various sections that comprise 
the Indian people." Having established his aim he pointed 
out that he had "Always placed it in the forefront of my 
aims, the advocacy of Muslim claims in all those departments 
out of of Csic.] public administration, in which I know as 
a matter of fact the Musalmans have not had their adequate 
share"
His adamant perseverance and careful preparation paid off,
In many respects the new leadership could not satisfy the
Muslim demands. In 1318 many were looking for a leader who
would not compromise with the Hindus. The man who supplied the
need was Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury. At no stage had he
had dealings with the Congress Leaders. In August 1918 he
was elected the president of the Central National Mahommedan
Association. As a member of the traditional school he
appreciated the value of personal intercession at the highest
level. Throughout 1919 by personal interviews and letters
he kept up the pressure on the members of the provincial and
Indian governments. Through the Central Mahommedan Association
he organised Muslim conferences in various parts of the province, 
at which resolutions were passed disallowing the right of the
1. Syed Nawab Aly: A Year on the Imperial Legislative Council,
pp.ii,iii.
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Moslem League to speak for the Bengal Muslims and urging 
the British to honour their pledges to the Liuslim community.^
The Bengal Moslem League held its 1919 sitting at Mymensingh.
"As a counter-blast to the Lloslem League, Nawab Nawabali 
Chaudhuri held a conference at Serajgunj under the auspices 
of the Central National Muhammadan Association. In a speech 
of considerable courage and ability he called upon all 
reasonable Muhammadans to form a moderate party and to break 
free from the designing influence of the Hindu politicians 
who had captured the Moslem League. In particular he pro­
tested against the admission of Hindus to Mosques for the 
purpose of addressing mixed audiences on politics!*. His 
campaign was successful and he managed to bring back many of 
his co-religionists to the line formulated by the Nawab of 
Dacca and his associates. But it could not be denied that 
total control of the Muslims by the nobles could never, be 
established again.
The above examination reveals the attitudes of the Bengal 
nobles in reference to the so-called freedom movement. 7/hen 
the Indian National Congress was launched they gave it their 
enthusiastic support.' Many prominent'noblemen actively par­
ticipated in its formation and helped during its initial 
stages of development. When the Party launched the anti­
partition movement on a large scale many senior rajas and nawabs 
worked shoulder to shoulder with the Pairty members. They 
advocated, initiated and supported many swadeshi enterprises 
in consequence of it. But as the swadeshi slogan got more
1. J.H. Broomfield, pp.125-127
2. Bengal Diary Vol. I : Ronaldshay, Vol.I, p.229
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and more embroi3.ed with the terrorism prevalent in the
province the nobles gradually withdrew their support.
This was principally so because the revolutionaries were
members of the same Congress Party to which the Lloderates
also belonged. Though the latter claimed abhorence of
such acts they apparently could neither denounce them as
criminal activities nor reject the supporters of such acts
from the Congress Party. Lloreover, these extremists who
put forward Hindu symbolisms to excite the masses into more
vigorous agitation disturbed the Liuslim nobles of Bengal.
Because of this the latter felt the need to create a defence.
organisation against the apparent Hindu hegemony which such
'Congressmen seemed to advocate. This hardened attitude of
the nawabs continued unabbetted even when the Lloslem League
they helped create for the above purpose showed symptoms of
tendencies to fuse with the Indian National Congress.' Thus
it can be concluded that the overall effectiveness of the
concerted activities of the nobles incited by their attitude
made it possible for the swadeshi movement to avoid being
totally identified with hooliganism and boycott, and prevented the
possibility of terrorism overwhelming the province as a whole,^
and prevented the Liuslim separatist movement from Losing its
2
individuality to the Indian National Congress.
1. According to the Sedition Committee at the very height 
of the movement (1906-1919) there were 311 political 
mul’ders in undivided Bengal. in contrast to 265 in the • 
first half of 1971 in \7. Bengal alone according to the 
Guardian 15 June 1971. Without the restraining hands 
of the senior zarnindars violence may have spread in the 
rural areas converting Eastern India into a place like 
Algeria making it impossible for Gandhi and his associates 
to launch the Sat.vagraha movement with success in Bengal 
and its environment.
2. But for the Liuslim nobles there might not have been an 
East Pakistan or Bangladesh.
CONCULSION
The landed nobles of Bengal could not claim 
to be a nobility from a legal viewpoint. The British 
authorities had refrained from converting the Subedari 
nobility, which they had inherited, into an equivalent 
of the British nobility.* Moreover, the baronial houses 
of the Nizamat era, which had survived the attrition 
of time, had been trimmed of all the political power 
which they had once wielded. The noblemen had been 
officially reduced to the functional level of revenue 
agents for the Government on a par with other owners 
of agricultural estates.
Despite their degradation, the surviving members 
managed to retain their physical identity. Certain acts 
and attitudes of the paramount power helped 
them to do so. The British Government declared the 
Bengal landholders - both baronial and ministerial - to 
be proprietors of the territories in their charge by 
the Permanent Settlement and it continued to bestow the 
age old titles conferred on them by previous regimes.
This arrangement justified the continuance of the use 
of noble paraphernalia despite the loss of baronial powers. 
In the eyes of the general public the old nobility 
appeared unaltered. This misconception was further 
buttressed by the fact that, though the British reduced 
their powers, the members were still addressed by the 
Administration as nobles, with all the accompanying
terminology generally applicable to persons of 
such status. So the nobles steadfastly continued 
to adhere to the old pattern of life and to instill 
an attitude of pompous superiority into succeeding 
generations. Thus, the aura of an indigenous nobility 
was never allowed to perish while the British administered 
Bengal•
This conscientious attachment by the surviving 
noble houses to the traditional life style of the Mughal 
period bore fruit. The new Administration invested 
many more personalities with, and declared others as 
hereditary holders of, titles considered either noble 
or royal by Indians throughout their history. These 
new recipients soon cultivated habits and life patterns 
similar to the earlier group. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century the individuals and families with 
rights to noble titles from both eras had merged into
a reasonable homogeneous body in which it was practically
*
impossible to distinguish between the behavioural 
patterns of the nobles who could trace their pedigree 
back to the pre-British days and those of the nobles 
who could not.
Irrespective of their antiquity, all the nobles 
resided in palatial buildings surrounded with princely 
pomp and splendour. The morning was heralded with the 
hoisting of their family colours amidst bugle calls and 
the ringing of bells. Their 'palace* grounds were pat­
rolled by their liveried retainers. The nobles disported 
themselves in Mughal costumes and held princely darbars
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on ceremonial occasions in accord with regulations 
established by their forbears• Sitting on gaddis 
amidst their courtiers they made public speeches, 
announced general policies, received nazars, gave 
benedictions, accepted darkhasts, and allotted reliefs.
In short they went through all the motions of royal 
personages despite the lack of any legal foundation 
for such pretentions.
An inevitable by-product of their conspicuous 
consumption was a specific style of upbringing for 
their children. Unlike the bhadralok the nobles did 
not attach much importance to formal education since 
it was considered a means of livelihood for people of 
’inferior1 birth. Although some of their children were 
sent to schools and colleges, the general practice was 
to educate the children at home on subjects considered 
useful for zamindari management. Moreover, from a very 
young age the children were instructed in carrying them­
selves in a ’dignified' fashion and a cultivated etiquette 
considered appropriate for noblemen. This conscious 
inculcation of a superior attitude, plus the fact mat 
they spent their formative ages behind high walls sur­
rounding the 'palace' compounds, instilled in children 
of noble families a profound self-importance which in 
turn led to exclusiveness. They grew up in an atmosphere 
apart from children of 'lesser' families, believing that 
they were above the rest of the community, and continued 
to remain aloof even as men. On maturing they either 
married within their own group or, if circumstances
necessitated taking brides from outside, methodically 
severed relationships with the bridal families.
These children, on succeeding their parents, 
continued to regard themselves and their fellow nobles 
with the highest esteem. They strove to attain further 
honours with more flamboyant titles. To emphasise 
their exclusiveness they corresponded with one another 
on specially prepared paper, received one another in 
state, and maintained exclusive formalities in their 
relationships with each other. In a similar manner they 
treated and received important British notables.
This traditional nobility gained further importance 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
effects of the Sepoy Mutiny led to the transfer of power 
from the Company to the Crown, which thereby became an 
Indian Sovereign. One of the side effects of this 
alteration was to bring the indigenous 'nobility1 to 
public attention. Official efforts were exerted to 
systemise the Sovereign's noblemen. All of this publicity 
further enhanced their sense of self-importance. By the 
end of the century they had been categorised and ranked 
in a hierarchical pattern with privileges and prerogatives 
in keeping with their seniority. The Government also 
allotted them special seats on ceremonial occasions, 
reserved certain forms of adornment for their exclusive 
use, fixed the cost of medical expenses chargeable by 
Government medical officers, granted to the hereditary 
noblemen the rights to make formal visits to and receive 
a return visit from the head of the province, exempted
them from attendance in civil courts and from the 
compliance with the arms act. Such privileges further 
separated them from the rest of the community. They 
began to clamour for special privileges such as dis­
tinctive buildings in colleges for their use and for 
separate schools for their children. Soon, with the 
aid of the Title Committee, this group totally closed 
their ranks, making it practically impossible for any 
new aspirant to enter their closed corporation.
Thus, although a nobility with substantive power 
did not exist in twentieth century Bengal, the group 
under review manifested all the basic qualities of a 
recognisable status group. They were exclusive and 
remote in the extreme, they demanded a specific way 
of life from their fellow members, and they had a sense 
of belonging to a group superior to and more 'dignified' 
than the rest of the society.
Their position as proprietors of large agricultural 
estates, along with their love for high sounding titles 
activated by their desire to be identified as the scions 
of the old nobility, created a situation by vhich they 
emerged as a profitable element to the inhabitants of the 
province. The groups' standing was of such importance 
that its members could claim with confidence that they 
were the hatural leaders' of the indigenous society. The 
Permanent Settlement gave these families perpetual 
proprietory rights in law which they had until then only 
held in fact. Thus instead of depriving them of their
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illegal gains acquired during the decline of the Mughal 
rule, the new Administration officialised their status 
"by equating .iagir-i~tankwans with jagir-i-watans.
The act of 1793 perpetuated their lineage and this 
removed the danger of being replaced because of any 
popular dissatisfaction against any individual concerned. 
Personal competency as the defacto government in the 
locality was no longer called for. So long as they were 
able to keep the revenue collecting machinery oiled and 
working allowing them to render proper accounts to the 
Government, they were sure of being left unmolested in 
their territories. This made it possible for the families 
concerned to safely withdraw into their seclusion even 
more than the ncbles of earlier eras. Thus, over the 
generations the individual on the gaddi gradually acquired 
a depersonalised quality. Under the circumstances it 
became practically impossible for the local people to 
assess the failings of any particular occupant of the 
gaddi. The achievements and roles that he received credit 
for were not necessarily his own but that of the family 
institution which he symbolised. Thus despite any short­
comings he could still bask in the glories of some com­
petent ancestor. This made it unnecessary for a capable 
personality to be on the gaddi at all times. All that 
he required to do was maintain what he had inherited and 
pass it on to his successor. In time another competent 
successor would inherit who would add to the glory of 
the family. This process could keep the family at the 
apex for generations. Because of this cumulative process
a situation developed whence the effects of such acts 
were felt in some form or the other by a very large 
section of the population. This capacity to influence 
the people thus linked to them made it possible for 
them to claim that they were the ’natural leaders’ or 
leaders by virtue of the advantages of birth.
By virtue of the size and character of their 
estates this status group was in a dominant position in 
their own economic class. The Administration quite ob­
viously looked at them for support and advice on issues 
affecting the landholders. This made it possible for 
the nobles to set the pace for the rest of their class. 
Their estates were regarded as the models by the lesser 
zamindars. their systems of zamindari management were 
studied and imitated, they themselves were used as 
channels of communication to convey local grievances 
and needs to the Administration. At times they were 
even relied on to act as trustees and managers for smaller 
estates, and often funds expended by them for the improve-
4
ment of their own estates benefitted the surrounding 
zamindaris also. In short they formed the nucleus of 
the zamindari system that was in existence in Bengal.
The usefulness of the noble households was not 
limited to these handful of zamindars only. To ensure 
regular payment of revenue to the Government the Burdwan 
Estate, followed by several others, had introduced a 
system of dividing and sub-dividing the cultivable areas 
and farming them out to numerous tenants and sub-tenants.
Thus came into being a school of sub-contractors 
graded according to a hierarchical pattern. It was 
the lowest level of this group of sub-contractors 
which came into actual contact with the local peasantry, 
making each successive level more and more remote and 
exclusive. This pattern increased the possibilities 
for the individual noblemen to withdraw into seclusion 
permitting the populace to be aware of only a semi- 
ethereal facade. Thus the efforts and the activities 
of the noblemen enumerated beyond the 'palace* walls 
became more legendary than real, giving these depersonal­
ised figures a mythological glamour. The girth of this 
pyramidical tenantry, who unconsciously aided to the 
growth of the nobles' exclusiveness, gradually increased 
until it engulfed practically the entire bhadralok 
population of rural Bengal. A great portion of the land­
lords' incomes were shared out amongst this large section 
of the mufassil population. Although on the average QOyo 
of the income derived from land was the proprietdr's 
share, on record it is noted that even the Maharaja of 
Burdwan, the owner of the largest zamindari, actually 
received only an average of 16^ from his estate. Thus 
it is safe to presume that a big proportion of the rural 
bhadralok population was economically inter-linked with 
the noble households. The large zamindars depended on 
them for their collection while they in turn derived 
substantial supplementary income for their joint family pools. 
This inter-dependence made it possible for the tenants 
to air their grievances with ease since their relationship
with the local zamindar: was an intimate one, and it 
also forced the zamindar to listen to their concerted 
appeal with sympathy since his own well being depended 
on the latter's cooperation. But doubtless the more 
significant benefit was the actual financial gain. The 
tenantry income acted as -a supplement to the income of 
the bhadralok who were primarily professional men. This 
insignificant sum gained in importance during emergencies 
since it functioned as a financial cushion. In a country 
where there was no state provision for social welfare 
and where social taboos prevented such people from tiding 
over difficult times by accepting menial work or by their 
women seeking employment, the only income that existed 
under such circumstances were their share in the tenancy.
An economic link so fundamental in character gave the 
depersonalised figures on the gaddis a patriarchal 
authority over the local population despite the lack of 
legal sanction.
The traditional authority of these patriarchs 
spread further than the people linked to them by the 
land only. This was so because of the impossibility of 
claiming noble status without continuing to perform 
certain traditional roles established by their forbears.
One such sphere of activity was in the religious life 
of the province. They were expected by the people, the 
Government, and their fellow members to maintain temples 
and mosques with considerable properties attached which 
provided large sums as revenue. This function placed them 
in the position of the local shebayats and mutwallis.
In such religious establishments not only'/were daily services
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performed tut thousands of devotees were also expected 
to be regularly fed. Moreover, these sanctuaries acted 
as refuges for the poor, the sick, the old, the widows 
and other unfortunate people. It was possible for such 
people to retire to these establishments and thus avoid 
becoming dependent on others' charity, or facing the 
danger of having their reputations tarnished as social 
parasites, or as people living off Government handouts.^"
On the contrary the move was considered an act of piety 
and such people were regarded and treated with considerable 
respect.
Closely linked with the religious life of the 
province was caste. Here also the nobles, following the 
example of their predecessors, functioned as the caste 
dalpatis and financed their respective central funds for 
educating the less fortunate, providing up-to-date infor­
mation to interested parties, giving financial assistance 
to the needy, supplying free or cheap kitchens and 
dormitaries for people away from home, and generally 
strengthening the economic base of their respective caste. 
It must be kept in mind that hion caste did not necessarily 
signify affluence. The poorest man in Bengal could quite 
easily belong to the highest caste. Thus the system, 
greatly sustained by the noble houses, provided a process 
by which poorer members of the society could receive 
help from the better off without any loss of face. This 
process of distribution of wealth was even more effective 
as the unique position of noblemen made it possible for 
them to act as dalpatis of more than one caste, thus
providing means of communication in the apparently rigid
1. In a country where only a small percentage paid any tax 
such benefits woula undoubtedly be considered handouts 
rather than rights.
social structure.
This traditional role of annadatas along with 
the desire to gain further honours, also forced the 
nobles to maintain schools and colleges, dispensaries 
and hospitals, where they had to provide subsidised 
education or scholarships and free or inexpensive 
medical facilities. They also had to concentrate their 
funds on the civic development of the locality by 
providing waterworks, electricity, canals, drainage, 
and river dams despite the fact that these activities 
were legally in the Government.' s sphere. They were also 
expected to maintain model farms and patronise agro­
industrial exhibitions to promote better production in 
their localities. They had to further maintain machineries 
which could be mobilised during emergencies for such acts 
as importation of cheap food during famines, rescue work 
during floods, and financial assistance from their suspense 
accounts'*' for the suffering during periods of stress. They 
were also expected to encourage cultural development of 
the people by patronising such intellectual bodies as 
literary societies and mu^ c circles. Some of them 
participated in the commercial life of the province as well.
All these functions necessarily had to be performed 
by them even if the individuals concerned may have desired 
otherwise. The neglect of these roles would have led to 
the inevitable exposure of this nobility without a legal 
or political base. Their forbears had established that
1. Appendix II
a nobleman was to be the local karta or malik and 
act as the inhabitants' annadata. To change their 
character at this late date, when they had been dep­
rived of their political power, would have been 
suicidal. So they refrained from allowing this func­
tional role to wilt and perish. It was not a difficult 
task since the system which had been built over 
generations had become self-generating requiring no 
undue effort to run from the individuals concerned.
This unbroken chain of functions paid them good dividends. 
Despite the unworthy character of many nobles, a great 
many of local people continued to respect and remain 
attached to these households which exercised patriarchal 
authority. This attachment of the people to the gaddis 
is well illustrated in the autobiography of the Maharaja 
of Susang. The Maharaja returned to his estate for a 
visit in 1956, a decade after the creation of East Pakistan 
and found near the 'palace' gate, the parent of a sick 
child, waiting there in confident expectation tha^ the 
mere sight of the gaddi would inspire a miraculous cure. 
Another couple came to make offerings as thanksgiving for 
the birth of a male child. Wot only had the Maharaja been 
away for many years, and was expected never to return, 
but when the people concerned actually saw him they did 
not even «recognise him.'*' Doubtless the individuals on 
the gaddi were of secondary importance. The respect and 
attachment were for the gaddi itself.
The existence of these socio-economic links which 
could be utilised as channels of communication made it 
possible for the nobles to find a new role in the political
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life of the province. The nineteenth century experi­
enced the emergence and growth of a process of consul­
tative politics in India. In time, the Administration 
rarely legislated on any issue, introduced any reforms, 
or pursued any policy without first assessing the public 
reaction to the proposed “schemes. The development of 
this form of political mechanism gave the Bengalis who 
were conversant with English ideals and methods, and who 
were at the same time capable of guiding public opinion, 
an opportunity to become intermediaries in public affairs. 
Under the circumstances the nobles and their fellow 
zamindars were at an advantage. Though they had been 
shorn of most political powers they still exercised 
considerable traditional influence in most of the province. 
Moreover they had it in their control the various lines 
of communication discussed by which the Government's 
policy could be conveyed and interpreted to the populace. 
Thus their hereditary position already provided the 
channels through which they could function as intermediaries 
for the rulers.
All they lacked to become truly effective in the 
role of intermediaries were platforms from which Indian 
needs could be voiced for the Government's attention.
This need led to the creation of numerous political 
associations representing various interest groups. The 
first one of some importance was the British Indian 
Association. Apart from the senior zamindars the Associa­
tion's membership comprised eminent businessmen, renowned 
lawyers, reputed doctors, and other such people involved
in professions and services. Despite its multi- 
class constitution, the motive force of the body lay 
in the hands of the nobles and other senior zamindars.
For the first half of the nineteenth century this 
political organisation dominated the Indian political 
scene. ;
In the second half of the century the zamindars^ 
monopolistic political leadership of this indigenous 
society was challenged by the growing Calcutta intelli­
gentsia whose interest lay in professions and services 
rather than landholdings. The Indian Association, a 
subsidiary body of the Indian National Congress, became 
their spokesman and superseded the British Indian 
Association in importance in the urban areas. With its 
growth in importance it became increasingly obvious to 
the leaders of the older body that the attitude of the 
members of the two associations on various basic points 
were at variance with one another. While the former advo­
cated the role of intermediaries by such associations, 
the latter took on the more vigorous stance of opposition 
to the Government. Moreover, their opposition took the 
direction of nationalism in contrast to the older group 
who struggled for equal status of Bengal in particular, 
and India in general, within a federated empire. But 
the most fundamental difference in the nobles' opinion, 
lay in the newer group's approach to western ideas and 
institutions. Being bound by traditions the older leaders - 
preached that western views should be studied, examined 
and then carefully adapted to the indigenous institutions
already in existence. Viewing the activities of the 
new group, the traditional leaders felt convinced that 
the intelligentsia, in their anxiety to show that 
educated Indians were as advanced in all respects as 
the British were falling into the dangerous habit of 
rejecting all indigenous•institutions in favour of 
western ones. The nobles were convinced that the new 
leadership was nudging India into a path leading towards 
'denationalisation1. In other words they were preaching 
'racial suicide'. Due to this divergence of attitude, 
and the nobles' suspicion of the efforts of the intelli­
gentsia, the turn of the century found two rival groups 
of leadership in Bengal. Thus the nobles took a step 
further in their evolving political functions. From 
baronial powers they had moved to the role of intermedi­
aries; now they had become intermediaries functioning 
in part as a counter-poise to the nationalist leaders.
This rivalry with the fast rising intelligentsia 
instilled fear in the minds of many noblemen and other 
senior zamindars. They feared that the controversy 
would inevitably lead to an attack by many of the newer 
leaders on their rights as landlords. In their opinion 
this was an inevitable result of the younger group's 
tendency to seek inspiration from the west. Since most 
of them appeared to be supporters of the English liberal 
the nobles feared that the Liberal Party's doctrine of
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more equitable distribution of land^ould inevitably 
creep into the demands of many local nationalists, 
thus endangering the very foundation on which the 
nobility stood. As an antidote to such a possibility 
some senior noblemen initiated the formation of the 
Bengal Landholders Association in 1911. The Association, 
which was to consist exclusively of landlords, aimed to 
advocate the landholders’ cause to the Government, to 
improve the image of the landholders in the $yes of the 
public, and to create closer understanding between the 
landholders and other important sections of the community.
Along with the general antagonism the Muslim 
nobles further feared that the Hindu dominated urban 
intelligentsia's vigorous efforts would deprive their 
fellow religionists the opportunity to secure special 
treatment to allow the community to catch up with the 
Hindus. In their view this would undoubtedly result in 
most of the better employments being retained by the more 
advanced Hindus in contrast to the lesser educated Muslims. 
This misgiving led to the formation of the Bengal Presi­
dency Moslem League and the Central National Muhammedan 
Association of Calcutta. Utilising these platforms, the 
Muslim nobles and their associates determined to safe-guard
1. They were aware of the Liberal Party's endeavours 
to curtail the rights of the landlords in England,
In 1909 the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
a strongly worded speech had questioned, "... who 
ordained that a few should have the land of the 
Britain as a perquisite, who made 10,000 people 
owners of the soil, and the rest of us trespassers 
in the land of our birth.....1’ - R. Jenkins:
Mr. Balfour's Poodle, p.94
the interests of the Muslims against the overhearing
✓
domination of the Congress cum Indian Association, 
who apparently cared little for Muslim advancement.
Apart from being the nerve centre of the urban 
intelligentsia the city and its hinterland were important
commercially. The Indian commercial community that
resided within had grown into an important element
in the economic life of the province. Following the
example of the British commercial community, the Indian
merchants, led by the Law family, established a chamber
of commerce. The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce
thus initiated emerged in due course as the spokesman of
Indian commercial interests in eastern India.
These six associations - British Indian Association, 
Bengal Landholders Association, Bengal National Chamber of 
Commerce, Bengal Presidency Moslem League, Central National 
Muhammedan Association, and Indian Association - were the 
major political associations which gained prominence and 
emerged as the main intermediaries in public affairs in the 
early decades of the twentieth century. Thus, on close 
examination we find that, apart from the Indian Association, 
the nobles dominated the proceedings of all the important 
political bodies of the province. Moreover, $.11 six major 
associations were considered of equal importance by the 
Government and their opinions carried equal weight.
Keeping this in mind, one must conclude that while the 
nationalists basically represented a Single interest group, 
the nobles in their corporate capacity represented a far 
wider spectrum of interests in the province. In short they 
had emerged as the inter-organisational political leaders
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of Bengal. This development, added to the fact that 
they had numerous channels by which the public could 
be mobilised, placed them as intermediaries in a far 
superior position to the nationalist leaders of the 
time. Their effectiveness as such was ascertained by 
their capacity to move the Administration without having 
to resort to agitational demonstrations and to mobilise 
public opinion without having to succumb to making either 
conciliatory or inflamatory speeches.
A close examination leaves little doubt that the 
nobles functioned very effectively as conservative 
intermediaries. The major issues that affected Bengal 
during the decade under review were the revocation of 
the partition, the transfer of the capital from Calcutta 
to Delhi, the conversion of Bengal from a Lieutenant 
Governor's to a full Governor’s province, the First World 
War and its aftermath. The revocation of the partition 
caused a great deal of resentment in the hearts pf many 
Bengali Muslims. The move was interpreted by them as the 
Government's defeat in the hands of the Hindu agitators 
who cared little for the well being of the Muslims.
Their despondency was further aggravated by the attitude 
of the British regarding Persian affairs and the Turko- 
Italian conflict. The Pan-Islamists, taking advantage 
of the existing atmosphere, excited the Muslim people 
on the slightest excuse such as the inadvertant demolition 
of a section of a mosque. The situation became explo­
sive with Turkey’s declaration of war with Great Britain. 
The delicate handling of issues affecting the Muslim 
community and the guidance of Muslim public opinion
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became the primary task of Carmichael on taking office 
as Governor. Matters were not made any easier for him 
by repetitive communal riots during the Bakr Id festivals 
and by the need to establish an efficient machinery to 
organise pilgrim traffic during the forthcoming Akbari Haj. 
The Governor relied heavily, and with excellent results, 
on the judgement and support of the Nawab of Dacca,
Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury, Nawab Shamsul Huda, and 
the Nawab of Murshidabad. The Nawab of Murshidabad, 
though less articulate in political matters than the other 
nawabs, had the advantage of representing that household 
which linked the Bengali Muslims to their historic past 
in the province. This placed him in a unique position 
for which they felt a profound respect. Moreover, he was 
the officially recognised Amir-ul-Omra. The combination 
of these factors caused his requests and instructions to 
be considered with some respect. His effectiveness 
became unmistakeable when a manifesto issued by him 
in 1912 brought an apparently uncontrollable communal 
riot to an end. Apart from these nawabs, others who were 
similarly prominent were Nawab Abdul Jabbar, Nawab 
Sujatali Beg, Nawab Serajul Islam and the Nawab of Bogra.
The revocation of the partition coincided with the 
transfer of the capital to Delhi. Both moves were 
announced during the Delhi Darbar. The transfer caused 
great fears amongst the commercial community that the 
commercial importance of Bengal would be diminished.
This created a need to prevent the fear from degenerating 
into discontent by improving the standard of trade and
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commerce, opening up better waterway traffic, improving
port facilities, and so on. The understanding and
appreciation of the Government’s policies in connection 
with these matters by the Indian merchants was of prime
importance. To achieve this end, the administration
relied heavily on the National Chamber of Commerce
and the British Indian Association. The person who
acted as the representative of Indian interests in most
of the various committees called for such purposes was
Raja Reshee Case Law: Chairman of Bengal National Chamber
of Commerce, Secretary of the British Indian Association,
a premier landlord, an eminent dalpati. a renowned
educationalist, and a senior merchant.
The transfer of the viceregal seat to Delhi and 
the up grading of Bengal to a Governor's province involved 
many administrative changes. Some, such as the conversion 
of the executive head from Lieutenant Governor to a full 
Governor, could be carried out with equanimity without 
Indian advice and support; while others, like the re­
modelling of the Board of Revenue, had to be done with 
greater caution. In this and other such matters, the 
British Indian Association and the landholders associa­
tions were relied upon to help the Administration.
More than any of the above issues it was the War 
which caused the greatest anxiety, creating a need for 
extreme care and caution. Law and order in the city 
and the province had to be maintained. Unfortunately, at 
that very critical time, the police force had lost a 
good deal of prestige in the eyes of the public.
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Hardinge aspired to remedy the situation by creating 
an understanding between apparently irreconcilable 
forces. To effect this he called upon the Maharaja 
of Burdwan and his associates for help. The Maharaja 
appealed to the British Indian Association and other 
such societies to guide public opinion towards a 
sympathetic understanding of the difficulties faced 
by the police in Bengal. At the same time he advised 
the Government to carry out effective police reforms.
Their efforts in this matter proved successful.
With the outbreak of hostilities there also arose 
a great need to mobilise public opinion in support of 
the allies' cause. It was in this sphere that the nobles 
showed their real worth as intermediaries. Acting in 
concert, they encouraged the growth of public loyalty, 
raised funds and supplies for the war, encouraged en­
listing in the armed forces, helped create the Bengal 
Double Company, opened their homes to wounded and con­
valescing soldiers, exerted their influence to keep the 
prices of food and other essential goods under control, 
and offered their entire resources for the use of the 
Imperial Government.
The end of the War marked the beginning of a new 
phase in Indian History. The Nationalists were clamouring 
for a more dynamic gesture on the part of the British 
for the men and supplies contributed by the princes and 
people of India during the War. Bengal joined the rest 
of India in this demand. To a large extent the efforts
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of the nobles made it possible for the province to 
justify such a claim. This led to the inclusion of 
nobles and other eminent personalities of Bengal 
in the list of those who were being asked their opinion 
on the type of reform the country should be granted. 
Apparently very little consideration was paid by the 
Authorities in England to the views and recommendations 
expressed by the nobles.
With the rejection of their suggestions it 
became obvious to the nobles for the first time that 
there were distinct limits to their effectiveness as 
natural leaders of the people or intermediaries in 
public affairs. Doubtless they had proved very 
effective as such. As a bridge between the rulers and 
the ruled and in their capacity in representing Indian 
interests, they played a larger role than the nationalists 
of the time. But their aspirations were founded; on 
apparently false premises. They aimed at a federated 
empire with every unit having equal status without 
losing its individuality. They were misled by the 
Administration's apparent sincerity in its assurance 
that the task of the British in India was to function as 
trustees until she attained political maturity and 
could stand equally with the advanced units of the Empire.
The nobles were beguiled by such assurances that had 
been repeatedly made by many administrators. Even as 
early as 1833 Macaulay had worded this apparent aim by 
stating that when such a time arrived it would be the 
proudest day in English history. But the nobles failed
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to keep in mind that the public utterances of the 
desires of individual politicians - especially those 
ultimately responsible to alien interests - did not 
necessarily mean that they reflected the opinions of 
the policy makers• On examining the private corres­
pondence of some senior officials'^ regarding the 1912 
Round Table Conference we find that although they 
agreed that it was their duty to provide India with the 
best type of government, many of them denied that 
their objective was to allow India one day to speak on an 
equal level with Britain. It must always be kept in 
mind that Indian interests were subordinate to imperial 
interests they maintained. The correspondents emphasised 
that the representative from India must be the one who
would represent the Government of India rather than the
2
people of India. Thus it could be argued that the 
nobles had lacked the ability to anticipate reality 
and in the process provided a leadership which misled the 
people into a path of pitfalls: indeed the very thing 
they accused the nationalists of doing.
1. Memos of W.H. Buchan, H.T.Cullis, Y.Chirol,
E. Molony, W.S. Marris, Kerr, Round Table Conference: 
Meston, Vol.10, loose pages.
2. It is difficult to assess the sincerity behind such 
arguments . Keeping in mind that the officials
in India were nervous about the rising importance 
of the belligerent nationalists one may wonder 
whether they were using such arguments to convince 
the Liberal Government in London that they should 
not nominate a non-official to the Conference.
After all when one spoke of the people of India 
it usually meant the vocal intelligentsia. One 
is left with the query whether they would have 
taken the same stand if they were certain that such 
a person would not be chosen.
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There is considerable evidence to indicate that 
in the early years of the decade the nobles believed 
that the liberals in England - who had gained the 
ascendancy in parliamentary politics - were the inadver­
tent enemies of India since they unconsciously diverted 
Indian aspirations into harmful channels. But they could 
not overlook the fact that the destiny of India and their 
own position in the Indian political fabric was in the 
hands of the liberals. Thus the nobles desired the 
continuation of conservative principles and yet realised 
the necessity of adjusting to liberal doctrines. With 
that in mind they proceeded to project a liberal image 
of themselves without actually sacrificing their 
conservative aspirations. Even when the proposal to 
establish advisory councils - which would have given the 
large landholders a legislative position equivalent to 
those of the Peers in London - was rejected, their
disappointment was not voiced publicly. Eminent noble-
*
men such as the Nawab of Dacca"*" and the Maharaja of 
2Burdwan noted their regrets in private letters to
Curzon but never ventured to mobilise a concerted effort 
against the decision. On the contrary they quietly 
agreed to work along with the intelligetsia in the 
Legislative and Executive Councils. All that they aimed 
to do was to act with moderation as a counterpoise to 
excessive nationalist tendencies.
During the 1909 elections, the nobles came very 
close to becoming an effective counterpoise to the
1. Dacca to Curzon 24 Eeb. 1909, Letters:Curzon,Vol.427,
p.3.
2. Burdwan to Curzon 6 Jan. 1909, Ibid.Vol.426. p.82 .
nationalists. The nationalists had declared that they 
would boycott the elections with the hope that the 
legislative and Executive Councils would be devoid of 
any Indian representatives by their move. This would 
effectively humiliate the Administration. The nobles 
along with their fellow zamindars deprived the nationalist 
move of its full impact by disregarding the boycott call. 
Moreover Raja Kishori Lai Goswami accepted office as 
the Indian Executive Councillor without any pre-conditions
Although the nobles had gained an advantage in the
Council by their move, they were unable to retain it
for J.ong. Unlike the nationalist leaders their capacity
as parliamentary debaters was very limited. Throughout
the session their speeches and amendment motions were
of poor quality. Despite this limitation, they might
have matured as an effective force if they had closed
their ranks and concerted their voting strength into a
power block. But, in contrast to their willingness to
close ranks where the question of their status as a group
was concerned,^* in their parliamentary activities they
showed symptoms of disintegration. Doubtless it was the
effect of the degradation of the Peers in England by 
2
Asquith. This move on the part of the British liberals 
created a sense of panic in their ranks. They wondered
1. The Title Committee.
2. Since the liberal victory in 1906 the struggle 
with the Conservative-orientated Upper House 
became very pronounced. There was resentment 
that a hereditary body should have the veto over 
the elected representatives of the people. The 
question came to a head when the Lords rejected 
the Liberal Budget in 190.9. The Liberal Party 
made sure that such a possibility would never arise 
again by replacing the power of veto by the mere 
power of delay.
what would happen to them when the Lords in the ruling 
country itself could he coerced into submission and 
degraded below the commons. They realised that the 
landholders were on trial and got on the defensive.
They began to make desperate efforts to be bracketted 
with the liberal leaders with moderate views. Their 
reaction became apparent during the sitting of the 
Revision of Election Rules Committee. The nobles in 
the Committee not only conceedsd to the intelligentsia 
supremacy in the city, but they also opened their 
reserved constituencies to non-nobles. This move was 
in contradiction to their basic principle which was to 
retain patriarchal authority by remaining remote and 
cultivating exclusiveness.
Depsite their concessions in the Election Rules 
Committee, they managed to capture enough seats in the 
1912 Legislative Council to be in a position from which 
they could emerge as the decisive factor in the House. 
Their combined votes could tilt the divisions in favour 
or against any motion. This combination in the Chamber 
was essential for them since they did not stand a chance 
against the nationalist leaders as debaters. Most of them 
were untrained in such arts and all of them found it 
psychologically difficult to vie words with people they 
considered below their own ldignif ied* status. They were 
so handicapped by this fact that even relatively good 
orators such as Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury and the 
Maharaja of Burdwan could seldom be seen taking the floor 
in the Council. Such being the case the only way they 
could have made their prescence effectively felt was by
a combination of voting strength. Instead of working 
towards this end which could have nullified their 
shortcomings as legislative speakers, they exerted 
themselves to establish the principle of individuality 
and vigorously preached against the formation of party 
platforms. This impractical aim proved disastrous for 
them since they were outshone at every count in the 
Council Chamber. At last they had been forced out of 
their exclusive surroundings and placed on an equality 
with 'ordinary men'. In the circumstances they began 
to lose their mythological glamour in the eyes of the 
public and the electorate became aware of their glaring 
shortcomings. The effect of this was felt in the 1916 
elections. Many of the senior nobles were defeated and a 
younger group which showed potential vitality and ad­
vocated a different approach to issues were returned 
instead. This ended once and for all the possibility 
of the group combining into an effective power block in the 
legislative body of Bengal. »
Through their lack of insight into parliamentary 
affairs they failed to become an effective counter­
poise to the nationalist "radicals" in the House. But 
their efforts to become so were not restricted to the Council. 
The nationalist movement, inspired by the leaders of the 
intelligentsia in the Indian National Congress, was 
gathering increasing momentum and showed symptoms of 
deteriorating into full-scale violence and terrorism.
The nobles in concert took to the field to counteract 
this dangerous and unpleasant possibility. At its in­
ception the nobles of Bengal hailed the formation of 
the Congress and participated in its activities with
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unrestrained enthusiasm. But in time when it became 
obvious to them that various factions in the party were 
inspiring ultra-Hindu tendencies and violence, the nobles 
withdrew their support. On the contrary they exerted 
themselves to contain its growing influence. They 
mobilised public opinion'against the terrorists via the 
political associations in their control, the press and 
platforms they could influence, the schools and colleges 
they patronised, the caste bodies that they supervised, 
and every aspect of socio-economic activities that was 
in their sphere of influence. Their efforts were doubt­
less effective since their appeal could be backed with 
positive acts. A great deal of the police activities 
in the mufassil were in their charge. Moreover they 
could coerce disruptive elements by their own lathials.
The Nawab of Dacca claimed that he could mobilise more 
than 10,000 men single handed. They could also counter­
act the growth of discontent caused by rising prices by 
providing essentials from their storehouses and financial 
help from their suspense accounts. Their subsidised 
educational institutions and medical facilities could 
further relieve a certain amount of economic pressure. 
Furthermore, their encouragement of swadeshi enterprises, 
in contrast to the swadeshi slogans of some nationalists, 
created employment opportunities. Finally, their free 
dormitories and kitchens provided much-needed shelter 
for the young during the transition period between student 
life and the securing of suitable employment.
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Simultaneously, the nawabs and their associates 
took up the task of weaning the Muslims from the 
possibility of succumbing to the influence of the Con­
gress. They were conscious of the fact that when the 
nationalist leaders of Calcutta toured the mufassil they 
left an emotionally charged atmosphere of discontent in 
their wake. As a counter measure, the Moslem league 
•was initiated in the Nawab of Dacca's residence. Even 
when the League appeared to have fallen under the domination 
of the Congress after the death of the Nawab of Dacca, 
his associates continued to exert themselves under the 
lead of Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhury and succeeded 
in retaining the separate identity of the Muslim community 
in Bengal.
Despite all their immediate effectiveness, the 
analysis of their efforts, functions and role leaves one 
with the same doubt. One cannot help but question 
whether they were wise in doing what they did. -One is 
left with the disturbing query whether they had not 
lacked the necessary foresight which makes a leadership 
worthy of credit. Their inability to see further into 
the realities of alien colonisation was a glaring 
failure. Thus, although the institution may have provided 
socio-economic benefits and their personal efforts may 
have prevented the growth of violence leading to a 
bloody end of the Empire, because of their basic short­
coming one is left with the nagging feeling that they failed 
in their responsibility to the people over whom they held 
traditional authority.
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Summing up, we find that the nobility had 
changed in character. The noblemen's behavioural 
pattern, privileges and prerogatives were such as to 
create the impression that they had not changed.
Despite this, there is little doubt that the noblemen 
of Bengal formed a status group. Their faces, though 
they differed in conformation, echoed each other in 
expression. Thus over the years the nobles had changed 
from a political class to a status group.
Their overemphasis upon their traditional functions 
encouraged them to continue in the role of annadata 
established by their predecessors as appropriate to the 
malik or karta. This function of the nobles provided 
numerous social benefits which proved very useful in a 
society that did not live in a welfare state. Although 
these socio-economic roles were based on traditional 
functions, they too had undergone considerable change.
The kha.ina they received was no longer entirely their 
own but had to be shared with nearly the entire rural 
bhadralok community of Bengal. They had become social 
safety valves. However, in the social services they 
maintained, although the pattern remained similar to 
their forebears they were flexible enough to adapt them 
to modern needs like electrification, model farms, cooper­
ative societies, and agro-industrial exhibitions.
These socio-economic links that emerged from the 
continuance of such traditional roles provided the nobles 
with channels of communication by which they could be 
in touch with the general public. Using these channels, 
the nobles were able to function effectively in their new
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political role of intermediaries in public affairs 
and also contain the spread of terrorism and ultra- 
Hinduism to a large extent. In short their political 
function had undergone a complete change from the 
role of the governing class to that of intermediaries 
and counter-poise to extreme nationalism. As a side 
effeat of it the Muslim nawabs inspired and gave shape 
to the separate Muslim identity in the province. This 
the nawabs managed to preserve despite the small b]£t 
powerful Muslim intelligentsia's inclination to join 
hands with the Hindu dominated Congress movement. But 
for the efforts of the nawabs East Pakistan or Bangla­
desh may have never come into existence.
Although the status group appeared to be a dynamic 
indigenous institution, in reality it contained some 
inherent qualities which led to its ultimate failure.
The most glaring defect was the fact that it was not a 
real nobility and thus lacked any concrete foundation in 
law. No matter how hard they tried to suggest otherwise, 
the fact remained that in the eyes of the law they were 
nothing more than mere revenue agents of the Government. 
This inherent weakness prevented the group from becoming 
as powerful as the members may have wished. They came 
very close to acquiring a political status with the pro­
posal for advisory councils in the provinces and in the 
centre with the large landholders as the nuclei. They 
tried once more with the forthcoming Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms by suggesting to the Authorities that some of them 
should be nominated to the House of Lords in London. But 
both attempts proved futile.
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Moreover, since the status group was built 
on hereditary principles, it was unable to overcome 
this weakness by providing sin unbroken chain of meri­
torious men capable of leadership in their localities: 
a factor so essential for them since they were engaged 
in a struggle for political leadership with the rising 
intelligentsia. Authority being passed from father to 
son with no respect for competency prevented a healthy 
circulation of elites. The consequences justified 
Pareto's argument that aristocracies do not decline only 
in numbers but decay also in quality, in the sense that 
they lose their vigour and that there is a decline in the
proportions of the 'residues'^which enabled them to win
2
their power and hold it. This weakness caused by the 
lack of circulation barring any possibility of quick 
replacement came to pronounced focus during the decade 
under review. Effective noblemen such as the Nawab of 
Dacca, the Raja of Sovabazar, the Maharaja of Nashipur, 
the Nawab of Bogra, and Nawab Abdul Jubbar died and left
1. Pareto's concept of residue: He distinguishes between
the rational and noh-rational actions of individuals 
in social life. Rational actions are those directed 
to attainable ends and employing means which are 
appropriate to the attainment of the ends. Irrational 
actions are those directed to any ends, or'directed 
to unattainable ends, or using means which cannot 
attain the end. The forces or 'residues' behind 
rational action are the cunning, force, sociability, 
activity and integrity of individuals. When the 
proportion of these 'residues' decline the quality 
of the aristocracy degenerates. - V.PARETO: Sociological 
Writings, pp. 38-41, 54-55.
2 . Ibid. p.50
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a vacuum which could not easily be filled by their 
successors. Under such conditions the successors 
were more often than not too young and inexperienced.
With such a fundamental shortcoming the group was unable 
to maintain its superiority when the emphasis of 
political activities shifted from depersonalised in­
fluence to the legally constituted Councils requiring 
individual merit and positive ability. They proved in­
capable of contesting in this field. To salvage their 
deteriorating situation they desperately tried to merge 
with the moderate nationalists. It is significant that 
the Maharaja of Burdwan ignored family traditions and, 
unlike his eldest son who was educated at home, sent his 
younger son to Harrow for formal education. It was also 
noticeable that the Maharaja of Susang while building a 
new 'palace' at his estate headquarter left out the darbar 
hall from its construction plan.^ Moreover, eminent 
noblemen such as the Maharaja of Burdwan, the Raja of
A
Santosh, and the Maharaja of Dighapatia began to attend
2
conferences convened by moderate Congressmen. In their 
desperate effort to project a liberal facade they acti­
vated a process which gradually eroded the very plinth 
on which their basic strength was built: a separate 
identity and depersonalised influence. With the emergence 
of leaders of national standing like Gandhi and Jinnah the 
nobles receded to the background forever.
1. N.C.Sinha: Changing Times, pp. 4,6
2. India Review, no.xxi 1920, p.24
439
Al-PERDIX I 
RAJAS ARP NAWABS. (1911-1919)
RATIVL PRINCES. (HEREDITARY)
Maharaja Bahadur Raj Rajendra Rarayan of Cooch Behar. 
Maharaja Bahadur Jitendra Rarayan of Cooch Behar.
Maharaja Barindro Kishore Deb Barman of Tripura.
ROBLEMER. (HEREDITARY)
Rawab Bahadur Wasaf Ali Mirza of Murshidabad.
Rawab Bahadur Salimulla Khan of Dacca.
Rawab Bahadur Habibullah Khan of Dacca.
Maharajadhiraj Bahadur Bijay Chand Mahtab of Burdwan. 
Maharaja Xurnud Chandra Singh of Susang.
Maharaja Ranajit Sinha of Rashipur.
Raja Bahadur Bhupenara Narayan Sinha of Rashipur.
Maharaja Bahadur Prodyot Coomar Tagore.
TRIBAL CHIRPS. (HEREDITARY)
Chakma Raja Bhuban Mohan Rai.
Mong Raja Riphiru Sain.
NOBLEHSB- TERRITORIAL. (OBSTRUCTAD HERITAGE)
Rawab Abdus Sobhan Chaudhuri of Bogra.
Rawab Syed Rawab Ali Chaudhury of Dhanbaria.
Maharaja Bahadur Mahendra Chandra Randi of Kassimbazar. 
Maharaja Bahadur G-irija Rath Roy of Dinajpur'.
Maharaja Bahadur Kshaunis Chandra Ray of Radia.
Maharaja Bahadur Pramada Rath Rai of Dighapatia.
Maharaja Ram Ranjan Chakravarti of Hetampur.
Maharaja Jagadindra Rath Roy of Rator.
Raja Bahadur ^ashi Ranta Acharjya Chauahuri of Muktagacha.
Raja Bahadur Jagat Kishore Roy of Mymensingh. 
Raja Bahadur Benaya Krishna Deb of Sovabazar. 
Raja Bahadur Kristendra Rai of Bolihar.
Raja Bijay Singh Dudhoria of Azamgunj.
Raja Janaki Ballabh Sen of Bimli,
Raja Satyaniranjan Chakravarti of Hetampur. 
Raja G-opal Lai Ray of Tajhat.
Raja Berindra Chandra Singh of Paikpara.
Raja Rao Jogendra Rarayan Ray of Lalgola.
Raja Baikuntha Rath Be of Balasore.
Raja Sharat Chandra Rai Chaudhuri of Chanchal. 
Raja Sati Prosad Gogra of Mahisadal.
Raja Shasi Shekhareshwar Rai of Tahirpur.
Raja Kanmatha Roy Chaudhury of Santosh.
Raja Moniloll Singh Roy of Chakdighi.
Raja Srinath Rai of Bhagyakul.
Raja Rarendra Lai Khan of Rarajole.
Raja Pramada Bhusan Deb Rai of Haldunga.
Raja Mahendra Ranjan Roy Chaudhuri of Kakina.
NOBLEMEN- PERSONAL. (OBSTRUCTED HERITAGE) 
Rawab Syed Mohammad Khan.
Rawab Khwaja Mohammad Yusuf Eosain.
Rawab byea bhamsul Huda.
Rawab Serajul Islam.
Rawab Abdul Jabbar.
Rawab Mohammad Yusuf.
Rawab Badruddin Haidar Khan.
Rawab A.P.i'i.Abdur Rahman.
Rawab V/ala Qadr Mirza.
Rawab Mohamed Ali Rawab Chaudhury.
Rawab syed Jahandar nirza.
Rawab Sujat Ali Leg.
Rawab Syed Moazzin Hossain.
Raja Jogendra Kishore Roy.
Raja Bhuban Mohan Roy.
Raja Kishori Lai Goswami.
Raja Govind Lai Rai.
Raja Jyot Kumar Mekerjee.
Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee;
Raja Kristo Las Law.
Raja Reshee Case Law.
Raja Saurindra Mohan Tagore.
Raja Shib Chandra Banerji.
Raja G-opendra Krishna Deb.
Raja Dinendra Rarayan Roy.
Raja Bahadur Pramatha Bhusan Deb. 
Raja Bahadur Ban Bihari Kapur. 
Raja Upendranarayan Mitra Roy. 
Raja Shew Bux Bogla.
Raja Sreenath Roy.
Raja Surja Kanta Guha Ray.
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APPBNDIX III,
OPFICD BBAiiuHS: POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS
I .BRITISH IIIDIAK ASSOCIATlJlT.
Presidents: Maharaja of Darbhanga 1910-11
Maharaja of Burdwan 1911-19 
Maharaja Tagore 1919-22
Vice-Presidents: Raja Peary Mohan Mukerjee 1910-11,
1912-13
Maharaja of Dinajpur 1911-20
Maharaja of Rashipur 1913-14, 1916-17
Maharaja of G-idhour 1911-12
\ Maharaja of Kassimbazar 1910-11, 1912-1
1914-15, 1916-1 
1918-19
Raja Gopendra Krishna Deb' 1911-12
Raja Kishori Lai Goswami 1914-15,
1917-16
Raja Kristo Das Law 1910-11
Maharaja of Susang 1912-13
Maharaja Tagore 1914-15", 1918-19
Raja of Azamgunj 1915-16
Kumar Arun Chandra of Paikpara 1917-16
Raja of Paikpara 1918-19
Maharaja of Hadia 1919-20
Raja of Dighapatia 1919—20
Raja of Santosh 1919—20
Rai Bahadur Manmatha Lath Mitter 1913-1
Sir Hariram Goenka 1910-11, 1918-19
Rai Bahadur Dwarka Math Chakravarty
1913-14
Babu Ganesh Chandre Chandra 1912-13 
Babu Daiuodar Bas Burnian 1914-15
445
Rai Bahadur Lalit Mohan Singh Roy 1215-16 
Babu Surendra hath Roy 1915-16 
Rai Bahadur Manilal Nahar 1916-17 
Sir B.C.Mitter 1916-17
j
Rai Bahadur Xiran Chandra Roy 1917 - 18 
Secretaries: Maharaja Tagore 1899-1912
Raja Reshee Case Law 1912-24 
Treasurers: Babu Charu Chandra Mullick 1911-16
Babu Atal Kumar Sen 1916-28
II.INDIAN ASSOCIATION.
Presidents: Br.Rash Behari Ghose 1909-12
Babu Ambika ChRran Mazumdar 1913-16 
Babu Baikuntha hath Sen 1917-20 
Vice-Presidents: far.R.D.Mehta 1913
Rai Yatindra hath Chaudhuri 1906-17 
Babu Debenara Chandra Ghose 1907-13 
Mr.A.Chaudhuri 1908-11 
Lt.Col.U.N.Mukherjee 1908-13 
Babu Motila'l Ghose 1912-13, 1915-18 
Babu Baikuntha hath Sen 1914-16 
Babu Byomkesh Chakravarti 1914-15, 1917 
Babu Bhupenaranath Basu 1914-17 
far.a .Rasul 1916-17 
Babu L.P.Sarbadhikari 1918-27 
Hr.B.C.Hitter 1918-28 
Babu Heramba Chandra Maitra 1918-58 
Babu Krishna Kumar Mitra 1918-20 
Dr.Nilratan Sircar 1911-24 
Secretaries: Surendra hath Sanerjea 1885-2u
Asst.Secretaries: hr.P.h.Banerjea 1906-13
hr.h.C. en Gupta 1914-15
Honv.Treasurers:
Sachindra Prasad Basu 1914-15, 1918-55
If.C.Roy 1915, 1917-26
Bijoy Krishna Basu 1916-17
Jitendra Lai Banerjee 1916
D.If.Basu 1918-19
B.C.Ghose 1918-23
Satish Ch. Chatterjee 1919
Basanta Kumar Bose 1914-17
Kumar Arun Chandra Sinha 1918
Jatindra hath Basu 1919-28
Lists sunnlied By Sec.B.I.A.
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A-l'-cjL^DIX IV.
Tim PRim.'CnlOD.'
I .LADDBOLDDRS. (Direct Voting)
Pranchise for the four zamindari seats= approx.500 
Qualifications:
1.Rajas and nawabs upwards and inclusive.
2.Revenue not less than Rs.10,000 
Road cess not less than Rs.1,500
3.Revenue not less than Rs.5,000 
Road cess not less than Rs.1,250
B.A.P.:1913
II.UNIVDRSIIY OP CALCUTTA. (Direct Voting)
Pranchise for one university seat= 20 elected
121 nominated 
141
Qualifications:
1.10 elected by 583 Registered Graduates. (Ph.D. , P.A. , P..-.
of 10 years.
2.10 elected by 140 Faculties.
3.77 nominated ordinary. *
4.10 nominated ex-officio.
5.34 nominated honourary.
Burdwan, Presidency
Rajshahi, Dacca, 
Chittagong (alternate 
elections)
B.A.P.: 1 91 7
III.CORPORATION OP CALCUTTA. (Direct Voting)
Pranchise for two Corporation seats= 35 elected
11 nominated 
50
Qualifications:
1.25 elected by 38,412 ward electors.
2. 4 elected by 206 members of Bengal Chamber of Commerce
3. 4 elected by 82 members of Cal.Trades Association
4. 2 elected by 16 Port Commissioners
5.15 nominated for specialised knowledge
(38,412 Ward Hectors: Over 21 years; resides or pays
municipal rates or taxes under Cal.Kun.Act and is regis­
tered in Assessment Book as owner and occupier of land 
or building in Cal. valued for assessment purposes for 
not less than Rs.150 per annum; owner of land or building 
so valued not less than Rs.300; occupier building so 
valued not less than Rs.300; licence holder under same 
act cost not less than Rs.25 for election year; paid 
preceeding election year Rs.24 rates or taxes under same 
act; ward elector may also be a company, corporation, 
or H.U.P./ 16 Port Commissioners: 1 chairman, 1 vice 
chairman, 5 nominee (ali 7 nominated by Govt.), 6 
elected by Bengal Chamber, 1 elected by Cal.Trades Asso.,
1 elected by Commissioners of Cal., 1 elected by Indian 
firms.) B.A.P.;1917
IV.DISTRICT ADD LOCAL BOARDS. (Indirect Voting)
Pranchise for five D.& L.Boards seats- 548 elected
ill nominated 
962
Qualifications:
1.139 elected by 225 members D.B. & 92701 *L.-B. Burdwan
2.187 elected by 247 members D.B. & 153281 L.B. Presidency
3.124 elected by 215 members D.B. <1 157072 L.B. Dacca
4. 15 elected by 47 members D.B. Chittagong
5. 63 elected by 117 members D.B. & 32859 L.B. Rajshahi
6.414 nominated by Govt.
(Half D.B. members elected by L.Bs./ L.B.Electors: 21 year 
male; a member of Union Committee; paid Re.1 road cess and 
possessed Rs.24o annual income/ Union Committee Electors:
21 year males who paid Re.1 road cess)
B.A.P.:1917
V,MUNICIPALITIES. (Indirect Voting)
Franchise for five municipalities seats= 840 elected
496 nominated 
1309
Qualifications:
1.238 elected by 49,923 Burdwan 
2.311 elected by 57,876 Presidency 
3.114 elected by 23,319 Dacca 
4.131 elected by 15,659 Rajshahi
5. 46 elected by 10,006 Chittagong (alternate elections 
(Electors: 21 year male; residence of 12 months who 
paid minimum aggregate of Rs.l-J- for one or more of tax: 
on persons, on houses, on carriages and horses, water 
rate, lighting rate, latrine tax; paid fees for cart 
registration; paid income tax; paid Rs.20 rent for 
house on which house tax has been imposed; graduates; 
passed 1st.Arts or I.A. or I.Sc. exams, final commercial 
class exams, held diploma from Govt.vernacular medical 
school; pleaders, muktears, revenue agents).
B.A.P.:1917
VI.MUSLIMS. (Direct Voting)
Franchise for five Muslim seats.
Qualifications:
Members of Legislative Councils; titles from Govt.;
Fellow of Cal.Univ.; own entire or share in land which 
paid revenue of Rs.750; paid Rs.187y of road and public 
works cess; paid income tax preceeding election year 
on Rs.6,000;received pension as gazetted or commissi::no-' 
officer; honourary magistrate; marriage registrar; a 
barrister, and attorney, a vakil, a pleader, a medical 
man, an engineer, a graduate of 10 year standing; teacher 
of Govt, institution or affiliated to University.
B.a .P.:1911 u 1:13
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